PRESUPPOSITIONAL

APOLOGETICS

PRESUPPOSITIONAL

APOLOGETICS

Stated and Defended

GREG L. BAHNSEN

Edited by Joel McDurmon

AMERICAN VISION PRESS

POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

&

COVENANT M E D I A PRESS

NACOGDOCHES, TEXAS

P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L A P O L O G E T I C S

Stated and Defended

GREG L. BAHNSEN

Edited by Joel McDurmon

Copyright © 2008 The American Vision, Inc

Published jointly with Covenant Media Press

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C O N T E N T S

Editor's Preface vii

PART ONE:

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETCS

POSITIVELY STATED

1 Introduction; God In the Dock? 3

2 The Christian Mind and Method 25

3 Neutrality and Autonomy Relinquished 77

PART TWO:

C O N S I S T E N C Y APPLIED: CRITIQUES OF

INCOMPLETE PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

4 Gordon Clark 137

5 Edward J. Carnell 197

6 Francis Schaeffer 241

7 T h e Critical Quintessence 261

APPENDIX 1:

The Necessity of Revelational Epistemology 269

APPENDIX 2:

The Pragmatist's Rejoinder and the Christian Alternative 279

APPENDIX 3:

The Possibility of Argument 287

Subject and Person Index 291

EDITOR'S PREFACE

B Y J O E L M C D U R M O N

Dr. Greg L. Bahnsen (1948-1995) provided perhaps the

clearest, most faithful, and most powerful advancement

of Cornelius Van Til's presuppositional apologetics of

anyone. This statement holds true both for Bahnsen's written schol-

arly work as well as his practical applications in both formal and

informal debates and exchanges. Those knowledgeable of Van Til's

"Copernican Revolution" in Christian apologetical method will un-

derstand the enormity of this compliment to Greg Bahnsen. Those

not formerly introduced to Van Til or Bahnsen will understand shortly

after beginning this volume—for this book presents the most clear,

systematic, and rigorous statement and defense of Van Tillian presup-

positional apologetics written to date.

This volume presents the systematic counterpart to Bahnsen's

earlier publication, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis.1

While that previous work included a broad and topical overview

and explanation of Van Til's contribution—which, though highly or-

ganized according to an outline, and much more accessible than

Van Til's own massive corpus of writing, still does not fully execute

the task of a systematic work—this volume gets closer to an apolo-

1. (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1998).

PREFACE

getical version of "systematic theology," as opposed to, say, "biblical

theology." Both approaches provide vital understanding, and now

we have both.

As Morton Smith explains in his Systematic Theology, the task

of systematic theology involves beginning with revelation, con-

structing the system, demonstrating and defending the truly biblical

nature of the system, and lastly, examining critically all that has

gone before.2 If we can understand Bahnsen's former Analysis as

outlining a general system, we can receive this text as completing

the rest of the systematic task. In this volume you will find the

biblical and theoretical muscle behind the explanations given in

the previous effort, the faithful defense, and the trenchant critical

examination of alternative works and methods. Thus this work

naturally compliments and expands the earlier Analysis (although,

as you will see, Bahnsen actually wrote this later work years prior

to the earlier published book).

What Was Lost Now Is Found

Besides the importance, rigor, and quality of this work, the book also

has an amazing story behind it. Bahnsen originally began this work

only to fill two chapters in a collaborative effort, The Foundations

of Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, edited by

Gary North in 1976.3 Bahnsen—as by all accounts he was wont to

do—continued adding and revising the work. It outgrew the scope

useful for the book, with the side effect of beginning to delay the

publication. The publisher gave Greg an ultimatum: either submit

his two articles within two weeks, or he would use another author

(who had already submitted!) for the chapters. Greg complied, but at

the necessary expense of setting aside the much lengthier and more

detailed work he had already begun. Within two weeks Bahnsen

supplied almost a hundred pages that became chapters 10 and 11—

still necessary reading today!—in North's phenomenal display of Van

Til's influence and importance.

2. See Morton H. Smith, Systematic Theology, 2 vols. (Greenville, SC: Green-

ville Seminary Press, 1994), 1:22-24.

3. (Vallecito, CA: Ross House Boob, 1976).

viii

PREFACE

Meanwhile, Bahnsen periodically returned to the "chapters" he

originally began, which now approached a self-sustaining treatise.

Over time he continued adding and revising, and at some point had

the work typeset as a preliminary step for publication. When he re-

ceived the "galley proofs" (20"-long typeset pages used for author's

review and editing), Greg continued revising towards what clearly

promised to be his magnum opus—a work which contained a clear

and thorough positive statement of the presuppositional method as

well as a comparison of that method against other allegedly "presup-

positional" systems and a defense against other non-presuppositional

critics and rivals.

At this point, the most unexpected—and unfortunate—turn of

events occurred. For some reason, unknown to everyone close to

Bahnsen, the galleys were lost. Lost, as in disappeared. I can only

imagine, in view of Bahnsen's voluminous and varied output during

this time (he taught seminary until 1979, pastored a church and

Christian school after that, wrote articles and lessons for various

media, generated hundreds of audio tapes, and regularly typed

out twenty-page, single-spaced letters to critics and inquirers alike,

among other things, plus a draining embroilment in controversy

at Reformed Theological Seminary), that th e magnum opus which

took so much valuable time, yet had little direct financial support,

gave way to his various other duties necessary to pay the bills.

Whatever happened (and my speculation may not come even re-

motely close), the galleys vanished into the mists of a life in transi-

tion and remained lost until Bahnsen's untimely passing in 1995.

Only by the amazing grace of God did that which was lost

get found. After Bahnsen's death—about sixteen years after his

masterpiece-in-progress disappeared—the effort of cleaning out

his offices solved the great mystery. The long-lost galleys and atten-

dant materials—which Greg had apparently sealed in an envelope

and mailed to his California office from Jackson, MS—had fallen

behind one of thirty filing cabinets bulging with Bahnsen's written,

received, and clipped materials. Dusting off the cobwebs and in-

specting the envelope, Covenant Media Foundation director Randy

Booth conferred with Bahnsen's mother, who helped discern the

date of the package from the old address written on it. Having long-

since heard rumors that Bahnsen had begun this work around the

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PREFACE

time she mentioned, Randy put two and two together to get four

hundred—over four hundred pages that is, once we would convert

the galleys into standard pages.

Having the physical evidence that the publication began, Randy

called the original publisher to inquire about the printing plates (es-

sential for continuing the process!). Unfortunately, the original printer

had long since destroyed them. Bahnsen had delayed so long, and

further circumstances had extenuated that delay, the printer could no

longer wait—he could not keep the valuable resources and materials

tied up with an old lagging project when other orders demanded

them. So the old plates no longer existed. In the absence of vital

resources, the project remained filed away.

Less than a year ago the project arose as a subject of interest

at American Vision. Hearing that Covenant Media had something

of a "manuscript" unpublished, we began to talk. Upon receiving

the galleys for our review, we realized that even though the printer

destroyed the original plates, the advance of technology made it pos-

sible to convert the text to a digital format. After a quick scanning

and conversion effort, I personally spent half of a week pouring over

the text correcting scanning errors and other minor problems. Then

I began the task of incorporating Bahnsen's hand-written edits into

the text from the scanned proofs—revising words, deleting sections,

and inserting "new" materials he had prepared in manuscript. After

this tedious work, we finally got the text into a modern typesetting

program and began final editing.

I am so thankful and proud merely to be included in resurrecting

this impressive work. Why our Lord delayed it and preserved it until

now for publication He alone knows; but what was lost for thirty

years, now is found. To help bring the clearest, most rigorous state-

ment and defense of presuppositional apologetics—from perhaps

Van Til's most gifted disciple—brings American Vision and Covenant

Media Foundation a great joy and sense of fulfillment.

About the Contents

To begin a few brief explanatory notes about this edition of Bahn-

sen's opus I should note firstly that we have not included the entire

contents in this first volume. We have good reasons for this. Bahnsen

PREFACE

appears to have planned the work, as earlier intimated, in three parts:

1) a positive statement, both biblical and philosophical, of the pre-

suppositional method; 2) a critique of three other apologists who use

the term "presuppositional," in which Bahnsen shows their methods

to fall short of the biblical presuppositional standard set by Van Til;

and finally, 3) a critique of fully non-presuppositional proponents.

Unfortunately, due to his self-imposed high standard of rigor and

detail (and life circumstances), Bahnsen never completed the third

section. Despite covering over two hundred manuscript pages, he

only appears to have completed the first point in his outline for Part

3—covering three apologists under the heading "Positivists." He left

no further information for his outline.

As a result, this edition contains only the first two (completed)

parts, leaving the third part for future editing and publication. We

hope to involve other authors from the Van Til-Bahnsen tradition to

generate and complete an outline which will encompass more of

the major modern apologetical methods and authors and publish

such in conjunction with Bahnsen's existing material. The resulting

second volume would complete Bahnsen's work in a compilation

meaningful for both its content and legacy.

Of the two parts that fill this volume, the reader will see Bahnsen

at his most precise, exacting, and faithful in explaining and applying

apologetical methodology. Part 1 explains the method and reasons

for the method in an in-depth fashion, exegeting vital biblical pas-

sages throughout Chapter 2, and analyzing relevant philosophical

and ethical ideas in Chapter 3. This section we have titled, "Presup-

positional Apologetics Positively Stated," as this appears to approxi-

mate Bahnsen's intention.

Part 2 examines three well-known apologists who often used

the term, and whom many people identified as "presuppositional."

Bahnsen contrasts them against the standard of Van Til's presuppo-

sitional method and shows the many ways and instances in which

they—despite all of their many positive contributions and aspects—

depart from a thoroughly biblical presuppositional pattern. The names

of Gordon Clark, Edward Carnell, and especially Francis Schaeffer,

all find ready acknowledgement today for the most part. In critiquing

such giants, Bahnsen shows clear awareness that the debate involved

takes place between brothers in the faith—that this debate is an in-

xi

PREFACE

tramural debate. Nevertheless, Bahnsen thoroughly and boldly criti-

cizes their departures from biblical methodology and calls readers to

recognize and implement a more consistent approach.

The analysis of Schaeffer, in particular, carries great importance

here. Among the three, Schaeffer by far had the widest influence,

and yet his apologetic has probably endured the least scrutinizing.

With the exception of a paper and a letter by Van Til—little-known

outside of a few specialists—Schaeffer has received almost no cri-

tique from a thoroughly presuppositional perspective. This book pro-

vides a needed silence-breaking—and some may conclude ground-

breaking—assessment.

During his last wave of editing, Bahnsen removed a few substan-

tial sections from the text. Whether he intended to exclude them per-

manently or move them to a different place in the work is not clear.

Judging the content of these excisions to have some significance, and

in the interest of the greater cause of apologetical learning, I have in

determined to include them in this work. The reader will find these

in Appendixes 1 thru 3. Keep in mind that Bahnsen may not have

desired them to remain in his final edition.

One point of interest comes in the anticipated reaction from

some followers of Gordon Clark. Since Bahnsen treated Clark first in

the series, that critique appears as the most rigorous, most detailed,

longest, and possibly (to some readers) the most merciless of the

three. In reality, and as Bahnsen mentions, the three critiques piggy-

back on one another so that the author does not repeat himself in

dealing with the same issues multiple times. What he explicates at

length when dealing with Clark applies also to the same ideas in the

others as well, and thus the analyses balance in actuality.

Fans of Clark will remember that Van Til—Bahnsen's mentor—

entangled with Dr. Clark in at least one major (and heated) intel-

lectual disagreement, and thus may encounter the temptation to see

Bahnsen's detailed critique as a settling of old scores. I do not believe

this enters the picture at all here. Considering the amount of criticism

that Clark encountered in his lifetime—just review the work which

Bahnsen references often, The Philosophy of Cordon H. Clark,4 and

see Clark's interaction with many scholars from various angles—I

4. Ronald H. Nash, ed. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1968).

xii

PREFACE

suspect Bahnsen simply wished to provide a definitive critique from

his presuppositional viewpoint, which former works appeared to him

not to include. With this in mind, however, it is a shame that the fore-

most exponent of Dr. Clark's thought, John Robbins, passed away in

August, 2008, and thus will not be able to interact with this critique.

It might have been helpful to hear his comments.

Nevertheless, for those who succumb to popular images that

some promote about Bahnsen, I wish to offer the next paragraphs.

Due to his rigorous, machine-like precision in debate, and his relent-

less pursuit of accuracy in scholarship, some people have painted

Bahnsen with the undue image of a merciless critic more bent on

tearing down opponents than having a heart for ministry. Perhaps he

did both, but the following will help dispel the charge of heartless-

ness as it shows the importance of Reformed theology, the reliance

on the Holy Spirit, and the care for subtle rewording or editing with

which Greg operated.

The Editorial Window

Entering the editing process at this stage provides some added bene-

fits to those interested in the personality and character of the author.

The perspective of the editor who gets to see the author's mind

and heart at work in revising his own words and ideas compares,

analogously at least, to that of a pastor hearing private confession.

He shares in keen and touching insights that others do not, presides

over personal decisions that others do not, and he sees a side of

the author that many readers may never know (and would almost

certainly not know based on popular lore). The editor coming to a

work already self-edited by the author, similarly watches that author

reassess, correct, improve himself where others do not. Where these

little "confessions" are favorable (and Bahnsen's almost always are),

sharing them publically, especially posthumously, can only inspire

and encourage other apologists and scholars. Bahnsen would have

certainly approved of such openness, especially towards furthering

the quality of Christian scholarship.

The process of self-editing requires a tremendous amount of hu-

mility, as well as a knowledge sensitive of the intended audience. 1

believe Greg illustrates both in some of the following changes.

xiii

PREFACE

A first example involves a paragraph which he removed com-

pletely from Chapter 3, Article 7. It reads,

Any argument between an intelligent, self-conscious unbe-

liever and an intelligent, self-conscious Christian must even-

tually reduce to the appeal of ultimate, but diverse, presup-

positions. A critical analysis of their respective language and

logic would strip their arguments bare and reveal this fact. But

the apologetic appeal will not always end in a deadlocked

antithesis between the non-Christian and Christian. The Holy

Spirit does grant the ability for the unbeliever to repent and

believe in Jesus Christ, All that the Father has given to the Son

will definitely come to Him (John 6:37).

Exactly why Bahnsen wanted this removed I cannot tell. It does seem

to introduce too much of a dogmatically theological position into his

"philosophical reflections" chapter, and perhaps he wished to avoid

the risk of such a criticism, as insignificant as such a risk might be.

The passage does show, however, how closely the Van Til-Bahnsen

apologetic involves Reformed theology, the work of the Holy Spirit in

apologetics, and a belief in predestination. This same focus echoes in

another passage Bahnsen excised later from the same article:

We do not present Christianity as a "hypothesis" to be veri-

fied, and we are repulsed by the idea of presenting men with

a "probability" to worship. Our apologetic must presuppose

the authority and truth of Christ's Word in Scripture, casting

down all reasoning that exalts itself against God. We must use

the tools supplied by the Holy Spirit, not the devices of sin. We

must seriously recognize that the sinner's problem in rejecting

the Bible is ethical, not intellectual. Only regeneration can bring

a man to belief, and apologetic argument must never presume

to preempt or in any way take the place of regeneration.

I would have liked to have seen Bahnsen deal more with the relation-

ship between apologetics and regeneration, or between apologetics

and evangelism, within this work.5 Nevertheless, the inclusion of this

5. As he did, for example, in his article, "Apologetics and Evangelism,"

xiv

PREFACE

relationship stands out here, and the reliance on the Holy Spirit rather

than personal debating ability highlights Bahnsen's presuppositional

method. I also believe that the obvious Calvinism of the method

presents a big obstacle to many of those who oppose it, but that

matter belongs to another discussion.6

While many early on painted Bahnsen with a reputation as a

cold logician cutting through opponents' arguments with the razor

of Reformed dogma, this portrayal does not correlate with the self-

corrections evident in this project. The process of editing this work

finds him correcting his early draft in order to curb and soften some

claims that would have come across too harshly. For example, he

had originally written in Chapter 3, Article 7, "Since Scripture speaks

of God's unmistakable existence as absolutely certain and known to

all men, it would be a denial of biblical faith to suppose His probable

existence or to work toward proving Him to exist as such. Scripture

does not present, nor do we worship, a probability." Upon review,

however, he realized that the phrase "a denial of biblical faith" states

the case too strongly, and thus he revised it to read "a departure from

truth." Bahnsen certainly did not wish to argue for the apostasy of

his intramural opponents (he in fact considered those apologists who

opposed his method as yet part of a "united defense of the faith," as

he writes in the last paragraph of Chapter 1), but rather he intended

to convey that they simply interpreted the Bible incorrectly. To catch

such a comment and to revise it in one's own writing displays no

small amount of sensitivity and willing humility.

Bahnsen's excising of the following sentences from the same

section reveals the same heart a work:

The very question of whether God might exist or Scripture

might be true is tantamount to a denial of what Scripture says

about God's inescapably clear and authoritative revelation.

To attempt an apologetic that takes an (allegedly) impartial

Synapse 3 (Fall, 1974); available online at http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/

PA013.htm (accessed March 3, 2009).

6. For illustrating the coherence and consistency of different theological

commitments versus differing apologetic methods, the best place to start is Van

Til's original The Defense of the Faith, 4th Ed., ed. K. Scott Oliphint (Phillipsburg,

NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, [1955] 2008).

xv

PREFACE

starting point and method is to radically deny the existence

of the Christian God as described in His nature and activities

by Scripture.

I don't know if he removed this due to eventually disagreeing with

it, seeing it as unnecessary, judging it too strongly stated, or for

some other reason. I personally tend to believe the statement in

theory, though the inclusion of such in practice might have alienated

many fellow apologists, unnecessarily I think. Once again we have

an argument about apologetical method hinging on a theological

debate, in this case (considering the context from which Bahnsen

cut it), the analogous debate about Eve's sin: did she sin when she

ate, or already in her heart when she first desired to eat. The Re-

formed view would, by and large, argue that Eve sinned at the very

moment she questioned in her heart God's revelation about the

tree. The eating just outwardly manifested her sin, and certainly

constituted sin in itself as well; but in truth, even before she touched

the fruit she had committed the sin. At any rate, I believe Bahnsen

wished to avoid the perception of contrasting fellow-believers' po-

sitions so antithetically as "a denial of what Scripture says," and,

"radically deny the existence of the Christian God," even though

these descriptions bear much truth in the context.

In some places Bahnsen softened words for which I actually

wish he would have kept the edge. For example, in the same Article

7, he writes that "Argument for argument's sake when one is dealing

in the vital matters of salvation and damnation would be unseemly"

(my emphasis). In the original draft Bahnsen had written "sadistic"

rather than "unseemly." The stronger word, I think, really presses

the truth for those who may forget (for whatever reason) the mission

of apologetics. To allow an apologetical encounter to follow rabbit

trails (or "foolish questions," as Paul calls such diversions—Titus

3:9), or not to prosecute the unbeliever's case with the most effec-

tive apologetic tools available ignores that eternal torment awaits

the unrepentant unbeliever. To present anything less than the fullest

truth of God in the name of apologetics is thoroughly sadistic.

In regard to the quality of argument and character contained

in this volume, we must remember—and it comes to my amaze-

ment—that Bahnsen completed the bulk of this text at the young age

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PREFACE

of twenty-five years old. Having completed his Master of Divinity

and Master of Theology degrees simultaneously (unheard of then

and now!) at Westminster Theological Seminary, he immediately

began teaching alongside veteran professors at RTS in Jackson. To

advance such a work as this one as far as he did while handling

other duties, while engaging in other major theological debates,

and yet maintaining something of a pastoral concern for his own

words exhibits the highest of character and composure. One may

(although with some reservation) compare the magnitude of this

effort so early in life to Calvin's publication of the first edition of

his Institutes (1536) at the age of twenty-six. We can only hope that

readers will still profit from reading Bahnsen five hundred years

later, as we do Calvin today.

Those further interested in Bahnsen's personal life, character,

work, and influence will find substantial and encouraging mate-

rial in The Standard Bearer: A Festschrift for Greg L Bahnsen7

This important work offers a biography written by Greg's son

David, as well as essays contributed by Michael Butler, Robert

Booth, Jeffrey Ventrella, and many others, all exhibiting the Van

Til-Bahnsen perspective.

About the Format and Editing

Besides headings and subheadings, the reader will notice two type-

faces appearing within the main text of this book. With the different

fonts we intend to delineate between Bahnsen's contributions (the

main purpose of the publication) and any editorial notations. Bahn-

sen's main text appears in a traditional typeface and rightfully consti-

tutes the vast majority of the text. With the exception of this Preface,

my contributions appear only in footnotes, but maintain the font-face

you see here.

I have attempted to keep any editorial comments to a minimum.

Where I have included such I have done so for the purpose of

clarification, elucidation, or adding what I consider to be helpful

context. Otherwise, I have limited the editor's role in this project

mainly to the most faithful construction and presentation of the

7. Steve M. Schlissel, ed. (Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media Press, 2002).

xvii

PREFACE

text possible, including Bahnsen's last available edits so that the

final product appears as closely as he would have intended. Pos-

sibly excepting the decision to save the incomplete Part 3 for later

publication, I believe we have realized this goal.

xviii

P A R T O N E

PRESUPPOSITIONAL

APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

C H A P T E R 1

INTRODUCTION:

GOD IN THE DOCK?

John Calvin wrote, "Contentious disputes arise from the fact that

many think less honorably than they ought of the greatness of divine

wisdom, and are carried away by profane audacity." These words

were written in his commentary on 1 Peter 3:15, a verse long taken as

the charter of Christian apologetics. It commissions and defines how a

Christian should defend the faith: "Sanctify Christ as Lord in your hearts,

always being ready to set forth a defense to everyone who asks you for a

reasoned account concerning the hope in you, yet with gentleness and re-

spect." A truly Christian defense of the faith must never fail to exalt Christ

as Lord over all, including argumentation and reasoning. An apologetic

that builds on any other rock than Christ does not honor the greatness of

divine wisdom; it is foolishly and audaciously erected on the ruinous sands

of human authority.

The task of apologetics must be exercised upon the infallible and pre-

supposed authority of the Word of Christ in Scripture. Apologetics does

not first do obeisance to human philosophy and science and then proceed

to encompass God in its sphere of reverence. The Christian cannot, in-

deed must not, take an unattached or neutral stance with respect to his

faith in order to win the unbeliever over to Christ's authority. A Christian

apologetic grows out of, and is shaped according to, a total dedication to

the wisdom of the Logos as expressed in His inscripturated Word—not self-

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

sufficient human "wisdom." "Let us hold fast the profession of our hope

without wavering, for the one who promised is faithful" (Heb. 10:23). Since

God is faithful to us, our apologetic must not be faithless to Him; in setting

forth our defense we must not set aside or waver with respect to the profes-

sion of our faith. Christian apologetics must begin and end with Him who

is the alpha and the omega, the one who only and always reigns as Lord.

T h e purpose of this treatise is to exhibit presuppositional apolo-

getics as the only faithful and sound method of contending for the

Christian hope and biblical message. Resting upon the authority of

the living God rather than that of independent human reasoning, the

apologist must presuppose the truth of Scripture and lay siege to all

apostate presuppositions. This must be his method because the Word

of God in the Bible has a unique epistemological status for the Chris-

tian: it requires no corroboration and carries its own evidence inher-

ently or self-attestingly. As God makes a total demand upon the lives

of His covenant people they recognize that the words of Scripture are

logically primitive,1 the most ultimate authority. So if our apologetic

is to be a Christian apologetic it must be presuppositional in character

and method.

A U T O N O M Y VS. R E V E L A T I O N A L A U T H O R I T Y

Thinking to maintain neutrality with respect to Scripture, any natu-

ral theology that reasons autonomously from logical and/or empirical

grounds to God results in an exclusion of revelational necessity and au-

thority endorsing some other imperious philosophy. Knowledge of God

must be rooted in His own self-disclosure. Because the clear revelation

of God in nature's and man's constitution is suppressed in unrighteous-

ness, it is impossible for theology or apologetics to base their efforts

in a rebellious understanding of the world or history, independently

working up to a verification of God's written revelation. Faith must

necessarily start with the clear, authoritative, self-attesting, special

1. By "primitive" Bahnsen does not intend to conjure up images of cave-

dwellers or log cabins. He uses the term to mean "primary" as in "starting point."

He makes the same point about Scripture elsewhere using similar phrases: "place

to stand," "reference point," and "ultimate standard." See Greg L. Bahnsen, Van

Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburgh, NJ: Presbyterian and Re-

formed Publishing Co., 1998), 127n.113,230, 508-509, as well as 18-20 below.

4

GOD IN THE DOCK?

revelation of God in Scripture coordinated with the Holy Spirit's in-

ner testimony to the regenerated heart.

Historically, when David Hume and Immanuel Kant exposed the

invalidity of the theistic proofs, apologists generally balked at returning

to revelation as the basis for their certainty of God's existence. They

elected, rather, to maintain status in the blinded eyes of the "worldly

wise" by attempting to prove Christianity's credibility by means of argu-

ments that hopefully pointed toward the probability of God's existence and

Scripture's truth. They settled for a mere presumption (plus pragmatic as-

surance) in favor of a few salvaged items (i.e., "fundamentals") from the

Christian system. Refusing to presuppose the sovereign God revealed in

the Bible as the source of all material and logical possibility, and hence

failing effectively to challenge or internally criticize the very feasibility

of knowledge, logic, factuality, interpretation, or predication as based on

the boasted autonomy of "free-thinkers," apologists found their defenses

razed by those who (likewise) postulated that bare possibility was a prin-

ciple more ultimate than God. Deterministic science disqualified mira-

cles, positivistic sociology relativized morality, historical criticism faulted

the Bible, and Kant's transcendental dialecticism invalidated cognitive

revelation. Idealism made God finite, pragmatism made Him irrelevant,

and logical analysis made Him meaningless. Process thinking limited God

by pulling Him down from the throne of His sovereignty and pulling ev-

erything up into Him for the panentheistic drive to omega point, while

phenomenology made the universe into a machine for the fabricating of

gods, and existentialism made man himself the being who strives to be-

come God. By appealing to probability, apologists saw Christianity rel-

egated to the museum of mere religious hypotheses (i.e., "possibilities"),

rather than embraced as the actual truth of God.

The present urgency for Christians, then, is to submit to and adopt

a revelational epistemology and scriptural apologetic that are honoring

to God and powerful tools against unbelief. The Christian apologist

must not trade away the certainty of knowing God for a probability or

subjective moral conviction; he must unashamedly presuppose the truth

of the Word of Christ in Scripture as congruous with the inescapable

self-revelation of God in nature and man's constitution. Then he will be

equipped with spiritual weapons that are mighty to the pulling down of

every reasoning that exalts itself against God. God's self-attesting rev-

elation must be taken as the firm foundation of all knowledge, the final

23

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

test for truth, and the standard for living. We are under obligation to

submit every facet of our lives to Scripture—whether it be morals, voca-

tion, emotions, deliberations, reasoning, or even the use of logic.

No attempt should be made to soften our principial and basic an-

tithesis with the unregenerate; by conceding ground to the assump-

tions of autonomy, the apologist loses his forceful challenge and assured

life-source. A non-Christian principle can never genuinely be fruitful

within the framework of Christian thought and apologetic. Hence we

must avoid embracing Platonism (as did the early apologists), Aristo-

telianism (as did the scholastics), Rationalism and Empiricism (as did

the men of the enlightenment), or Kantianism and existentialism (as

did modern thinkers).

By catering to autonomous assumptions the Christian will see his mes-

sage absorbed into its diametric opposite as a result of his alien method-

ology. But by presupposing the sovereign Creator and His Word as the

requisite transcendental of any intellectual endeavor, the apologist can

expose the fatal defects of all autonomous reasoning, calling unregenerate

men back (for the sake of their eternal salvation) to covenantal obedience

in terms of God's Word, and praying for the operation of the Holy Spirit

to that end. The only proper starting point for an adequate theology and

apologetic is God's special revelation; only upon this necessary, sufficient,

authoritative, and clear foundation can any fact receive a proper interpre-

tation—God's interpretation. When man will submit to the powerful and

meaningful Word of Christ in Scripture his eyes will be opened to recog-

nize God's revelation in every phenomenon of nature, principle of reason,

and detail of history—a revelation that constantly exerts its pressure on

him even while he struggles to hold it back.

Being confident of these things, a truly Reformed apologetic must

begin from the presupposition that the living and true, triune God

speaks to him with absolute authority in infallible Scripture. His rea-

soning then finds its only legitimate function as a servant or tool of God's

Word, rather than its judge. Following God's Word, the Christian re-

ceptively reconstructs the created facts of the universe about him with a

view toward both fulfilling the cultural mandate and being conformed

to the image of his Savior by the power of Christ's Spirit; hereby he glo-

rifies God and enjoys Him forever. Thus, the apologetic task will consist,

not of externally verifying the Christian presupposition but, of applying it by

(1) bringing God's truth and commands to bear upon the lives of unbe-

G o d IN THE DOCK?

lievers, appealing to the image of God in them (distinguishing between

present remnants of man's original nature and the ever-present nature

of fallen man), pointing out that every fact of the world bears witness to

God, and (2) doing an internal critique of the non-Christian's system,

calling down its idols, and pointing out the absolute necessity of Chris-

tian presuppositions if logic, factuality, history, science, and morality

are to have any meaning, validity, and application at all. The Christian

apologetic will not concede intellectual ground to Christianity's cul-

tured despisers or allow them to exploit theoretical foundations to which

they have no legitimate claim without depending on the Christian faith.

Thus, part of the Christian's reasoned defense of the faith will be an ag-

gressive offense.

Not like the fool who built his house upon the sand, the Christian

apologist must, in love for Christ, found his whole life, including apolo-

getical reasoning, upon the solid rock of Christ's Word. In accordance with

this the apologist seeks the repentance of the sinner and does not encourage

his continued use of hostile, autonomous reason in judgment over God's

Word. We seek a God-controlled man, not a man-controlled god.

W H O SHALL JUDGE

The circumstance in which we find ourselves defending the Christian

faith is aptly described by C. S. Lewis:

The ancient man approached God (or even the gods) as

the accused person approaches his judge. For the mod-

ern man the roles are reversed. He is the judge: God is in

the dock.... The trial may even end in God's acquittal.

But the important thing is that Man is on the bench and

God in the dock.2

It is this situation that must be rectified; the sinful attitude portrayed

here needs to be redressed. Consequently the infallible Word of God

must be presupposed by our apologetic without apologies. We defend a

genuine system of authority that cannot be known except by divine rev-

elation; this inscripturated Word from God stands in judgment over all

2. C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock• Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. W. Hooper (Grand

Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 244.

23

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

and is itself to be judged by no one. The submission to this authoritative

revelation is caused, not by impudent reasoning, but by the Holy Spirit.

God's Word is perfectly rational; however, it is not the autonomous "ra-

tional man" who receives it, but the "humble man" who knows better

than to subject the sovereign Lord's prerogatives to an independent test

for verification at the overriding bar of human intellect. J. I. Packer is

right to the point:

Nor, again, may we present the faith as a philosophy, to be

accepted (if at all) on grounds of rational demonstration;

we must always declare it as revealed truth, divinely mys-

terious and transcending reason's power to verify, to be

received humbly on the authority of God. Faith involves

the renunciation of intellectual self-sufficiency; we must

always proclaim the gospel in a way that makes this clear.3

The natural man is in no position to pass judgment upon the reality and

reliability of God's special revelation at the tribunal of reason; his pow-

ers of appraisal are incompetent, his standards distorted. Our apologetic

must never encourage the contrary opinion. The fact that God has de-

livered redemptive special revelation should itself indicate to us that we

cannot overture the unregenerate to use principles of logic and science

rooted in natural revelation (which he suppresses in unrighteousness) to

evaluate the Bible.

If special revelation assumes that in consequence of sin

the normal activity of the natural principium is dis-

turbed, this implies of itself that the natural principium

has lost its competency to judge. He who considers it pos-

sessed of this competency declares thereby eo ipso that it

is still normal, and thus removes all sufficient reason for a

special revelation. You must either deny it the right of

judgment, or, if you grant it this right, the object disap-

pears upon which judgment shall be passed. The psychi-

ater, who treats the maniac, cannot render his method of

treatment dependent upon the judgment of his patient.

3. J. I. Packer, 1 Fundamentalism' and the Word of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

1958), 136.

8

G O D IN THE DOCK?

Equally little can you attribute this right of judgment

over the special principium to the natural principium... .4

Our defense of the faith accomplishes nothing positive if throughout it

we allow the unbeliever to keep God in the dock, thinking that he has

every right and capability to stand in judgment over the one whom he

has sinned against. August Lecerf rightly points out that our apolo-

getic arguments

have no persuasive value except from the moment when,

at once vanquished and enlightened by grace, the natural

man consents, as is his objective duty, to relinquish the

autonomy of his reason and submit to the discriminating

principle of religious truth. This principle consists in the

affirmation of the absolute independence and exclusive

sovereignty of God in the noetic order, as in all the orders

of reality. It is the soli Deo gloria.5

A Christian apologetic does not seek, therefore, autonomously to verify

God's Word, having the believer serve as God's defense attorney who at-

tempts to win an acquittal from the tribunal of the unbeliever. The Bible

is not externally verified at all, for it has absolute authority inherent to

itself; its self-attesting nature is of utmost apologetical significance.

The ground of faith emphatically is not our ability to dem-

onstrate all the teaching of the Bible to be self-consistent

and true. This is just saying that rational demonstration

is not the ground of faith.... The nature of faith is accep-

tance on the basis of testimony, and the ground of faith is

therefore testimony or evidence.... This means simply that

the basis of faith in the Bible is the witness the Bible itself

bears to the fact that it is God's Word.... This might seem

to be arguing in a circle.... We should be little disturbed

by this type of criticism. It contains an inherent fallacy.

It is fully admitted that normally it would be absurd and

4. Abraham Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1898),

381.

5. August Lecerf, An Introduction to Reformed Dogmatics (London: Lutterworth Press,

1949), 213.

23

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

a miscarriage of justice for a judge to accept testimony of

the accused rather than the verdict required by all the

relevant evidence. But the two cases are not analogous.

There is one sphere where self-testimony must be accepted

as absolute and final. This is the sphere of our relation to

God. God alone is adequate witness to himself.6

Hence our apologetic would not serve to put man in the dock and rec-

ognize God as the legitimate judge at the bench if it strove to work into

faith from an independently acquired and neutral understanding of log-

ic and facts. Our understanding does not precede and serve to arbitrate

with respect to the faith to which God calls us. By contrast, faith pre-

cedes and undergirds any and all genuine understanding by the human

intellect. Faith is not established upon the groundworkings of reason,

but vice versa. Human understanding can never be made the verification

of faith since without faith there is no proper understanding available

to man whereby he might judge. As Augustine well said, "I believe in

order to understand."7 Christian apologetics must reckon with this truth

by beginning with the self-attesting word of Scripture as an absolutely

necessary presupposition, the assurance of which being produced by the

Holy Spirit, who opens blinded eyes to see God speaking authoritatively

in the Bible and who grants a heart of flesh enabled to bow before the

Holy Sovereign.

BY WHAT STANDARD?

Because God's inscripturated Word bears highest epistemic certainty,

our defense of the Christian faith begins not with proofs and probabili-

ties, but with the presupposition of the Bible's truth. The conclusion of

Calvin is most appropriate here:

Let this point therefore stand: that those whom the Holy

Spirit has inwardly taught truly rest upon Scripture, and

6. John Murray, "The Attestation of Scripture," The Infallible Word, eds. Stone-

house and Woolley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 7fF.

7. This is a paraphrase. See, for example, St. Augustine, "Tractates on the

Gospel of St. John," XXIX.6 (John 7:14-18), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First

Series, 14 vol., ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983 [1888]), 7:184.

10

G O D IN THE DOCK?

that Scripture indeed is self-authenticated; hence, it is not

right to subject it to proof and reasoning. And the certainty

it deserves with us, it attains by the testimony of the Spirit.

For even if it wins reverence for itself by its own majesty, it

seriously affects us only when it is sealed upon our hearts

through the Spirit. Therefore, illumined by his power, we

believe neither by our own nor by anyone else's judgment

that Scripture is from God; but above human judgment

we affirm with utter certainty (just as if we were gazing

upon the majesty of God himself) that it has flowed to us

from the very mouth of God by the ministry of men. We

seek no proofs, no marks of genuineness upon which our

judgment may lean; but we subject our judgment and wit

to it as a thing far beyond any guesswork!... Such, then, is

a conviction that requires no reasons; such, a knowledge

with which the best reason agrees—in which the mind

truly reposes more securely and constantly than in any

reasons; such, finally, a feeling that can be born only of

heavenly revelation.8

The Christian religion is under constant attack by the unregenerate,

being pitted against rival religions, logicistic onslaughts, scientific in-

cursions, and the like. Moreover, to complicate the apologetical exi-

gency, the defensive stances that have been advocated throughout the

years are manifold and multiform. The central question, then, in the

pursuance of the apologetical task is, what standard should be utilized for

guidance, judgment, and argument? Is the acceptance of that stan-

dard based on an arbitrary volition or upon a reasoned case? How can

one be sure his standard is right, and to what degree of certainty is

he entitled? The Westminster Confession of Faith definitively answers

these questions of apologetical criterion for those religious disputes in

which the apologist finds himself; if we heed its word, God will no lon-

ger be sinfully assigned to the dock to plead for acceptance before the

judgment of self-deified, autonomous men.

The supreme judge by which all controversies of religion

8. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, I. VII. 5, from The Library of

Christian Classics, Vol. XX, ed. J. T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), p. 80.

23

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

are to be determined, and all... doctrines of men, and

private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sen-

tence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit

speaking in the Scripture....

The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to

be believed, and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testi-

mony of any man, or Church; but wholly upon God (who

is truth itself) the author thereof: and therefore it is to be

received, because it is the Word of God....

Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth

and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of

the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in

our hearts.9

Here we see that the ultimate standard for the Christian must always

be the self-attesting word of God. This standard is accepted because

of what it truly claims to be (the word of God) and not on the basis of

independent human buttresses. This self-attesting revelation of God

is objectively true and authoritative, even though subjective persua-

sion about it comes only by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit.

By what standard, then, shall Christian apologetics proceed? By the

standard of God's self-attesting word. Far too often apologists have

failed to recognize the unavoidable and reciprocal relation between

one's theological system and his apologetic method. The result has

been methodological inconsistency: a different epistemology for ex-

pounding the faith than that used in defending the faith. However,

we must not defend our message—that Christ's word is self-attesting

and possessing the ultimate authority of the Lord—with a method that

works counter to it—by claiming an ultimate epistemological standard

outside of Christ's word of truth. The final criterion for the Christian

in every department of his thinking (theology and philosophy, procla-

mation and defense) is the self-attesting word of God.

9. Chapter I, Sections X, IV, and V

12

GOD IN THE DOCK?

The Insufficiency of Traditional Methods

Since this self-attesting word is what it claims to be, and thus the

divinely-given standard of truth and knowledge, we must not present

Christian faith as an unreasonable, voluntaristic, fideistic decision of

the heart. We definitely have reasons for submitting to Christ—reasons

which can be used to appeal to, and argue with, the unbeliever. Judged

by this objectively true standard, all facts and logic must support the

truth of Christianity. Because this ultimate standard is correct, those

who attempt to use contrary standards can only destroy the very pos-

sibility of intelligible experience of the facts, reasonable explanation of

the world or history, and meaningful interpretation or communication.

Consequently, we must not be satisfied to present Christianity as

the most reasonable position to hold among the competing options

available to men. Rather, the Christian faith is the only reasonable

outlook available to men. Fideism says Christianity is not a matter of

reason. The traditional approach to apologetics is somewhat better;

it does not throw over the reasoned defense of Christianity. However,

by using a standard of knowledge and truth which is independent of

God's self-attesting word, and by claiming only a high degree of prob-

ability for the Christian hypothesis (as judged autonomously in the

light of facts and logic), it does not go far enough in defending the word

of the self-attesting Christ. It does not at base present the intellectual

challenge of the gospel, but makes fatal concessions to the unbeliever's

desire for intellectual self-sufficiency.

The traditional method... is based on the assumption

that man has some measure of autonomy, that the space-

time world is in some measure "contingent" and that

man must create for himself his own epistemology in an

ultimate sense.

The traditional method was concessive on these basic

points on which it should have demanded surrender! As

such, it was always self-frustrating. The traditional meth-

od had explicitly built into it the right and ability of the

natural man, apart from the work of the Spirit of God,

to be the judge of the claim of the authoritative Word of

23

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

God. It is man who, by means of his self-established in-

tellectual tools, puts his "stamp of approval" on the Word

of God and then, only after that grand act, does he listen

to it. God's Word must first pass man's tests of good and

evil, truth and falsity. But once you tell a non-Christian

this, why should he be worried by anything else that you

say. [sic] You have already told him he is quite all right

just the way he is! Then Scripture is not correct when

it talks of "darkened minds," "wilful ignorance," "dead

men," and "blind people"! With this method the correct-

ness of the natural man's problematics is endorsed. That

is all he needs to reject the Christian faith.10

What the apologist must endeavor to do is to demonstrate that without

Christian presuppositions there is no intelligible use of facts and logic—

that human knowledge and interpretation fail instantly. Therefore, to

be reasonable at all, men must submit to the ultimate standard of God's

self-attesting word; to refuse this is to insist upon intellectual foolishness

and eternal damnation.

When the Christian apologist points out that his ultimate standard

is God's revealed word, the non-Christian will rightly observe that it is

just the truth of this standard that is now in question. The believer has

not been requisitely "open-minded." To this we must reply that, on the

other hand, the unbeliever has not been uncommitted and neutral from

the outset either; he has used an espoused standard for weighing and in-

terpreting the facts which precludes the truth of the Christian position.

He has been begging the question. The unavoidable fact is—regardless

of how intensely some apologists lament or decry it—that nobody is a

disinterested observer, seeing and interpreting the facts without a set of

assumptions and pre-established rules. All men have presuppositional

commitments prior to their examination of various hypotheses. In the

nature of the case, apologetics requires that we argue with the unbe-

liever in terms of each other's most basic assumptions. We must chal-

lenge each other's final standards. This means that we must contest the

grounds on which our opponent stands, showing that only within the

context of the Christian worldview could he know anything at all. We

10. Cornelius Van Til, "My Credo," Jerusalem, and Athens, ed. E. R. Geehan (Pres-

byterian and Reformed, 1971), 11.

14

GOD IN THE DOCK?

must show his espoused standard to be self-vitiating, explaining that to

see even this fact requires working in terms of the Christian's ultimate

standard. Thus Christianity is the only reasonable position to hold—the

only outlook which can have an apologetic. That is, we must argue that

the non-Christian's epistemology and corresponding metaphysic not

only prevent him from coming to faith in Christ, but they prevent him

(if held consistently) from coming to any knowledge whatsoever.

Such an argument as this refuses to consign the Lord God Almighty

to the dock, awaiting the rational verdict of the sinful creature who has

arrogated to himself abilities and prerogatives in the intellectual realm

to which he has no legitimate claim. Such an argument does not settle

for the conclusion that Christianity is possibly, perhaps probably, true;

it is an appeal to the necessity of Christianity's truth. It is the most strin-

gent defense of Christianity as reasonable. It stands in diametric opposi-

tion to fideism. Moreover, it does not settle for the leniency of half-way

measures of traditional apologetics (which fail to challenge unbelieving

epistemology, urging its further use so as to conclude merely that Chris-

tianity is probably true).

The Necessity of a Presuppositional Approach

Since neutrality is unattainable for either the unbeliever or believer,

and since they have conflicting ultimate standards for judging claims

to knowledge, the task of apologetics will ultimately be carried on at

the presuppositional level. Contrasting worldviews are being debated.

Each worldview has its presuppositions about reality, knowledge, and

ethics; these mutually influence and support each other. There are no

facts or uses of reason which are available outside of the interpretive

system of basic commitments or assumptions which appeals to them; the

presuppositions used by Christian and non-Christian determine what

they will accept as factual and reasonable, and their respective presup-

positions about fact and logic will determine what they say about reality.

Thus there can be no direct proof offered for the truth of either perspec-

tive; direct appeals to fact and reason are emptied of argumentative

strength by the opponent's presuppositions (with which he understands

and accepts facts and logic in a different light altogether). The argument

between believer and unbeliever must then be indirect, admitting the

impossibility of a neutral approach to reasoning and facts which are

23

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

allegedly outside of an interpretive system. The argument must pit the

unbeliever's system of thought as a unit over against the believer's system

of thought as a unit. Their overall perspectives will have to contend with

each other, rather than debating isolated points in a piecemeal fashion.

When the Christian sets forth his outlook he will stress the kind of

God to whom he is committed, the nature of the world in relation to God,

and the nature of man as God's creature. The Christian God is totally

self-sufficient, and in Him there is an equal ultimacy of unity and diversity

(being Triune). Everything outside of Him derives its existence, character,

meaning, and purpose in light of Him and His sovereign counsel. There

is a categorical distinction to be drawn between this sovereign, self-suffi-

cient, triune God and the created realm; the Creator is absolute, original,

and unconditioned, while the creation is finite, dependent, and derivative.

The Creator plans, governs, and controls every event of history. Thus

the standard of meaning and truth is always the mind of God. Man was

created as the image of God, which in his original condition entailed ca-

pability (e.g., intellect, morality) as well as perfection (i.e., ability to use his

capacities constructively and to God's glory—obeying His commands,

thinking His thoughts after Him). When man rebelled and fell into sin

he attempted to replace God's authority with his own self-sufficiency; he

would no longer take the standard of meaning and truth to be the mind of

God, but rather the mind of man. The fall did not take away his reason-

ing and moral decision-making; it removed their perfection, giving them

a new perverted direction. Refusing to be subject to God's authority and

word, the sinner no longer attempts to receptively reconstruct the truth

about God and the world, refuses to see the facts as controlled and inter-

preted by God, and makes himself the ultimate judge of truth. Therefore,

the restoration of man to fellowship with God and to constructive use

of his capacities requires God's gracious redemption, which is communi-

cated to us by special revelation in Scripture. All of reality (every aspect

thereof) must now be seen correctively through the instruction of Scripture.

To refuse to see things through these gracious spectacles is to destroy the

intelligibility of man's experience and to undermine his knowledge; it is to

insist on foolishness and blindness. Because Scripture is inspired of God it

is infallible; the word of God cannot fail to be authoritative and true, be-

yond challenge. Scriptural revelation is necessary for man, authoritative

over man, and communicated clearly to man.

Because fallen man cannot escape the knowledge of God he is still

16

GOD IN THE DOCK?

able to acquire knowledge through his contact with general revelation

in the world; as a creature of God he retains an irradicable knowledge

of his Creator, knowledge of himself always bringing knowledge of his

God as well. However, this knowledge which the sinner has and is able

to gain only holds him all the more responsible for his intellectual rebel-

lion against the Lord. When God's saving, special revelation comes to

the sinner, it comes to correct his commitments and outlook; it comes

to save him from sin and its noetic effects.11 Because everything outside

the Bible derives its meaning and intelligibility from what is infallibly

taught only in the Bible, nothing outside the Bible is in a position to

verify it independently and self-sufficiently. The facts and logic surely

conform to the teaching of Scripture; however, facts and logic will not

be intelligible and used correctly apart from submission to the truth of

Scripture. Speculation which is independent of God's word cannot then

lead a rebellious sinner to a proper knowledge of God. For the believer,

the Christ of the Scripture is the basis for human knowledge; He is the

necessary starting point for knowledge, or else man's intellectual efforts

will lead to utter skepticism. Consequently, the word of Christ in Scrip-

ture is accepted as self-attesting. There is no higher authority by which it

can be judged and accepted. Facts and logic are meaningful and useful

to man within the context of Christ's word.

On the other hand, the apologist must work through the nature and

implications of the unbeliever's worldview, recognizing that the man to

whom he speaks is a fallen creature of God. As a creature he can and does

use his mind to know things; he is able to do so despite of what he thinks

about his epistemological situation. As a creature he foremost knows

God and is responsible to Him. Indeed, because his acquired knowledge

is only made possible because of the unacknowledged knowledge of God

which he has, he is especially guilty for rejecting the revelation of God.

However, not only is he a creature with inalienable knowledge and no-

etic abilities, he is a sinful Creature. As fallen he will not—and morally

cannot—love God, profess knowledge of Him, or reason in a way that is

subject to the authority of God's revelation. The sinner must constantly

attempt to be what he is not: autonomous and free of God. Thus the

11. "Noetic effects" refer to the effects of the fall on the mind (See Gen. 6:5;

Rom. 1:18, 25; 8:6, 20; 12:2; 1 Cor. 1:21; Eph. 4:23, for example). See Bahnsen's

discussion below, page 53-55.

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

unbeliever looks upon the world as contingent (the diverse facts are what

they are by chance), he looks upon the standards of logic as abstract

(the unifying principles of reason are not derived from experience but

legislatively imposed on it), he looks upon himself as autonomous (his

own laws or principles or experience will be the final judge of truth and

meaning), and finally he looks upon man, the world, and logic as all reli-

giously neutral (they can be understood totally apart from God and His

revelation). The unbeliever will consider his thinking and interpretation

to be normal and normative.

But it must be pointed out to him that his "neutrality" is but a

token of his desire to be free from the all-embracing revelation of

God—his thinking is not indifferent at all to the knowledge of God.

Moreover, an insurmountable tension exists between the contingent,

diverse, fluctuating, chance character of his experience and history

and the necessary, uniform, unchanging, regular character of his rea-

soning principles. On the one hand he endorses utter freedom, while

on the other he insists on restrictive norms. His rational principles

vainly attempt to bring unity to his irrational world of facts. Because

his outlook is committed to both uniformity and continual change,

he is not able to explain anything at all—whether it be about history,

nature, man, ethics, experience, or logic. What he has been able to

understand and learn in the past—the knowledge which he has at-

tained—has only been possible because he self-deceivingly relied on

borrowed presuppositions (viz., the knowledge of God suppressed in

unrighteousness). Pretending to be autonomous, the self-sufficient

judge of truth, the unbeliever has in fact been dependent of God and

His revelation all along. In his heart he has had to believe what he

professed to disbelieve with his mouth.

Christ the Only Foundation for Reasoning

This short discussion has shown the nature of the apologetical situa-

tion and the standard by which the apologist's argument should proceed.

How should the unbeliever decide whether or not to receive the word of

God in Scripture as true? In attempting to decide for himself and on

his own standards, he will have already decided against the God who is

revealed in Scripture, who makes the unqualified and unchallengeable

claim that all thinking must be subordinate to Him. As a covenant-

18

G O D IN THE DOCK?

Breaker the unbeliever will twist everything around him, distorting the

truth in the interest of his unrighteous rebellion. He will with futility try

various schemes that combine rationality and irrationality (unity and di-

versity) in order to replace the truths of creation and providence. While

(conveniently overlooking facts, becoming inconsistent with his princi-

ples, and not being able to give an intelligible account of fact and logic

on his espoused presuppositions, the unbeliever will charge Christianity

with being unfactual or illogical. Although asserting that nobody can

know anything for sure, he will claim to know that Christianity must

be false. When the believing apologist encounters the self-conscious un-

believer, there will be an unavoidable conflict between their ultimate

standards of knowledge and truth.

Does this mean that Christianity cannot be shown to be reasonable?

Does all argumentation and communication then cease? The answer

is no. We always have a point of contact even with those who profess

to have different ultimate standards. This basis for discussion and ar-

gumentation with the unbeliever is not a common ground which is re-

ligiously neutral, nor is it facts and logic as he falsely conceives them.

The unbeliever's professed interpretation of things is not our common

ground, for we do not share that interpretation. Rather, the actual state

of affairs—man as God's image, the suppressed knowledge of God, the

world as totally revelatory of God—constitutes a point of contact for the

apologist. We know that, despite his different explicit standards, the un-

believer is able to think correctly about our argumentation and is always

accessible to the gracious work of God's Spirit. He can be called back to

a remembrance of His God, to an acknowledgement of what he knows

in his heart of hearts.

By what standard should the conflicting claims made by believers

and unbelievers be adjudicated? How should they resolve their differ-

ence in perspective? It is futile to appeal to standards which are alleg-

edly intelligible apart from the truth of God's word. No fact can be un-

derstood, and no reasoning can be meaningful, apart from Christ as

the Creator and Redeemer of men. Scripture provides the interpretive

context within which fact and logic can be intelligible and used aright.

Thus our standard cannot be autonomous—something independent

of God's revelation. What amounts to good reasons and proof should

not be determined by the unbeliever's alien, basic assumptions. The

standard that we use in apologetics will have to be the self-attesting

19

G O D IN THE DOCK?

breaker the unbeliever will twist everything around him, distorting the

truth in the interest of his unrighteous rebellion. He will with futility try

various schemes that combine rationality and irrationality (unity and di-

versity) in order to replace the truths of creation and providence. While

conveniently overlooking facts, becoming inconsistent with his princi-

ples, and not being able to give an intelligible account of fact and logic

on his espoused presuppositions, the unbeliever will charge Christianity

with being unfactual or illogical. Although asserting that nobody can

know anything for sure, he will claim to know that Christianity must

be false. When the believing apologist encounters the self-conscious un-

believer, there will be an unavoidable conflict between their ultimate

standards of knowledge and truth.

Does this mean that Christianity cannot be shown to be reasonable?

Does all argumentation and communication then cease? The answer

is no. We always have a point of contact even with those who profess

to have different ultimate standards. This basis for discussion and ar-

gumentation with the unbeliever is not a common ground which is re-

ligiously neutral, nor is it facts and logic as he falsely conceives them.

The unbeliever's professed interpretation of things is not our common

ground, for we do not share that interpretation. Rather, the actual state

of affairs—man as God's image, the suppressed knowledge of God, the

world as totally revelatory of God—constitutes a point of contact for the

apologist. We know that, despite his different explicit standards, the un-

believer is able to think correctly about our argumentation and is always

accessible to the gracious work of God's Spirit. He can be called back to

a remembrance of His God, to an acknowledgement of what he knows

in his heart of hearts.

By what standard should the conflicting claims made by believers

and unbelievers be adjudicated? How should they resolve their differ-

ence in perspective? It is futile to appeal to standards which are alleg-

edly intelligible apart from the truth of God's word. No fact can be un-

derstood, and no reasoning can be meaningful, apart from Christ as

the Creator and Redeemer of men. Scripture provides the interpretive

context within which fact and logic can be intelligible and used aright.

Thus our standard cannot be autonomous—something independent

of God's revelation. What amounts to good reasons and proof should

not be determined by the unbeliever's alien, basic assumptions. The

standard that we use in apologetics will have to be the self-attesting

23

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

word of God—a standard which is not verified by anything external

to itself. This must be the starting point for everything we say and all

of our argumentation. Faith in the self-attesting Christ of Scripture

is the beginning, not the end result, of wisdom. In debating with the

unbeliever we will need to show him the irresolvable conflict between

his espoused principles and ours, and then argue that apart from the

self-attesting Christ of Scripture his thinking—based on his autono-

mous presuppositions—loses meaning, coherence, and intelligibility.

Christianity will be offered to him, not simply because it affords with

facts and logic, but because facts and logic could not be meaningful

without it. Christianity is not simply as reasonable as other options, or

even slightly more so; it is the only reasonable position for man to hold.

Here is the reasoned defense, the standard, by which we can pursue

apologetical discussion with any unbeliever. As Van Til clearly pro-

claims: "the Christian offers the self-attesting Christ to the world as

the only foundation upon which a man must stand in order to give any

'reasons' for anything at all."12

DEVELOPING A FAITHFUL APOLOGETIC

The present collection of studies grows out of the preceding convictions.

In my own personal judgment, although other twentieth-century evan-

gelical apologists have made contributions which we can utilize and ap-

preciate, the presuppositional approach of Cornelius Van Til has given

the best, most consistent, and momentous to the biblical and presup-

positional concerns rehearsed above. Van Til's Reformed apologetic at-

tempts to honor the Lordship of Christ over every realm of life, including

philosophy and reasoning. It appreciates the unique epistemological sta-

tus of God's word, this revelation as necessary, self-attesting, and abso-

lutely authoritative—the rock foundation for all epistemology, and thus

not itself autonomously verified. Moreover, Van Til's apologetic does not

tone down the principial antithesis between believing and unbelieving

philosophies; because the impudence and incompetence of the natural

man's alleged autonomous reasoning is taken account of, Van Til urges

us to call for the unbeliever's unconditional surrender, humbly submit-

ting to God's redemptive word, which shall be accomplished only in the

12. Van Til, "My Credo "Jerusalem and Athens, 18.

37

G O D IN THE DOCK?

power of the Holy Spirit's work.

Likewise, Van Til does not tone down the objective and clear evi-

dence for the truth of Christianity; admitting the inescapable revelation

of God in all things, Van Til renounces the claims of neutrality and

will not consent that the facts have been properly interpreted unless the

certainty of Scripture's truth is our conclusion—not merely its probable

truth. His presuppositional apologetic defends Christianity, not in terms

of piecemeal truths, but as a unit or complete worldview. His argument

is transcendental in character, aiming to demonstrate that the truth of

God's word is the precondition of intelligibility for man's thinking and

interpretive efforts; that is, he wishes to show that Christianity is reason-

able in virtue of the impossibility of the contrary. Consequently, rather

than presuming to act as an autonomous judge over God's revelation,

presuppositionalism as taught by Van Til applies the truths of that rev-

elation to the unbeliever, by: (1) setting forth the pervasive, positive evi-

dence provided by God of His veracity, and (2) performing an internal

critique of the unbeliever's worldview and presuppositions so as to show

that they destroy the possibility of human knowledge.

It seems to me that, in this way, Van Til has appreciably advanced Re-

formed apologetics in our day by building on the strengths of the two out-

standing Reformed theologians and philosophers, B.B. Warfield and A.

Kuyper; yet he has done so without wandering into the questionable infer-

ences drawn by these two great thinkers with respect to their distinctive

contributions. Kuyper's writings vigorously set forth the fact that the be-

liever and the unbeliever use antithetical principles in their respective phi-

losophy and science. The ethical alienation of the natural man from God

had to be stressed, and this alienation is operative in the noetic realm. The

antithesis between the natural mind and the regenerated mind, Kuyper

saw, would produce opposing theories of knowledge. This was Kuyper's

distinctive emphasis. From it he drew the illegitimate inference that apolo-

getics was virtually useless; apologetics and communication with the un-

regenerate were seen as hopeless because of the unbeliever's depravity.

Thus apologetics inevitably tends to be accommodationist in character.13

On the other hand, Warfield's distinctive emphasis was on the objective

13. By "accomodationist" Bahnsen means making the apologetic message

"palatable and congenial to secular presuppositions," as opposed to "established

upon the testimony of God." See page 50 below.

38

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

clarity of God's revelation, such that it could not be genuinely rational to

reject the Christian faith; the evidence for the truth of the Bible was mani-

fest and could not be overlooked with intellectual justification. However,

from this commendable distinctive Warfield drew the illegitimate infer-

ence that the natural man, using "right reason," could interpret and judge

the revelation of God correctly. As can be readily seen, a disagreement

had developed between Kuyper and Warfield. Kuyper's illegitimate in-

ference (viz., apologetics is virtually useless) contradicted Warfield's com-

mendable emphasis (viz., the evidence is so plain that we can show unbe-

lief to be against all reason). Further, Warfield's illegitimate inference (viz.,

the natural man can use right reason and God's revelation) contradicted

Kuyper's commendable distinctive (viz., the antithetical principles of the

natural and regenerate minds produce opposing theories of knowledge).

What Van Til has done is to incorporate the emphases of these two Re-

formed scholars, without following them into their illegitimate inferences

(which produced the dispute between them).

Van Til clearly sees the principial antithesis between the believer and

unbeliever in epistemology. Because of the unbeliever's espoused presup-

positions, his thinking would—if pursued consistently—destroy the very

possibility of meaning, intelligible experience, and knowledge; on his most

basic assumptions the non-Christian cannot use reason correctly and

evaluate the evidence of God's revelation aright. Yet Van Til also sets

forth the objective clarity of God's revelation, saying that it is utterly un-

reasonable to reject Christianity. The evidence for the truth of God's word

is so obvious that we can be certain in our Christian convictions and can

show the folly of unbelief. The result is Van Til's presuppositional defense

of the faith and transcendental argument for the veracity of God's revela-

tion. Apologetics is definitely useful, for the unbeliever is still a creature

made in God's image and God has made His revelation manifest to all

men. Yet in this apologetic argument the unbeliever should be shown that

he is in no position to pass judgment on God's word and that right reason

is impossible for him, given his espoused presuppositions. Christianity is

thereby presented to the unbeliever as the only reasonable position for

men to hold; the truth of Christianity is advanced as the foundation with-

out which there could not be proof of anything else at all.

Van Til's presuppositionalism, then, is the most stringent defense of

the reasonableness of Christianity that is set forth today. Although by no

means completely lucid or philosophically flawless, Van Til's published

39

G O D IN THE DOCK?

works on apologetics do not get carried away by the profane audacity

| which fails to think less honorably than we ought of divine wisdom (as

Calvin put it). Other apologetical systems popularly presented to the

church today suffer from major internal flaws, despite the many and fine

points which can be learned from them: their arguments either fail to be

genuinely presuppositional, or their presuppositions fail to be genuinely

biblical. Because they seek neutral common ground with the unbeliev-

er and build their defense on some philosophical authority apart from

God's revealed word, their epistemology is less than self-consciously and

consistently biblical. As such these non-presuppositional defenses of the

faith tend to be too concessive to the unbeliever and aim simply to show

Christianity as probably true. They do not leave the unbeliever "without

excuse," but suggest implicitly that he has the prerogative and ability to

stand in judgment over God's own word. Presuppositionalism does not

require us to consign God to the dock, awaiting the verdict of an autono-

mous rebel. Instead, it constantly reminds us that sinful man is in the dock

before the awesome bar of God's scrutiny and judgment. It encounters

him with the intellectual challenge of the gospel.

In the following studies I aim to present biblical and epistemological

reflections which point us toward a presuppositional defense of the faith,

clarify and defend this apologetic method by responding to certain pop-

ular criticisms of it, and then compare it with a few, basic, other kinds of

apologetic strategy which are promoted today. Those who do not utilize

the transcendental kind of defense found in Van Til's presuppositional-

ism treat Christianity as a viable hypothesis to be considered by the

unbeliever and tested according to certain standards: logical coherence,

empirical evidence, personal utility, or a combination of them all. Again

I would repeat that such apologetic arguments have valuable insights

which, when placed within a better presuppositional context, can be

useful to the modern apologist. However, their ultimate standard is mis-

conceived, and accordingly a charitable critique of these procedures is

appropriate in order to improve the quality of our united defense of the

faith against Christianity's cultured despisers.

23

C H A P T E R 2

THE CHRISTIAN MIND

& METHOD

A1though a presuppositional approach in apologetics is de-

manded epistemologically, the ultimate source of strength

for such a method of defending the faith must come from the

self-attesting, inspired Word of God itself. We should expect this to be

the case for a biblical presuppositionalist! Since he claims that his au-

thority must be the Word of God, the presuppositionalist is obligated

to "authorize" his apologetic method by that very same authority.

Although Van Til has been criticized for not being more exegeti-

cal in his discussions—for not showing the Biblical underpinnings for

his method of defending the faith1—it is quite clear that he views such

a scriptural foundation to be a prerequisite for sound apologetics. His

students can attest how saturated with biblical allusions his apologetic

lectures could be. He has written: "The Christian is not to take the

formulation of his problems nor his answers to them from a philosophy

which is not itself, in its basic principles, drawn from Scripture."2

1. For example, see G. C. Berkouwer, "The Authority of Scripture (A Respon-

sible Confession)," Jerusalem and Athens, ed. E. R. Geehan, Presbyterian and Reformed,

1971), 197-203.

2. C. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed,

1955), 228.

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

Consequently our present concern will be to learn from Scripture that

God has a unique epistemological status, that all men inescapably know

their Creator but hinder that knowledge in unrighteousness, that intelli-

gibility and knowledge are impossible outside of submission to revelation

from God who is the source of any and all knowledge, that there is an an-

tithesis between the espoused presuppositions of the believer and the un-

believer, that the unbeliever is of himself unable to come to a knowledge

of the truth, that "genuine" knowledge (i.e., that which includes conscious

conviction and confession of the veracity of Scripture) requires regenera-

tion and faith, and that the Word of God must never be called into ques-

tion or defended by appeal to some other, more certain authority.

These things being true, an apologetic approach that does not ap-

peal to the principles or notions of the unbeliever to get off the ground,

but does appeal to the suppressed knowledge of God all men have as a

result of God's clear revelation and does base its argumentation in the

self-attesting word of Scripture, an apologetic that refuses to waver as to

the truth of Scripture and appeals to man as the responsible image of

God to admit the impossibility of knowledge without the revealed God,

an apologetic that looks to the sovereign grace of the Holy Spirit for suc-

cess in changing men's hearts and minds and sees faith as a moral pre-

requisite to understanding—in short, a presuppositional apologetic—is

demanded by the Bible itself.

C H R I S T - C E N T E R E D A P O L O G E T I C S

Where Peter commands us always to be ready to set forth a defense of

the hope in us, he also specifies the condition under which this must be

done: "Set Christ apart as Lord in your hearts" (1 Peter 3:15). In all our

apologetical endeavors we must honor Christ as Lord over our thinking

and argumentation. He alone must occupy this unique position of lord-

ship in our minds, for He must be "set apart" to that function. That which

dictates what we think and present in defense of the faith must not be the

theories, inferences, and assumptions of secular learning. The content and

logic of our apologetic comes from the Word of Christ our Lord. This

Word of Christ has a unique status among all other words that men may

speak, for Christ is metaphysically the Lord (John 1:1—3; Col. l:16f.; Rom.

11:36; 1 Cor. 8:6), ethically the Lord (Ps. 145:17; Rom. 7:12; Matt. 5:17-20;

26

THE CHRISTIAN MIND &. METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

1 John 5:1-3), and epistemologically the Lord (Col. 2:3; Rom. ll:33f.; Ps.

147:5; Acts 15:18; Ezek. 11:5).

Since Christ is our Lord and we His servants, we recognize that

He makes an unqualified, radical demand upon our lives. It is radical

because it takes precedence over any and all other claims. Competi-

tion is ruled out from the beginning, because Christ demands that we

love the Lord with every faculty we possess (Matt. 22:37) and that we

never presume to serve two masters (Matt. 6:22ff). The Lord's claim

upon His servants is radical also because it covers every facet of our

lives; every thought (2 Cor. 10:5), every word and deed (Col. 3:17), and

whatever we do must be done for the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31). Thus

the Lord's claim upon our living and thinking is radical because it

cannot be brought into question. Adam failed on this score in the gar-

den, and Israel did no better in the wilderness. But the true and faith-

ful Son of God, when tempted by Satan, honored the Lord's demand,

saying, "You shall not put the Lord your God to a test" (Matt. 4:7).

Exclusive loyalty belongs to the Lord, and hence His Word must

never be doubted or tried. Consequently, when Peter commands us to

defend the faith by honoring the lordship of Christ, this means that we

must never assume an uncommitted or neutral stance with respect to

the veracity of God's Word. Scripture is not on trial, but must always

be presupposed as true. To presume to work up to a recognition of its

truth by independent argumentation would be to honor some other

lord than Christ (whether it be empirical discovery, logic, some schol-

ar's opinion, one's own rational abilities, or whatever). Christ alone

must govern our thoughts, and His Word must not be brought into

question. In setting forth our reasoned account for the Christian hope

in us we are obligated by the word of our Lord to do so without cast-

ing doubt upon Scripture's veracity. The Lord's word must be presup-

posed and obeyed in everything we do— even apologetics. Like faithful

Abraham, we must never waver in unbelief (Rom. 4:20). The Word of

God should not be treated as a hypothesis to be proved by rational-

empirical testing; it must never be reduced to the level of probability. It

is the unquestionable Word of Christ our Lord; we begin with its verac-

ity and argue accordingly. It is the thinking of the rebel sinner, not the

Word of the Lord, that must be brought into question. Our defense of

the faith does not work toward an honoring of Christ's lordship; it works

under that lordship!

27

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

God's Word vs. Crafty Persuasions

Our apologetic presupposes the Word of Christ rather than the intel-

lectual principles and methods of unbelief. We challenge the unbeliever

as to the validity and intelligibility of knowledge outside of submission

to Christ as Lord. In Colossians 2:3-8 Paul infallibly declares that "all

the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid in Christ." He says this

in order that "no one delude you with persuasive speech [craftily plau-

sible argument]," and exhorts us to be steadfast, confirmed, rooted, sta-

blished in the faith as we were taught. Then Paul warns us against any

philosophy that does not operate according to the presuppositions of the

Christian faith: "Beware lest anyone be robbing you by means of phi-

losophy, even vain deception which is according to the tradition of men,

according to the worldly elements of learning [or fundamental principles

of the world], and not according to Christ."

Let's examine this passage point by point. Isaiah 11:2 said that the

Spirit of the Lord, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding and knowl-

edge, would rest upon the messianic Son. This Spirit is called the Spirit

of Truth (John 15:26), and this Son is himself called the Truth (John

14:6). Now Paul adds that all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are

hid in Christ. Christ has all knowledge and is the source of all knowl-

edge. Every treasure of knowledge must be found in Him, for He has

them all. There are no exceptions; any intellectual endeavor must begin

with the One who has, and is, the truth. These riches of God's wisdom

and knowledge have incomprehensible depth according to Romans

11:33. Hence the striking assertion of Paul in Colossians 2:3 would be

enough to show us that our apologetic must not call the Word of Christ

into question but must challenge the unbeliever to the impossibility of

knowledge outside of Christ.

However, Paul does not leave this to our inference, but draws out the

implication himself. He explains in verse 4 that he makes this assertion

so that the Christian believers would not be deluded by those who can

use crafty arguments or persuasive speech. Romans 16:17-18 informs

us that such people are those teaching contrary to apostolic doctrine.

Those who disagree with the scriptural faith of the Christian may give

the appearance of persuasive intellect, but it is only a delusion, since it

works against the One who has all the treasures of knowledge. These

words of exhortation against those who would delude believers by argu-

28

THE CHRISTIAN MIND &. METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

ing against Christ are very similar to Paul's command in Ephesians 4:17

that believers not walk in a way that imitates the way the nations walk—

that is, in the vanity of their mind. Christians must not think or reason

in accordance with the worldly mind-set, for the intellectual outlook that

opposes Christ is vain. Indeed, in verse 18 Paul says that the unbeliever

is ignorant, having a darkened understanding and a blind heart. Follow

the principles and methods of those who deny Christ (or bring His Word

into question) and vain ignorance is the result. By not honoring God as

they should, the God whom they cannot escape knowing, their reason-

ing is made vain (Rom. 1:21). But, as Paul teaches in Ephesians 4:20-24,

we have not learned Christ after this manner! Instead, we were taught by

Him, and the truth is in Jesus. We have put off the old man who thought

in a worldly fashion, and we have been renewed in mind. Christians do

not follow the methods or logic of unbelief; they now, by the grace of

God, have new standards and presuppositions for thinking.

Returning to Colossians 2, Paul says that the crafty ways of think-

ing which characterize opposition to Christ can do nothing but delude

or beguile. Thus in verses 5-7 Paul urges us to be established in the

faith that is grounded in apostolic teaching. He urges this because the

apostles teach the Word of the Lord, and this Word is the foundation for

all truth (cf. John 14:26; 15:26f.; 16:13-15; 17:14-19). In Christ are all the

treasures of knowledge. Therefore, Paul puts us on the alert against any-

one who would rob us by philosophy. This word "rob" in verse 8 harkens

back to the "treasures" mentioned in verse 3. If we want to be deprived

of knowledge we can do so by following "philosophy" (such as Paul en-

countered at Athens; cf. Acts 17:18) rather than the Word of Christ, for

only in Him do we find the treasures of knowledge.

Avoid Vain Deceptions

Paul goes on to describe the type of philosophy we must avoid: phi-

losophy that is vain deception. Then he delivers three parallel character-

izations of this vain, deceptive philosophy: according to human tradition,

according to worldly presuppositions, (that is) not according to Christ. What

kind of philosophy is vain deception? We can easily infer what it is when

we read in Deuteronomy 32:47 (LXX) that the word of the Lord is not

a "vain" thing, or in Philippians 2:16 that not running or laboring in

"vain" is dependent upon holding forth the Word of life. Acts 4:25 tells

29

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

us that it is the rebellious nations who imagine a "vain" thing. Paul]

declares in 1 Corinthians 3:20 that the thoughts of the worldly-wise are

"vain"; in 1 Timothy 6:20 he tells Timothy to avoid "vain" utterances,

those that are antithetical to the faith; 2 Timothy 2:15—18 makes clear

that "vain" utterances err against the Word of God's truth. " Vain-talk-

ing" is equated with swerving from the commandment according to 1

Timothy 1:6; vain-talkers do not understand what they say (vs. 7). Paul

says in Titus 1:9-10 that because of such vain-talkers we need to hold

fast the faithful Word and to convince by sound doctrine those who

contradict it; their mouths must be stopped so that they do not continue

to turn away from the truth (vss. 11, 13f.). Hence it is clear what "vain"

philosophy is according to God's Word: it is rebellious thinking that

opposes the truthful Word of God. Such thinking which works with

presuppositions not grounded in Scripture results in an absence of un-

derstanding since it will not submit to Him who is the fountain of all

wisdom and knowledge.

In Colossians 2:8 Paul uses the word "deception" for this vain phi-

losophy as well. This is an appropriate designation since secular phi-

losophy gives the appearance of intelligibility and knowledge, but it

actually could have neither on the basis of its espoused presuppositions

which are outside of Christ. Hebrews 3:12-15 says that sin is "deceit-

ful" and causes us to harden our hearts to the voice of God. According

to 2 Thessalonians 2:10-12, those who do not receive the love of truth

bear an unrighteous "deceitfulness," and God sends them strong delu-

sion to believe the lie and not the truth. The old man of sin who is not

renewed in the spirit of his mind has "deceitful" lusts (Eph. 4:22), and

false teachers with destructive opinions revel in their "deceits" (2 Peter

2:13). Hence "deceptive" philosophy denotes the same basic thing as

"vain" philosophy: unregenerate and false opposition to the voice of

God speaking in Scripture.

Paul brings the two designations together in Colossians 2:8, warn-

ing us against "philosophy, even vain deception"—that is, philosophy

that does not begin by submitting to the truth of Christ in Scripture.

This warning corresponds to his injunction in Ephesians 5:6, "Let no

man deceive you with vain words." Because of such vain words the wrath

of God comes upon the sons of disobedience as Paul says in the same

verse. We must not reason or think according to their secular premises

and principles since (in verse 7) Paul commands us not to be partakers

30

THE CHRISTIAN MIND &. METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

with them. His explanation for the prohibition against cooperating with

and using secular presuppositions is that we were darkness in the past but

now are light in the Lord—and subsequently bear the fruit of truth (vss.

8f.). Again, in verse 11, Paul commands us not to have "fellowship" (i.e.,

sympathetic interest, cf. Phil. 4:14) with the unfruitful works of dark-

ness—even their thoughts or arguments—but "rather, reprove them."

Paul drives home the point (in Col. 2:8) that philosophy that does not

follow the presuppositions of Christ's Word must be avoided by means of

his further description of that vain, deceptive philosophy which robs us

of the treasures of knowledge that can be found only in Christ. Such phi-

losophy is not according to Christ but according to the tradition of men

and the elements of learning of the world. That contrast should make

it plain to us that there is an antithesis between the presuppositions of

the believer and those of the unbeliever. The standards, methods, and

premises of Christian thought are rooted in the Word of Christ, but the

presuppositions of the non- Christian are derived from the thinking of

men and the principles of the world. The "tradition of men" denotes the

sort of philosophy that sets aside the Word of God and eventually makes

it void (cf. Mark 7:8f., 13).

The Greek word stoicheia, taken in its immediate context (especially

the threefold parallel phrases beginning with kata), should be translated

"elements of learning," "rudiments," or "fundamental principles" rath-

er than "spirits" (as some allege). Reference to the worldly elements of

learning fits the context of philosophy, human traditions, and treasures

of knowledge much more naturally than does a reference to worldly

spirits or demons. Moreover, the same Greek word is used in verse 20

of the same chapter of Colossians where it is said that we are dead with

Christ from the stoicheia of the world, that is (according to vs. 22) the

"injunctions and teachings of men." So the stoicheia of verse 8 refer to the

elements of learning. This use of the word is parallel to that of Hebrews

5:12 and much extra-biblical literature.3

Now to make sure that he has made himself perfectly clear Paul

adds that the philosophy that is vain deception, that is according to

human tradition, that is according to worldly elements of learning, is

philosophy that is not according to Christ. Such thinking does not begin by

3. For a representative sampling, see Arndt and Gingrich, Greek-English Lexicon of

the New testament and Other Early Christian Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1957), 776.

31

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

presupposing the truth of Christ's Word, the Scriptures. It does not take

its direction and foundational content from the Word of God. That is

why it can only delude us and rob us of knowledge. In 1 Timothy 6:20 Paul

urges us to turn away from godless, vain utterances and contradictions

(i.e., "antitheses") such as derive from that which goes under the "pseud-

onym" of knowledge. Secular philosophy is falsely named "knowledge

because it does not begin with an acceptance of the Word of Christ, in

whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Knowledge

is possible only upon the rock-foundation of divine revelation (cf. Matt.

7:24ff.).

Any line of thinking that does not begin with Christ can end only

in foolishness. God has made foolish the wisdom of this world (1 Cor.

1:20). So, if anyone desires to be genuinely wise, he must become fool-

ish in the eyes of the world by submitting to the authoritative truth of

Christ (1 Cor. 3:18). Worldly philosophy considers itself wise to begin

its thinking independently of Christ, but in point of fact it is apostolic

Christianity that is "the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 2:7) . In Colossians

Paul strives to make this point clear: secular philosophy may seem to

be wise, but in reality it is the Christian who has genuine knowledge,

spiritual understanding, and wisdom (1:9), thereby being able to teach

with all wisdom (1:28). This is effected by the Word of Christ dwelling

in him by all wisdom (3:16), and the believer is to walk by such wisdom toward

them that are without (4:6).

In this context the teaching of Colossians 2:3-8 is unambiguous. Our

presuppositions must be according to the Word of Christ rather than hu-

man, worldly philosophy—especially when we apologetically encounter

those who are outside the faith. This is because all knowledge (note: not i

simply knowledge of "religious" matters) is to be found in Christ. Our

firmly established argumentative assumptions must be biblical, not agnos-

tic or apostate. Failure to begin our thinking or arguing with the Word of

Christ will set us down the one-way road to foolish ignorance.

R E D E M P T I V E R E V E L A T I O N AND A P O L O G E T I C S

God only is wise (Rom. 16:27), and He has made the world according

to His wisdom (Ps. 104:24). Man cannot search out God (Job 11:7), for

God's thoughts are higher than man's thoughts (Isa. 55:8f.). Consequent-

ly, man cannot know God and, hence, God's world without revelation; a

32

THE CHRISTIAN MIND &. METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

vain man who rejects God's revelation will certainly never get under-

standing (Job 11:12). The Lord is the one who teaches man knowledge

Ps. 94:10). It is He who leads man in the truth and instructs him (Ps.

25:5, 8f., 12; 71:17; Isa. 54:13;John 6:45). Thus God tells us to apply our

hearts unto His knowledge if we are to know the certainty of the words

of truth (Prov. 22:17-21). "Attend unto my wisdom; incline thine ear to

my understanding that thou mayest preserve discretion and that thy lips

may keep knowledge" (Prov. 5:lf., KJV).

Man must begin with the revealed truth of God if he is going to have

knowledge. Therefore, humble submission to God's Word must precede

all of man's intellectual pursuits, and he must renounce the arrogant

independence of secular thought. "Talk no more proudly; let not ar-

rogance come from thy mouth, for Jehovah is a God of knowledge" (1

Sam. 2:3). All knowledge is founded in Him and His revealed Word;

hence no man dares to challenge God's Word. Man must begin with

the truth of God's Word in order to obtain knowledge of any area, for

when he attempts to proceed in autonomous fashion he will end up in

the darkness of total ignorance if he is consistent. The declaration of the

Psalmist is "In thy light shall we see light" (36:9). Man cannot attain

to knowledge without a prior knowledge of God and His revelation; he

must begin with God in order to find out about anything else at all.

Without the light of God's revelation man would be at a loss to self-

generate the light of knowledge. Because God is the Lord and source of

all knowledge it is necessary for man to presuppose the revealed truth of

God before he can meaningfully pursue knowledge of any field and have

theoretic grounding or direction for science and philosophy. We can

see light only within the prior light of God. It is the Lord who must en-

lighten our darkness (Ps. 18:28); thus it is the entrance of His words that

gives us light and understanding (Ps. 119:130). Scripture must be presup-

posed if man is to have understanding; consequently he cannot presume

to utilize self-wrought understanding to decide if Scripture should be

accepted. We can see light only in the light of God, and God gives this

light by the entrance of His Word.

While Satan may have blinded the minds of unbelievers, God shines

in the hearts of believers for the enlightenment of knowledge in the face

of Christ (2 Cor. 4:4, 6). It must be God who gives us a Spirit of wis-

dom in a genuine knowledge of Him and who enlightens our eyes (Eph.

l:17fi). Because the apostles represent the risen Christ and speak His

33

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

Word their teaching turns us from darkness to light (Acts 26:18), and

Paul can boldly tell Timothy to consider what he says as an apostle be-

cause "the Lord will give you understanding in all things" (2 Tim. 2:7).

Enlightenment and knowledge must come from the Lord, who has all

knowledge in Himself and declares the end from the beginning, who as

the possessor of all wisdom has created the world in wisdom, and who

must instruct man in truth if man is to attain to knowledge of any field.

The presupposed truth of Scripture is requisite for understanding.

How much more is this the case when we consider that man is not

only a creature (hence needing revelation to have a foundation for

knowledge) but is a sinful and rebellious creature. Man needs not only

revelation (of metaphysical and epistemological premises and principles),

he needs redemptive revelation (that which deals with his ethical rebel-

lion). If man in the garden required special revelation to interpret the

world properly, a fortiori man who has fallen into sin needs special rev-

elation for his scholarly efforts; however, now the special revelation is

redemptive revelation. Hence natural theology, autonomous methodology,

and probabilistic apologetics will gain nothing of significance when en-

countering the unbeliever. God can be known (and thereby God's world

can be known) only by a voluntary revelation by the Son and Spirit of

God (Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 2:10).

Now this Son has come as the Savior, and this Spirit operates as the

regenerator. Together they deal with man's ethical hostility to God and

His Word and, in this way, make it possible for man to know his Cre-

ator and Creator's world aright. Fallen man can approach a genuine (or

"saving") knowledge of God, therefore, only by means of the Son and

Spirit of God. This in turn should indicate the necessity for our apologeti-

cal endeavors to begin with, and be directed by, the special redemptive

revelation of God in Scripture. Independent epistemological principles or

methods joined with the autonomously interpreted facts of science and

history cannot bring fallen man to a genuine knowledge of his God (one that

includes conviction and confession of the truthfulness of Scripture); for that,

the revelation of God's saving Son and regenerating Spirit are requisite.

Man's sin must be dealt with by the redemptive revelation of Christ

and the Holy Spirit in order that a proper understanding of God can be

regained. In this case the apologist clearly cannot hope to gain anything

by arguing first for a broad, general theism and then progressively up to

Christian theism; to know God at all fallen man must come via Christ.

34

THE CHRISTIAN M I N D & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

Only Jesus has the epistemological prerogative to reveal the Father, and

this revelation can be hidden from the worldly wise and those who are

thought to have understanding, while given to babes (Matt. 11:25—27).

Consequently, our apologetic should not be foolishly founded upon com-

monly interpreted notions with the secular thought-world and should

not be concerned to appease the thinking of unbelief by allowing its

methodological principles or standards to dictate what shall constitute a

satisfactory argument. By starting independently of submission to the truth

and direction of Christ's Word we shall never end our arguments any-

where but independently of Christ. An effective and self-conscious apolo-

getic must presuppose and follow the Word of Christ, for Jesus alone can

give the sinner a knowledge of the Father.

Only redemptive revelation can secure genuine knowledge of God

for fallen man, and the requisite understanding of the mysteries of the

kingdom must be given or granted to him (Luke 8:10); as long as they

are kept hidden from him he shall not understand (Luke 18:34). The one

who has not believed the Scriptures must have his mind opened to understand

God's redemptive revelation (e.g., Luke 24:45). The world is not able to

receive the Spirit of Truth who regenerates and enlightens us; indeed it is

quite unaware of this Spirit who enables one to understand the truth of

God. By sharp contrast the followers of Christ have this Spirit dwelling

within them (John 14:17). The Spirit convicts the world (John 16:8) and

will "guide" (a word etymologically related to "way" in John 14:6) into

all truth. This He does by bearing witness to Christ (John 15:26), who

is the Truth (John 14:6) and the Word of God (John 1:1). When Christ

is removed from the world it will be the Spirit who continually witnesses

concerning Him; it is the Holy Spirit who conducts Christ's case before

the world as His legal representative for the defense (i.e., "Advocate").

Therefore, we conclude from the above observations that our apolo-

getic can only bring men to a genuine knowledge of God when it is rooted

in the Word and the Spirit. We must presuppose the truthful Word of Christ,

for all knowledge comes from God; and it is the Spirit who now opens the mind

of fallen man to understand and accept the needed redemptive revelation of

God. The Spirit carries on the "apologetic" for Christ before the world

and witnesses to the Word. The Spirit can use our apologetical argument

when it is shaped according to a scriptural outlook and approach to truth.

The fact that the Spirit witnesses to the word does not restrict our apolo-

getic to simply preaching the message of the gospel or reciting Scripture,

3 5

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

but it does mean that our argumentative considerations must be function-

ally equivalent to the viewpoint of God's Word or applications of its teachings

that bear on knowledge, truth, etc. (e.g., Prov. 26:5).

R E V E L A T I O N A P R E R E Q U I S I T E F O R T H E A P O L O G I S T

So an apologetic that does not presuppose the Word of Christ, but tries

to win men over to an acceptance of the truthfulness of Scripture by

considerations supposedly built up independently of commitment to the

scriptural viewpoint and authority, is doomed to ineffectiveness. Knowl-

edge and understanding are impossible aside from revelation from God.

The apologist must understand this fact and boldly challenge the in-

tellectual rebel with it. Because the apologist recognizes the necessity

of the Spirit's work in the sinner's heart before belief and subsequent

understanding are possible, his chief responsibility is faithfully to argue

within the presupposition of God's Word. Moreover, a non-presupposi-

tional apologetic, which tries to convince the unbeliever by making use

of the presuppositions for knowledge and learning dictated by man, is

inherently without use for granting man an understanding of God; for

with the Holy Spirit's instruction we have no need that any man teach us

(1 John 2:27). Hence our apologetic must not be founded upon the word

of man but must depend upon the Word and the Spirit—that is, it must

be presuppositional.

So then, if any man is to gain genuine knowledge of God or God's

world, and if the apologist for the Christian faith is going to be effective

in his defense, they both must heed the exhortation of Paul in Colossians

3:16: "Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly." When this is done we

can partake of the treasures of knowledge hidden in Christ. If we remain

(continue, dwell) in Christ's Word, then we will know the truth (John

8:31f.). (Note that Christ does not tone down His declaration or reduce

its extent by merely saying that it is necessary to remain in His Word in

order to know "religious" truth.) If the truth (without qualification) is to be

known, one must begin with the Word of Christ; Christ is certainly in a

position to make this far-reaching claim (cf. Col. 2:3).

The unbeliever cannot of himself hear the Word of Christ, for you

must be of God in order to hear God's words (John 8:43, 47). As long as

one does not dwell in Christ's teaching he can never have God (2 John

9). Hence the apologist knows that if the unbeliever is to have genuine

36

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

truth he must begin with the words of Christ, and only these words (not

those of autonomous argumentation), empowered by the Holy Spirit so

that the man listening can actually hear the Word of God, will bring

the unbeliever to God. So instead of founding his apologetic upon truths

that are supposedly independent of Christ's Word (a possibility excluded

by Christ in John 8:31f.), the Christian must argue upon the presup-

posed Word of Christ. This does not mean that his only argumentative

approach is to quote memory verses or repeat the way of salvation, but

that his reasoned defense must not appeal to the unbeliever outside of

the presupposed truth and direction of Christ's Word. Our case must

be an outworking of the viewpoint and teaching of Scripture, and so

our formulations and arguments must be founded on the authority of

Scripture. The Holy Spirit empowers and witnesses to the Word and

considerations rooted therein, not to the "wise" and clever arguments of

the autonomous intellectual. Our apologetical reasoning, no less than

our preaching, must be fashioned from the Word of God and according

to its authoritative teachings, for it is to the Word that the Holy Spirit

bears His powerful witness.

Apologetics is not to be some kind of autonomous intellectual ac-

tivity that goes before the believer's submission of his mind to the rev-

elation of God. One's epistemology will be influential in every phase

of his thinking, including his theology as derived from Scripture, and

this epistemology will be made most explicit in apologetics. Thus while

we should definitely see a difference in emphasis between the positive

statement of biblical teaching and its defense, we must also recognize

how indispensable they are to each other. Consequently, the Christian's

apologetic ought to expound the theology of Scripture and its noetic im-

plications. It ought to be an application of the Word of God.

In performing the task of apologetic argumentation, then, we must

see to it that the Word of God dwells in us rather than the wisdom of

men. On the basis of God's Word indwelling us, and its outlook be-

ing the foundation of our arguments and defense before the unbeliever,

our prayer for his conversion can be effective (cf. John 15:7), we can be

strong to overcome the rebellious thinking of the evil one (1 John 2:14),

and we ourselves will remain in the Son rather than being intellectually

trapped behind enemy lines (1 John 2:24). The apologist must have the

mind of Christ when encountering the foolishness of the world, for secu-

lar thinking is unable to come to a knowledge of spiritual things (1 Cor.

37

P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L A P O L O G E T I C S P O S I T I V E L Y STATED

2:14, 16). T h e Word of Christ, rather than the premises and standards

of the unbelieving world, must be presupposed in formulating a defense

if an apologist is going to be able to bring the unbeliever to a saving

knowledge of God. Unbelieving or agnostic apologetical presuppositions

will leave the non-Christian in his unbelieving or agnostic inability to

receive the things of the Spirit. Some men have an ignorance of G o d (1

Cor. 15:34), and they can come to a knowledge of the True O n e only

when the Son grants them an understanding (1 J o h n 5:20). Because Christ

is the one who makes known the things of the Father (John 15:15), the

apologist must presuppose the Word of Christ and have the mind of

Christ when encountering unbelief with reasons for accepting the gos-

pel message. A n d a predominant characteristic of the mind of Christ is

humble obedience (Phil. 2:5ff). T h u s our apologetic must not proudly oper-

ate within the unbelieving or agnostic presuppositions of the rebellious

thought world, but it must humbly and obediently submit to the Word of

Christ, presupposing its truth and arguing accordingly so that we will

be able to overthrow reasonings and every high thing that exalts itself

against the knowledge of God (2 Cor. 10:5). Such an effective apologetic

requires that we bring every thought captive to the obedience of Christ.

T H E UNBELIEVER'S KNOWLEDGE OF G O D

AND WILLFUL SUPPRESSION OF IT

T h e last few paragraphs have been given to considerations of the neces-

sity of revelation from G o d the Creator if m a n , as a creature of G o d , is to

have any knowledge whatsoever. T h e n discussion focused on the neces-

sity of presupposing the redemptive Word of G o d if the apologist is going

to bring fallen m a n to a genuine knowledge of his Lord.

We turn now to see why the unbeliever is not as ignorant as he should

be if consistent with his unbelieving attitude and presuppositions (that is,

why the unbeliever has a great deal of knowledge about the world in spite

of the fact that his unbelieving presuppositions are incapable of leading to,

or theoretically grounding, knowledge and truth), why the apologist can

be certain that the sinner can intellectually apprehend the witness and

defense of the gospel, and why the believer has a point of contact with

the unbeliever. T h e explanation of these things is to be found in the fact

that m a n knows, yet does not know his Creator. This is not to be seen as a

logical contradiction, for the unbeliever knows G o d in one sense (a sense

38

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

that leaves him entirely responsible for his intellectual rebellion) but does

not know God in another sense (a sense that would bring him to salvation).

We might express the situation in this way: The unbeliever knows

God but will not acknowledge or self-consciously submit to and use that

knowledge properly. Hence he does not have a "genuine knowledge"

(i.e., an unsuppressed and saving knowledge) of God—he knows God in

unrighteousness and judgment, but not in obedience and blessing.4 At

base all men know God and cannot escape knowing Him. Nevertheless,

they will not admit to that knowledge or use it properly, choosing rather

to suppress it with respect to their public lives and espoused philosophies,

yet never eradicating it in their private "heart of hearts." The harden-

ing process of sin hinders a "genuine knowledge" of God and may even

make the sinner refuse to admit any knowledge of God to himself, but

Scripture assures us that no man can escape the clear revelation of God.

The world was created by the dynamic and meaningful Word of God

(John 1:3, 10; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2); God spoke and it was so (Gen. 1:3;

etc.). Thus the whole created world, both things visible and things invis-

ible, has the express imprint of God's mind, because it was formed in ac-

cordance with His Word. Only God's knowledge is comprehensive, and

His knowledge eternally precedes all other knowledge; for the knowledge

of the creature to be knowledge it must reflect the thinking of God the

Creator. When the creature departs from God's thoughts he is doomed

to ignorance, for God is the original of knowledge; He is comprehensive

knowledge and the source of all derivative knowledge.

God created man as His own image (Gen. l:26f.). So just as man

cannot escape himself, he cannot escape the face of his God. Man is

not able to isolate himself or be ignorant of God. Self-knowledge and

self-awareness unavoidably entail God-knowledge and awareness of

one's Creator. In virtue of his creation as a human every man "images"

his God. When man works against his inherent knowledge of God, he

works against the very possibility of any knowledge at all and moves in

the direction of destroying his own humanity. When man looks at the

t

4

. The phrase "genuine knowledge" should not b e taken i n this context t o imply that

the knowledge held in unrighteousness is in any way "inauthentic," spurious, or un-

real; here ingenuine knowledge is not knowledge that "doesn't count." Yet knowledge

held in unrighteousness is not "genuine" in the sense that it is not "sincere"—it is not

loving, pure, and obedient knowledge of God, but knowledge sullied by hypocrisy

and infidelity.)

39

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

world created by the word of God he is confronted with a clear revela-

tion of his God again.

There is no environment where man can flee to escape the revela-

tion and presence of God (Ps. 139:8). Man continually lives under the

pressure of God's omnipresent manifestation of Himself. "The heavens

declare His righteousness, and all the peoples have seen His glory" (Ps.

97:6). Men cannot escape this revelation since God himself has made

it known. Psalm 19 is emphatic on the clear and inescapable character

of God's revelation in nature: the heavens declare God's glory, the

firmament proclaims His handiwork, day to day pours forth speech

while night to night declares knowledge (vss. 1-2). Even though this

revelation may be verbally silent (vs. 3), it is universal and inescapable

(vs. 4). God's revelation is everywhere and always shouting to man

without stuttering.

The universality and inescapability of the knowledge of God is dra-

matically expressed in the fact that all men, whatever their moral and

spiritual condition before God, know Him. God has one of two atti-

tudes toward every man: either judgmental wrath or gracious favor.

God makes Himself known in curse and disfavor toward men (e.g., Ex.

14:4, 18; Ezek. 35:llf.; 38:23;James 2:19), as well as in blessing and grace

(e.g., Ex. 33:13; Isa. 19:20-22; 66:14). And in addition to all this, John

1:9 declares that Christ enlightens every man coming into the world (cf.

Isa. 40:5; 52:10; 66:18). There is no man made in the image of God and

living in God's world, whatever God's attitude toward him and his own

feelings about Christ, who does not know the living and true God, his

Creator. All men have the requisite knowledge of God to make them

eternally responsible before Him; this was true in the Garden, and it

does not cease to be true after the fall. Sin or no sin, special revelation

or no special revelation, all men inescapably know their God.

Such is the infallible teaching of God's Word. No apologist dare

deny it or work in a manner that assumes this is not the case. Yet just

as surely the Word of God says that there is a sense in which men do

not know the Lord. Jeremiah 31:34 anticipates a day in which all men

will finally know Jehovah, and Hosea can speak of the absence of a

knowledge of the Lord even in the favored land of Israel (4:1; 6:6). Christ

declared both that His enemies knew Him (John 7:28), yet that they did

not know Him (John 8:19). While knowing the truth about Jesus' divine

and messianic character, these people refused consciously to submit to it

40

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

and, hence, did not have a knowledge of Him in the proper and signifi-

cant sense. Indeed, by not knowing Christ they in reality did not even

know the Father (the knowledge of whom they took great pride in), for

Jesus alone has exegeted the Father (John 1:18). Scripture asserts that men

inescapably know God in their heart of hearts while in their outward

thinking and response they do not acknowledge it and thus do not know

God in the genuine or proper sense. The apologist is under obligation

to keep both of these facts in mind when he defends the faith: the un-

believer's espoused presuppositions are ignorant of God and unsuitable

as a foundation for apologetic argumentation; but the unbeliever still

has an unacknowledged knowledge of God to which the apologist can

appeal and which he can use to call the sinner back to proper remem-

brance of his God.

Paul set forth both of these truths about the unbeliever in his writings

and missionary activity. He describes the unbeliever in Romans l:18ff.,

and he encounters unbelievers who do not submit to the authority of

Scripture in even a nominal way in Acts 14 and Acts 17; his practice was

consistent with his theory. In fact the teaching of Romans is strikingly

parallel to his missionary proclamation. In Romans 1 Paul plainly asserts

that all men know God: "What can be known about God is plain within

them" (vs. 19); "His invisible nature" is "clearly perceived" and "intel-

lectually apprehended" (vs. 20); and man is characterized as "knowing

God" (Greek, gnontes ton theon, vs. 21)—man knows the living and true God,

not simply a vague deity. The knowledge of God is clear and unavoidable

"because God made it plain [manifested it] to them" (vs. 19).

The sovereign Lord and Creator has chosen to make Himself

known to all men, and nothing can prevent Him from accomplishing

His purposes. God has given a universal self-revelation, and there has

never been a man, nor will there ever be one, who could escape it. This

revelation is not vain as if falling upon deaf ears; Scripture says it is

plain within man, clearly perceived, intellectually apprehended, and actually

known. God speaks and is heard; He manifests Himself and is seen. And

the knowledge of God which all men unavoidably possess is not of lim-

ited extent or value; even His everlasting power and divine nature are

clearly perceived (vs. 20), so that man has everything he needs properly to

glorify the one true God (vs. 21), and he is without any excuse at all (vs.

20). The sinner is without an "apologetic" for his departure from God

41

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

(note the Greek of vs. 20)!5 This revelation of God, which clearly renders

all men as " knowing God." (vs. 21), confronts men everywhere. It is both

"in them" (vs. 19) and "from the created world" (vs. 20). The apostle

could hardly have been much more emphatic in his teaching: all men do

know the living and true God and are completely responsible to Him since

His revelation confronts them everywhere!

Paul also teaches that these men outwardly exchanged the truth of

God (which they inwardly knew) for the lie, worshiping some aspect of

creation in the place of the Creator (vss. 25, 23). They do this by hinder-

ing, suppressing, or misusing the truth in unrighteousness (vs. 18). As a

result they might profess wisdom, but they had actually become foolish

(vs. 22) and reached the point of intellectual futility. Their reasoning

became vain, and their misguided hearts were darkened (vs. 21). Thus

while man knows full well the truth about God, he nevertheless refuses

to acknowledge it or respond properly to it; instead he suppresses it. He

tries everything he can to avoid facing the God before whom he is guilty

of rebellion. He even manufactures a god to take the place of the living

and true God, a god that will perform the various functions of deity in

man's own system of thinking yet is under the authority of the rebel sin-

ner. He knows God and cannot escape knowing Him; yet he works as

hard as he can in his outward thinking and behavior to shield himself

from an admission of that knowledge.

The only thing preventing that knowledge from coming to the sur-

face and being publicly recognized is the sinner's busy activity of suppres-

sion—whether he be the boisterous and adamant atheist or the quiet and

sophisticated philosopher. A man who holds a basketball under water may

deny that he knows anything at all about the truth of basketballs, but the

truth keeps exerting its pressure on him! He both possesses the basketball

and denies it; yet if he would cease from hindering it, the truth which he

possessed all along would surface. So it goes with all intellectual rebels

against the truth of God; they inwardly know the truth, but do not have a

genuine or proper knowledge since they suppress the truth in unrighteous-

5. Bahnsen in particular alludes to the Greek, anapologetous, which

most translations render, "without excuse." One could literally translate

the word as "without apologetic," that is, "without a reasoned defense."

Bahnsen points out that the unbeliever, having received adequate testi-

mony of the knowledge of God, and yet having suppressed that knowledge

of God, stands with no defense for his position. He has no apologetic.

42

THE CHRISTIAN MIND &. METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

ness. They know enough to be responsible, but they do not know in a way

that will secure their salvation. Paul teaches both aspects of man's condi-

tion in Romans 1, and our defense of the faith before the unbeliever must

take account of, and respond accordingly, to each aspect.

PAUL'S A P O L O G E T I C I N P R A C T I C E

Against those who would oppose presuppositional apologetics by pointing

to the activity of Paul, when he confronted unbelievers at Lystra and Ath-

ens (Acts 14 and 17 respectively), we need to observe that Paul's missionary

and apologetical endeavor in these places corresponded exactly to what he

wrote in Romans 1 about the spiritual condition of the unbeliever. Unless

we are prepared to attribute inconsistency to the apostle or see Paul as

some sort of schizophrenic we should expect to find the very definite logical

relation holding between the three passages which actually characterizes

them. Acts 14 and 17 are practical applications of Romans 1.

The contents of these passages can be summed up in this way: An

affirmation of natural revelation and a subsequent denial of the possibility

of natural theology. We can broaden this a bit: Paul boldly states that God

has clearly witnessed to Himself in history but cannot be identified with

anything in history or the world since He is Lord over both. The sinful

man rules out this God who created him in His image and reconstructs

a god in apostate man's own image. But the rebel sinner is not able au-

tonomously to fashion a correct theology from his understanding of na-

ture. Further, all men are responsible for their rebellion against the truth

of God. Based on what we have seen Paul write in Romans 1 we would

not expect him to appeal to unbelievers on the basis of some theoretic

common ground, for they suppress the truth in unrighteousness, hav-

ing darkened minds and vain reasoning, being fools who worship some

aspect of the created world (vss. 18, 21-23, 25).

Under these conditions natural theology or an apologetic that strives

after neutral agreements with the unbeliever's interpretation of the facts

in order to ground a defense of the faith is going to be impossible. Con-

sequently when Paul preaches in Lystra and Athens he refuses to estab-

lish a common theoretic point of contact in the unbeliever's espoused

interpretation of the world or intellectual methodology and then work

up to a proof of his gospel message based upon it. One thing should be

abundantly clear: Paul's hearers did not recognize any common inter-

43

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

pretative ground between themselves and Paul! At Lystra the people

were scarcely restrained from their idolatrous sin, and Paul was stoned,

dragged out of the city and left for dead (Acts 14:18f). At Athens the

people called Paul a babbling doctrine-monger who brought startling

and strange things to them, and their foremost response to his Areopa-

gus address was mockery (Acts 17:18-20, 32).

The note of authority that Paul sounds in Athens certainly does not

facilitate an effective appeal to a common outlook. In fact Paul's point

of contact is actually the ignorance of his hearers! He stresses, not their

worship, but their ignorance—"that which you worship openly demon-

strating your ignorance I proclaim unto you" (vs. 23). It is primarily the

worshipers who are without genuine knowledge rather than the object

of worship being, from Paul's perspective, unknown. At Lystra Paul ex-

horts the people to turn away from their "vanities" (Acts 14:15); as in Ro-

mans 1:21, these unbelievers are characterized as vain and foolish. Just

as he described unregenerate men in Romans 1:23, 25, Paul viewed the

Athenians as greatly idolatrous (Acts 17:16). In response to both of these

situations Paul does not become greatly encouraged with the prospect

of an effective apologetic rooted in a common point of view with these

pagans. He does not become hopeful of adding the gospel of Christ to

the substratum of Gentile natural theology! Instead he rends his cloth-

ing and runs among the people crying out (Acts 14:14), and his spirit is

convulsed within him (Acts 17:16).

However, just as strongly as Paul rejects any natural theology or

common interpretative outlook on the facts he also affirms boldly the

actuality and facts of natural revelation. As creatures of God his pagan

hearers cannot eradicate the sense of deity within them despite their sin-

ful rebellion; even in their ignorance and suppression of the truth they

are not without a certain awareness of God and their creaturehood. Just

as in Romans Paul asserts that God is clearly known by all men because

of His self-revelation within man and without (l:19f., 32; 2:15), so in his

missionary speeches he stresses the same truth. Sinners have not been

left without a witness from God in the world (Acts 14:17; cf. Rom. 1:20),

and thus they are completely responsible before Him to repent (Acts

14:15; 17:30; cf. Rom. 1:20, 32). In their intellectual rebellion against

the truth of God the Athenians were, nevertheless, very religious by

nature, felt a responsibility for devout worship, and even their poets had

discerned functionally correct truths about God and man (Acts 17:17,

28). Fallen man cannot escape knowing God, not even the Athenian

philosophers (cf. Rom. 1:19-21).

Thus we find that Paul emphasized the same motifs in Romans 1

that he did in Acts 14 and 17: creation by God, God's preservation and

providence, God's sovereign control over history, and man's dependence

upon his Creator. Based on these motifs Paul declares the regular wit-

ness of God to men and their full apostasy and guilt. God is sovereign

Creator (Rom. 1:20, 25; Acts 14:15; 17:24). He exercises providential

oversight on history (Rom. 1:24, 26fif.; Acts 14:16; 17:26)—in this He

has turned men over to their sinfulness. Yet men depend upon God

metaphysically, ethically, and epistemologically (Rom. 1:18-32; 2:15;

Acts 14:17; 17:28). God has constantly witnessed to Himself by means of

history, conscience, nature, and creation (common) grace (Rom. 1:18—

20, 32; 2:4, 15; Acts 14:15, 17; 17:27-29). Consequently God's judgment

awaits all sinners (Rom. 1:18, 28, 32; 2:2-12, 16; Acts 14:15; 17:30f.).

Attention should be given to the fact that all three of the passages un-

der consideration parallel each other in these common motifs; the read-

ier will note that every motif has been cited in each of the three passages

in the above review. Paul's doctrines of man's kinship to God, His clear

revelation, and man's apostasy from the truth led the apostle to reject

the religion of unregenerate man (Rom. 1:22-25); such does not provide

a suitable foundation for the message and defense of the gospel. What

Paul theoretically presented in Romans 1 was appropriately worked

out in his missionary activity. He rejected the overlay of mythological

folk-faith on his gospel and miracles even when it seemed that it might

provide favorable attention for his proclamation (Acts 14:11-18), and he

diametrically opposed the Epicurean notion of ateleological6 "chance"

(fate) as well as the Stoic notions of exclusive knowledge of God for the

elite plus their idolatrous teachings (Acts 17:24-29).7 One can hardly see

the apostle standing on Mars Hill with the majestic Greek Parthenon

6. "Ateleological" (from Greek a "no" + telos "end, goal, purpose") simply

means "without purpose," or "to no end," and thus "by chance." The word, while

helpfully descriptive, is a late academic development, and not used by the Greek

philosophers.

7. For Bahnsen's full exposition of Paul's apologetical confrontation in Acts

17, see Greg L. Bahnsen, Always Ready: Directions for Defending the Faith, ed.

Robert R. Booth (Atlanta, GA: American Vision and Texarkana, AR: Covenant

Media Foundation, 1996), 235-276.

45

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

in the background and proclaiming, "The God who made the world

and everything in it, this One who is Lord over heaven and earth, does

not dwell in temples made with hands" (Acts 17:24), and think that Paul

was striving to find common interpretative ground between himself and

the unbeliever on which he could build an apologetic for the faith! Acts

14 and 17 are consistent with Romans 1; all men clearly know God but

suppress the truth in unrighteousness. Our apologetic appeals to what

the sinner knows in his heart of hearts. It does not begin with or build

upon what the sinner professes with darkened mind and vain reasoning..

T H E A N T I T H E S I S

Because the unbeliever's knowledge of God is suppressed (yet still present)

but the believer's knowledge of God is openly acknowledged (being used

properly), there is a definite antithesis between the thinking or philoso-

phy of the Christian and that of the non-Christian. To some extent this

has already been discussed above. The unbeliever does not begin his

reasoning with the truth of Christ's Word, while the believer does. Al-

though the sinner can never escape knowing the truth of God's revela-

tion in his heart of hearts, still he does not openly and self-consciously

base his public philosophizing upon Scripture. Since the Christian, by

contrast, is obligated to presuppose God's Word in his public philoso-

phizing and apologetical argumentation, there is outwardly a clear an-

tithesis between the thinking of the believer and that of the unbeliever

(even though both, as creatures of God living in God's creation, know

the truth about God). The believer has a genuine and proper knowledge

of the Lord, but the unbeliever is lost in foolishness because he misuses

and suppresses the clear revelation of God.

In the apologetical argument that arises between these two there

will be a direct clash of espoused presuppositions. Those of the Chris-

tian are rooted in Scripture, but those of the unbeliever rebel against

Scripture. By observing the antithesis as Scripture presents it the apolo-

gist will be shown that he must not depend upon the presuppositions of

secular philosophy and science in constructing his defense of the faith.

Rather his argumentation must be firmly established on the Word of

Christ and must boldly challenge the non-Christian from within that

position. When one becomes a Christian all things become new and old

things pass away (2 Cor. 5:17) and this applies even to our ways of think-

46

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

ing and presuppositions. The believer has different standards, assump-

tions, and authority than the unbeliever; whereas he once walked in

the vanity of mind, he now has the mind of Christ. The believer and

unbeliever have no agreement in outlook with each other, for those of

the light have nothing in common with those walking in darkness. So

the believer must separate himself from, and have no part with, the

unbeliever's way of thinking (2 Cor. 6:14-18). Because there is a striking

contrast between the presuppositions and reasoning of the unbeliever

and those of the believer it requires a dramatic intellectual transition for

one to leave the kingdom of darkness and enter the kingdom of God's

beloved Son—indeed, it can be described as nothing less than a conver-

siom. The change from unbelief to belief is not merely a matter of degree

or the addition of a few further steps in reasoning, but rather a radical

change in mindset.

Because the believer has the mind of Christ he is not of the world just

as Christ is not of the world (John 17:16). The Christian has been born

of the Spirit from above (John 3:3, 6), but the unbeliever is of the world

land of the flesh. Those who follow Christ are distinct from the world and

the ways of the flesh. As Christ says in John 17:17, they are consecrated

or set apart from the world, and the distinctive thing about Christians is

that they have the truth. Being not of this world, believers are "set apart

by the truth." And Jesus asserts in the same verse that God's Word is truth.

Consequently, Christians are set apart from the world by the Word of

God, and having this status they are sent into the world (John 17:18).

As we walk before the unbeliever, then, the thing that makes us dif-

ferent is our submission to the Word of God. Our lives and thinking are

founded on Scripture while the essence of the unbeliever's life is rejec-

tion of the revelation of God. Our presupposition of Scripture's truth

and authority is at diametric odds with that of the world, and because

we have been given the Word of God the world hates us (John 17:14).

Thus from the outset the focus of the world's opposition to the faith is

the Word of God. The apologist must not surrender his presupposition

of the authority of Scripture in order to start on the unbeliever's ground

and lead him into the faith, for the Christian who is set apart by the

Word of God thereby has the truth (John 17:17; Ps. 119:142, 160). Hence

when the Christian uses the presuppositions dictated by the world in

his apologetic he has moved over into the realm of error. Christian pre-

suppositions are distinctive in virtue of embodying and leading to the

47

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

truth; the antithesis of the world to Christianity locks it into error and

ignorance. "They are of the world; therefore they speak of the world and

the world hears them. We are of God; the one who knows God hears us,

the one who is not of God does not hear us. By this we know the spirit of

truth and the spirit of error" (1 John 4:5f.).

The antithesis between the believer's thinking and speaking and

that of the unbeliever could hardly be more bold: truth versus error.

We can discern error by observing whether one has presupposed and

submitted to the authority of God's Word or not. The Christian apolo-

gist certainly will not want to reason within the presuppositions of the

unbeliever after noting what these passages from the Word of God have

said about the antithesis between believer and unbeliever. That convic-

tion is reinforced when we read in James 4:4 that "friendship with the

world is enmity with God; therefore, whoever resolves to be a friend of

the world is constituted an enemy of God." As apologists we must work

to insure that we keep our antithesis with the presuppositions of the un-

truthful world sharp; otherwise we will be betraying our faith and the

truth of God.

Wisdom vs. Foolishness

Perhaps no passage of Scripture more plainly sets out the antithesis

between Christian thinking and unbelieving philosophy (in addition

to the implications of that antithesis) than does 1 Corinthians 1-2. As

John's writings characterize the antithesis as that of truth versus error,

Paul characterizes it as wisdom versus foolishness. The Christian and

the non-Christian see each other's "wisdom" as foolish; in reality, how-

ever, worldly wisdom is foolishness. Thus the defender of the faith weak-

ens his case and compromises the antithesis with the world when he sees

worldly philosophy with its agnostic and unbelieving presuppositions as

wise, and his apologetic will be devastated if he follows the philosophic

methods and standards of the world. Paul unambiguously asserts in 1

Corinthians 1:17 that the cross of Christ can be made vain (or of no ef-

fect) by "wise" words (or the wisdom of speech); a pompous intellect will

leave man unaffected by the truth of the gospel. The word of the cross

is seen by those who perish as foolishness, but by contrast those who are

saved see the gospel as the power of God (1:18).

Thus the gospel is not improved upon by the words of human wis-

48

The C h r i s t i a n Mind & M e t h o d : Studies in Scripture

dom or philosophy. O u r apologetic need not follow the presuppositions of

secular thinking, since only the gospel as "the power of G o d unto salva-

tion" (Rom. 1:16) will be effective in dealing with those who are dead in

sin and who have darkened minds. Verse 19 speaks of "wisdom" which

derives from godless thinking; such " p r u d e n t " philosophic schemes do not

account for God's truth and power, and G o d brings them to nought (cf.

Isa. 29:14; J o b 5:12; Ps. 33:10). So, as verse 20 rhetorically asks, where is

the wise? W h e r e are those counselors who pretend wisdom but are actu-

ally futile in their reasoning because they do not presuppose or reckon

with God's Word (cf. Isa. 19:12)? W h e r e is the disputer of this age with his

Greek dialectic subtlety? G o d makes worldly wisdom foolish (Is. 44:25;

Rom. 1:22), says Paul in his last rhetorical question. A consideration of the

history of philosophy or the lives of Christianity's cultured despisers will

bear out Paul's conclusion. Because the gospel contradicts the presupposi-

tions that underlie the reasoning of the unregenerate, the world despises

it; the gospel of Christ does not bow to the world's d e m a n d for signs and

philosophical proofs (l:22f.).

M e n m a y view the gospel as foolishness. But the gospel is actually

wiser t h a n m e n (1:25), since Christ is the very wisdom of G o d (1:24). If

one will but consider his own gracious salvation by G o d he will see the

utter folly of infatuation with h u m a n wisdom (1:26). God's favor does

not lie with the worldly wise but with those w h o humbly submit to His

Word. G o d uses these believers w h o are foolish in the eyes of the world

to confound and s h a m e those w h o follow the pseudo-wisdom of hu-

m a n philosophy a n d presuppositions (1:27). Again Paul stresses that it is

Christ w h o is the wisdom of G o d (1:30; cf. Prov. 8:22"31;John 17:3; Col.

2:3). T h i s W i s d o m is eternal and is the key to life eternal. Consequently

the apologist presupposes the W o r d of Christ a n d confronts the unbe-

liever, not with secular philosophic schemes or theses, but with the genu-

ine wisdom of G o d . Without the W o r d of Christ there is no theoretic

basis for logic, history, or science; so when the unbeliever fights against

the gospel he is working toward r u i n i n g his very tools of destruction! His

"wisdom" becomes folly.

T h e apologist will be effective, then, only if he refuses to reason on

the basis of the same presuppositions as the unbeliever a n d he begins

as well as ends his intellectual efforts a n d a r g u m e n t s with the W o r d of

Christ in w h o m dwells all wisdom a n d knowledge. Intellectual cred-

ibility c a n be m a i n t a i n e d only by presupposing the W o r d of G o d . T h e

49

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

apologist should follow the example of the Apostle Paul, who did not

come to Corinth from Athens with elaborate language or philosophical

subtlety (2:1). He did not use Athenian intellectual wares, but his procla-

mation was founded on the testimony of God. Human philosophy was

unnecessary, for Paul needed nothing more than the gospel of Christ

(2:2) for his presentation and defense. It was the power of God rather

than the persuasiveness of human philosophy that made Paul's ministry

effective. The vanity of humanistic presuppositions would actually have

hindered the exaltation of God and His Word in the minds of Paul's

hearers. Paul shunned the persuasive words of human wisdom and phi-

losophy for a demonstration of the Holy Spirit and God's power (2:4)

Worldly philosophy would not be effective or accomplish anything for

the gospel of Christ.

Instead of trying to make his message palatable and congenial to

secular presuppositions, Paul depended upon the operations of the Holy

Spirit and kept his proclamation and apologetic established upon the

testimony of God (cf. Eph. l:17f.). Paul needed to know only Christ cru-

cified and to witness to God's Word of truth (i.e., to present the gospel

and use it as the basis and standard for his argumentative approach).

The things the Christian speaks are not taught by human wisdom (or in

accord with secular presuppositions) but by sharp contrast are taught by

the Holy Spirit (2:13); that is, the Christian is submissive to God's Word

from the beginning and throughout. It is of utmost importance that the

apologist not have his hearer's faith be by the wisdom of men but rather

by the power of God (2:5). Faith is a gift from God (cf. Eph. 2:8) and as

such cannot be produced by the intellectual contrivance of the apolo-

gist. Human wisdom or secular presuppositions cannot be the ground of

faith, but it must be generated in the power of God.

Thus what the Christian speaks is not the wisdom of this age that is

brought to nothing, but the wisdom of God (2:6f.). Recognition of Christ

as the wisdom of God does not come from reasoning upon presupposi-

tions that deny or ignore this fact. Such recognition can come only when

it is revealed by the Holy Spirit (2:10), and man can know the things of

God only when God sends him the enabling Spirit of God (2:12). Be-

cause only the Spirit knows the things of God (2:11) our apologetic must

rely upon His Word rather than autonomous philosophy, science, and

history to bring the unbeliever to a knowledge of God. Our speech must

be rooted in the presuppositions taught by the Holy Spirit, not secular

50

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

philosophy (2:13). The man who follows the "wisdom" of the world rath-

er than the things of the Holy Spirit rejects the Word of God as foolish-

ness. He is unable to know the things of the Spirit (i.e., God's Word) and

he cannot have the spiritual discernment to judge for the truth as long as

is steeped in unbiblical presuppositions (2:14). By refusing to submit to

the authority of Christ's Word at the very beginning of his thinking the

sinner's mind is at enmity against God and he is epistemologically inca-

pacitated altogether. By contrast the whole field of knowledge and truth

is open to the one who presupposes the Spirit-inspired Word of God and

is enlightened by that same Spirit (2:15) . Fallen man is incapacitated

from seeing things as they really are; he has incapacitated himself by

suppressing rather than presupposing the revelation of God. The "un-

spiritual man" rejects the Word of God as foolish since it does not fit his

own apostate frame of reference. Having the spirit of the world manifest

in his reasoning, the unregenerate is unable to understand the things of

God's Spirit.

The pseudo-wisdom of worldly philosophy would either, as does

the unbeliever, find fault with or, as does the non-presuppositional

apologist, attempt intellectually to strengthen the scriptural message

that came from the mind of the Lord. But Paul rhetorically asks,

Who is in a position to do such a thing? (2:16). The answer comes in

thundering silence— no one! The apologist wastes his time when he

attempts to build a defense of Christianity upon the presuppositions

of secular thought, for nothing could provide a stronger foundation

for philosophy and argument than revelation from God Himself.

Nobody knows the mind of the Lord in such a way that he could

instruct God! The gospel message and its scriptural defense cannot

be improved upon. We can know the truth of God only by having

the mind of Christ, a mind that will humbly submit without question

to God's Word from the very beginning of all reasoning endeavors;

the mind of Christ is the direct antithesis of the mind-set of worldly

"wisdom." Because the Word of Christ has supreme authority in

the thinking of the Christian the apologist should not present it to

the unbeliever in un authoritative human foolishness. The unbeliever

will be totally unable to accept the message of God's Word until he

receives the mind of Christ (i.e., is converted from secular presup-

positions). This is the conclusion to Paul's discussion of the antithesis

that exists between the thinking of the believer and that of the un-

51

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

believer.

C O N F R O N T I N G U N B E L I E V I N G R E A S O N I N G

We have now seen that the unyielding antithesis between secular and

Christian thought brings worldly philosophy, history, and science into

a position of opposing truth, Wisdom, and the very foundation of cor-

rect thinking. By refusing to submit to the truth of God as the authority,

standard, and presupposition of proper reasoning and knowledge the

unbeliever has incapacitated himself from coming to a genuine knowl-

edge of any field of study and from receiving the revelation of God.

It is through knowledge of Christ that all things pertaining to life are

granted (2 Peter 1:3). The man who opposes that knowledge throws his

reasoning with respect to every area of life into a foolish and ignorant

frame of reference.

Consequently the apologist must challenge the very foundation

of the unbeliever's thinking when he attacks the faith with supposed

knowledge of extra-biblical fields of study, for every field of study and

all things pertaining to life can be understood properly only with a

presupposed knowledge of Christ. The apologist, therefore, should fol-

low the example of Jesus in John 7:15—17. When Jesus was questioned

as to his competence as a teacher (since he had not been taught in the

principles of learning used by his opponents), he countered by calling

into question the competence of his opponents as hearers. It is not the

experts, but any man striving to do God's will who has the requisite

spiritual discernment to decide whether the teaching is a revelation

from God or not. Because the unbeliever is not doing the will of God

he is in no position whatsoever to be interrogating and judging the

Christian's proclamation. It is the sinner's intellectual competence that

is on trial, not the truth of Christ's Word!

The Need for God's Grace

All men have inherited Adam's sin (Rom. 5:12ff). Thus from the

outset of their lives their minds, emotions, and wills are depraved (1

Cor. 2:14; Prov. 2:14; Rom. 6:17, 20; 8:7f), and they are nothing short

of spiritually dead (Eph. 2:1, 5; Col. 2:13; Rom. 5:15). No one escapes

this condition; as Paul says in Romans 3:10-18, 23, all men sin and

52

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

fall short of God's glory. Because the whole human race is dead in

sin, no one has understanding or seeks after God (vss. 10f.). Instead

they all have deceitful tongues and lack proper reverence for God

(vss. 13, 18). Indeed every one of them has turned aside and become

unprofitable (vs. 12); this is a quote from Psalm 53:1-4, which begins

by identifying the fool who says in his heart that there is no God. Sin

has incapacitated man's mental ability by making him rebellious in

thought against God; as a result he does not speak or know the truth.

Lacking understanding his reasoning is unprofitable and deceitful.

And according to Ephesians 2:1—10 this incapacitation is total and

ultimate; man is dead in sin and, thus, can do nothing for himself.

Even devoting his life to study of the outstanding philosophies of all

time and using every spare moment to analyze, syllogize, and scruti-

nize all the information of the scholarly publications available to man

cannot rescue his vain thinking. He walks according to this world

and its spirit of disobedience (vs. 2), thus fulfilling the desires of the

sinful flesh and mind as a child of wrath (vs. 3).

Under these circumstances the apologist is not able to do anything

of himself for the unbeliever, and the defender of the faith certainly

does not move the non-Christian closer to the kingdom by having his

argumentation rely on the principles of vain, unprofitable, and deceit-

ful secular thinking. Only the grace of God is able to overcome the

sinner's dead and worthless condition (vss. 4—10). Only God's grace

will rectify the worthless condition of the sinner's thinking. This is

not of our own doing but is a gift from God. Until that gift is granted

the unspiritual man's reasoning will be vain, and he will continually

see Christian reasoning as absurd (1 Cor. 2:14). Faith is given in con-

junction with hearing, and hearing by the Word of God (Rom. 10:17).

Thus this Word of God, not vain philosophy, should be the foundation

of our apologetical appeal to the unbeliever. Unless the unbeliever is

challenged with God's Word, and unless the unbeliever is graciously

given faith from God, he will continue with a darkened mind which

is unable to discern the truth. Of himself the rebel against God can-

not hear the Word of Christ or receive the Spirit of Truth (John 8:43;

14:17), since he by nature desires not to stand in the truth (John 8:44).

Such is the epistemological inability of the one who follows after the

disobedient mind-set of the world.

53

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

Understanding the Effects of Unbelief on Knowledge

God's revelation is withheld from those who are "wise and under-

standing" according to the standards of unbelieving thought (Matt.

11:25). The unsaved may have an apparent zeal for God and participate

in the motions of worship, but their zeal is not according to knowledge and

they worship in ignorance (Rom. 10:2; Acts 17:23).

Refusing to bow to the Word of Christ leads to epistemological in-

ability, for out of the heart are the issues of life (Prov. 4:23) and the heart

is deceitful above all things and exceedingly corrupt (Jer. 17:9). The man

who does not follow the revelation of God is a rebellious person walking

after his own thoughts (cf. Isa. 65:2), but that which proceeds from his own

heart are evil thoughts, false witness, deceitfulness, and foolishness (Matt.

15:19; Mark 7:21f.). This intellectually disobedient thinker cannot under-

stand the things of the Spirit because, as an enemy of Christ's cross, his

thinking is earthly (Phil. 3:18f.) and vain. False prophets speak evil of the

way of truth (2 Pet. 2: If.), speak evil of that which they do not understand

(vs. 12); because they are false teachers who speak vain words they live in

error (vs. 18). Those who oppose the Word of Christ have their lives char -

acterized as a whole by vanity and error. The one who departs from the

faith speaks falsehood, and his teaching is demonic (1 Tim. 4: If.) since he

follows the Satanic lie that beguiled Eve (cf. Rom. 1:25). The unbeliever's

tongue is against the righteous, and it is deceitful and sharp (Ps. 57:4;

64:3; 140:3; 5:9f.; Jer. 9:8); however, the wicked eventually are destroyed

by their own work and words (Ps. 9:16; Prov. 18:7). By rebelling against

the Word of Christ the unbeliever actually undercuts his own thinking

and makes it futile.

When the skeptic speaks against the faith the apologist should defend

the faith by pointing out the vanity of the skeptic's position—that is, do

an internal, destructive critique of it. Noting all these indications of the

sinner's intellectual inabilities from God's Word we can understand why

Paul would declare that all things aside from knowing Christ are dung;

everything apart from the knowledge of Christ is loss (Phil. 3:8). Because the

unbeliever will not submit to the Word of Christ and presuppose its self-

attesting truth the whole of his thinking is misguided into deceitfulness

vain reasoning, lack of understanding, unprofitableness, ignorance, evil

thoughts, foolishness, error, demonic teaching, lies, and self-destruction.

Paul concludes the whole matter by declaring that man, before he is

54

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

reconciled to God, is an enemy in his mind (Col. 1:21) against the Lord and

H i s Word. For this reason the thoughts of the worldly wise are vain (1

Cor. 3:20); this assertion is quoted by Paul from Psalm 94:11-12, where

the vain man is placed in contrast to the man whom the Lord teaches

out of His law.

The philosophy of the pseudo-wise unbeliever is foolish, but the

redeemed abound in true wisdom by God's grace (Eph. 1:7f.). Conse-

quently the rejoicing of the Christian is this, that he does not operate ac-

cording to the principles of fleshly wisdom, but by diametrical contrast

(cf. alla in Greek) he operates according to the principles of God's grace

in the world (2 Cor. 1:12). As we defend the faith before the world we

are not to use the principles of secular thought but the presupposition of

God's truthful Word, for the presuppositions of unbelieving philosophy,

science, and history cannot secure genuine knowledge for man in any

way. By not bowing to the Word of the Lord the sinner is locked into

foolish ignorance. The case is just the opposite for the believer—a fact

which the apologist must take account of when encountering unbelief.

Pushing the Antithesis in Practice

Thus far we have observed that the Lord places a radical demand

upon even the apologist that he not put God to a test. One of the central

reasons for this, from the epistemological standpoint, is that all knowl-

edge for man depends upon the revelation of God. The unbeliever, as

was then noted, cannot escape the clear revelation of God in him and

around him. However, the sinner does everything he can to suppress

that knowledge in unrighteousness. Thus there is a clear antithesis be-

tween the thinking and presuppositions of the Christian and those of the

non-Christian. By refusing to submit to the Word of Christ in his rea-

soning endeavors the unbeliever's mind has become alienated from the

truth and steeped in foolishness; his intellectual incapacitation, though

not recognized by other unbelievers, is dramatic.

It should be clear from these observations, then, that the apologist

must presuppose the truth of Scripture and argue from this basis. He

would be mistaken to assume the validity of agnostic or unbelieving

premises, methods, or standards and use them to forge a defense of

God's Word. The apologist must take the Word of Christ to be the

necessary foundation for philosophy or argument of any kind; thereby

55

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

he can challenge his opponent's very principles and position. If, then,

the apologist is required by God's Word to presuppose the authority of

Scripture's self-attesting truth, he is obligated not to bring that Word

into question in his apologetical approach to the unbeliever. He must

not assume that God's Word needs to be proven or shown to be prob-

ably correct on the basis of independent scholarly research and au-

tonomous standards of credibility. The defender of the faith must not

surrender to the attacks upon God's Word from unbelievers, and so he

must not give in to their improper demands that the Christian satisfy

their rebellious minds as to the Scripture's veracity. When the believer

and unbeliever argue two full-blown world-views clash with each oth-

er. In faithful maintenance of his Christian position and commitment

the apologist must argue from within his own presuppositional outlook.

His standards, logic, and premises are given him by the authority of

God. Hence, in obedience to the Lord, the apologist develops his de-

fense upon the incorrigible and logically primitive Word of God.

When Jesus taught he taught with authority and not as one who need-

ed to depend upon the opinions of others (Matt. 7:29). So also we who

teach the Word of Christ should not be compelled to submit it to the

opinions of others in order to win for it credibility or acceptance. Our

proclamation and defense come in the authority of God, not the wisdom

of men. Everything we do in word, even our defense of the faith, should

be according to Jesus' name and authority (Col. 3:17); it must be based

upon His authoritative Word. Hereby when we are required to give an

account for our faith the Lord gives us a mouth and wisdom which all

our opposers will not be able to withstand or contradict (Luke 21:15).

Hebrews 4:12 declares that the Word of God judges the thoughts

of the heart. We must not surrender to the unbeliever's desire to have

things the other way around. Man, especially sinful man, is in no posi-

tion to call God's Word into question or assume that it needs intellectual

bolstering and defense to give it credence. Instead it is the thought of

man's heart that is on trial, and the standard of judgment is the Word of

God. If anyone does not receive Christ's words, he will be judged by these

very words (John 12:48—50). Hence our standard of judgment when ana-

lyzing any teaching must be this presupposed Word of God. We are not

to believe every spirit but to prove them by apostolic doctrine (which is

received in Scripture) according to 1 John 4:1. Whenever a new prophet

arises, even a prophet who advances miracles, he is to be tested by the

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THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD; STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

verbally revealed Word of God (Deut. 13:1- 4). The Word of God is the

test standard—not historical or "objectively sufficient" evidences—and

thus is self-attesting (not in need of being itself verified). For the Chris-

tian the principle to be used in judging any thought is,0 "To the law and

to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word surely there

is no morning for them" (Isa. 8:20). The thoughts of man cannot be al-

lowed to stand in judgment over God's Word, for that is a reversal of

proper roles; rather, the Word of God must be the standard by which the

thoughts of men are evaluated and judged. Consequently, God's Word

must be presupposed rather than proven by independent human crite-

ria; we do not work up to an acceptance of it by putting it through vari-

ous tests, but we must begin by humble submission to it as unassailable.

G O D ' S VERACITY PRESUPPOSED

It is important for the apologist who desires to be obedient to the Word

of God in defending the faith to pay special attention to the fact that

throughout Scripture God's veracity is not defended, but accepted from

the outset on His authority. We begin by noting that the very first chap-

ter of God's special revelation assumes God's existence and veracity, and

it does not argue the point. Unless we have more wisdom than that con-

tained in the revelation of God, we should take the same attitude. God

will not give grace to those who arrogantly call Him into judgment.

Rather, He gives grace to those who humbly submit to Him (James

4:6f.). While we may demand evidence and proof of men, we never do

so with God. His Word is inherently persuasive or carries within itself

its own evidence. Thus it is incorrigible or self-attesting, which explains

why God demands that we trust Him in our thinking without question.

His truth and justice must be presupposed. Thus all His ways are defined

as justice (Deut. 32:4) and need not be argued. As the Lord He can do

and say as He pleases without being subject to interrogation (cf. Matt.

20:15). No one is in a position to challenge Him who says, "I, Jehovah,

speak righteousness, I declare things that are right" (Isa. 45:19). Isaiah

appropriately views man as clay in the hands of God, the potter; it is ab-

surd to hold that the clay can contend against the potter! Hence, "Woe

unto him that striveth with his Maker!" (Isa. 45:9).

57

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

God Is Not to Be Tested

God's veracity is not defended before the bar of human judgment

There can be no doubt but that the Judge of all the earth shall do right

(Gen. 18:25). And so the servant of the Lord is required to "sacrifice

his intellect" in the sense that he gives up his autonomous ways of think-

ing and submits to God's Word without wavering in unbelief (Gen.

22:1_19; cf. Rom. 4:20). When God commanded Abraham to sacrifice

the son of promise, the only channel of fulfillment of God's promise

to Abraham, we do not see the father of the faithful challenging the

rightness of God's Word. Abraham did not sit down and work out an

intellectual defense and explanation of God's ways, and he did not stop

to take it into his own critical ability to pass judgment as to whether

this word could actually be from the Lord or not since it had all the

appearance of contradicting the nature of God. No, Abraham did not

bring God's word into question. It was Abraham who was on trial,

not God (Gen 22:1); and he is rewarded for his faithful obedience to the

Word of God (Gen. 22:18). Abraham bowed to the Word of God with-

out doubting or proving it; he did not depend upon the authority of his

own reasoning, but subordinated his thinking to God's. All those who

are genuine children of Abraham must do likewise.

Consider also the case of Job. When Job finally got his hearing with

God it was Job who was demanded to answer to God's interrogation (Job

38:1-3) rather than vice versa! When God finished questioning Job it was

plain what Job's position and status were; before God Job had no intel-

lectual prerogatives of his own. Give attention to Job's response:

Jehovah answered Job and said, Shall he that cavilleth con-

tend with the Almighty? He that argueth with God, let him

answer. Then Job answered Jehovah and said, Behold I am

of small account; what shall I answer thee? I lay my hand

upon my mouth. Once have I spoken, and I will not answer;

yea, twice, but I will proceed no further (Job 40:1-5).

Before the Word of God Job must be silent and recognize his place. God

rhetorically asks, "Wilt thou even annul my judgment? Wilt thou con-

demn me that thou mayest be justified? Or hast thou an arm like God?

And canst thou thunder with a voice like Him?" (Job 40:8f.). No one is

on the same level as God, and no one is like unto Him in strength and

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THE CHRISTIAN M I N D & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

knowledge. So then, His judgments cannot be questioned by man. His

Word cannot be found in error to the exaltation of man's independently

acquired knowledge. The only proper response to the Lord is humble

submission; because Job had not done this he abhorred himself and re-

pented in dust and ashes (Job 42:6); when Job finally spoke rightly of

God he was blessed (Job 42:7ff.).

From Abraham and Job we learn not to question the Word of the

Lord. His veracity needs no defense, for His Word is true in virtue of its

being His Word. We define Scripture as truth, therefore, or presuppose its

authority; this is not the conclusion of an independent line of thought but

the starting point of all our reasoning.

The apologist can also learn much from Paul's methodology in the

book of Romans. Throughout the book Paul answers critical objec-

tions by directly appealing to the unquestionable and indisputable good-

ness and veracity of God. Paul will not allow his opponent to bring the

Lord under human scrutiny. Instead he calls the authority of man into

severe question: "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against

God?" (Rom. 9: 20). Paul sets forth the attitude to which the defender

of the faith must be committed: "Let God be found true, but every

man a liar" (Rom. 3:4). The Word of God demands that the apologist

presuppose the veracity and authority of Scripture. In his apologetical

efforts he must not allow the sinner to assume prerogative to bring

God's Word into judgment, and he must not defend the truthfulness

of God by, first, allowing for the possibility that Scripture is mistaken

and then, secondly, verifying or arguing for its truthfulness on the

basis of independently established considerations. Instead the apolo-

gist brings the absolute claim of God upon His creature to bear on the

unbeliever, judging the believer's thoughts by the Word of God, which

is never doubted as to its truthfulness and authority. He is willing to

view any man who contradicts God's Word as a iiar rather than ever

beginning to entertain the notion that God could be untrue. Scripture

is our absolutely foundational standard of thinking and evaluation.

The person who departs from the authoritative Word of God is the one

who needs a defense, not the believer who humbly submits to the Word

of the Lord as unassailable!

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

No Double-Mindedness

The apologist who fails genuinely to presuppose the Word of God and

submits to doubting it is like a sea wave that is driven by the wind and

tossed about; he will be unstable in all his ways (cf. James 1:6, 8). All the

wisdom that a man needs is available from God upon request (James 1:5),

so we have no need to rely upon worldly philosophy in our apologetic. If

we mediate between the authority of God and the alleged authority of

humanistic scholarship we are "double-minded" and, thereby, unstable in

our defense of the faith. When we have come to a knowledge of the Son of

God we do not have to be tossed to and fro, carried about with every wind

of doctrine by the trickery and cunning of men unto the craftiness of error

(Eph. 4:13f.); instead we boldly speak the truth in love (vs. 15).

We who follow the Lord cannot serve two masters (Matt. 6:24): Scrip-

ture and humanistic thinking. Exclusive loyalty, even in intellectual mat-

ters, belongs to Christ. A double-minded apologetic is an unfaithful apolo-

getic as well as one without stability or power. When the Word of God is

doubted rather than presupposed the apologist is driven here and there by

every contradictory teaching coming from unbelieving "scholars." When

he submits to the authority of both Christ and those who oppose Christ

he cannot present a stable defense of the faith or boldly speak the truth,

being continually subject to the ever-present craftiness of error. Such an

unreliable apologist is driven by every wind of humanistic teaching rather

than the "Wind" of God's Spirit! As we give a defense for the hope in us

as apologists (1 Pet. 3:15), we must unyieldingly hold fast to the confession of

that hope (Heb. 10:23). We never bring the Word of God into question or

doubt its truthfulness. We do not submit to the assumption of those who

oppose Scripture that it needs to be demonstrated as credible or true. We

do not surrender the incorrigible authority of God's Word even for a short

while in order to convince the unbeliever of its truth by arguing within the

framework of secular presuppositions.

The Word of God must be presupposed not only in systematic theol-

ogy, but in apologetics as well. To bow to the Word of Christ as a theo-

logian but assume that it must be proven true as an apologist is simply

hypocrisy. The Christian must not relent on the lordship of Christ in

any area of life or for even the shortest amount of time. As Paul, we must

not yield in subjection to those who oppose the truth of the gospel for even.

a moment (Gal. 2:5). Paul was adamant, even as an apologist in the face of

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attack, in maintaining his commitment to the truth of the gospel with-

out wavering for even the shortest time in order that it would continue

in his readers.

The Strategy of Rebellion

So then, in looking at what it means to presuppose the Word of Christ,

we have seen that Scripture teaches us that because we proclaim Christ's

Word of authority it does not have to be subjected to the opinions of men,

that the Word of Christ judges the thoughts of men rather than vice versa,

that Scripture is the standard and test for truth, that the veracity of God

need not be established by autonomous demonstration, that sinful man

is in no position to call God's Word into question, that the believer must

humbly submit to Scripture as unassailable and beyond doubt, and that

this commitment must not be yielded under any circumstances even for

the shortest length of time.

Final confirmation of these things is received by way of negative

example taken from the Genesis 3 account of man's fall into sin. Even

in the garden man was expected to submit without question to the clear,

authoritative, necessary and sufficient Word of the Lord specially re-

vealed to him. Satan's strategy in working toward man's fall was to

undermine man's presuppositional submission to the truthfulness and

authority of this word from the Lord. First he called the Word of God

into question (vs. 1), and then he actually contradicted it (vs. 4). Satan

set the epistemological situation into upheaval by suggesting to Eve that

she could have a proper understanding and interpretation of reality

without presupposing the Word of the Lord; the deceiver told her that

knowledge could be gained by not thinking God's thoughts after Him.

Specifically, he tempted her with the possibility of making herself equal

to God and taking to herself the prerogative to determine good and evil

on her own (vs. 5).

Man was rebelling against the Word of his Creator when he took

unto himself the right to stand in judgment over the revelation from

God. Adam and Eve viewed the Word of God as one hypothesis to be

set alongside the word of Satan. They decided that they were in a posi-

tion to determine which of the hypotheses was actually true. They ex-

alted their own reasoning above the Word of the Lord, and in doing this

they ceased to submit humbly to the authoritative Word of God. They

6 1

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

attempted to usurp the epistemological lordship of God, and the result

was their fall into sin and punishment. From this account the believer

learns that he must never view Scripture as a mere hypothesis to be veri-

fied independently of God's presupposed authority, that he must not call

God's veracity into question, that he must never allow that man has the

right to stand in judgment over God's Word and determine for himself

whether it is right or wrong. To do these things is the essence of sin, for

these things represent lawlessness and disobedience to the dictates of the

Lord. Such things should never be named among Christian apologists!

G O D ' S K N O W L E D G E AND M A N ' S F A I T H

We can again see the necessity for a presuppositional apologetic if we brief-

ly examine the nature of God's knowledge and the nature of man's faith.

God exhaustively knows His own mind and our minds as well (Acts 15:18;

Ezek. 11:5). Consequently He is able to search our hearts (Jer. 11:20; 17:10;

20:13; Rom. 8:27) while for us there is no searching of His understanding,

for it is infinite (Ps. 40:28; 147:5). The Lord's greatness is unsearchable (Ps.

145:3; cf. Job 5:9; 9:10), and He cannot be found out unto perfection (Job

11:7). Neither can we attain unto His high and wonderful knowledge of all

our own ways (Ps. 139:6; cf. Job 42:3).

Man's knowledge is not only less than God's in a quantitative sense, but

their respective knowledges are epistemologically separated as to Creator

and creature (Isa. 55:8f). Indeed, God is incomprehensible. He is not inap-

prehensible, for Paul preaches the inscrutable riches of Christ (Eph. 3:8);

yet the creature cannot exhaustively know God or attain unto the quality

of God's knowledge. God has a remarkable depth of richness, wisdom, and

knowledge which is unsearchable and inscrutable (incomprehensible) in His

judgments and ways (Rom. 11:33). As Paul declares, no one has known the

mind of the Lord or been able to be His counselor (vs. 34). Because the

Lord's mind is incomprehensible we are futile in our endeavors if we try

to make His thoughts amenable to man's mind and ways. Because we are

simply not able intellectually to schematize or rationally to construct the

thought of God, it must be, and can be, accepted only by obedient submis-

sion. The Lord's mind is beyond our understanding, in which case we would

be foolish to think that we could figure it out and render it into inescapable

formulas that any rational man could verify. We endorse the Lord's Word in

intellectually humble obedience, not in self-reliant satisfaction of our schol-

THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

arly scrutiny. This must be so in the nature of the case. The apologist cannot

forge a proof for that which is inherently incomprehensible to him.

Thus our apologetic must pre suppose the truth and authority of

Scripture rather than demonstrating it on the basis of independent secu-

lar scholarship and logic. We can see this to be the case, moreover, when

we examine the nature of man's faith in God as portrayed by Scripture.

Faith does not require demonstration and verification of the truth be-

lieved, but only trust in the sufficiency of God's Word because it comes

from God. Such faith is not "blind" since it rests in the all-seeing God.

By trusting in God's indubitable veracity, genuine faith need not trust in

one's own ability to intellectually work things out. No word is too hard,

too wonderful for Jehovah (Gen. 18:14; Jer. 32:17, 27); hence the very

fact that He speaks something is sufficient reason for us to believe it. His

Word does not require independent verification or confirming evidence

before it is trustworthy.

The type of faith that is reckoned for righteousness is that possessed

by Abraham, who believed God's incredible promise that his seed would

be innumerable even though he was an old man with no visible heir

(Gen. 15:5f.). Indeed, Hebrews 11:1 declares that faith is the conviction

of things not seen. Take Noah, for example; he obeyed God even though

he did not see the unlikely things that God had warned him were com-

ing (Heb. 11:7). By faith Abraham obeyed God's call to go to a new

place, not knowing where he went (vs. 8). The essence of Sarah's faith

was her deeming the Promiser (i.e., God) faithful (vs. 11); she trusted that the

one who promised her a seed was faithful—even when she was past age

for conception. The nature of Abraham's faith is dramatically seen to

be submission to the a priori dependability of God's Word when we ob-

serve that he obeyed God's command to sacrifice his only son, the son

of promise whom he finally had received (vss. 17-19); this he did, simply

accounting the ability of God even to raise the dead.

Such is the kind of faith the apologist strives to engender in the un-

believer, not a faith that walks by self-satisfying sight and demonstrable

verification, but a faith that trusts in the ability and faithfulness of God.

That which in human ability is unseeable is seen by faith (Heb. 11:27)

which submits to the self-attesting Word of the Lord. We work for faith

like that of Abraham, who is our father (Rom. 4:16), who "in hope be-

lieved against hope .. . (but) according to that which had been spoken (by God),"

says Romans 4:18. Abraham did not trust what the horizon of human

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PRjESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

hopes dictated as credible, but he believed rather the Word of God on its

own merits. "Looking unto the promise of God, he wavered not through

unbelief, but waxed strong through faith, giving glory to God, and being

fully assured that what He had promised, He was able also to perform

(Rom. 4:20f.). Faith is humble submission to the self-attesting Word of

God. Faith accounts God truthful, faithful, and powerful on the basis

of His own Word, not requiring to see demonstrable proof or evidence

outside of God's Word that could confirm it as trustworthy.

Not seeing, not knowing, and not understanding, the patriarchs

still trusted that no word was too hard for Jehovah; thus they believed

what God spoke on the simple basis that God Himself had declared

it. Nothing outside of God's Word is required for one to have genuine

faith, for God's Word is self-attestingly true and authoritative. Hence the

apologist need not work toward independent verification of the truth of

Scripture. Instead he urges the unbeliever to submit humbly to it as self-

attestingly true, since it is the Word of God. The apologist presupposes the

Word of God in genuine faith, and he desires to have the non-Christian

do the same, because aside from such faith no one can be saved. There-

fore, having noted that God's mind is incomprehensible and that biblical

faith is submission to God's Word as self-attesting, the obligation of the

Christian to assume a presuppositional apologetic is further reinforced.

R E G E N E R A T I O N , F A I T H , AND R E P E N T A N C E

Finally, it remains for us to see that according to the Bible a man cannot

come to an understanding of God's Word or a knowledge of God without

regeneration and faith. Hence the apologist cannot give the unbeliever

convincing understanding, rational demonstration, probable verification,

or knowledgeable proof and expect these to bring him to faith in God's

Word. All the argumentation in the world, all the scholarly explanation

that we can set forth cannot effect saving knowledge in the unbeliever, for

as dead in his vanity of mind he needs regeneration by the Holy Spirit.

Thus the apologist presupposes the Scripture and focuses on the unbe-,

liever's intellectual rebellion or sinfulness, witnesses to the Word of Christ,

and argues upon its self-attesting authority, looking to God rather than

secular "wisdom" to give success to his words of proclamation and de-

fense. The apologist does not expect the unbeliever to be able properly to

understand and thereby be convinced of the truth of the gospel as long as

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THE CHRISTIAN M I N D & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

he remains unrepentant for his guilty rebellion against God and does not

begin by faith in his approach to God's Word.

The Necessary Precedence of Faith

Hence, again, we see that the defender of the faith needs to pre sup-

pose the authority and veracity of Scripture rather than introducing

more primary and independent reasoning which makes the authority

and veracity of God's Word the conclusion of a line of thought. Because

faith and regeneration precede conviction, understanding, and genuine

knowledge the apologist squanders his efforts if he attempts to utilize

autonomous argumentation that does not begin with humble submission

to the unquestionable, self-attesting Word of the Lord. A non-presuppo-

sitional defense of the faith squelches the Christian's effective challenge

to unbelieving thought and substitutes an approach that fails to take ac-

count of the need for regeneration and faith before understanding and

knowledge. By reversing the proper order of things the non-presuppo-

sitional apologist sees submission to God's Word as secondary rather

than primary, sees demonstration as the basis for faith, sees independent

argumentation rather than the Holy Spirit as the source of conviction,

and therefore advances the destruction of his own defense of the faith.

The necessary precedence of faith is indicated by Hebrews 11:6.

Before the sinner can approach God with a saving knowledge of Him

it is requisite first that the sinner believe the truth about God's exis-

tence and character. Coming near to God and having a knowledge of

Him does not lead to faith, but faith enables one to draw near: "for he

that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder

of them that seek after Him." Jesus declared that the man who does

God's will shall be the one who has the necessary spiritual discern-

ment to know that Christ's Word is from God (John 7:17), and doing

the will of God certainly involves having faith in God's Son (e.g., John

6:29). From this Augustine rightly concluded, "Understanding is the

reward of faith; therefore, do not seek to understand in order to be-

lieve, but believe that thou mayest understand."8 Faith is the founda-

8. See St. Augustine, "Tractates on the Gospel of St. John" XXIX.6

(John 7:14-18), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, 14 vol., ed.

Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983 [1888]), 7:184.

6 5

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

tion for understanding and knowledge rather than the superstructure

built up from underlying rational prowess.

That faith underlies knowledge is also indicated in 2 Peter 1:5: "To

your faith add virtue, and to your virtue [add] knowledge" (alternatively,

"by your faith support virtue, and by your virtue support knowledge").

It is clear that faith precedes knowledge and is a condition thereof. So if

anyone desires to know God he must first believe God, doing God's will,

by having faith in Christ, and making faith the foundation of knowledge.

When a man has faith, then he can understand. Without faith it is im-

possible to please God, and hence He will not grant understanding or

knowledge to the unbeliever. "The beginning of knowledge is the fear of

Jehovah" (Prov. 1:7). "The fear of Jehovah is the beginning of knowledge,

and the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding" (Prov. 9:10). Faith-

ful submission to God is the ground of knowledge and understanding; we

must begin all our reasoning with reverence for Him. Proverbs 15:32f. is

an appropriate conclusion: "He that refuses instruction despises his own

soul, but he that hearkens to reproof receives understanding. The fear of

Jehovah is the instruction of wisdom, and before [such] honor goes humil-

ity." Surely a vain man will never get understanding (Job 11:12).

The Need for Repentance

Not only is faith a requisite condition for knowledge, but moreover re-

pentance is unto belief or faith (Matt. 21:32). Man must have a converted mind

and be willing to confess his sin if he is to have faith. And because faith is

the foundation of knowledge, repentance which is unto faith is a prereq-

uisite of saving knowledge. Consequently, Paul declares that those who live

in ignorance must repent (Acts 17:30). The sinful rebel is obligated to repent,

be converted, and turn back to God (Acts 3:19; 26:20), and concomitant

to repentance is faith (Mark 1:15; Acts 20:21). Repentant faith necessarily

precedes knowledge, and hence Scripture declares that man's mind must

be renewed (Eph. 4:23). The new man which is put on is created according

to God in righteousness and holiness of the truth (Eph. 4:24). This condition

is contrasted with that of those who are not regenerate and hence walk

with vanity of mind, darkened understanding, ignorance, and blinded

heart (vss. 17f.). The believer is taught by Jesus, and the truth is in Him

(vs. 21); therefore, those who have put on Christ (Gal. 3:27) are renewed

unto a knowledge of the truth. In an allusion to Adam (Gen. 1:27), a man

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THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

who was required never to call God's Word into question, Paul says that

believers "have put on the new man who is renewed unto genuine knowledge

a ccording to the image of his Creator" (Col. 3:10). Before conversion and

regeneration man's mind is distorted and misled, but under the operation

of the Holy Spirit man can come to genuine knowledge. The knowledge

that the believer has images (mirrors) the knowledge of God. Thus we

are to live out of God's revelation, submitting to it without question, since

all genuine knowledge reflects its truth. We who have put on Christ, the

new Adam, must live as He did—never calling God's Word into question

or subjecting it to testing (cf. Matt. 4:7). Returning to our main point, we

see then that if man is to have truth and knowledge he must be recreated,

renewed, regenerated by God.

The fact that repentance is required for knowledge and the fact that

regeneration is a necessary condition for knowledge appropriately go to-

gether, for the Holy Spirit who regenerates the sinner's dead mind must

be the agent who also grants repentance thereby. Just as a leopard can-

not change his spots (Jer. 13:23), so also the rebellious unbeliever cannot

bring himself to repentance (Rom. 8:7f.; Matt. 7:17f.). Therefore, the

unbeliever is unable to know the things of the Spirit (2 Cor. 2:14). The

unbeliever needs to be born again with a new heart and mind, and this

heart is given to him by God (Ezek. ll:19f.; 36:26f). So rebirth is not by

the will of man but by the will and mercy of God (John 1:13; Rom. 9:16).

The unbeliever cannot come to Christ unless it is given to him by the Fa-

ther and the Father draws him (John 6:44, 65); he is made willing only

in the day of God's power (cf. Ps. 110:3). Both faith and repentance are

requisite for knowledge, and just as faith must be granted to the unbe-

liever from God (Eph. 2:8) and is not of himself or his scholarly abilities,

so also repentance must be granted from God (Acts 5:31; 11:18). In order for

anyone to have faith (which is a condition of genuine knowledge) he must

be born of God (1 John 5:1) who gives the repentance which is unto a genuine

knowledge of the truth (2 Tim. 2:25).

The implication of this for Christian apologetics is unambiguously

laid out by Paul in Colossians 4:2-6, where he teaches that prayer is nec-

essary that God may open a door for the Word. In our apologetical endeavors

God must give the success in getting men to open their minds to the

Scriptures. Thus Paul commands us to "walk in wisdom toward them

on the outside" (vs. 5). In confronting the unbeliever we need to use the

presupposed authority, truth, and wisdom of Christ's gospel and not the

67

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

foolishness of unbelieving presuppositions. When we do this, God can

open the door for our words to be accepted. Our speech has got to be by

God's grace (not secular rationality) so that we may know how to answer

every man (vs. 6). Depending upon the power of prayer, the apologist

does not let corrupt communication proceed from his mouth (such as that

which characterizes corrupt humanistic thought, cf. Matt. 7:17f.). Instead,

he speaks forth good words (such as represent the mind of God, cf. Matt.

19:17, in contrast to the words of evil men, cf. Matt. 12:34). Thus he can

minister grace to his hearers (Eph. 4:29), knowing that by prayer God

grants wisdom, genuine knowledge, and enlightenment (Eph. l:16f.).

Thus, as apologists, we pre suppose the Word of Christ, depend upon

prayer, and recognize that God must open the door for our word (cf.

Acts 14:27; 1 Cor. 16:9; 2 Cor. 2:12).

The repentant believer who has been converted from his old man-

ner of life and has been regenerated unto new life by the sovereign grace

of God's Holy Spirit is the one who, according to the declaration of

God's Word, gains and possesses wisdom, understanding and knowl-

edge. Right thinking is the result of right living, and hence the apologist

cannot expect to convince the unbeliever who continues in his rebellion

and intellectual sinfulness of the truth by mere rational evidences and

arguments. "The fear of Jehovah is the beginning of wisdom; a good

understanding have all they that do His commandments" (Ps. 111:10);

wisdom is found in beginning, in presupposing the authority of God,

and a submissive, obedient attitude begets understanding. "Behold, the

fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understand-

ing" (Job 28:28). Thus our wisdom and understanding are found in

obeying the law of God (Deut. 4:6), and we know God only if we keep

His commandments (1 John 2:3—5). Genuine knowledge and stability

against false opinion are correlated with spiritual maturity in the stature

of Christ (Eph. 4:13f.); so then, a moral life and fruitful, pleasing walk

which is worthy of the Lord leads to genuine knowledge, wisdom, and

spiritual understanding (Col. 1:9—11). One cannot argue from within the

unbeliever's form of life (with its style of thinking and behaving) into the

knowledge of God's truth, which stems from the antithetical form of life

that submits at the outset to God's self-attesting truth and obeys without

question His Word.

The apologist is wrong to give the opposite impression to the un-

believer by letting him assume that knowledge is possible on the basis

68

The C h r i s t i a n Mind & M e t h o d : Studies in Scripture

of his secular presuppositions a n d that God's W o r d should be verified

thereby. In his attempt to bring about the good situation of acceptance

of Scripture by the unbeliever, the apologist makes use of an unjusti-

fied lie if he assumes or gives the impression that the n o n - C h r i s t i a n can

have u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d knowledge while persisting in his rebellious

ways of living a n d thought, that faith a n d repentance are not requisite

for a knowledge of the truth, or that the unbeliever needs n o t h i n g m o r e

than the expected intellectual verification of God's veracity according to

standards that worldly philosophy or science dictates, a n d not his com-

plete regeneration a n d conversion by the sovereign Holy Spirit. T h e end

does not justify m a k i n g use of an apologetical m e a n s that operates in

disagreement with, or independence of, the teaching of Scripture. "If

the t r u t h of G o d a b o u n d e d by my lie unto His glory, why am I still

judged as a sinner? A n d not r a t h e r (as we are blasphemed a n d some say

that we say), Let us do evil in order that good m a y come? T h e d a m n a -

tion of w h o m is j u s t " (Rom. 3:7f.). T h e apologist is prohibited f r o m us-

ing a non-presuppositional apologetic u n d e r the excuse that t r u t h could

thereby a b o u n d . In all our a r g u i n g a n d speaking we must be in submis-

sive agreement with the outlook of God's W o r d . T h u s we must presup-

pose its self-attesting authority a n d truthfulness as the only foundation

on which m a n can by repentant faith find wisdom, understanding, a n d

knowledge. A Christian apologetic never sets aside the presupposition

of Christ's W o r d in order to a r g u e u p o n the basis of secular scholarship

and logic. A scripturally rooted defense of the faith is the only valid a n d

effective challenge to unbelief.

PURE WORDS VS. FOOLISH QUESTIONS

W h e n the Christian a n d n o n - C h r i s t i a n speak with each other about

the faith, a n d the believer is called u p o n to defend the hope in h i m , he

should in the ensuing verbiage keep in m i n d that God's W o r d is that

which powerfully stops the opponent a n d brings the foolishness of the

unbeliever's thinking to light. Evil m e n c a n n o t speak good things (Matt.

12:34), for the m o u t h reflects the attitude of the heart. W h e r e a man's

treasure is, there shall his h e a r t be also (Matt. 6:21), a n d it is evil trea-

sure that the unbeliever has in his h e a r t (Luke 6:45). T h u s his heart gives

forth evil thoughts, deceitfulness, a n d foolishness (Matt. 15:18ff.; M a r k

7:2Iff.); his h e a r t is darkened a n d foolish ( R o m . 1:21), desperately wick-

69

P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L A P O L O G E T I C S P O S I T I V E L Y STATED

ed, and deceitful above everything (Jer. 17:9). Consequently his tongue

is a world of iniquity, untamable and full of deadly poison; indeed it is an

unruly evil (James 3:5-8). His throat is an open grave; with his tongue

he uses deceit, and poison is under his lip while his mouth is full of curs-

ing and bitterness (Rom. 3:13ff.). W h e n the unbeliever speaks against

the faith, the apologist should remember these things. T h e fool's mouth

is his own destruction (Prov. 18:7). He thinks that he will prevail with

his tongue and that he alone is lord over the use of his lips (Ps. 12:4). His

autonomous attitude leads him to speak falsehood (vs. 2), but Jehovah

will severely judge his sinful lips and his tongue which pretended to

speak great things (vs. 3). T h e unbeliever wrongly supposes that he need

submit in the things that he says to no Lord; subsequently he thinks fool-

ish, vain thoughts and speaks evil, erroneous things which render him

damnable before God.

Guarding Pure Speech

By contrast, the Lord's words are pure words (Ps. 12:6); they are

as purified, highly valuable silver and will be preserved by G o d for all

generations (vs. 7). It is this Word of G o d that stops every mouth (Rom.

3:19), so that m a n is left speechless (as was J o b , cf. J o b 40:4). T h e Chris-

tian, then, must avoid profane babbling and word-strife such as charac-

terize those who teach contrary to God's Word. Instead he should be an

approved workman who properly handles and rightly divides the Word

of truth (2 T i m . 2:14-18). Any m a n who teaches a different doctrine

than that godly teaching found in the words of Jesus (i.e., Scripture

is puffed-up, knowing nothing, and diseased with respect to questions

and word-disputes, because he has a corrupted mind that is bereft of

the truth (1 T i m . 6:3-5). In response, we must do as Timothy was com-

m a n d e d to do: guard the apostolic deposit (i.e., Scripture) and turn away

from the godless, vain utterances and contradictions that come from

what is falsely called "knowledge" (1 T i m . 6:20). T h e apologist does

not base his replies to the unbeliever on the vain thinking and secular

presuppositions characterizing antagonism to Scripture, for although he

might be viewed as a babbler and unskilled in oration, it is the Christian

who possesses the irrefutable knowledge of G o d (Acts 17:18; 2 Cor. 11:6).

God's covenant grace has confounded and closed our rebellious, foolish

mouths (Ezek. 16:63), and the Word of Christ silences those who are

70

THE CHRISTIAN M I N D & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

antagonistic to Him (Matt. 22:34; Luke 14:6).

We, then, who are defenders of the Christian faith must show forth

good works, uncorrupt teaching, and sound speech that cannot be con-

demned in order that he who is contrary to it may be put to shame

and the ignorance of foolish men may be silenced (Tit. 2:8; 1 Pet. 2:15).

Proud and arrogant talk is stifled because Jehovah is a God of knowl-

edge (1 Sam. 2:3). Thus before God and His Word all men must be

silent (Isa. 6:5; Dan. 10:15; Zeph. l:7;Job 40:4f.). "Let all the earth keep

silence before Him" (Hab. 2:20). "Be silent, all flesh, before Jehovah"

(Zech. 2:13). If we are going to be effective apologists for the faith we will

have to use, not the foolish ignorance of worldly thought, but the presup-

posed Word of God in its self-attesting authority and power. Our own

human words will not convince the rebel with vain mind, but the Word

of Jehovah can stop him in his sinful tracks. If our voice is that of the

Lord's servant when we speak to those who walk in darkness and have

no light, our appeal must be for the sinner to rely upon God and not his

own "wisdom" (Isa. 50:10). God opened our ears and made us to be not

rebellious, and He gives us a learned tongue and helps us so that we are

not confounded and none will be able to contend with our message (Isa.

50:4-9). If God be for us, who can be against us? Who can condemn us?

(Rom. 8:31, 34). Such must be the outlook of the apologist; he must be

bold to challenge unbelief with the thoughts of God, not the weakness of

humanistic "wisdom." Being transformed by a renewed mind that does

not fashion itself according to this world (Rom. 12:2), the apologist defends the

faith with the wisdom supplied by Christ so that no one who opposes his

message will be able to withstand or contradict it (Luke 21:15).

As we have learned from God's Word that the apologist must sub-

mit to Christ as Lord over his thoughts and not allow the Lord to be

questioned or put to a test, that God is the source of all knowledge and

man can only find truth based on His revelation, that all the treasures

of knowledge are hid in Christ but the worldly elements of learning de-

lude and rob us of truth, that all men inescapably know their Creator

yet suppress the truth in unrighteousness, that there is a sharp antithesis

between the thinking of the foolish world and the wise believer, that the

unbelieving rebel is epistemologically incapacitated and so unable to

know the truth or receive God's Word, that no man is in a position to

bring the Word of God into question or doubt, that faith is humble sub-

mission to God's Word as self-attestingly true, that faith and regenera-

71

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

tion are necessary conditions of knowledge and understanding, and that

it is the Lord's Word that effectively stops the mouth of antagonists—as

we have observed all these things to be taught by Scripture—we can

see that God's Word demands that we use an apologetic which is presup-

positional in nature.

Avoid Foolish Questions

Paul summarizes the whole matter for us in 2 Timothy 2:23-25:

Avoid foolish and undisciplined questions, knowing that

they produce quarrels, and a servant of the Lord must

not quarrel, but must be gentle toward all, skillful in

teaching, patient, one who courteously instructs those

who oppose themselves if perhaps God may grant to

them conversion unto a genuine knowledge of truth.

When we are challenged to defend the faith we must never consent to

answer in terms of foolish unbelief, for we are commanded to reject fool-

ish questions.

Foolish questions are those characteristic of a fool or given from a

fool's viewpoint. A fool proclaims foolishness (Prov. 12:23) and flaunts

his folly (Prov. 13:16). He has perverse lips (Prov. 19:1) and does not de-

part from evil (Prov. 13:19). The fool does not have knowledgeable lips

(Prov. 14:7) and hence he dares to reproach God (Ps. 74:22). The fool's

lips enter into contention and are the snare of his soul (Prov. 18:6f.); he

will not endure God's judgment (Ps. 5:5). The thought of foolishness is

sin (Prov. 24:9), and so the follower of a fool is a twofold child of hell

(Matt. 23:16f., 13, 15). A fool hears Christ's Words and does not live by

them, but builds his life on a rejection of them (Matt. 7:26). The fool de-

spises the instruction of genuine authority (Prov. 15:5) and rejects God's

commandments (Prov. 10:8). The fool has said in his heart that there

is no God (Ps. 53:1; 14:1). The fool does not understand that the Lord's

works are great and that His thoughts are very deep (Ps. 92:6), and so

the fool walks in darkness (Eccl. 2:14). The people described in Jeremiah

4-5 are called foolish because they do not know God, His ways or His

judgments. The fool's doing is to level a charge against God (Job 1:22).

The fool trusts in his own heart (Prov. 28:26) and his way is right in his

own eyes (Prov. 12:15). Thus the fool is insolent and takes confidence in

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THE CHRISTIAN MIND & METHOD: STUDIES IN SCRIPTURE

himself (Prov. 14:16); he utters his own mind (Prov. 29:11) and has lying

lips (Prov. 10:18). The fool's vision is earth-bound (Prov. 17:24) rather

than spiritually directed. A fool delights in having his heart discover

itself (Prov. 18:2); he returns to his folly as does a dog to his vomit (Prov.

26:11). A fool despises wisdom and instruction, refusing to begin with a

fear for Jehovah (Prov. 1:7). He despises the preaching of the cross, re-

fuses to know God, cannot receive God's Word, glories in man and has

vain, shameful thinking (1 Cor. 1—3). According to Romans 1:22, a fool

professes self-wisdom and he suppresses God's revelation (vs. 18), has a

darkened heart and vain mind (vs. 21), and serves the creature rather

than the Creator (vs. 25).

From all this we can see that a foolish question is one asked from

the perspective of the self-proclaimed autonomous man who does not

submit to the Word of God. A similar study would show that an undis-

ciplined question is, like a foolish question, asked from the perspective

of one who is ungodly and irreverent, not a son of God, and not in-

structed by the Lord and Scripture (cf. Tit. 2:12; Heb. 12:9; Rev. 3:20;

Eph. 6:4; 2 Tim. 3:16).

Our avoiding of such foolish and undisciplined questions does not

take the form of silence. Although we should simply refrain from an-

swering in cases of stupid and rude questions, which give birth to quar-

relsome disputes and emotionally pitched contentions, yet because the

passage indicates a response being given, our avoidance of foolish ques-

tions takes the form of refusing to answer in terms of the critic's tacit

assumptions and erroneously presupposed authority. Instead we educate

(vs. 25) and correct the thinking of the unbeliever based on divine truth

and authority. The reason we must avoid foolish questions by refusing to

answer in terms of the unbeliever's presuppositions is that such questions

lead to unchristian attitude and behavior (vs. 23). Moreover, answering

from a rationalistic or agnostic foundation denies that conversion takes

place by sovereign grace (vs. 25b). Also, because we have the genuine

truth to which the unbeliever must be converted, and because the non-

Christian is intellectually schizophrenic (i.e., he "opposes himself' by

suppressing and denying the clear revelation of God which is the neces-

sary foundation for all the knowledge any man possesses), we must not

answer him in terms of his rebellious and unfruitful presuppositions.

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

Courteous Faithful Instruction

Our Christian apologetical obligation is to instruct in and toward

genuine knowledge, honoring God's authority and truth. As just ob-

served, this must be done because the non-Christian "opposes himself'

by not submitting to God's Word. In suppressing the truth of God the

unbeliever lives a lie (pretending he can theoretically ground knowledge

in his secular assumptions). While depending on divine revelation for

the knowledge he has, the unbeliever denies that revelation. The apolo-

gist must bring the suppressed truth to bear on him by using argumen-

tation grounded in the presupposed and self-attesting Word of Christ,

thereby calling the sinner back to a remembrance of his God. It is the

responsibility of the apologist in all this to make courteous instruction

his goal (vss. 24f.). The wise man shows his wisdom by good conduct and

meekness, not descending to rivalry and bitterness since he is peaceable,

gentle, and merciful in his approach (James 3:13—17). Still, he is sincere

(i.e., without hypocrisy) and unwavering (James 3:17) in his stand; he rec-

ognizes that his wisdom is from above, so he does not glory in himself and

lie against the truth (James 3:14f., 17).

If the apologist does not assume this attitude (courtesy and uncon-

tentiousness, yet unyielding submission to the presupposition of God's

truth), his undertaking will be worthless and will only engender confu-

sion (James 3:16). Returning to the 2 Timothy 2 passage, we now see

that the apologist must not be obsessed with a desire to dominate his

opponent, take pleasure in rivalry, or bring attention to his own intellec-

tual glories. Also, the apologist must not be sidetracked from his major

responsibility. He must avoid speculation and clever scholarship rooted

in secular assumptions and pay attention to a straightforward presenta-

tion of, and instruction in, the truth.

Finally, Paul points out in 2 Timothy 2:25 that the apologist must

recognize and live by the fact that foolish inquirers can be won over only

if God grants them a change of mind. The unbeliever's mind is blinded

as he stubbornly holds out against submission to God; until he receives

gracious illumination from God the non-Christian is captive to Satan

(vs. 26). Thus we sow the unadulterated seed of God's Word, trusting

and looking to His power to give the increase (cf. 1 Pet. 1:23; 1 Cor.

3:6f.). God must be the One who liberates the sinner from servitude to

Satan and gives him the ability to change his mind. The repentance

74

which God grants produces a genuine knowledge of the truth (vs. 25);

what had been previously suppressed and rebelled against is now known

in blessing and grace and given the proper response. So Paul here teach-

es the necessity of regeneration and repentance for genuine knowledge.

So then, taking the passage as a whole, Paul teaches us our need of a

presuppositional apologetic in 2 Timothy 2:23—25.

The two basic elements of presuppositional apologetics are dictated

to us in Proverbs 26:4-5. "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest

thou be like unto him. Answer a fool according to his folly lest he be wise

in his own conceit." In the first place the apologist does not defend the

faith against the unbeliever by answering in terms of the unbeliever's

presuppositions. If he surrenders to those presuppositions he has lost the

case from the outset and will end up in the same position as the fool.

The apologist must work within his presupposition of the authority and

truthfulness of God's Word. If he surrenders to secular assumptions he

will be trapped behind enemy lines. On the other hand, he should put

himself in his opponent's position so that he might show the unbeliever

the outcome of his apostate presuppositions. He answers in terms of the

foolishness of unbelief in order to manifest its ridiculous and ignorant

outcome, thereby preventing the unbeliever from being wise in his own

conceit. So then, positively the Christian apologist presupposes the self-

attesting authority and truth of Scripture, refusing to answer criticism

in terms of secular premises, standards, and method; negatively, he per-

forms an internal critique of the unbeliever's system of thought in order

to demonstrate its vanity. By following this kind of apologetic procedure,

which demands that every thought be made captive to the obedience of

Christ and which does not use the intellectual weapons of the flesh or

walk according to secular ways of thought, the apologist will be mighty

before God and able to overthrow reasonings and every high thing that

exalts itself against the knowledge of God (2 Cor. 10:3-5).

C H A P T E R 3

NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY

RELINQUISHED

1. T H E NECESSITY OF COORDINATING

EPISTEMOLOGY WITH METAPHYSICS

R. M. Chisholm distinguishes between two different questions in

Theory of Knowledge1 with reference to "The Problem of the Crite-

rion" (chapter 4):

(A) What do we know? (or what is the extent of our

knowledge?)

(B) How are we to decide in any particular case whether

we know? (or what are the criteria of knowing?)

He then goes on to note that "if we know the answer to either one of

these questions, then, perhaps we may devise a procedure that will

enable us to answer the other." The question naturally arises for him

which of these two questions should be answered first and act as a key

to answering the other. The contention of this article is that, contrary

to most non-Christian and autonomous philosophies and even to the

method of many Christian apologetical systems, the epistemological

1. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hail, 1966).

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

and metaphysical questions cannot be divorced in the way Chisholm

proposes. Neither one of these questions is more primary than the other,

for an answer to one assumes an answer to the other.

However, it is common today to view the methodological concern

of epistemology as prior to deriving answers in the area of metaphys-

ics. Thus when a Christian and non-Christian argue with one another

it is assumed that they must arrive at some common epistemological

ground before going on to discuss the substance of their disagreement

(e.g., God's existence, etc.). This article will attempt to exhibit the im-

possibility of such a procedure. It is interesting to notice that Chisholm

proceeds to consider question (B) as if it were primary to (A) but con-

cludes his investigation by saying, "It may not be surprising, then, that

the general problem of criterion has created impasses in almost every

branch of knowledge." Such impasses can be removed only by coordi-

nating the tasks of metaphysics and epistemology, not by subordinating

the former to the latter.

Presuppositions Involved in the Question

It follows from the traditional formulation of "knowledge" as "justi-

fied true belief" that question (A) above is in effect asking:

(A2) What is justifiably believed and true?

and that question (B) is asking:

(B2) How do we decide whether a proposition, k, is justi-

fiably believed and true?

In chapter 7 of his book,2 Chisholm maintains that a true proposi-

tion asserts a certain state of affairs to be the case when in fact that is the

state of affairs. Based on this (A2) would be asking:

(A3) What do we justifiably believe to be, and is, an exist-

ing state of affairs?

and (B2) would be asking:

(B3) How do we decide whether we have justification for

2. The chapter entitled "What Is Truth?"

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NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

believing a proposition, k, and that k accurately states

the existing state of affairs?

It is clear, then, that (A3) and (B3) are two-part questions, their compo-

nents being rendered as follows:

(A3a) What do we have justification for believing?

(A3b) What is the existing state of affairs?

(B3a) What will count as justification for believing some

proposition, k?

(B3b) By what means do we determine whether k states

the existing state of affairs?

The reason for unpacking (A) and (B) in the above way is to demonstrate

that (A) is not strictly an epistemological question, for it involves the meta-

physical question (A3b). This feature of (A) sets it in sharpest contrast to

B); the distinctive feature of the former is true belief, while the distinctive

emphasis of the latter is justified belief. Answers to (B3a) and (B3b), as

epistemological questions, will not be formulated without recourse to, and

dependence upon, an answer to (A3b), a metaphysical question.

The kinds of reasons that will be sanctioned as offering "justification"

for a belief (in answer to (B3a)) will be so selected because these lead to be-

liefs accounted as true in a satisfactory number of cases. Justification is not

to be found for a belief in that it is true, for that would collapse "justifica-

tion" into "truth" (leaving "knowledge" as simply "true belief"). Rather,

justification is conferred on certain types of reasons (or warrants) because

of the relatively high degree of success they have in engendering true be-

lief. Hence the notion of justified belief is related to that of true belief in

that justifying reasons for a belief are those that will most always lead a

person to hold beliefs that are true.

Now, if types of reasons are to be sanctioned in this fashion, it is

obvious that knowledge of the existing state of affairs is essential. One

could not estimate the success factor for particular kinds of reasons un-

less he possessed some knowledge of the truth (propositions correspond-

ing to the existing state of affairs) with which to make comparison. So

answers to (A3b) are essential to answering (B3) altogether. The require-

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

ment of justification for a person's allegedly knowledgeable belief is laid

down in order that a person who builds up his case according to proped

procedure and with appropriate content (i.e., follows the "justifying"

guidelines) will have good reason to suppose that he has accurately rep-

resented the existing state of affairs. The criteria of justification will the

need to be established in accordance with what is indeed the existing

state of affairs." Hence it is an inescapable requirement that one have

at least an elementary knowledge of the existing state of affairs if he is

going to lay down sensible, valid, workable and promising criteria for

justification. In short, the justifiableness of a justification for belief must

itself be counted worthy according to the presumably known state of af-

fairs. If a man is to answer (B3a), then he must already know something

about the world.

It turns out that we cannot begin purely and simply with an episte-

mological method—a procedure and criterion for distinguishing knowl-

edgeable beliefs from those which are otherwise—and then proceed to

find out the extent of our knowledge. To begin with such an epistemo-

logical method and standard would be to start one's thinking with a

generalization (about the success of an epistemological procedure in vari-

ous cases) and an arbitrary criterion which is given no warrant or rea-

son. In actual practice we know how to decide which epistemological

methods are to be over others on the basis of their success in leading to

knowledgeable beliefs. But this already assumes that we have certain

recognized items of knowledge which can serve as paradigms and test

cases. We would already need to know something about the extent of

our knowledge before we could settle philosophically on a criterion of

knowledge. Our thus epistemological rules will thus be adapted to our

accepted cases of knowledge.3 The epistemological question cannot be

answered in isolation.

The very nature of questions (B3a) and (B3b) indicates that the one

asking them believes there are extramental states of affairs, that it is pos-

sible to have true knowledge of them, that error is possible yet avoidable,

that it is appropriate to seek after reliable standards, etc. Yet a solipsist,

or radical monist, or person who considers human thinking (or at least

his own thinking) infallible, etc., would not ask such a question as (B3).

3. See Chisholm's later study, The Problem of Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette Uni-

versity Press, 1973).

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NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

Knowledge as such involves the notions of known object and knowing

object, but a consistent monist would be averse to such a dualism. A so-

lipsist would not be concerned with knowledge in this sense either, since

he as the subject is the imaginating source of all "objects" anyway. The

idea of judging propositions against standards of truth and justification

is senseless unless the possibility of error is recognized, for comparison

with the standard is supposed to be capable of yielding at least two an-

swers (e.g., correct, incorrect). The endeavor to find reliable standards is

meaningful only if error is avoidable, and if it is not the case that every-

thing is in ultimate flux. So again, the very posing of questions (B3a) and

(B3b) presupposes a metaphysical commitment, some answer to (A3b).

The establishing of conditions for "knowledge" both requires and

entails some degree of knowledge already. When a criterion is pro-

pounded for "knowledge," the statement of that criterion falls within

that set of propositions known to be representative of the existing state of

affairs; that is, an epistemological belief is informative of the metaphysi-

cal situation. Further, a number of other things are apparently known

i.e., fall within the extent of what, rather than how, we know) prior to

the espousing of this criterion. The rendering of an epistemological cri-

terion presumes knowledge of the fact that man's mental capacities are

sufficient for gaining true beliefs (i.e., a knowledge of anthropology), that

extramental states of affairs are amenable to man's epistemological ap-

paratus (i.e., a knowledge of cosmology), that this criterion is somehow

appropriate and applicable (i.e., a knowledge of axiology), etc. So then,

to some degree what is known is coordinated with how we determine

whether we know; one cannot proceed to answer the epistemological

question without simultaneously rendering decisions on the metaphysi-

cal question. One cannot gain an epistemological position untainted by

metaphysical commitment.

A Classic Impasse in Philosophy

The interdependence of metaphysical and epistemological commit-

ments within a particular worldview is illustrated from the history of

philosophy. Some philosophers have favored a permanence and atomis-

tic orientation to the world; they tended to focus on the enduring aspects

of experience and to view the world as made up of diverse, separate,

discontinuous entities. For them the real world is characterized by sta-

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bility, and change is the philosophical problem needing an explanation.

However, other philosophers, who have favored a process and monistic

orientation to the world, have tended to focus on the changing aspects

of experience and to view everything in the world as united and con-

tinuous with everything else. For this second group of thinkers reality

is characterized by dynamic instability, change being so obvious a fea-

ture of experience that any belief in stability or fixity needs an explana-

tion. With these two different orientations toward reality it is no surprise

that there are correspondingly diverse attitudes toward truth and logic.

The permanence-atomistic perspective favors a correspondence theory

of truth: the epistemological problem is to get independent minds into

correspondence with independently existing objects. The process-mo-

nistic perspective, however, tends toward a coherence theory of truth

minds and objects are already in a relationship with each other, but the

problem is now how finite minds could know isolated, finite truths. To

know anything, one should have to know everything. With respect to

logic the former school thinks that there are two quite discrete, separate,

unchanging categories of propositions: the consistent and the contra-

dictory. Proper philosophical analysis and advance requires that every

statement be classified into one or the other of these discrete categories.

But the latter school feels that such categories are merely tentative and

provisional; between these two categories there is a dynamic tension

which, when resolved, only results in a new conflict within man's under-

standing and analysis.

One can imagine how unfruitful arguments between these two phil-

osophical orientations or schools could be. The permanence-atomistic

perspective would accuse the process-monistic perspective of failing to

draw sharp distinctions and thus falling into muddled reasoning about

reality and knowledge. Yet the second perspective would accuse the first

of being simplistic and reductionistic, thereby falsifying the whole truth

When one outlook uses an epistemological method or standard to argue

with the metaphysical beliefs of the other, the second school will coun-

ter with its own epistemological method which refutes the metaphysical

beliefs of the first. If they attempt to argue over each other's epistemol-

ogy, it will be in terms of their correspondingly different metaphysics.

That is, their arguments will not simply be over how well each other has

developed his philosophy, but over what kind of philosophy should be

developed. What take to be problems, what kind of analysis they say is

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acquired, and what methods and standards they use will all be viewed

differently. What each school sees as amounting to "making a good

case" for a basic position—what each will count as plausible or not—de-

bends on their own initial perspectives or presuppositions. Their views

of reality have suggested certain epistemological attitudes, and their

epistemological standards have supported certain views of reality. For

example, because Plato believed in abstract entities (the Forms) he was

a rationalist in epistemology, but because Hume thought that only per-

ceivable individuals existed he was an empiricist in epistemology. Yet on

the other hand, both philosophers felt that their metaphysical conclu-

sions were demanded by their epistemological criteria. The inescapable

fact is that one's views of reality and knowledge mutually influence and

support each other.

The fact that reasons can be, and are, offered in support of an an-

swer to (B3) above suggests that an insight into an answer to (A3b) is

possessed. A person usually will offer considerations that he feels will

compel others to take the same epistemological position as his own.

Something is known about the existing state of affairs that leads to the

criteria of knowledge proposed. Not many philosophers will say that

they, while devoid of any knowledge about the existing state of affairs,

struck upon the "lucky" formula that became their key to knowledge.

Epistemological considerations are not capricious guesses; they are giv-

en because someone feels that they are appropriate for the reality in

which he lives. Epistemology is not a subjectivist guessing game; reasons

are put forward for epistemological positions, and this strongly indicates

that (B3) is answered in conjunction with (A3b).

There is another way to demonstrate that a thinker cannot begin an

examination of epistemology free from metaphysical knowledge to some

degree. For consider: Certain theologians expound the scriptural position

that an absolute and authoritative God demands that every single thought

be brought into subjection to His Word. They explain that since God

alone is all comprehensive in His interpretation of reality, nothing can

qualify as "knowledge" that does not correspond to His thoughts. Their

claim is that all reasoning, even epistemology, must be brought under

God's authority or else reason itself collapses as inoperative. Now when

a person holds that philosophy need not take a metaphysical position but

can start from a neutral epistemological ground and work toward a meta-

physic this person excludes (indeed, precludes) the theological epistemology

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expounded by that group of thinkers just mentioned. So a person must at

least know that the God and system of interpretation of these Christian

theologians are untrue to the existing state of affairs if he is going to assert

epistemology's precedence to, and independence of, metaphysics. But this

is only to say that even the person who adamantly asserts that epistemol-

ogy must be considered separately from questions of metaphysics must

himself have some metaphysical knowledge prior to his pronouncement

(enough to discredit the theological position just outlined)! One cannot

escape making his study of epistemology concomitant with his study of

metaphysics; the two inform and direct each other.

Epistemology and Metaphysics Interdependent

The preceding considerations lead us to reject the mistaken at-

tempt to settle matters concerning epistemology and method prior to,

and in abstraction from, questions of metaphysics. The questions "What

do we know?" and "How do we decide in any particular case whether

we know?" should not be, indeed cannot be, subordinated one to the

other. One's view of knowledge is itself necessarily conditioned by his

understanding of what constitutes ultimate reality (his view of man, the

world, and God). Common epistemological ground between disputants

of different metaphysical positions cannot in principle be found, for an-

swers to the questions of epistemology assume answers to the questions

of metaphysics. Common metaphysical commitments cannot be arrived

at by proponents of different epistemological schools, for methodology

dictates the type of conclusion one can reach. The task of epistemology,

therefore, must be coordinated with that of metaphysics.

In his later discussion of "the problem of criterion," Chisholm came

to this conclusion: "What few philosophers have had the courage to rec-

ognize is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the ques-

tion. It seems to me that, if we do recognise this fact, as we should, then

it is unseemly for us to try to pretend that it isn't so."4

4. Chisholm, The Problem of Criterion, 37.

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2 . U L T I M A C Y I N A U T H O R I T Y

At this point the dogged neutralist might reply that if metaphysics and

epistemology are interdependent, then indeed we are left with a subjec-

tivist guessing game, and all philosophy begins with a "leap." Now we

could respond by pointing out that the fact someone does not like the

outcome of a line of argumentation is no refutation of that argument.

Epistemology and metaphysics do seem to be circularly related; if that

leaves us with a "leap," then we may not like the circumstances in which

we find ourselves, but in all honesty we would have to face up to them.

However it is far more important for us to ask whether the fact that

we cannot incontestably begin solely in epistemology or metaphysics

when we philosophize really does leave us with skepticism. Does the

fact that ultimate principles are strictly incapable of external verifica-

tion (since to have a standard above these assumptions by which to

judge them is simply to push the question of verification back to this

ultimate standard) leave us with a guessing game at the beginning of

our thinking?

Knowledge and Ethical Authority

Only if Christianity were untrue (which it is not) would this dire

conclusion follow. Because God has clearly revealed Himself to all

men by means of nature, man's own constitution, and Scripture, men

do not begin with a mere guess about reality. All men as creatures of

God have the same true metaphysical information and moorings, as

well as justification for them (i.e., revelation from God Himself). So

their intellectual endeavors do not begin with a "leap," but rather they

begin either in submissive obedience or rebellious disobedience. That

men suppress and mishandle the revelation of God, thereby denying

to themselves in one stroke the true metaphysic (beginning with the

God of creation) and valid epistemology (resting upon divine revela-

tion), fails to alter the fact that intellectual endeavors do not begin from

a blank position of neutrality and make their first move by means of a

guess. All men begin with genuine knowledge—true belief about the state

of affairs and justification for that belief—and then proceed to use or

misuse it. The beginning of philosophy is not a subjectivist guessing

game but a matter of ethics.

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

To get to the real heart of the matter in the neutralist's objection

against the circular dependence of metaphysics and epistemology we

must recognize that most philosophers do not want intellectual mat-

ters to reduce to a question of morality (obedience or rebellion to God's

Word). They want to hold the intellect or reason to be above matters

of moral volition. They hold that truth is obtainable and testable no

matter what ethical condition the thinker is in. Hence they maintain

that all disputes must be rationally resolvable, and a rational case for a

philosophic position relies upon a valid chain of discursive argumenta-

tion that takes us back to incontestable first principles or facts. However,

if the situation described above pertaining to God's clear revelation of

Himself to all men actually obtains as the only alternative to skepti-

cism, then epistemology and metaphysics are so intertwined that an ap-

peal to authority is inevitable at basic levels of philosophy. So if, when

it comes to the fundamental question of Christian faith, arguments are

ultimately circular (since metaphysics and epistemology depend on one

another), then the matter reduces to one of submission or rebellion to the

authority of the revealed God.

Whether most philosophers like it or not, Scripture assuredly tells

us that the way a man uses his intellect is an ethical matter (e.g., rebel-

lion against God leads to a darkened mind). Irrespective of the way in

which men respond to it, God's clear revelation is the only escape we

have from the skepticism that would otherwise result from the necessity

of coordinating metaphysics and epistemology, and it is this revelation

that provides both the epistemic ground and metaphysical content for the

foundation of all of man's intellectual endeavors. Hence a Christian's

apologetical argument (working on a transcendental level) will finally be

circular; what he knows and how he knows are both tied up with God's

revelation. At the base of every man's knowledge is the coordination of

metaphysics and epistemology that is expressed in God's clear revela-

tion to all men, a revelation that saves men from ultimate skepticism. In

being thus saved from skepticism, however, philosophers are faced with

the authority of God and the fact that reasoning is a matter of morality.

Uncovering Presupposed Authorities

Because men will suppress or misuse the clear revelation of God and

continue to exalt the primacy of their reason, disagreement between the

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Christian and the unbeliever will understandably involve reasoned argu-

mentation. This raises a crucial question. Because both men will of neces-

sity be involved in arguing matters of epistemology and metaphysics (since

the two are interdependent) without first establishing primal agreement

in one area and then discursively moving on to answers in the other, the

practical question arises: where do all philosophical justifications come to

an end? Every system must have some unproven assumptions, a starting

point not antecedently established, with which reasoning begins and ac-

cording to which it proceeds to conclusions. Therefore, all argumentation

over ultimate issues of truth and reality will come down to an appeal

to authorities which, in the nature of the case, are ultimate authorities.

Circularity at this level of argumentation is unavoidable. If the alleged

authority is not taken to be authoritative in itself, but justification is offered

for that authority, then this is not really the ultimate authority after all—

rather, those justifying considerations are the final authority. When that

ultimate authority is challenged, the argument must necessarily become

circular, for nothing is "more authoritative" or carries greater warranting

power than the "ultimate" authority.

The unbeliever, as much as the believer, has a final authority to

which he appeals in order to defend the world-view that embraces his

interdependent metaphysic and epistemology. When two people, Chris-

tian and unbeliever, are arguing, their ultimate authorities will be dis-

tinguishable by what they refuse to impugn or contradict in the long

run. They may be moved to abandon secondary authorities along the

way, but that which is the last "fortress" to fall, that consideration whose

veracity they will assert to the dire end, that which governs and qualifies

all higher movements of thought and argumentation, constitutes their

authority. For a trivial disagreement in logic homework two students

may appeal to a commonly recognized authority in the non-personal

laws of inference; for a disagreement between two philosophers appeal

might be made to the authority of their respective views of truth (e.g.,

coherence vs. pragmatic). But at base, when one is giving reasons for

his fundamental outlook on reality and knowledge he will appeal to

some personal authority: his own mind, an esteemed scholar, a group of

thinkers, the majority opinion, or God. Providing that no mistakes have

been made in logical calculus or observation, a difference in personal

authority will always lie behind an argument that is at an impasse. Dis-

agreements in world-view (the axis of metaphysics-epistemology-ethics)

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

will finally reduce to an absolute antithesis in personal authority.

Until one's authority structure changes, his ultimate philosophic

position will remain unaltered. Therefore, all argumentation between

non-Christian and believer must inevitably become circular, begin-

ning and ending with some personal authority (and not a question

of epistemology or metaphysics abstracted from the other). Since this

is the case the Christian should not be ashamed of his admittedly

dogmatical apologetic, a system of interpretation which starts "from

above," from the authoritative Word of the self-contained, triune God

who speaks in self-attesting Scripture. The necessity, clarity, sufficien-

cy, and authority of Scripture are correlative to that revelation of God

in nature and man's constitution. This forms the solid basis for our

apologetical effort, an endeavor to bring the ultimate authority of God

to bear on every area of life. The suggestion of authoritarianism is no

onus, no scandal, to the servant of God. In the nature of the case the

best witness to God's existence, the truth of His revelation, and the

basis of a genuinely sound defense of the Christian faith would be God

Himself. To require proof of Him or His Word would be to misunder-

stand who He is or the argumentative procedure. The beginning of an

argument is a personal authority not previously argued for, and there

can be no higher or more reliable source of truth and validation than

God, The truth of Scripture, then, is not established by the apologist's

use of external tests; rather the Word of God is self-attesting. The Bible

is accepted on God's own authority.

3 . T H E I M P O S S I B I L I T Y O F N E U T R A L I T Y

The patent corollary of all the foregoing discussion is the impos-

sibility of neutrality in an argument dealing with wide-scope and

fundamental issues. It should be recognized that the claim to be, or

the attempt to be, completely objective and value-free in deciding an

issue of truth is ridiculous; the very fact that evidence is collected,

arranged, and evaluated by each man's own mind and in response

to his personality and past experience indicates the strong element

of subjectivity that is involved in settling issues of truth. If a man's

mind really could be free of interpretative principles so that he could

treat all "facts" as though they had no pre-interpretation inherent in

them, then his interpretative activity could never get started or make

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contact with the "facts." He would have a blank mind working on

blank impressions.

Furthermore, the place where a man goes to secure or look for evi-

dence indicates a certain prejudice toward the answer expected to a

question on his part from the very outset. Also, what a man even consid-

ers "factual" will be determined by his outlook or philosophy (e.g., the

materialist and Buddhist will disagree from the start of an argument).

Moreover we note that the very formulation and styling of an argument

require that a man have his final conclusion in sight even from the outset

in order that the argument be structured to move to the proper end; the

predetermination of conclusion significantly governs the formulation of

premises. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,5 Thomas Kuhn clearly

exhibits the non-objective character of science when it comes to foun-

dational questions. He says that the scientist views the world through a

model or arranging-picture; he has a paradigm that defines the scope

and methodology of the science using it. The world becomes a totally

new place when the paradigm is altered; even sense data and its in-

terpretation are governed, qualified, and determined by the model. In

1931 Kurt Godel pulled the rug out from under the supposed neutrality

of logic in the same way that Kuhn later made scientific or factual neu-

trality look suspicious. Godel developed a theorem that demonstrated

the impossibility of formulating a consistency proof for any system of

logical calculus (with its signs and rules of inference) within that system.6

Hence different systems of logic are selected for reasons other than ob-

jective logical argument.

Against this background it should come as no surprise that the Chris-

tian and unbeliever do not and cannot approach their differences with

argumentative or philosophic neutrality. Even though the Christian

and the non-Christian have the facts of the objective world in common,

they have radically divergent interpretations of them. For the Christian

5. (Chicago University Press, [1962] 1970).

6. Bahnsen here refers to the two famous "incompleteness theorems"

as published by Godel in 1931. See Kurt Godel, "On formally undecidable

propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems," in A Source-

book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, trans, and ed. Jean van Heijenoort

(Harvard University Press, 1967), 596-616. Within that paper the relevant

selections are "Theorem VI" and "Theorem XI."

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

all facts are pre-interpreted by God, created by God, and revelatory of

God; they must be handled in such a way that glory is brought to God.

But the non-Christian views these facts as meaningfully interpreted

only by his own mind, as uncreated and free from God's control, as

ambiguous and contingent; he uses them to bring glory to man. Hence

the Christian and non-Christian have different interpretative schemes.

Even when the believer and unbeliever share the same rules of logi-

cal inference, they nevertheless can be said to have different "logics."

For the believer and unbeliever differ as to the use, significance, ground,

and authority of these rules; basically one subordinates logic to God

while the other does not. One views logic as rules of thought implanted

in man's mind by the Creator; the other sees logic as the self-sufficient,

self-authenticating tool of autonomous man's reason. One founds logic

in God; the other founds it in itself. The Christian places God's author-

ity above considerations of logical possibility or his own human use of

logic; the unbeliever places abstract possibility above God. Since the fall

of man was ethical in character (not metaphysical), the unregenerate

and regenerate share the facts of the world and the rules of thought, but

their interpretation and use of them are far from neutral. The Christian

obediently submits all thoughts to the word of Scripture, but the non-

Christian autonomously treats "logic" and "fact" as the final reference

point of all truth. The believer accepts God's interpretation of every-

thing without question; the rebel unbeliever imposes his own interpreta-

tion on all things in order to challenge the interpretation of the Creator.

Fundamentals of the Disagreement

Given the interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology, the

difference in personal authorities, and the unavoidable lack of neutral-

ity between Christian and non-Christian, the debate between the two

cannot proceed objectively and on agreed-to principles. From the first J

move of argument the truth or falsity of the Christian Scripture has

been assumed (not "proven"). The Christian and non-Christian will

take different minds as the final reference point in their own thinking;

the believer will use patterns of thought and interpretation provided by

God while the unbeliever will derive them from the created world itself

(e.g., his own mind).

The two will disagree as to whether God is enveloped within, and

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subject to, the same laws of logic and science and history as any other

(created) object or not. The Christian takes God as an absolute, com-

prehensive, incorrigible authority, while the non-Christian absolutizes

some aspect of his finite, temporal experience. The non-Christian be-

gins by assuming that God cannot clearly reveal himself in history or

by means of human words, that He cannot demand every thought to

be made subject to Christ; the Christian presupposes the very oppo-

site. Self-consciousness and knowledge of facts and laws are impossible

without God-consciousness according to the believer, but the unbeliever

assumes the non-createdness of the facts as well as man's mind and re-

jects the need to refer to God in any interpretative scheme. There is not

one fact or law which is "neutral" to the Christian and non-Christian.

Their respective views of anthropology, cosmology, and axiology are in

principle totally conflicting.

While they both stand on common ground, this common ground

is distinctively Christian ground (for all creation is revelatory of God).

But the non-Christian refuses to admit this and to build his reasoning

and life upon the Word of God. So while both stand upon common

Christian ground, the believer and unbeliever are nevertheless not neutral

in their outlook and convictions. Given the antithetical mindset of the

regenerate and unregenerate, the hope of a "neutral" apologetic which

appeals to commonly understood and accepted "facts" and "logic" is

futile. Neutrality is impossible.

How then can one ever hope to salvage the apolgetical effort? How

can there be any meaningful discussion between believer and unbeliever?

Are we not reduced to having the two disputants sit in separate philosoph-

ic towers and mutually loathe one another? All of these questions would

carry a powerful sting if one did not follow a presuppositional apologetic

rooted in the truth of God's Word. Scripture tells us that the non-Chris-

tian must always live in God's world (i.e., upon Christian ground) and

continually be confronted by God's revelation within and without him.

The non-Christian is not and cannot be consistent with his boasted au-

tonomy and self-authority. It is the unbeliever's inconsistency, wherein he

knows the truth about God and depends upon it in his intellectual efforts

(even while he denies it), that makes communication and argument with

him by the Christian possible. Christian language and discussion are not

hermetically sealed off from all non-Christian discourse. The sinner can

still understand the words used by the Christian, for they are both made

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in the image of God. Satan has not defeated the Word. The burden of the

following article is to demonstrate that the unbeliever can be said to know

that something is the case while being ignorant of his knowledge to that

effect and even denying it. Hence, to some degree the unbeliever is in-

consistent with his rejection of Christianity; in denying certain Christian

presuppositions he, nevertheless, makes use of them. This inconsistency

on his part makes apologetic argument possible.

4. IGNORANCE OF O N E ' S O W N KNOWLEDGE.

One of the curious things about the activity of human knowing it that

it is not self-certifying; that is, psychological conviction is not invari-

ably associated with all instances of genuine knowledge.7 A person who

knows that something is the case does not automatically feel certain

or have psychological surety about his knowledge, and a person who

is more than confident of knowing something does not thereby have a

guarantee of possessing genuine knowledge. People often know more

than they might have supposed, and many times are wrong in thinking

that they know something that they in reality do not know (e.g., Smith

claims to know a short cut yet gets lost; Jones is surprised to find that he

can work the problems on his calculus test). Although the autobiographi-

cal statement, "I know that p, although I am not sure of it," is rather

strange, it is not self-contradictory. Confidence is neither a sufficient nor

a necessary condition of knowing. The psychological states of certainty

and uncertainty function neither to verify nor to falsify a person's pos-

session of actual knowledge.

Hence it would be well if we were to keep separate a man's claims to

know and his actual knowing; the presence of one is no guarantee of the

presence of the other. The man who claims to know that p may be mis-

taken, while the man who genuinely knows p might never utter a claim

to that effect. This latter condition can obtain for a number of reasons:

(1) the knower may never have occasion or interest to report his knowl-

edge; (2) he may not be confident that the reasons for his belief constitute

justification for it (while in fact they do); or (3) he may not personally

realize that he knows such and such. The first case is simply a matter of

7. See A. D. Woozley, "Knowing and Not Knowing," in Knowledge and Belief, ed. A.

P. Griffiths (London: Oxford, 1967).

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circumstance. The second case is often attended by odd construction, "I

think I know that ..." and calls the claim to knowledge into doubt (this

construction should be distinguished from "I think I know how, when,

where, etc.," which is a cautious assertion of having the right answer or

ability; in this case the test is simply in the performance of the correct

action or delivering the correct answer). The third case goes a step fur-

ther and in fact always precludes a claim to knowledge, no matter how

[cautious it might be. However, we must not suppose that a man does not

know something because he refrains from claiming to know it.

Because confidence is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition

of knowing, and since claiming to know and knowing can be mutually

exclusive of each other, the following observations are appropriate.

1. "I am not at all sure that p" does not entail that the

speaker does not know that p.

2. "I would not claim (I know) that p" does not entail lack

of knowledge either.

3. "I am sure that p" does not imply the truth of p or

falsity of non-p.

4. "I know that p" is also susceptible to error.

5. "I think I know that p," being a weaker form of 3 and

4, emphasizes the definite possibility of error.

The interesting thing, then, is that a person's knowing p or knowing

not-p is not incompatible with any of these previous five autobiographi-

cal statements. Knowing p, a person might still not be sure or claim it;

knowing not-p is not contrary to thinking that one knows p or even be-

ing confident that one knows p. Therefore, a person can genuinely know

something even if he lacks assurance or claims the very opposite.

The reason why this observation may seem somewhat strange (and

might seem totally unacceptable if made out of context) is that we tend to

construe it in terms of autobiographical affirmations. We realize how odd

an autobiographical rendition of such a state of affairs would be. Indeed

the statement, "I am not certain that p, but I know that p" or even more,

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

"I know that p, but claim to know the opposite" would strike us as inane

or absurd. However, one's own psychological consistency does not con-

cern us here; even when the state of affairs would warrant it, we will rarely

hear such incongruent assertions. Smith's uncertainty or denial of p, while

knowing that p, is not a contradictory state of affairs; his reporting of that

state of affairs may be odd, but that is not a good reason for Jones to re-

frain from asserting the state of affairs to be such that Smith knows what

he is unsure of or even denies.

Self-Deception in Common Practice

Therefore, a man can be ignorant of his knowledge; that is, he can

know something and not know that he knows it. This ignorance can take

very strange or ironic forms-even the denying of what one genuinely

knows. The possibility of being ignorant of your knowledge applies to

knowledge-that as much as to knowledge-how. It is easier for us to see

the latter than the former case (e.g., a man can turn out to know how to

use chop-sticks despite his hesitation to employ them). This is because

examples of the former situation are rarely related to us, and those in-

stances that come to mind are all of a more or less irrational or schizo-

phrenic type. This is not surprising, however; to say of a man that he

knows that p although he is not sure of it or claims the opposite is to

criticize him for being somehow unreasonable (i.e., he does not admit

or have confidence of something he ought to be sure of). Common and

numerous examples of self-deception show that it is possible for a man

to be ignorant of his knowledge that something is the case. It would be

true that a man "knows" p if he fulfills the requirements of knowledge:

justified, true, belief. If Smith believed p, had justification for p, and p

is true, then Smith could be said to know that p—even if Smith did not

know that he knew p or failed to admit his knowledge of p. It is even

conceivable that Smith could deny that he knows that p when p is the

case, and Smith has justification for p and believes that p. To make this

point we turn to a few brief observations.

To some degree it is possible for a person to be mistaken about his

beliefs; he can fool himself about what he genuinely believes yet denies.

This can be seen to be so because a disposition to behave consistently

with a belief is a mark of its genuineness. If a person professes to believe

something (say, that this apple is poisoned) and does not act in accord

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with that belief (say, by eating this apple without any suicidal intentions),

we tend to judge that he does not really believe what he professes. Belief

is more than mental assent or the recitation of a formula.

Consistent behavior is expected if a person is to be credited with

believing something; actions are often the most accurate pointer to what

a person actually believes in his "heart of hearts." Numerous examples

could be cited where we see in others (and not often enough in our-

selves) behavior inconsistent with professed belief. In such cases (depend-

ing upon the nature of what is believed) inconsistent behavior can serve

to falsify profession and indicate an alternative belief. (Since people of-

ten do what they believe to be wrong I refrain from saying that any

inconsistent act falsifies any respective belief; each case must be judged

according to its own peculiar character and circumstance. While one

transgression does not falsify a genuine commitment to the Decalogue,

eating this apple at this time while professing to believe that it is poison-

ous would automatically discredit the belief. Moreover, since the public

profession of a belief is itself an action to be taken into account I draw

back from a completely behavioristic understanding of "belief." The

Christian must especially take account of the complications in judging a

man's beliefs, for the old nature still resides in believers while common

grace operates in unbelievers.) So it is possible for a man to be mistaken

about his beliefs; "a tree is known by its fruits." A man can believe some-

thing without acknowledging or admitting that he believes it.

Moreover, a person can have strong evidence or adequate justifica-

tion for a proposition while refusing to accept it. This often takes place

when the proposition to be believed carries with it a great deal of ad-

verse emotional force; when such an emotional factor is present it can

often lead a person to reject a justification or argument which would

satisfy him intellectually under normal conditions. For example: a fa-

ther who has accidentally run over his child when backing the car out

the driveway can encounter more than sufficient evidence of that fact

and still painfully refuse to see that the evidence proves the point—-it

would be too much for him to bear to face the fact that he killed his own

child. Many "reasonable" men will reject arguments that are sound if

those arguments would require major changes in their life-styles. If a

proposition poses a possible threat or anxious situation for someone, he

can refuse to grant the validity or sufficiency of the justification for that

proposition. One's psychological disposition can compel him to "close

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

his eyes to the facts."8

Apologetical Implications of Self-Deception

We conclude, then, that it is possible for a man to meet the condi-

tions of knowledge and yet refuse to admit it. A man can be mistaken

about his beliefs. He can have justifying reasons for a belief to which

he will not submit. Hence he could be in error as to the extent of his

knowledge; he can be ignorant of his knowledge. An application of

this principle would be the case where someone who denies God's ex-

istence behaves (epistemologically or ethically) as though there were a

God and who would suffer loss of pride or self-esteem if he "opened

his eyes" to the clear evidence of God's existence around him; such a

person would be denying what he "knows" to be true (i.e., that God

exists). This theological illustration is particularly fitting since belief in

God has a negative and positive side for the individual who believes; it

requires humility (negatively) while (positively) guaranteeing the pos-

sibility of knowledge and grounding human values.

Thus we can see how a man would behave as though he believed

God existed (e.g., maintaining that he can "know" objective truth, de-

pending on the uniformity of nature, applying moral norms, fearing

death, etc.) while not wanting to acknowledge it (i.e., because of his guilt

before the Creator-Judge). He can have justification for believing that

God exists (i.e., Scripture says that the revelational evidence is clear and

inescapable, the impress of God's plan being found in the facts of science

and the laws of thought; God's existence and character are made known

to every man in the creation around him and in his own constitution;

and the nonexistence of God is epistemologically impossible) while re-

fusing to admit it (because of the emotional factor involved).

A non-Christian can claim that God does not exist then, and nev-

ertheless be said to know that God indeed does exist. Because this is the

case one can employ an effective apologetical argument. Yet the apolo-

gist need not fall back upon false and impossible claims to neutrality nor

utilize the hostile presuppositions of the unbeliever in order to do so.

8. For a further detailed study of self-deception, see Greg L. Bahnsen,

A Conditional Resolution of the Apparent Paradox of Self-Deception

(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1978).

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NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

Rather he drives home the Word of God, forcing the rebel to see that

he is living "on borrowed capital" (i.e., Christian presuppositions), and

calling him back to a "remembrance" of his God.

5 . T H E HOPELESSNESS O F AUTONOMOUS REASONING

By epistemological autonomy is meant the ability to attain to knowl-

edge independent of God's revelation and existence. The person who

rejects the Word of God feels that he can find truth with his own powers

of exploration, examination, and explanation. He thinks that personal

knowledge of the world is attainable irrespective of God's existence. For

the self-styled autonomous man personal understanding need not make

reference to the God-situation in order to justify or explain itself. It is

assumed from the outset that the human mind is epistemologically self-

sufficient. He purports to start simply with himself, his native abilities,

the facts of experience, and the principles of logic in order to establish an

interpretation of the world built up without reference to God or divine

revelation. He takes it that his thinking is straightforwardly original and

relies upon no a priori judgments as to fact. This epistemological stance

needs to be unmasked.

The autonomous man would obviously have to determine the na-

ture and possibility of knowledge without God. For the free-thinker

a disclaimer of any knowledge whatsoever or the legislation of the

impossibility of knowing anything is self-vitiating; even if one is with-

out certainty in his beliefs he still knows a particular state of affairs

(i.e., his own agnosticism). Utter skepticism is not a legitimate op-

tion for the man who is epistemologically self-sufficient; he must know

something if he knows that he should reject revelational epistemology

and dependence upon God—he thinks himself in a position to reject

the absolute demand God makes upon his life and intellect. A person

knows to reject an optical illusion only if he already knows the actual

state of affairs; he can make a negative judgment only if he is also pre-

pared to assert something positively. To reject revelational epistemol-

ogy, then, is to commit yourself to defending the truth of autonomous

epistemology.

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

Relativism in Knowledge

Since the knower who claims independence of God cannot escape

asserting that he knows something, we can inquire from him, "What

constitutes knowledge?" The first self-generated perplexity arises at this

point, for his criteria will fluctuate back and forth between being too

lenient to exclude obvious faults and being too stringent to be met. If

knowledge is simply belief, then wild fantasies are competent to contra-

dict well-reasoned, scientific views, and furthermore two people could

have "knowledge" of contradictory states of affairs as a result of their

conflicting beliefs. There is a self-evident absurdity in holding that any-

thing I choose to believe thereby becomes a known state of affairs; if

"knowledge" collapses into "belief' utter relativism results (necessitat-

ing skepticism). When someone purports to "know" something we ex-

pect that he is reporting more than his own personal perspective or

feelings. Knowledge must be constituted by a particular kind of belief.

Psychological conviction will not qualify as the distinguishing mark of

knowledgeable belief, for then we are right back into the same problems as

noted above. Knowledge must correlate one's personal belief and the state

of affairs objective to him. Yet "true belief' is still too weak a definition of

"knowledge" since men have been known to make "lucky guesses" where

their beliefs so happened to be true. Wild-eyed hunches are not excluded

by such a view of knowledge, yet these hunches do not square with the or-

dinary usage of the word "knowledge." A man may turn out to be correct

in his beliefs while not being granted that he had any right to think that he

"knew" a state of affairs. If a man falls asleep at his desk with pen in hand

and because of biological twitches he scrawls on a piece of paper and then

awakens to find a somewhat coherent (yet accidental) sentence written on

his paper, he might take this sentence as a personal belief; however, such

a belief is too arbitrary for anyone to grant that he has genuine "knowl-

edge," even if his accidental sentence turns out to be factual. If knowledge

were taken to be simply "true belief," then outside of possessing the truth

itself all beliefs would be of equal worth—thinkers having no reason to

choose any belief over another.

Moreover, even this weakened definition has besetting problems.

What constitutes "truth" according to the autonomous thinker? By ex-

cluding revelation as that which sets the criteria, he runs into the fore-

boding threat of relativism (skepticism) again. If every man has his own

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Stated NEUTRALITY & aUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

standards, then every man is a law unto himself. Also we observe that

autonomous thinkers operate on the basis that the less a m a n knows the

less certain he should be about his judgments; the inference is that out-

side of omniscience no man can have unqualified truth. So what might

the autonomous man substitute for infinite knowledge as grounds for

claiming truthfulness in any of his predications? Is there any safeguard

against delusion? Can even the simplest thing be known for sure?

Being dialectically strewn between haphazard guesses and the de-

mand for omniscience, the autonomous m a n must push beyond "true

belief' as his standard of "knowledge" and introduce the notion of jus-

tification as that which eliminates arbitrariness and provides a ground

for asserting truthfulness in a belief. If someone has a good reason for

his belief, then another person might have incentive to take that belief

as true. However, different people are convinced by different kinds of

reasons; what satisfies Jones may be completely inadequate according

to Smith. A good case for a belief might persuade another to endorse it,

but that does not come all the way up to "knowledge" (and relativism

continues to threaten). At this point the autonomous m a n might be

willing to lower his sights: after all, he says, no one can demand more

than can be given.

So we settle for these criteria of knowledge: assenting to a proposi-

tion, the correctness of that judgment, and having a good reason to as-

sent to. A person will be said "to know" something if it is actually the

case, if he believes it, and if reasons can be offered for his belief. How-

ever, E. L. Gettier has leveled a serious attack on the traditional for-

mulation of "knowledge" as "justified, true belief."9 He maintains that

it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that

is true, but this person does not actually have knowledge. For example:

having spoken to the company president and having counted the coins

in Jones's pocket, Smith has strong evidence for the conjunctive proposi-

tion, "Jones is the m a n who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in

his pocket." This proposition entails the further proposition, "The man

who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket." But it turns out that

Smith, who also has ten coins in his pocket, lands the job. Hence Smith

justifiably believed the entailed proposition above and that proposition

9. See his article in the volume mentioned earlier, Knowledge and Belief, ed. A. P.

Griffiths (London: Oxford, 1967).

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

was true. Yet we realize that Smith did not genuinely have knowledge

of the state of affairs, was misinformed, and had an erroneous under-

standing of the entailed proposition in the sense that it turned out to

be true. Hence, even the weakened sense of "knowledge" offered by

the autonomous thinker (weak since it does not specify what constitutes

anything more than a relativistic notion of "truth" and "justification")

is burdened with problems.

The autonomous thinker might salvage his credibility in epistemol-

ogy by urging two criticisms against Gettier: (1) his example involves

an equivocation, and (2) Gettier fails to recognize that appropriateness

is a necessary attribute for justification. By its vagueness the entailed

proposition from the example allows for an equivocation: "The man

who will get the job" means "Whoever gets the job" at one point and

"The particular man, Jones" at another. It is clear that what is justified

("... Jones") is not what is true ("Whoever..."). Moreover, a person has

justifying reasons for his belief only if those reasons are relevant to the

truth of that belief. Strong evidence would not be considered such if it

were inappropriate evidence. Irrelevant reasons are not reasons at all.

In Gettier's example the entailed proposition is justified, with reference to

Jones but true with reference to Smith; hence his justifying reasons are

irrelevant to his true belief.

Failure in Relevance and Justification

But now the autonomous thinker has generated another set of perplex-

ities for himself: What constitutes relevance? What should be accepted as

justification? If Smith is in the business of selling audio equipment to edu-

cators and delivers his sales pitch to Jones, a teacher, and Jones interrupts

Smith, saying, "The mothers of my students had German measles during

their pregnancy," Smith could consider this remark totally irrelevant to

the business at hand. But Jones explains (to Smith's embarrassment) that

the comment was not lacking in pertinence since exposure to German

measles during pregnancy often causes the baby to be born deaf, and

(hence) his deaf students could not use the offered audio equipment! It

was Smith's lack of knowledge that led him to think that Jones's remark

was irrelevant and inappropriate. Further examples could be multiplied

wherein a man's limited understanding of a field leads him to miss the

significance of a judgment made by one more fully informed on the topic

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NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

at hand. Outside of being omniscient, the autonomous thinker might eas-

ily assess justifying reasons for a belief as irrelevant when in fact they were

directly relevant to the belief under consideration

The self-proclaimed independent thinker fares no better when ad-

dressed with the question, "What constitutes justification?" Some men

favor certain kinds of arguments, while others are partial to a different

kind of consideration. And it will not work to have two disputants in this

area argue with each other in order to arrive at a common standard for

evaluating justifying reasons for a belief, for in their attempts to justify

their respective justification-criteria they will each have to assume their

own standards and evaluate the other's on that basis. That is, the ques-

tion would have to be answered before the two opponents could seek to

answer it! The very point at issue would be illustrated in the way each

disputant proceeded to debate. No man can demand a neutral set of

considerations by which all men are to be convinced of what constitutes

proper justification for a belief; at this primal level each man is a law

unto himself. To argue for a justifying standard is to assume that very

standard. Relativism again threatens the possibility of knowledge.

It should be clear by this time that a self-styled autonomous thinker

becomes an authority unto himself. Since the question of justifying con-

ditions for a belief cannot be argued, the personal view of the autono-

mous man must simply be posited as the standard. Instead of advancing

a good rational, scientific case for his position, the autonomous thinker

must simply assume his own authority and assert his position. His mind

is taken as the arbitrator and final point of reference; the justification-

criteria, relevance-criteria, truth-criteria, and verification-criteria are

what they are simply because the autonomous man says so. An argu-

ment must begin somewhere, and so the autonomous man begins it with

himself. The interesting thing here is that it is just such a dogmatic ap-

peal to authority that often leads unbelievers to reject revelational-epis-

temology and its insistence on beginning with the Word of an absolute

and authoritative God. Not tolerating an appeal to sheer authority, the

autonomous thinker turns out also to make final appeal to sheer author-

ity—his own! When the Christian claims to justify his beliefs by refer-

ence to God's authoritative revelation the autonomous man demands

proof of God's Word, in essence demanding that God's authority be sub-

jected to the authority of the rational man. Obviously if the Christian's

appeal to authority was illegitimate, so also is the autonomous man's

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

appeal to authority. He falls beneath his own criticism.

Summing up the preceding considerations we note that the self-

proclaimed autonomous thinker must make some claim to knowledge;

yet he cannot specify what the nature and possibility of knowledge

are. He fails to settle the issues of truth, verification, relevance, an

justification. The pitfalls of relativism and skepticism and the require-

ment of omniscience are all too much for him. And finally, his only

alternative, an appeal to authority, is illegitimate according to his own

ground rules. We need hardly go beyond this point, for the farce of

autonomy is apparent. The knower who claims to be epistemologically

independent of God must lay claim to that-which-he-knows-not-what;

he must be sure of having something he is not sure of. In the long run

the autonomous thinker must pit his own epistemological credentials

against, and covet, those of God.

Chaos and Subjectivism in History

There are further perplexities that the autonomous thinker faces.

By rejecting the God of scriptural revelation there is no one great plan

and direction for history, there is no exhaustive interpretation of reality

as a whole, there is no explanation of what exists and for what happens

in history. Hence the autonomous thinker seeks to find truth in an ulti-

mately mysterious environment, an inexplicable time-space continuum.

However, there are two problematic implicates that attach to this view

implicit in autonomy. First, if the historical universe is ultimately mysteri-

ous then anything that appears to be understandable or true for the pres-

ent is actually a delusion, a mirage along the way to final agnosticism

and ignorance. This would render the autonomous man's "knowledge" a

comfortable deception. Secondly, in an ultimately uninterpreted universe

the autonomous man would be generating original interpretations of the

state of affairs. So under the guise of finding out about reality and explor-

ing its characteristics the autonomous man would actually be legislating

for reality; his interpretation would be projected upon the world. So then,

by rejecting revelational epistemology the autonomous man renders his

own knowledge illusory and subjective at best. His own reason determines

what shall be possible and impossible even though it has no control over

history and is itself circumscribed by the system of logic in which it func-

tions. The facts discovered by the autonomous man will be fitted to the

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NEUTRALITY &. AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

mold of the arbitrary mind and interpretative scheme of the autonomous

man. Epistemological distortion becomes an inherent difficulty.

An Irrational Universe

And the problems of autonomous thinking do not end here. Let us

now turn our attention to the two most common and fundamental as-

sumptions of independent thinkers: the law of non-contradiction and

the uniformity of nature. If the autonomous man has no justification for

holding to these two principles, then the very foundations of his science

and philosophy will have crumbled. Without God there is no warrant to

assume these principles. If the triune God, the world, and man are not

what Scripture says that they are, we have no rationality or meaningful

factuality to expect in our intellectual pursuits.

What justification has the autonomous man for assuming the law of

non-contradiction to be a reliable principle? The independent thinker

is quick to respond that the critic himself must assume the law of non-

contradiction in order to argue against him; of course this is true since

all discourse requires logical distinctions (or else every utterance would

mean anything and everything else). But it does not follow from this fact

that the function of logic is its own foundation! Furthermore, noting

that the critic of the autonomous man must also assume the law of non-

contradiction is a moot point; the critic may very well have a foundation

for his use of logic within his worldview.

Moreover, for the autonomous man to appeal to the law of non-

contradiction in order to support his use of that law is to reason in a

vicious circle; he proves his conclusion by appealing to his conclusion.

This is illegitimate for him elsewhere, so it must be prohibited here

also—or else we have a deplorable case of special pleading and incon-

sistency simply because the autonomous man wants to be arbitrarily

granted the right to get his intellectual endeavor off the ground. At

this point the autonomous thinker may make note of the fact that we

all think according to the law of non-contradiction. Strictly speak-

ing, this is only an indication that we are bound to think in certain

patterns; this does not tell us anything about the truthfulness or ap-

propriateness of those patterns! Perhaps we are locked into a distorted

mind-set.

The autonomous man must be pressed to explain the necessity of the

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

laws of logic. What is the source of this necessity? What constitutes a

logical truth and how is it that this truth is necessary? Most charac-

terizations offered for logical truths tend to be circular (assuming that

one already knows and can identify logical notions, such as possibility

and necessity, logical constant, entailment, etc.) and are thus of little

explanatory value. Further, the necessity of logical truths does not seem

completely plausible in light of the history of logical development and

debate. For instance, the law of excluded middle has been questioned by

Epicurean logicians, some medieval scholastics, quantum physics, the

intuitionist school of modern logic, as well as systems of many-valued

logic; aspects of some metaphysical systems (e.g., Aristotle's potentiali-

ties, Hegel's characterization of things by negation) also draw it into

question. Disputes and disagreements continue to be found among "ra-

tional men" with respect to the philosophical foundations of logic—for

instance, as to what basic kind of entity is mentioned when the logician

speaks of the truths of logic (is it psychological-inferential judgment,

linguistic-sentential proof, or a combination of both-propositional argu-

ment?). The definitions of logic and specifications of its subject matter

are varied indeed. It is hard to decide what kind of evidence the logician

is supposed to have for his claims (e.g., "disjunctive syllogism is a valid

form of argument") when the various approaches to logic are speaking

of categorically different types of objects, which in turn call for funda-

mentally distinct modes of cognition. The alleged "science" of logic is

actually a field in disarray and confusion at the present time—as many

of the leading writers in the area would confess.

Logic is not a philosophically neutral and unproblematic tool. For

instance it makes unmistakable demands on one's metaphysic. The

laws of logic are abstract, nontemporal relations, and therefore seem to

presuppose a non-sensory world—which will prove an uncomfortable

assumption for the materialistic unbeliever. Moreover, they assume

both metaphysical diversity (there are discrete propositions which bear

logical relations with each other) and metaphysical unity (the prin-

ciples of logic are regular or unchangeable, and are all consistent with

each other—comprise a unified system)—a combination which the

unbeliever will find hard to justify and maintain. Furthermore, logic

makes unmistakable demands on one's epistemology. How does one

justify confidence in truths of logic? If one's justification is a priori,

then why should we think that repeated instances of logical truths will

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be experienced in the contingent world of history, and why do these

a priori truths create insurmountable paradoxes (e.g., the set of all sets

which are not members of themselves). If the justification of logical

truths is a posteriori, then where does one go to experience an argument

form by itself, and why should it be thought that inductively validated

argument forms are valid and applicable in situations which we have

not yet experienced (e.g., arguments we have not yet encountered)? If

logical truths are justified by conventional agreement, then they are

arbitrary and not necessary after all. Therefore, the unbeliever's un-

derstanding and justification of logic have not been made clear or evi-

dent; his autonomous appeal to the laws of logic has not been made

intelligible, and this realm of knowledge has not been shown to be

certain. His standards can be critically questioned.

Going even deeper we should note that the autonomous man, by

rejecting God and thereby His sovereign control over history, has no

assurance of order in the world or that the historical facts will fit a co-

herent pattern. How can he make any sense of distinctions in an utterly

lawless and chance universe? Identity and distinction become blurred

when all "order" is contingent. No system of truth could be possible in

a chance universe. Therefore, connections and relations between par-

ticular states of affairs or between particular thoughts would be simply

impossible. Hence no intelligible use of logic could develop. If fate lies

behind all historical eventuation, the structure of the world and our

mental functions as well as all occurrences, changes, and continuities

would be irrational and never necessarily connected. The autonomous

man is at a loss to generate rationality in an irrational world.

On the other hand the autonomous thinker assumes that the laws

of being are one with the laws of thought in his mind; reality could

not be beyond the logical comprehension of his own mind. Since

his mind always operates in terms of the law of non-contradiction it

should follow that reality as a whole is rational to the core for the au-

tonomous man. Yet by placing irrationality behind everything (i.e.,

denying that there is a determinate mind and purpose controlling

everything) the autonomous thinker comes into direct contradiction

with himself: he simultaneously affirms the rationality of all reality

(it must be so since his mind must be able to think through the facts)

and its ultimate irrationality (there is no sovereign God according to

whose plan history proceeds).

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P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L A P O L O G E T I C S P O S I T I V E L Y S T A T E D

W e m i g h t a l s o a s k w h a t i n t e l l i g i b l e m a t e r i a l s t h e a u t o n o m o u s m a n

h a s t o u s e h i s l o g i c u p o n . E v e n i f t h e f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c -

t i o n w e r e g r a n t e d , w h a t w o u l d h e a p p l y i t t o ? A c c o r d i n g t o h i s o w n p o s i -

t i o n t h e r e c o u l d b e n o c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s

b r o u g h t a b o u t b y i r r a t i o n a l h i s t o r y . T h e p a r t i c u l a r s w o u l d b e u n r e l a t e d

s i n c e t h e r e i s n o p l a n o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e c e d i n g t h e m . H o w c o u l d a

f a c t b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t a c o n t e x t ? I f t h e m i n d o f t h e a u t o n o m o u s

t h i n k e r r e l a t e s a l l t h e f a c t s t o g e t h e r a n d b u i l d s u p t h e c o n t e x t u a l sys-

t e m , t h e n h e i s o n l y u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t h e h a s b e f o r e h a n d d e t e r m i n e d

t o u n d e r s t a n d a n y w a y ; t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a f a c t h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e l y

r e a d i n t o t h e w o r l d b e f o r e t h e a u t o n o m o u s m a n g o e s t o e x p l o r e it.

T h e p r o b l e m o f s u b j e c t i v i s m i s t h e c o n s t a n t t h o r n i n t h e a u t o n o -

m o u s m a n ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f l e s h . I f h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s p r e f a b r i c a t e d ,

w h y b o t h e r t o g o t o t h e w o r l d o f f a c t s i n s e a r c h o f t r u t h ? A n d i f t h e f a c t s

b e a r n o i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n t o e a c h o t h e r a n d t h e r e b y c a n n o t b e i n t e l l i g i -

b l y i n t e r p r e t e d , h o w c a n t h e a u t o n o m o u s m a n p l u g t h e m i n t o h i s sys-

t e m o f l o g i c ? " I - k n o w - n o t - w h a t " c a n n o t b e l o g i c a l l y m a n i p u l a t e d . F a c t s

c a n b e c o n n e c t e d o n l y b y m e a n s o f t h e l a w s o f i n f e r e n c e w h e n t h e f a c t s

a r e i n t e l l i g i b l e , w h i c h t h e y a r e n o t i f h i s t o r y i s i r r a t i o n a l . W h a t d o e s

l o g i c p r o f i t a p e r s o n w h o r e j e c t s G o d ? H e i s c a u g h t b e t w e e n s u b j e c t i v e

s o l i p s i s m ( t h e f a c t s a r e r e l a t e d o n l y b y h i s a c t i v e m i n d ) a n d s k e p t i c i s m

(the p a r t i c u l a r s a r e u n r e l a t e d ) . C o n t i n g e n c y c a n n o t p r o v i d e a s u i t a b l e

f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e l a w s o f l o g i c . W i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f

a u t o n o m o u s t h o u g h t t h e f o r t u i t o u s a n d b a s e l e s s l a w s o f t h o u g h t c a n n o t

h a v e a n y g e n u i n e a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e f a c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e .

An Unpredictable Universe

T h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e v i t a l t o i n d e p e n d e n t t h i n k e r s i s t h e u n i f o r m i t y

o f n a t u r e . I f t h e y c o u l d n o t b e a s s u r e d t h a t t h e f u t u r e w i l l b e like t h e

p a s t , t h a t s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s w i l l s u s t a i n a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n t o p r e v i o u s

s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s , t h e b a s i s f o r a n y s c i e n c e w o u l d b e lost. E v e n d e s c r i p t i v e

h i s t o r y w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e (e.g.: I s m y p r e s e n t t h o u g h t a b o u t t h e F r e n c h

R e v o l u t i o n i d e n t i c a l w i t h p r e v i o u s t h o u g h t s ? I s t h e r e c o n t i n u i t y i n m y

m e m o r y ? ) . 1 0 A l l t h e d i s c o v e r i e s o f s c i e n c e w o u l d b e t o t a l l y i r r e l e v a n t f o r

10. W h a t Dr. Bahnsen here describes sounds like a hypothetical absurdity,

yet there are schools of thought, not only in philosophy but notably currently in

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NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

the future, and knowledge in any significant sense would be dissolved.

Now how can the self-styled independent thinker justify his assump-

tion of uniformity? Initially he would appeal to past uniformity; yet this

fails to answer the question. W h a t right have we to read the past into

the future? T h e n the autonomous thinker might observe that we all as-

sume this uniformity and even his critic relies on such a crucial axiom;

however, this observation simply fails to justify the autonomous man's

axiom and only reiterates his uncritical dependence on it. Moreover,

the critic may have good reason to assume uniformity, but this does not

bolster the legitimacy of the autonomous man's appeal to it. T h e uni-

versal uniformity of nature cannot be verified from the experience of the

independent thinker in any final sense since that principle exceeds the

bounds of his experience. A n d the principle of uniformity is not an a

priori necessary truth (to deny uniformity is not self-contradictory).

So the most fundamental premise of all autonomous science, the

uniformity of nature, is neither empirically nor rationally justifiable!

Years ago David H u m e demonstrated that the scientist proceeds on a

scientifically unfounded, yet critically essential, belief in the uniformity

of nature. T h e r e is no reason beyond psychological habit for the naturalis-

tic scientist to expect the future to resemble the past. Since history has

no plan and coherence behind it and moves according to the whimsical

force of an irrational fate (according to the autonomous man's implicit

outlook), we should not expect nature to be anything but totally discon-

tinuous at any future time. By assuming that there is no G o d in control

of history the naturalistic scientist cannot assume a regulated universe.

At this j u n c t u r e the autonomous m a n may attempt to defend uni-

formity by trying to build a causal bridge between past a n d future

events. But what grounds could he have for believing that a causal

principle operates in reality? If history has no coherence in itself, then

economics, which argue that each individual quantum of time represents a dis-

tinct break from the moment before it, thus denying continuity at the most radical

level. Thus economic (or scientific) prediction is an illusion. Paralleling the work

of G. L. S. Shackle, Ludwig Lachmann has popularized this theory of "kaleidic

society" beginning in 1974 with his lectures at the South Royalton Conference.

These are found in Edwin G. Dolan, ed., The Foundations of Modern Austrian

Economics (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1976), as well as in numerous

books. All this is to say that what Dr. Bahnsen describes is highly relevant and

important for both epistemology and life.

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

no particular can be related to any other particular in any way what-

soever, much less causally. As the naturalist looks at the world he may

note succession of events, but he does not observe any necessary connec-

tions', cause and effect are arbitrary categories he forces upon the facts.

Even if we arbitrarily grant the assumption that the brute facts are

causally related, the autonomous man would require omniscience if he

were to be sure that an occurrence is actually caused by what appears

to be causing it and not something apparently unrelated. The appeal

to causality is not only rootless, it is also unhelpful.

The scientist evidently believes that there is a world of things and

processes which can be known, and that he sustains a relationship to this

world that allows him to know these objects and events. The question

then arises, what good impartial reasons can the scientist adduce for

his belief that the state of affairs is actually conducive to science? Why

are things not otherwise? At this point the scientist who has depended

on the self-sufficiency of his logico-empirical testing procedures is in a

predicament. The scientific methodology is not capable of verifying hy-

potheses about the state of affairs necessary for science and is impotent

to generate explanations for that state of affairs altogether. So the scien-

tist's response is usually to the effect that "it is necessary to assume the

world's amenability to scientific endeavor as a working hypothesis; there

is no particular reason for it, it just is." But this fails to be good science.

It is useful to think that the world can be scientifically examined, but

why is it the case that the world is such as it is? If it is for no particular

reason, as the scientist is wont to suggest, then the case might just as well

be completely otherwise again, for no particular reason! If the world is

amenable to science just because it is (perhaps by chance?) then it could as

well just not be the case that the world is conductive to science (again by

chance) and the scientist is deceived.

In other words, the consistent naturalistic scientist entertains an

irrational belief so that his "rational" endeavor can get started. In this

prescientific realm of metaphysics and epistemology we must depend

on either speculation or revelation, and only an authoritative revela-

tion can deliver us from the subjective relativism of human opinion

and unimportant logical tautologies. Yet the rejection of revelational

epistemology constitutes the core of autonomous thinking. If science

proceeds autonomously, then the only thing that can be discovered

in the world is man's own interpretative and ordering activity; nature

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NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

merely echoes back the thoughts of the autonomous man. Hence he

ends up accepting his own revelation, based on his own authority.

Despite the facade of proceeding without any a priori synthetic

commitments, the activity of science is not carried on impartially, nor

can it ever be. It is always founded on a substructure of metaphysical

belief to which it is committed. If it did not, its work would be fu-

tile. The conclusions a scientist arrives at will always be within the

bounds of and actually directed by the metaphysical moorings sus-

tained by the particular scientific community within which he works.

Even the non-Christian philosopher of science and physicist, Thomas

Kuhn,11 recognizes the completely non-objective character of science

when it comes to foundational questions. Kuhn speaks of paradigms

as models by means of which the scientist views the world. The para-

digm (accepted pattern or picture) defines the very science using it,

its proper problems, and the legitimate area in which answers can be

found. Consequently, when the paradigm changes, the world itself

(understood by the scientist) changes with it. Even the sense data and

their interpretation are altered by a modification in the gestalt-like

paradigm. So, "facts" are only facts for a system (i.e., a particular para-

digm). The Occidental naturalist disagrees with the Eastern mystic

as to what the "facts" are precisely because their metaphysical under-

pinnings are different.

The Autonomous Self-Trap

Now what metaphysical presupposition can account for factual-

ity itself, what assumption can make the scientific enterprise a mean-

ingful endeavor? Certainly not agnostic solipsism; yet how can the

autonomous scientist consider that position any less relevant or true

than what he now proceeds upon? What guidelines does he have to

discredit agnostic solipsism? What source of information refutes this

equally viable position? The autonomous man cannot appeal to any

revelational authority to deliver him from his dilemma. He is locked

into skepticism or an arbitrary legislation for what reality "has to be."

But it is this sort of thing that the independent thinker has prohibited

from the outset!

11. Mentioned earlier; see page 89 above.

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pRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

Looking back, we have seen that the autonomous man must claim

knowledge while failing to know what "knowledge" is, must constantly

appeal to his personal authority while rejecting all appeals to authority,

must generate knowledge in an ultimately unknowable universe, must

seek and find truth while legislating what the truth has to be, cannot

justify his own dependence on the principles of non-contradiction and

natural uniformity, must believe in a rational yet irrational world, must

relate unrelatable facts, must be ultimately skeptical and omniscient at

the same time. By rejecting revelational authority the self-styled autono-

mous man has no order in nature to expect and is stranded between his

personal laws of reason and the pure irrationality of historical potential-

ity. He cannot escape the necessary patterns of his own reasoning but

must maintain that historical eventuation is beyond reason (the world of

actuality is an accident).

The intellectual dead-end of autonomous thinking is more than ob-

vious when we stop to take note of the dialectical conclusions resulting

from it. By clutching after God's epistemological prerogatives the alleg-

edly autonomous thinker ascribes to himself the right to assign interpre-

tation to the flow of experience, the flux of reality. All facts are taken as

random and uninterpreted until rationalized, organized, related, and

explained by the autonomous thinker. Man is thought to give the world

whatever meaning it is to have. The world shall declare no glory and

handiwork save that of the "rational man." Whatever gods there may

be must be enveloped in the same conditions as hold for the autonomous

man. Everything reduces to a fortuitous compilation of time, matter,

and chance. The mind of the autonomous thinker is taken as ultimate in

epistemological matters. A clear revelation of God in every fact, and the

need to assume the exhaustive knowledge and control of God in every

reasoning endeavor are both denied. The world is then interpreted in

terms, not of God's Word, but the speculations of the autonomous man.

What results is absurdity and despair.

Knowing himself not to be omniscient and therefore impotent to

provide a complete rational system of interpretation for the world, the

self-proclaimed autonomous man ultimately posits a set of mutually ex-

clusive limiting concepts12 in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology,

12. Bahnsen uses the Kantian phrase "limiting concepts" to mean

ideas which balance, check, or expose the practical extents of human

110

N e u t r a l i t y & A u t o n o m y r e l i n q u i s h e d

a n d e t h i c s . H i s s c i e n t i f i c e f f o r t s r e q u i r e n a t u r e t o b e v i e w e d a s u n i f o r m

a n d t h e c o s m i c p r o c e s s t o b e i n e v i t a b l y p r e d i c t a b l e ( g i v e n e n o u g h d a t a ) ;

h e n c e h e i s a m e t a p h y s i c a l determinist. E v e n m a n ' s b e h a v i o r m u s t b e a

p r e d i c t a b l e p a r t o f t h e c o s m i c m a c h i n e r y . I f h i s o w n m i n d i s t o b e t h e

u l t i m a t e i n t e r p r e t e r o f r e a l i t y , t h e f i n a l e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y , t h e n t h e a u -

t o n o m o u s m a n m u s t b e a rationalist. A n d s i n c e h e c a n n o t e s c a p e f e e l i n g

t h a t s o m e k i n d s o f b e h a v i o r a r e d i s t u r b i n g , w r o n g a n d o u g h t n o t t o b e

d o n e , h e i s a n e t h i c a l absolutist; w i t h o u t e t h i c a l n o r m s c o m m u n a l s t a b i l -

ity w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e .

H o w e v e r , t h i s s a m e a u t o n o m o u s m a n h a s a d r i v i n g n e e d f o r p e r -

s o n a l d i g n i t y a n d f r e e d o m , s o h e c a n n o t v i e w t h e w o r l d a s u n i f o r m l y

a n d c o m p l e t e l y d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r all. T h e r e m u s t b e m e t a p h y s i c a l inde-

terminism, t h u s g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e f r e e d o m o f h i s o w n v o l i t i o n s . I t f o l l o w s

t h a t t h e w o r l d i s n o t s u s c e p t i b l e t o e x h a u s t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; m y s t e r y

s u r r o u n d s e v e r y t h i n g . S o m a n ' s m i n d c a n n o t b e a b s o l u t e ; i t i s f i n i t e a n d

s u b j e c t t o e r r o r . I t i s s w a l l o w e d u p b y t h e u n k n o w n , t h e a n o m a l o u s ,

t h e r a d i c a l l y n e w , t h e u n f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , t h e m o v e m e n t o f f a t e . E p i s -

t e m o l o g i c a l irrationalism m u s t b e a d m i t t e d a n d w e l c o m e d . S i n c e h e i s

t h e " f r e e m a n , " t h e a u t o n o m o u s t h i n k e r c a n n o t b e b o u n d b y a u t h o r i t a -

tively i m p o s e d m o r a l s t r i c t u r e s . E a c h m a n m u s t s p o n t a n e o u s l y c h o o s e

t h e " g o o d " f o r h i m s e l f , a n d s u c h c h o i c e d i f f e r s f r o m m a n t o m a n ( b a s e d

o n h i s o w n c o n s c i e n c e , n e e d s , t r a i n i n g , e n v i r o n m e n t , etc.). T h e a u t o n o -

m o u s m a n h a s t h e p r e r o g a t i v e t o c h o o s e a d i f f e r e n t " g o o d , " a d i f f e r e n t

m o r a l a x i o m f r o m t h a t o f o t h e r s ; h e i s a m o r a l relativist.

S o t h e n , w e m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h e i n n e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n , t h e d i a l e c t i c a l

t e n s i o n , t h a t i s t h e i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t o f a u t o n o m o u s t h i n k i n g : d e t e r m i n -

i s m / i n d e t e r m i n i s m , r a t i o n a l i s m / i r r a t i o n a l i s m , a b s o l u t i s m / r e l a t i v i s m .

B y r e f u s i n g t o " t h i n k G o d ' s t h o u g h t s a f t e r H i m " o n t h e c r e a t u r e l y level,

k n o w l e d g e . I n the c o n t e x t o f the u n b e l i e v e r ' s t h o u g h t , s u c h c o n c e p t s

p r o v e " m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e " a n d e n d i n " i n n e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n , " a s B a h n s e n

a r g u e s , b e c a u s e the u n b e l i e v e r has n o w a y t o r e c o n c i l e the resultant

i d e a s w i t h i n his o w n w o r l d v i e w . I n a C h r i s t i a n c o n t e x t , " l i m i t i n g c o n -

c e p t s " a l s o h a v e a s u p p l e m e n t i v e c h a r a c t e r to other a s p e c t s of r e v e l a t i o n ,

m a i n t a i n i n g vital t e n s i o n but not c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n h u m a n k n o w l e d g e

a n d u n d e r the r e a l m o f the i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e but c o h e r e n t T r i n i t a r i a n

G o d ' s p r o v i d e n c e . S e e the h e l p f u l d i s c u s s i o n i n J o h n F r a m e , Cornelius

Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought ( P h i l l i p s b u r g , NJ: P r e s b y t e r i a n a n d

R e f o r m e d , 1 9 9 5 ) , 1 2 2 n . 2 8 , 1 6 5 - 1 6 9 .

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL aPOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

by making himself (rather than the Creator) the ultimate interpreter and

arbitrator of truth, by not acknowledging himself and the world around

him to be created, dependent, and revelatory of God, the autonomous

man must end up pitting nature against freedom, science against per-

sonal dignity. In the end, these contrary demands that his autonomous

thinking imposes will leave his intellectual endeavors embarrassingly

divided or despairingly shattered. "Unless the Lord build the house,

they labor in vain which build it."13 Only upon the solid rock of Christ's

authoritative Word can one build a life and intellectual endeavor that

can stand strong.

6 . INTELLECTUAL S C H I Z O P H R E N I A

Based on the previous articles a person may wonder whether the be-

liever and skeptic could even argue with each other. After all, neutrality

is impossible and two different authorities would be appealed to in such

a debate over ultimate issues. Because the Christian and non-Christian

have, in principle, nothing epistemologically or ethically in common,

they do not agree upon the ultimate interpretation of any fact. For the

Christian every fact is created, pre-interpreted, and divinely revelatory;

the unbeliever holds just the opposite. Even their respective method-

ologies are divergent: one begins with the Creator and approaches the

world thinking God's thoughts after Him, while the other attempts to

interpret experience by imposing abstract, formal, unifying principles

on concrete, contingent, diverse facts. For the non-Christian the laws

of logic are self-sufficient and ultimate, but the Christian sees them as

dependent upon the mind of God. The skeptic and believer disagree, at

base, over the very philosophy of factuality and logic—not just this or

that fact. What is involved is two world-and-life views; hence in principle

there is complete antithesis. So what use is there in reasoning together?

If epistemological method cannot be established without metaphysical

considerations and the argument is precisely over metaphysics, how could

an argument get off the ground?

13. Ps. 127:1.

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NEUTRALITY &. AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

The Unbeliever's Unconscious Agreement

The answer here is that the non-Christian is not consistent with his

professed autonomy from God (indeed, could not be) and therefore ar-

gument is possible. If both disputants were completely consistent and

adamant in their professed beliefs, then indeed they could do nothing

but stand in separate towers and mutually disagree. However, the non-

Christian is something of an intellectual schizophrenic: he professes to

believe one thing, but in his "heart of hearts" believes something else.

Being created as God's image and being surrounded by a world and

history that clearly reveal God, the unbeliever cannot avoid depending

upon God and His revelation in order to reason at all. Two kinds of

belief work side by side in the non-Christian: that which is outwardly

professed (and that which he attempts to live by), and that which he gen-

uinely believes but refuses to acknowledge. An earlier article explained

how a person can genuinely know something and yet deny knowing it;

this is the case for the "unbeliever." He lives in a constant tension be-

tween what he is (and cannot avoid knowing) and what he tries to be

(and makes claim to know).

Because the non-Christian is not consistent with his claims to au-

tonomy (thanks to God's restraining common grace), because he is a

creature made in God's image, and because he does not live in a vac-

uum but an atmosphere that surrounds him with a clear revelation of

God, the Christian is able to reason with him. The believer appeals to,

and is understood based upon, the image of God and suppressed beliefs

in the non-Christian. The Christian and non-Christian do have certain

ultimate beliefs in common; both are made in God's image and have the

metaphysical situation in common, living in the same world created by

God. It is this commonality which makes apologetics worthwhile, while

it is the disparity between their kinds of belief (acknowledged, unac-

knowledged) that makes apologetics necessary.

It is on the conscious level of interpretation that the disagreement

between believer and skeptic becomes apparent. The non-Christian has

ethically responded to his knowledge of God and God's world in an

improper and rebellious manner. Hence he thinks that his knowledge of

the world came independent of any reliance on a divine revelation. He

proceeds to reason and interpret independently of God, not realizing

that the formal activity of scientific investigation and use of logic take

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL aPOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

place only in terms of his suppressed knowledge of God. The unbeliever

could not reason at all unless he schizophrenically believed other than

his outward profession of autonomy would indicate. Since he constantly

makes use of his suppressed knowledge of God, the non-Christian can

understand the arguments of the Christian apologist since they enun-

ciate, elaborate, and presuppose those beliefs. Being epistemologically

schizophrenic, the unbeliever can gain knowledge in spite of his outward-

ly espoused position and he can apprehend the Christian polemic.

The Christian apologist must realize that the non-Christian self-

deceivingly knows that the metaphysical situation and his own per-

son are exactly as Scripture describes. Yet the non-Christian will

attempt to argue on terms not consistent with what he knows to be

true. He will play at autonomy and expect the Christian to do so

also. The Christian must then point out that the non-Christian could

not reason at all in terms of his propounded beliefs. The Christian

knows that only one metaphysic is suitable for rational-scientific epis-

temology and that the non-Christian has no foundation for any ar-

gumentation unless he admits to his suppressed belief in God. Hence

the Christian apologist confronts two kinds of belief in the non-

Christian; he argues against the professed beliefs by showing them

impossible, and he appeals to the suppressed beliefs. The Christian

cannot appeal to commonly interpreted facts on the conscious level

and use a neutral methodology to move the non-Christian over to

the Christian position, for the Christian and non-Christian do not

have conscious interpretations in common since the unbeliever views

everything as independent of God. A neutral methodology, more-

over, has already been shown to be impossible; the Christian must

either reason as a believer or must disobediently behave and think as

an unbeliever. The unbeliever must be urged to become a self-con-

scious believer or else be forced to see the farce of his epistemological

position; the non-Christian must be challenged to give an account of

anything he knows of his espoused autonomous outlook.

There will be no conscious agreement on ultimate points between

Christian and non-Christian. So, there can be no agreed-to "neutral"

approach to the dispute, no agreement on "possibility" or "probabil-

ity," no agreement on the proper use and foundation for induction and

logic, etc. Hence it is futile for the Christian apologist to begin in the

neutral area of nature and work up to the believing area of grace. The

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NEUTRALITY &. AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

realm of thought is not to be studied under two aspects, the natural

and supernatural. Since God is Creator and Controller over all, no

area of life can be understood apart from His revelation. Man is no

more "on his own" when it comes to science than he is when it comes

to religion. The sovereign God of redemption is Creator and Sustainer

of the existent material world as well. Hence a religious orientation

must, and does, precede work in any field of human endeavor. Any fact

that is known must be known for what it truly is: created by God and

functioning within His plan. The realm of the earthly, material, or sci-

entific cannot be set over against the heavenly, spiritual, supernatural

sphere of special revelation in some dualistic fashion.

Attacking the Unbeliever's Inconsistency

So when the Christian apologist approaches the unbeliever it must

be "all or nothing" as far as what the non-Christian can properly un-

derstand on his own basis. If the world were self-explanatory and could

be interpreted in terms of principles inherent in the world, then a non-

Christian would gladly wield the law of parsimony and point out that

Christians multiply entities (for instance, God) beyond need and justifi-

cation. But the fact of the matter is that nothing could be understood on

the basis of autonomous principles. Therefore, the Christian must use a

dogmatic (not neutral) apologetic, incisively challenging the non-Chris-

tian on every point of knowledge and interpretation. God either rules as

sovereign in interpretation over all areas or none. Our message must be

that Christianity alone has the true and only adequate interpretation of

nature and history as well as the God-situation.

Summing up, the Christian should reason with the non-Christian

because the unbeliever is not autonomous as he professes to be. He is

not able to account for any knowledge that God has permitted him to

gain. Being epistemologically schizophrenic, the unbeliever knows that

the God of the Bible exists but refuses to admit it. This inconsistency

renders him susceptible to the Christian polemic at all times. In this

polemic the Christian should challenge the unbeliever on the entire field

of knowledge rather than trying to establish pseudo-agreements in the

interpretation of some facts that hopefully can lead up, by neutral meth-

odology, to full Christian faith. The common ground between believer

and skeptic is metaphysical.

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

The Christian summons the unbeliever to epistemological consis-

tency by challenging his theoretical autonomy and appealing to the im-

age of God in which he exists. The Christian does not feel that there are j

two systems of truth just because the believer and skeptic have different

professed presuppositions. If there were two separate systems of truth,

we would be led either (1) not to reason at all, or (2) to present something

less than Christianity and accommodate the presuppositions of the non-

Christian. The first fails to see that the non-Christian can have knowl-

edge based only on Christian premises and that the non-Christian's

problem is that he ethically refuses to face up to this fact. The second

fails to see that there would be no way to bridge the gap between the

mutually exclusive systems, and there would be no possibility of conver-

sion without an irrational leap.

Although the believer and skeptic have different professed presup-

positions, the non-Christian cannot live up to his but must ultimate-

ly fall back upon those of the Christian. Because God is one, truth is

one—even when those who possess the same truth have differences in

outwardly espoused presuppositions. Thus it is the Christian's duty to

present the whole truth and nothing but the truth to the unbeliever.

His argument must not compromise the truth or assume that the non-

Christian can in any way escape it. Thus the Christian does an internal

critique of the non-Christian's system and brings to bear every evidence

of Scripture's truth. Realizing the necessity of regeneration and illumi-

nation by the Holy Spirit, the believer will refrain from compromises

and all attempts to maneuver the unbeliever into the faith without the

need to relinquish his autonomy.

When the case has been boldly made that the unbeliever must repent

and admit to his suppressed knowledge of God if he is to have theoreti-

cal grounding for any knowledge whatsoever, then the Holy Spirit either

opens his eyes at present or will do so at a coming day. In this present life

God's common grace restrains the apostate from utter intellectual self-

destruction. While not positing neutral ground between the Christian

and non-Christian interpretative systems, common grace nevertheless

prevents the non-Christian from being consistent with his futile boast of

autonomy. But in that coming day the unbeliever will cease to be schizo-

phrenic and will fully become what he continually strived to be, but as yet

could not be—completely independent of God. This will be hell.

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7. LANGUAGE AND LOGIC

Cornelius Van Til had noted the significance of certain features of lan-

guage usage and informal logic for argumentation and apologetics even

before these areas of discussion became widely popular in academic cir-

cles. For instance, in speaking of the traditional type of apologetic that

compromised with the non-Christian philosophic outlook or method in

order to win the unbeliever over to Christ, Van Til said,

The basic falseness of this apologetics appears in the vir-

tual if not actual denial of the fact that the natural man

makes false assumptions.... Anyone who says "I believe

in God," is formally correct in his statement, but the

question is what does he mean by the word God? The

traditional view assumes that the natural man has a cer-

tain measure of correct thought content when he uses the

word God. In reality the natural man's "God" is always a

finite God. It is his most effective tool for suppressing the

sense of the true G o d that he cannot fully efface from the

fibres of his heart.... [The traditional apologist] must tie

on to some small area of thought content that the believ-

er and the unbeliever have in common without qualifica-

tion when both are self-conscious with respect to their

principle. This is tantamount to saying that those who

interpret a fact as dependent upon God and those who

interpret the same fact as not dependent upon God have

yet said something identical about that fact.14

When the Christian believer speaks with the unregenerate skeptic there

are certain things about the use of language and logic that he should

be aware of if his apologetic is not to be muddled. Different people use

words and language in different ways. They can often have different in-

tentions and be performing different tasks with what appears to be simi-

lar language. Thus it is important to know just how the non-Christian

is using his theological language if we are going to be working toward

genuine repentance on his part. When the former skeptic begins to con-

14. C. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed,

1955), 262.

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fess Christ, declare His praise, witness to the propositions of Scripture, and

speak of God in a favorable light, it is imperative that the apologist ascer-

tain whether or not this is a Christian use of language. That is, what lies

behind these utterances, what motivates and controls them, how do they

affect the speaker, what jobs are being performed by them, how does the

speaker ring the logical changes on them, etc?

Indeed it is also important for the Christian to understand the skep-

tic's theological language before alleged conversion as well—or else their

argument could be sheer confusion with a deceptive appearance of

meaningfulness. That is, it is not sufficient for the apologist to get the

unbeliever to say, "Yes, God raised Jesus from the dead," and neglect

to correct the unbeliever's notions and language-usage about "God."

Should the unbeliever mean "karma" or "fate" when he speaks of

"God," then the above confession will in no way save him! Thus the

apologetical argument must cover the entire field of knowledge, includ-

ing use of language, and not work merely at isolated and particular facts.

Nothing is gained in an apologetical argument if the opponents mean

different things, perform different tasks, and understand different ap-

plications of their superficially similar utterances.

Language and Ethics

The uniqueness of man over the animals is tied up with the fact that

God spoke to man in the garden and man could answer. Also, the task

that God laid upon the original man was to be accomplished by means

of man's linguistic abilities. Man heard the spoken command of God

and proceeded to subdue the earth by naming the animals. Dominance

over the earth is exercised by means of language (the vehicle of learning,

recording, studying, etc.). Man's righteous character did, and still must

today, consist in obedience to the law of God verbally revealed in Scrip-

ture. Man's social nature is characterized and dependent upon lingual

communication. Man's freedom resides in an ability to surpass the here

and now by means of lingual symbols, calculated planning, remember-

ing, reading, writing. Even the religious nature of man is intimately con-

nected with the linguistic abilities to pray and praise.

Thus the way a man uses language reflects what he is, his heart at-

titudes, his relation to God. Man's fall into sin centered on language—

the verbal temptation, the lies, the rebellion against the Word of God.

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Resulting from the fall man is born speaking lies, he has a poisonous

tongue, he blasphemes with his mouth; Scripture says that this evil

tongue controls his whole behavior as a sinner. Indeed, for the most

part, man's heart and lip are consistent with each other. Consequently,

the one bearing the marred image of God and the one renewed after the

image of God's Son will be using their language differently.

When the believer argues with the unbeliever he should take this

difference into account. The only reason there is not absolute antithesis

in their use of language (and hence, hopeless confusion) is because of

God's common grace. Since the unbeliever is not completely epistemo-

logically self-conscious, he can still hear and understand the word of the

gospel. Yet in principle their respective outlooks and language would

be absolutely divergent. This means that the believer should not try to

gain a starting point for his argument in merely the unbeliever's utter-

ances or his (apparently agreeable) expressions. From the unregenerate

viewpoint these are not used in such a way that he can move consistently

(without conceptual, logical snags) into a Christian profession of faith.

Because the unregenerate does not mean what the Christian means by

certain assertions (i.e., they react differently to them, infer differently

from them, etc.), the believing apologist should refrain from arguing on

the basis of what the skeptic will outwardly and formally grant to him.

In addition to this there is a real sense in which a man's language de-

termines the scope and contours of his world. This explains why a non-

Christian can often be baffled by Christian language. To the unregen-

erate's way of speaking Christian theology is beyond him and therefore

labeled as confused or meaningless. The Christian has a new disposition

that is willing to purify his language in accordance with God's Word, to

speak the truth as God reveals it, to glorify God with his language. The

unregenerate does not have this ethical power. By means of regenera-

tion and sanctification the believer uses his language properly and hence

gains the ability to see more of the truth and with more clarity; he can

understand situations and see the relevance of God's Word beyond the

blinded unbeliever's ability to do so. When the two argue with each oth-

er, then, the unbeliever will linguistically rebel against the witness from

God's Word by refusing to admit the relevance of interpretation or even

the truth of the facts, by disqualifying Christian language as meaning-

less because of a procrustean view of language, or by refusing to engage

himself in the "Christian language game." The Christian must under-

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stand why this is and adjust his apologetical stance accordingly.

Language and Logical Meaning

By in large the explanation is found in the different types of

informal logic the believer and unbeliever use. Even when common

and agreed upon terms are used (i.e., what is vocally expressed)

different assertions, inferences, conceptual moves, and conclusions

result. This stems from divergent outlooks or "worldviews" or para-

digms; the believer and unbeliever ring different logical changes on

their expression because they have different concepts of the world,

man, etc. The Christian "way of seeing" certain facts makes cor-

responding conclusions inevitable, while the unregenerate "way of

seeing" finds these conclusions unfounded or irrelevant. A man's

paradigm or model will determine what kinds of data, warrants,

and backing are appropriate in various situations. This paradigm

will also determine what constitutes a fact, proper method, and

the range of possible and allowable conclusions. When the believer

speaks of God, man, the world, sin, salvation, etc., he has direc-

tions from God as to how he should think and behave as a result

of certain assertions. Failing to submit to the direction of God's

Word, the unregenerate will not react or think the same way as the

Christian. A different informal logic governs what the unbeliever

will think and do; he has different standards, desires, and behav-

ior patterns from those of the Christian. Both the Christian and

the non-Christian will be on the lookout for fallacies in the other

person's argument; yet what is seen as an equivocation, a complex

question, an improper appeal to emotion or authority, false cause,

irrelevancy, etc., will differ according to one's standpoint. The vari-

ant presuppositions with which the believer and skeptic approach

their debate will govern what shall be taken as legitimate evidence,

valid warrants, and convincing backing.

Thus with the variety of "language games" and informal logics

available to man, and with the present day criticism of a watertight

compartmentalizing of analytic and synthetic judgments, the apolo-

gist should be taking account of the fact that "meaning" is more than

words. The meaning of the non-Christian argument and the mean-

ing of the Christian's witness goes beyond the outwardly vocalized

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sentences utilized. We must understand people, social customs, ways

of thinking, value systems, hierarchical systems of basic beliefs, prac-

tical usage of language, etc., if we are going to understand the mean-

ing of a man's words. Variant definitions, differing applications, and

divergent contexts for a man's language will control the meaning of

his arguments. And it should be noted that it is not self-contradictory

to reject one use of language or one informal logic over another. Dif-

ferent uses of language and different logics stem from different forms

or styles of life. A man's ethical condition, his training and attitudes,

his persistent behavior will dictate his way of speaking and reason-

ing. That is, life style and basic commitment govern one's language

and logic.

Consequently, when one becomes a Christian he takes on a new

understanding and correspondingly new definitions and concepts; he

refuses to use terms and reason in the way that he had previously. A

new life style (effected by the regenerating and sanctifying work of the

Holy Spirit) brings with it a new way of seeing life, the world, God, and

man; thus there is the ability to confess Christ, agree with Scripture,

praise God. This new life with its corresponding insights and abilities

is not an advanced stage of the unregenerate form of life (obviously!).

One does not arrive at it, therefore, by a step by step logical progression

from within the presuppositions and outlook of the unbeliever. There is

no way to use non-Christian language and logic to arrive at Christian

utterances, conclusions, and behavior.

Consistent Language and Logic

If the unbeliever is going to be approached with an effective apol-

ogetic by the Christian, the believer must reason and argue consis-

tently from within his form of life and presuppositions—not those of

the unregenerate. The apologist cannot take a neutral approach to

the facts or an impartial approach to God's Word in order to reason

the unbeliever into faith from his unregenerate outlook on reality and

truth. The Christian must challenge the presuppositions espoused by

the unbeliever, basing his argument and witness on the presupposi-

tions of God's Word. The two outlooks, the two life styles with their

different language and logic, must meet each other head-on, for the

unbeliever will not be able to come to a new worldview by degrees. He

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL aPOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

must be confronted across the entire field of knowledge and behavior,

challenged at the very roots of his form of life (with its language and

logic) by the opposing and correct form of life—rather than reasoned

with on the basis of commonly interpreted facts and expressions.

Only a presuppositional apologetic avoids a piecemeal, compromis-

ing apologetic that does not take account of the false assumptions, form

of life, language, and logic of the unbeliever. A non-presuppositional

apologetic mistakenly assumes that common implications attend the

similar utterances of believer and skeptic. It fails to see that the unregen-

erate cannot be logically maneuvered into Christian faith but requires

a complete change of paradigm and life style. Such can be effected only

by the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit. This does not render our

apologetic argument arbitrary, unnecessary, or useless, for the Spir-

it bears witness to the Word of God, giving the ability to understand

and believe the Scripture-based apologetic and message of the Chris-

tian. Without our apologetic the Holy Spirit's influence would be blind

power; without the Holy Spirit our apologetic would be meaningful but

impotent. We need the Word and the Spirit, meaning and power, light

as well as new sight. Only an apologetic that presupposes the truth of

God's Word and depends on the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit

can induce an unbeliever to embrace the Christian form of life, use of

language, way of reasoning.

Therefore, the apologist must seek to argue with the unbeliever

from the firm standpoint of the Christian form of life and obedience

to the Word of Christ, not depending upon the unbeliever's use of

language or logic as a theoretical starting point for implicating him by

degrees into the faith. An apologetic that challenges the skeptic pre-

suppositionally with the truth of God's Word can be used by the Holy

Spirit to convert the skeptic away from that form of life, use of language,

and informal logic that hold him under the wrath of God. Only such

an apologetic that refuses to depend upon the allegedly common no-

tions of the unbeliever and his way of reasoning, that is, only a pre-

suppositional apologetic, can avoid having the apologist get trapped

behind enemy lines—forced to the skeptic's conclusions because of an

initial acceptance of his language and logic.

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8 . T H E E T H I C S O F T H E I N T E L L E C T ' S B E H A V I O R

Surveying the previous articles we can discern and summarize those

features that are most basic to a presuppositional apologetic. Since all

men have certain unproved presuppositions about knowledge and real-

ity, and since these presuppositions differ radically between the Chris-

tian and non-Christian, the apologist must be aware of this fact so that

he does not mistakenly try to build his defense of the faith upon pseudo-

neutral ground, notions that are apparently (but not actually) common,

or anti-biblical assumptions provided by the skeptic. The starting point,

method, and conclusion of a man's outlook or argument are dependent

upon each other, which means that the apologist will have lost the battle

with an intelligent unbeliever from the outset if he does not confront him

and challenge him at the presuppositional level.

Presupposing an epistemology controlled and informed by God's

revelation, the truth of Scripture, and the existence of the triune, sov-

ereign God, the apologist will find the unbeliever presupposing a dia-

lectic between indeterminism (chance) and determinism (regularity),

irrationality (nobody knows) and autonomous rationalism ("I can tell

you without the aid of revelation"), and presupposing that man must leg-

islate the interpretation that shall attach to any brute fact (rather than

understanding the world in subjection to God's self-attesting Word). The

espoused or consciously used presuppositions of the non-Christian can-

not account for or theoretically ground factuality or knowledge, explain

the amenability of unifying logical principles and diversifying factual

particulars, or do anything but inevitably destroy reason and human

personality and the very possibility of meaningful predication. On the

other hand the presuppositions of the Christian (taken from the Word

of God) salvage the scientific endeavor, account for the fruitful connec-

tion of logic and facts, ground human personality, provide a theoretical

basis for knowledge, and guard the meaningfulness of predication and

the usefulness of reason.

However, the unbeliever is still the image of God, living on meta-

physical common ground with the Christian, and being restrained in

his rebellion against God's clear, necessary, sufficient, and authoritative

revelation in nature and Scripture by common grace.

Hence he can attain to formal knowledge in spite of his espoused

presuppositions. In this day of God's patience before the Final Judg-

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

ment (when all rebels shall be made completely independent of God,

as they had striven to be), the Christian apologist appeals to the unbe-

liever as God's image (contrary to what he says about himself) and to

the metaphysical and revelational ground which they share (contrary

to what the skeptic says about the world), and the Christian bases his

propagation and defense of the faith on the self-attesting truth of God's

verbal revelation. In this process the presuppositional apologist makes

an internal critique of the non-Christian's espoused presuppositions,

showing that they destroy the very possibility of knowledge or "proof."

He maintains that only Christianity is a reasonable position to hold

and that unless its truth is presupposed there is no foundation for an

argument that can prove anything whatsoever. Thus it is irrational to

hold to anything but the truth of Scripture. The truth of Christianity

is proved from the impossibility of the contrary.

Not only does the presuppositionalist besiege the presuppositions of

his opponent's position, he also presents the inescapably clear evidence for

the gospel, depending upon the Holy Spirit to open the sinner's blinded

eyes, soften his hardened heart, and enlighten his darkened understand-

ing. Outside of God's regenerating grace, the sinner will still flee the face

of his Creator as he confronts it in the self-attesting Word of Christ. With

the understanding, and in the power of God's Spirit, the presuppositional-

ist presents his defense of the faith with all the clarity he can, knowing his

hearer has suppressed a clear knowledge of God and has been "secretly"

drawing upon Christian presuppositions in his epistemological and moral

experience and thereby can intellectually understand the matters at hand.

In this way the presuppositionalist calls the sinner back to a remembrance of

his God, preaching his need for repentance (moral and intellectual), sav-

ing faith (rather than suppressed belief), and obedience to the inscriptur-

ated good news of Christ Jesus, the Lord.

The foregoing articles have been given to demonstrating this presup-

positional position from epistemological considerations. We have noted the

unavoidable interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology (or method),

the fact that all argumentation appeals to an ultimate (and unproved) au-

thority, and the impossibility of neutrality. We have discussed the possibility

of a man being ignorant of items of which he really has knowledge (but

will not acknowledge). We have contrasted the necessity of revelational epis-

temology with the hopelessness of autonomous epistemology. It has been

observed that the unbeliever's intellectual schizophrenia makes a presup-

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positional approach to him legitimate, just as the possibility of a meaning-

ful argument makes a presuppositional approach necessary. Moreover,

an analysis of language usage and informal logics shows presuppositional

apologetics to be the only workable and promising approach to the non-

Christian. As has been stated, these articles dealt mainly with epistemologi-

cal matters in order to present a case for presuppositionalism.

9 . E T H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E S O F R E A S O N I N G

An ethical consideration, however, gives us a further reason why a Chris-

tian ought to use a presuppositional apologetic rather than attempting

an uncommitted methodology that uses alleged commonly interpreted

"facts" in order to build up a "proof' that any self-respecting, "rational

man" can recognize as "very probably" pointing to the possibility of

Christianity's reasonableness (if not its truth).

In Scripture, God requires Christian believers to subject every

thought captive to the obedience of Christ. This is not done if the apolo-

gist attempts to use to use unbiased premises and non-committed logic

to persuade his opponent. Such an argument would be set forth as "neu-

tral" in hopes that from an agreed-upon interpretation of something an

unbeliever can be rationally maneuvered into obeying Christ by sub-

mitting his every thought to Scripture! Apparently, then, the Christian

apologist would violate the imperative in order to have others observe

it! This is obviously unacceptable. If every thought is to be subjected to

Christ's authority, then we must not attempt to set forth thoughts that

are free from that authority or not committed to the truth of Scripture.

Neutrality and dedication to Christ are incompatible, even in the field

of apologetical argument.

Secondly, by attempting to reason with the non-Christian by means of

commonly interpreted "facts" and "logic" that are divorced from Chris-

tian commitment the apologist would be bowing to the unbeliever's sinful

demands on God. Who has the right to demand proof of God? Can the

clay bring the potter into judgment? The non-Christian continually as-

serts his arrogant independence and personal authority by requiring any

gods that be to verify themselves to him by adducing evidence and argu-

mentation that he will certify as admissible. Yet the unregenerate rebel

is in no position to exact justification from God. The Christian apolo-

gist must not give in to the unbeliever's sinful arrogance by attempting to

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

reason with him impartially and by giving him what he demands in the

way of self-certified proof built up from unbiased premises, interpretation,

and method. A presuppositional apologetic makes argumentation possible

without accepting the apostate's demands upon God (who, in reality, is the

One that makes an absolute demand upon the rebel).

Third, to reason with the non-Christian in a fashion purporting to be

independent of God or independent of reliance upon revelation is to honor

the unregenerate's notions of "evidence" and "verification" as legitimate

and correct. However, for the Christian it is Scripture that governs every

area of his life, even his concept of "evidence" and the way he reasons;

with skeptics. The Christian must live by every word that comes from the

mouth of God, thereby letting God style his standards of verification—

just as God styles the proper pattern for his personal behavior. To bow

to unbelieving standards would be to renounce those directed by God.

Hence the Christian cannot let the non-Christian dictate the terms on

argumentation. The Christian accepts as "verification" and "admissible

evidence" what God's Word, not the sinner, tells him. He always works ac-

cording to the presupposed truth of God's Word; this excludes his working

from any other foundation, even if it is for the sake and short time of con-

vincing the unbeliever. For the Christian nothing can qualify as evidence

that goes contrary to the faith. (When something appears to contradict

Scripture, further examination and corrected understanding are called

for.) Yet according to the self-authoritative unregenerate man, everything

can and probably does dictate against Christianity.

Further, to reason neutrally with an unbeliever is to endorse his idea

of possibility. To begin without a commitment to a position and examine

"facts" as evidence that can go either way is to admit that God possibly

exists. However, for the Christian his scriptural presuppositions deter-

mine what shall be taken as "possible." It is not possible, on this basis,

that God should not exist. The true Christian cannot conceive of God's

nonexistence, absence, or death. Indeed his own self-consciousness is

coordinate with God-consciousness. Hence the Christian must not even

"pretend" to reason with an unbeliever as though the Christian God

might not exist. It would be immoral for the genuine believer to say to

the skeptic, "Maybe God exists, and perhaps not; let's look and see.

The apologist ought not reason as though the conclusion "God exists

might warrant acceptance if evidence can be found supporting it. Since

Scripture speaks of God's unmistakable existence as absolutely certain

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land known to all men, it would be a departure from truth to suppose

His probable existence or to work toward proving Him to exist as such.

Scripture does not present, nor do we worship, nor should we present

in our apologetic, a probable god or a Scripture that is probably true,

but rather the living and true, triune God of certain existence and cos-

mic authority. A neutral apologetic would make possibility more ulti-

mate than God, allowing the assumed possibility of His non-existence.

A presuppositional apologetic will not conceive of God's existence as

epistemologically contingent as the skeptic demands. If the believer did

not look upon God's existence as in some sense necessary, then God's

demand upon his thinking and living would not be absolute (unqualified

and beyond question). Since this consequent is false, the antecedent must

be denied. God's existence is necessary.

If the Christian were to start with some commonly interpreted

"facts" and use a neutral, abstract "logic" to "prove" the probable truth

of Christianity, he would demonstrate that he considers these facts and

the validity of his logic as more certain and trustworthy than the God

whose Word he attempts to establish. What depends on man and his

reason or testimony in order to be acknowledged is less than man in au-

thority and epistemic certainty, and thereby, in existential necessity and

surety. If God relies on the facts of the universe and the reasoning mind

of man in order to have His existence or the truth of His Word con-

ceded, then He is less than the universe and inferior to the mind of man

in epistemic certitude. When an apologist attempts to be autonomous

in his reasoned argumentation he indicates that he considers God to be

less certain than his own existence and that he places greater credence

in his independent reasoning than in God's revealed Word. Clearly, any

such god or revelation proven by this method fails to match up to the

God and revelation described in the Bible. According to it everything in

creation is contingent upon God's existence and is what it is as it func-

tions within God's sovereign plan. The creature is less than the Creator

in epistemic certainty, authority, and existential surety. The apologist

should argue accordingly by using a presuppositional method.

If the neutralist in apologetics responds that he is not claiming that

God's existence is dependent on man but that man's knowledge of God and

the truth of His Word rests upon reason and evidence collected in the uni-

verse, he is forgetting that metaphysics must be correlative to epistemol-

ogy and is implying that the investigating activity of man's mind is more

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PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

dependable than the Word of God. It would appear that God's revelation

would not be necessary for the expert scientist and logician who could

theoretically arrive at the same truths if given enough data and time. If

the truths of Scripture are to be autonomously proved, they might just as

well have been worked out independently of revelation—thus Scripture

is simply a short cut for the less intelligent, common people. Or if this is

not the implication, then perhaps it is that God's uncertain Word can be

bolstered in its credibility by man's intellectual activities. Since neither of

these implications is acceptable to the Christian, a non-presuppositional

apologetic should be unacceptable as well.

Theological Implications

According to Scripture everything in God's creation is dependent

upon and subject to its Creator. Hence it is a denial of the Scripture

to hold that man's knowledge, reasoning, science, or apologetical argu-

mentation can function independently of God and His Word. The neu-

tralist in apologetics who claims that, given initial faith, God's existence

or Word could be impartially proven (going back and reconstructing a

reasoned path into the faith), fails to grasp the real character of faith as

resting for its truth and sufficiency on God Himself only and produced

by the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit. He further fails to see that

impartial reasoning proceeds in an agnostic manner (i.e., as dressed up

atheism). Agnosticism, and reasoning which proceeds from an agnostic

theoretical foundation, are in direct antithesis to the Christian view of

God as self-revealing in man and nature. According to Scripture man

cannot escape knowing God or recognizing the revelation of God inher-

ent in himself and nature around him. Man, according to the Bible, is

constantly confronting God's revelation and continually responding to

his knowledge of God in obedient faith or sinful rebellion. An "agnostic

apologetic" denies this in practice if not word.

A god or revelation capable of proof or rational verification by an

autonomous man would be worthless. Such a being or book would always

be acceptable to the non-Christian, only if they did not challenge his

autonomous authority or "rational" interpretation of the world and life.

A neutral apologetic, even one that attempts autonomous argumenta-

tion on the most trivial and short-range point of the Christian faith,

ultimately works at proving such a god. That Christianity is true means

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that there is evidence for it, but to approach this evidence unfaithfully

(i.e., agnostically or impartially) is to distort and deny it. Because the be-

liever and unbeliever do not stand on epistemological common ground

(e.g., they disagree as to the nature, possibility, and actual location of

relevant evidence) they cannot together approach evidence impartially

and autonomously. To attempt a proof by neutral logic and impartially

interpreted facts would be to work at disproving the God of Scripture (in

terms of whom depends the validity of reason and factuality in the first

place). We cannot be neutral with respect to God's Word, and we ought not

to reason as if we were uncommitted to His truthful Word. According to

agnostic argumentation or a neutral apologetic God would be allowed

into the universe of recognition only by making Him less than God.

Obedience in Apologetics

A neutral apologetic, as opposed to presuppositional argument,

moves in a wrong direction: from the totally unsure, relative, and con-

tingent to the perfectly sure, undeniable, and absolute. If the non-Chris-

tian's autonomy is to be challenged, the apologist must show him that

he cannot interpret any area of experience on his autonomous terms

without thereby making it unintelligible. To argue with him otherwise

is to grant him more than he honestly deserves. If the non-Christian has

no place to stand, the Christian cannot help him along in his unbelief

by allowing him an illegitimate and illusory foundation. To do so would

not be honest and straightforward in our dealings. The apologist must

not grant the unbeliever what he cannot have on his unfaithful and dis-

obedient terms, for that would be yielding to a lie. People may be con-

vinced by flimsy evidence and faulty reasoning based on the hopeless

foundation of autonomy, but to argue autonomously when that is beset

with insuperable difficulties reduces our evangelism to sophistry (look-

ing to practical results irrespective of the truth). Furthermore, an apolo-

gist must demand noetic conversion in his argumentation and, with it,

new canons of evidence, truth, inference, etc. A neutral apologetic fails

to do this. When a Christian replies to the attacks of his non-Christian

opponent he must not be unfaithful to his Lord but must obediently

presuppose Scripture's truth and rely on the Holy Spirit for conversion.

When the Christian speaks apologetically to the skeptic he does so

with one view in mind: accurately and fully to set before him the truth of

129

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

God with hope of seeing the unbeliever converted. Argument for argu-

ment's sake when one is dealing in the vital matters of salvation and dam-

nation would be unseemly. When so much is at stake in our witness and

defense we must be deeply concerned to use tools shaped to proper ends

and honoring to the God whom we desire the non-Christian to worship.

Only God can change the unbeliever's profession and behavior. The

non-Christian must be renewed unto knowledge, righteousness, and ho-

liness of truth. He must be saved from his epistemological folly induced

by his ethical rebellion against God's clear revelation in nature around

him, his own constitution, and Scripture. When the heart is cleansed

from sin, only then can the eyes see clearly, the ears hear plainly, and

the mind reason properly. Out of the most intense concern for the sin-

ner's salvation, and in full recognition of his true condition, we must use

an apologetic that does not compromise the authority or truth of God's

Word or give any ground to rebellion. We must challenge the unbeliever

at every point with the presupposed authority of Christ over his life and

thinking, praying the Holy Spirit to work regeneration along with the

sure witness of the Word.

So then, we must not be disobedient to Christ in either thought or

reasoning. We must not bow to apostate and God-insulting demands or

standards of possibility, verification, etc. We cannot play at agnosticism or

question God's Word. We cannot prove a god which is acceptable in terms

of the sinner's suicidal philosophy of fact and logic. We cannot grant the

unbeliever more than he has coming in the debate. And we must require

of him no less than Christ requires—full surrender.

Our apologetical method must be consistent with our message; in-

deed, it ought to be derived from that message. If we misrepresent the

message of Scripture by arguing in a way unfitting for a Christian, and

yet gain the unbeliever's assent, we just may have confirmed him in his

rebellion against God's authority. We must challenge the sinner's self-as-

sumed prerogative to determine what is and is not reasonable, what can

and cannot exist, what is right and what is wrong. By our argumentative

method we must not treat autonomous thought as the ultimate author-

ity. A neutral apologetic concedes the very point we wish to refute: the

sinner's autonomy. We who have learned to think God's thoughts after

Him, that is, to think biblically (submitting every thought to the clear

and authoritative Word of Christ) must call covenant-breaking sinners

to repent from their God-defying ways of thinking. By reasoning impar-

130

NEUTRALITY & AUTONOMY RELINQUISHED

tially with the skeptic and appealing to the ability of his mind to acquire

the truth on his own principles and to reason meaningfully, that is, by

not taking a firm presuppositional stance and challenging the sinner's

autonomy (but rather catering to it), we would allow the unregenerate to

believe a lie in order that he come to acknowledge the truth!

Therefore, we conclude that the Christian apologist requires a pre-

suppositional apologetic. Such an apologetic is necessitated epistemo-

logically as well as ethically.

131

PART T W O

CONSISTENCY APPLIED:

CRITIQUES OF INCOMPLETE

PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

I N T R O D U C T I O N TO PART 2

The second half of this book grows out of the convictions stated

in Part 1; in particular Part 1 sought to present a case in favor

of presuppositional apologetics, specifically the apologetical

writings of Dr. Cornelius Van Til, for in his system is found the most

consistently biblical presuppositional defense of Christianity.

In saying that consistent presuppositional apologetics is to be defend-

ed herein it is requisite that specification be made of Dr. Van Til's writ-

ings in order to avoid confusion, for in recent years three other writers

have come to be generally considered as "presuppositionalists": Gordon

H. Clark, Edward J. Carnell, and Francis Schaeffer. These three have all

made contributions to the cause of reformational apologetics; the pres-

ent writer is appreciative of their labors. Their thinking has been with

insight and their writings are lucid. With all due respect for these three

men, their sincerity, Christian commitment, and hard work, we must

press on to see why their apologetical systems are not fully satisfactory.

Although many fine points of presuppositional character can be found

scattered throughout their writings, we regretfully note that their posi-

tions as a whole are inconsistent with these points. This inconsistency

might make it appear that criticisms offered below could be rebutted by

retreating to the better points of the writer under scrutiny; however, af-

ter trying to harmonize the conflicting assertions and to read them in a

sympathetic spirit, I am simply unable to reconcile the major differences

or eliminate the tension among them. When the full examination has

been completed, the apologetical systems of Clark, Carnell, and Schaef-

fer all suffer from major internal flaws; their arguments either fail to be

genuinely presuppositional, or their presuppositions fail to be genuinely

biblical. The following critical notes are recorded to indicate why this

PRESUPPOSITIONAL aPOLOGETICS POSITIVELY STATED

treatise will not seek to present a case for, and defense of, Clark, Carnell,

and Schaeffer as presuppositional apologists.

Procedural Note: In a few cases the author who is under scrutiny

has offered a reply to a type of criticism that will be presented below;

in those cases where I have not pursued these published replies, let the

reader understand that it is because, as far as I can evaluate, these replies

have begged questions, unduly pontificated, merely argued ad hominem,

fallaciously imputed guilt and merit by association, skirted the main is-

sue, misunderstood the criticism, and just generally failed to meet the

point at hand and so are inadequate (e.g., Clark replies to a probing

criticism of him by G. Mavrodes by simply saying that it "clanks"). In

such cases a response to the author's definitive rebuttal is unnecessary.

Should the reader feel that any of my criticisms fail to take account of

what an author had to say about such arguments, I encourage him to

reexamine the alleged rebuttal. I have attempted to read all the major

publications of these men in the best possible light; still, I find their po-

sitions defective. In choosing what material to include in this treatise I

had to weed out the weak replies without taking up space to elaborate

what the author said and how it fails to shore up his position. As always,

the reader can and must judge for himself.

136

C H A P T E R 4

GORDON CLARK

Gordon Clark can and has expressed points of genuine and

accurate presuppositional analysis in his many writings. A

sampling of them can serve to indicate where this treatise is

in full agreement with him and where Clark parallels the thrust of Van

Til's position.

In a war a general does not willingly abandon half of his

position to the enemy in order to protect a few central

points. And in the battle of ideas it is not only safer, but

it is actually easier, not to say absolutely necessary, to de-

fend the complete position.1

Because God is sovereign, God's authority can be taken

only on God's authority.2

There is no proposition on which a consistent believer and

a consistent unbeliever can agree. Therefore the doctrine

of inspiration, like every other Christian doctrine, cannot

1. Gordon Clark, "Miracles, History, and Natural Law," The Evangelical Quarterly,

XII, 1940, 23.

2. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible? (Chicago:

Moody, 1963), 28.

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a clear thinking un-

believer.. .. A conviction that the Bible is really the Word

of God cannot be the conclusion of a valid argument

based on more clearly evident premises. This conviction is

produced by the Holy Spirit Himself.3

A philosophy that is based on the existence of God will dif-

fer throughout from a philosophy that has no place for God;

and similarly two systems that do not agree as to what sort

of Being God is, will also differ in all their details.4

The precise question ... is merely, What must be true if

history and humanity are to be meaningful? What is the

presupposition of significance?5

All historical writing in fact depends on presupposi-

tions.... Norms of possibility must be accepted from

naturalistic scientism, existential hunch, or the Biblical

revelation with its miraculous supernaturalism.6

Christianity ... should develop its epistemology and the-

ory of language from the information contained in the

Scriptures.7

A man either lives with the fear of God before his eyes,

attempting to make his whole life a song of praise to his

Creator or he does not. If he does, he is a theist; if he does

not, his life shows that, far from being neutral, his serious

belief is that God will not judge him and his actions, that

is, that there is no God who rules the universe with him in

it.... The atheist who asserts that there is no God, asserts

by the same words that he holds the universe in his mind;

he asserts that no fact, past, present, future, near, or far,

escapes his attention, that no power, however great, can

3. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 24, 32.

4. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 85.

5. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 77.

6. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious (Nutley, N.J.: Craig, 1971), 371.

7. Clark, Karl Barth's Theological Method (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed,

1963), 150; see also A Christian View of Men and Things, 267.

138

GORDON CLARK

baffle or deceive him. In rejecting God, he claims omni-

science and omnipotence. In other words an atheist is one

who claims that he himself is God.8

Now, methodology is never neutral Therefore, the use

of a method presupposes epistemological and metaphysi-

cal positions.9

A theory may precede the choice of facts.... The most

deceiving and the most deceived author is the one who

thinks he is simply describing what is there. The there

itself cannot be selected without presuppositions.10

The non-christian arguments regularly assume the point

in dispute before they start. The questions are so framed

as to exclude the Christian answer from the beginning.11

Presuppositionless experience is an impossible phi-

losophy.12

The historian must first choose his concept and only then

begin to select his facts.... There is no simple fact.... In

addition to the connectedness of history, which makes

simple, discrete facts impossible, another embarrassment

for objectivity is the historian's need of selection and the

principles on which that selection is made A judgment

of what event is important, involving as it must the larger

whole for which it is important, depends on the concept

of that larger whole. It is this concept that determines the

selection of the allegedly simple facts.13

[There is] need of revelation if the laws of history are

to be understood.... The study of these subjects cannot

8. Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1946), 45, 48.

9. Clark, "Reply to Arthur F. Holmes," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, ed. R. H.

Nash (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1968), 434.

10. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation (Nudey, N. J.: Craig, 1961), 14.

11. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 27.

12. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 371.

13. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 136f.

139

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

be carried on without a prior appeal to the more funda-

mental problems of the nature of God and the reality of

revelation.14

We neither abandon reason nor use it unaided; but on

pain of skepticism acknowledge a verbal, propositional

revelation of fixed truth from God. Only by accepting

rationally comprehensible [read: "apprehensible"] infor-

mation on God's authority can we hope to have a sound

philosophy and a true religion.... Revelation is needed as

the basis of a rational world-view.... Constructive thought

must presuppose information that has been divinely giv-

en.... A rational life is impossible without being based

upon a divine revelation.15

Sin has so vitiated human powers that man can read nei-

ther the heavens nor his own heart aright.... The doc-

trine of total depravity teaches that no part of human na-

ture escapes the devastation of sin.... It must be asserted

that sin has also affected their intellect.... The intellect

became depraved as well as the will. This is the doctrine

of total depravity: no part or function of man is free from

the effect of sin.16

Strong emphasis needs to be put on the work of the Holy

Spirit. Man is dead in sin, an enemy of God, opposed to

all righteousness and truth. He needs to be changed....

These verses, which refer primarily to regeneration, are

applicable to our acceptance of the Bible as the very

Word of God.17

14. Clark, "Apologetics," Contemporary Evangelical Thought, ed. C. F. H. Henry (New

York: Channel, 1957), 143.

15. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 87, 111, 152.

16. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 251; "The Bible as Truth," Bibliotheca

Sacra, no. 454, April (1957), 159f.; "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II),"

The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, ed. R. H. Nash, 75. See also, What Do Presbyterians

Believe? (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1965), 76; Religion, Reason, and Rev-

elation, 9, 106.

17. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 31 .

140

GORDON CLARK

Reasons or premises by which to prove the authority of

Scripture cannot be used because the consistent unbe-

liever will not accept any Christian premise.18

If apologetics is subject to the axioms of the Christian

system, it will not deceive an opponent by alleging that it

uses axioms which it has in common with secular thought.

A point of connection in the sense of a common principle

is a logical impossibility.... But Reformed theology, while

denying a common epistemological ground, has always

asserted a common psychological or ontological ground.

Believer and unbeliever alike, though their philosophic

axioms and theorems are totally incompatible, bear in

their persons the image of God from creation. This im-

age consists of or at least includes their ordinary rational

ability ... [and] theological and moral principles. These

beliefs, dimly and inconsistently held, often submerged

and repressed, can be thought of as a point of contact

for the Gospel.... Based as they are on separate sets of

axioms, they can have no proposition in common; and if

one system is true, the other must be false. However, liv-

ing people are not so thoroughly consistent as ideal sys-

tems. People are inconsistent; they believe contradicto-

ries without noticing the fact. Hence it is psychologically

possible for an unbeliever and a believer to agree on a

given proposition. And this point of agreement may be

used as a point of contact for the Gospel.19

The witness or testimony of the Holy Spirit is a witness to

something. The Spirit witnesses to the authority of Scrip-

ture The production of belief is the work of the Spirit,

for faith is the gift of God.20

When Clark says these things, he is truly reflecting a biblically pre-

suppositional position. But he disappoints us when we take into account-

18. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 25f.

19. Clark, Karl Barth's Theological Method, 89, 100, 103; Historiography: Secular and

Religious, 369f.

20. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 29f.

141

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

what he says elsewhere. We could only wish that he had conformed his

entire apologetic to the above points. However, there are a number of

problems in his apologetical writings that sully and set aside these posi-

tive statements. An audit of those difficulties leads us to draw back from

adopting Clark's apologetic.

STARTING POINTS AND CERTAINTY

As we canvass Clark's writings it soon becomes evident that the truth

of Scripture is not his firm starting point. While Clark never gives any

indication that he doubts the Bible's veracity, his apologetical system

does not take Scripture as its unreserved, unconditional, and absolute

presupposition. A notion of "possibility" still surrounds and lies behind

Clark's acceptance of Scripture as his supposition (and, as we shall see,

surrounds God as well), leading to an insufficient challenge to his non-

Christian opponents (being merely immanent), a regarding of Christi-

anity as a "hypothesis" needing verification (so that its truth status is

reduced to probability), and a logicistic separation of epistemology from

metaphysical commitments.

Instead of laying down a stringent demand that the truth of God's

revealed Word be accepted as the precondition for all intellectual en-

deavor and the indispensable stipulation for even the activity of aca-

demic evaluation, Clark treats Christianity as a possibility. He writes,

That religion or Christianity in particular furnishes a

better method than secularism is a possibility not to be

dismissed without discussion.21

The truth of the Christian world-view provides, not a "better" or "pos-

sible" method, but the necessary method, of all academic tasks. On

Clark's basis, however, the atheist's position leads to human despair

rather than (stronger) sheer meaninglessness.22 Such an argument is sim-

ply not a telling one against a rugged and enduring individual who can

grit through the bleak experience of living.23 The ground needs to be

21. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 232.

22. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry (Grand

Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1969), 11.

23. For example, see Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worship," Why I Am Not a

Christian, ed. P. Edwards (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), 104ff.

142

GORDON CLARK

pulled out from under the atheist's very ability to argue, not simply his

ability to live with his conclusions.

Clark fails to get to the very bottom of the difficulty in his oppo-

nents' positions and settles for arguments against them that a percep-

tive non-Christian critic could just as well formulate.24 (My point is not

that these criticisms are not good, but that they are not sufficient for

a Christian.) It is unsatisfactory to render truncated polemics, such as

"examining the possibility of formulating positivistic laws," by simply

pointing to practical problems and not relating the whole endeavor to

Christianity's bearing on the issue of possibility in science; or to sup-

pose that (without reducing it to utter absurdity) in dealing with natu-

ralism it is "sufficient to show the futility of trying to discover universal

laws by observation," such as asserting that "teleology escapes some of

the difficulties inherent in mechanism" without at all distinguishing

between Christian and non-Christian notions of teleology, or saying

that the main difficulty in the problem of historical causation is that

of defining "cause" thereby failing to force home the challenge of a

distinctively Christian historiography.25

Clark comes to the very conclusion of his book on the philosophy of

science and declares, "The value of science depends on the value of life;

but the value of life ... must be determined by some sort of general phi-

losophy" and then goes on to state his personal testimony that Christian

theism is the best option.26 In actuality only Christianity can give science,

as well as all of life, its necessary grounding and value.

Clark's treatment of R. G. Collingwood serves as a good example

of the problem we are discussing. Instead of distancing himself from

Collingwood by drawing attention to a fundamental antithesis, Clark

notes his general excellence and adds simply that "some corrections will

be needed."27 In Clark's evaluation, Collingwood's outlook almost makes

history impossible.28 Yet having credited Collingwood (instead of God's

providence and sovereign plan for historical eventuation) with solving

24. For example, see his treatment of Kant in Historiography: Secular and Religious,

36ff. 25. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 113, 126, 149, 142.

26. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God (Nudey, N. J.: Craig, 1964), 95;

emphasis Bahnsen's.

27. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 203; emphasis Bahnsen's.

28. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 213.

143

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

the problem of materialistic epistemology, Clark holds that, despite the

need to reconstruct some points, Collingwood could perhaps have the

final theme that can save history.29 In all this Clark has not made the

truth of Scripture an absolute and necessary presupposition, a genuine

transcendental of meaningfulness for all science, history, etc.

Indeed, by contrast, one could easily be led to believe that logic per

se is his transcendental rather than Scripture. Instead of the attempt to

be independent of God's Word, "the denial of the law of contradiction,

or even the failure to establish it as a universal truth, was the downfall

of secular philosophy."30 For the absolute presuppositionalist, God and

His revelation guarantee the possibility of epistemological fruitfulness,

for He who is the truth has deigned to give us a revelation of knowledge.

Clark, on the other hand, concludes his chapter on epistemology in A

Christian View of Men and Things by saying that it "has tried to show by an

application of the law of contradiction—a law that is not merely formal

but is itself an integral part of the system of truth—that truth exists and

that knowledge is possible."31 The impression that the truth of Scrip-

ture is not the grounding for logic, but that the law of contradiction is

methodologically more primitive than Scripture for Clark, is apparently

confirmed when he says,

Just how it could be possible to formulate reasons prior to

any logic remains unexplained. It seems evident to me

that any set of reasons or any argument for creation ought

to make use of and therefore presuppose logic.32

The issue here is not whether, de facto, one makes instrumental use of

the law of contradiction in all his thinking (that is readily granted), but

whether, in principium, logic or the truth of Scripture is your absolute

presupposition. Clark's comment either makes an illegitimate separation

of epistemology from metaphysics or posits logic as prior to the presup-

position of Scripture. (Both errors will be treated infra)

29. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 214, 220.

30. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, ed. R. H. Nash, 64.

31. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 323.

32. Clark, "Reply to Gilbert B. Weaver," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, ed. R.

H. Nash, 460.

144

GORDON CLARK

Possibility vs. Necessity

The observations made above are really nothing but the expected cor-

ollaries to Clark's handling of the notion of "possibility." God should be

taken by the Christian as the source and standard of all material, as well

as logical, possibility; He is the one who determines all things (even the

operations of the human mind and its limits). But for Clark the possibili-

ties of human imagination and the bare possibilities dictated by formal

logic have precedence to God (at least in Clark's writings). God too seems

to be drawn into an environment of "possibility" (i.e., made subject to the

conditions thereof); of course, then, this must also be the case for God's

Word. Instead of demanding that Barth, for example, must recognize the

subordination of all thinking to God's Word because it is our absolute,

transcendental presupposition that makes intelligibility, thinking, evalu-

ating, and meaning possible, Clark wants Barth, in considering such a

subordination, not to "bluntly rule out this possibility."

A more skeptical view of the amount of truth obtainable

by experimentation, with the help of operationalism,

might bring the idea of subordination back again within

the limits of possibility. The Scripture is a better source

than experimentation is for the norms of ethics and poli-

tics; perhaps there is some way to bring physics and zool-

ogy also under this authority.33

Because Clark, thus, does not take the truth of God's Word as an abso-

lutely essential presupposition to which all thought must (not merely pos-

sibly) be subordinated, it is not surprising that he should write,

From a logical standpoint it is equal whether one's assump-

tions are philosophical or theological, Christian or not.34

This is not the case! Christianity and unbelief are not on an equal foot-

ing, for unbelief has no footing whatsoever. And even logical possibility

cannot be a common background to Christian and pagan systems of

thought, for Christianity alone makes logic possible. With this quote,

whatever absolute character Clark's presupposition of God's Word may

33. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 68; emphasis Bahnsen's.

34. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 8.

145

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

have had is completely dissolved. Even God comes to be conceptually

manipulated by Clark's notion of possibility.

Speaking of the power displayed in the heavens, Clark states,

[T]his amount of power, great as it is, cannot be omnipo-

tence. Beyond the amount we observe, there can always

be more.35

Yet Paul tells us that God's attributes are clearly revealed in the created

order (Rom. 1), and David says that the very glory of God is declared in

the heavens (Ps. 19). If the sinner's eyes were not blinded by his sin, he

would conclude from general revelation that God is omnipotent. What-

ever God does witnesses to His omnipotence. It is hard to know how we

should take Clark's comment; either he means that God could display

His power in a different way (which would fail to lead to Clark's conclu-

sion that more omnipotence would be revealed), or he means that the

deity revealed in nature cannot clearly be identified with the true God

(a conclusion Clark obviously would reject as a Christian), or he means

that it is possible for God to be more omnipotent than He is.

In taking Scripture as an absolute presupposition and standard for

thought, the Christian apologist ought to maintain that there are no

possibilities outside of what God is and decrees to be. It is never possible

for God to be other than the type of being He is portrayed to be in His

self-revelation. Because he does not presuppose the certain truth of the

Bible at the very start of his apologetic {de facto and in principiurri) Clark (a

self-professed Calvinist) is willing to reduce the whole system of Chris-

tian truth revealed by God therein to a possible accident!

Strange accidents do indeed occur, and no proof is forth-

coming that the Bible is not such an accident. Unlikely

perhaps, but still possible.36

With this background we can understand why Clark would assert that

as his essay "Revealed Religion" removes objections, his argument will

have an indirect bearing on "the possibility of a divine revelation" (p. 3;

emphasis added). Later in the same essay he says,

35. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 15.

36. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 24.

146

GORDON CLARK

Again, let us insist, if we have some source of information

other than observation of nature, if God has revealed

some parts of a philosophy of history, we can handle

these unpleasant facts. Candid opponents of Christianity

admit this possibility?37

Because Clark has this illegitimate notion of possibility in his apolo-

getical system, a notion which lies behind even his beliefs about God

and God's Word, it is inevitable that he should cease to be a genuine

presuppositionalist. By not viewing the truth of Scripture as a presup-

position that is absolutely necessary, Clark reduces the status of the Bible

to a hypothesis. Therefore, it would be more accurate to designate Clark's

apologetic as "suppositionalism," rather than pr esuppositionalism.

Clark begins by taking Christianity as his supposition or hypothesis,

not the certain truth by which all else is to be judged. The truth of Scrip-

ture is not taken to be the case at the outset, so that only later are a man's

thoughts to submit to it. The Christian alternative is one of many possibili-

ties to be explored and evaluated. As in the scientific method, every pos-

sibility is at first only hypothetically true, so also in apologetics, Christian-

ity cannot be a definite assumption but only a hypothesis.. .."38 "If there

is such [an omniscient] God.... [I]f God is a person interested in human

beings.... [I]f Christian theism is true";39 "if, on the contrary, the idea of

God is an innate endowment by the Creator,"40 and he can speak of "the

hypothesis of divine omniscience."41

The Word of God is not presented in such an apologetical approach as

something that makes an absolute demand upon a person's life; the intel-

lectual challenge of the gospel is diluted to, "Either the Bible is a worthless

fraud and Jesus was a deluded martyr, or the Bible is in truth the Word

of God written."42 The Christian apologist should hold that the Bible must

be true, not that it merely may be true. It sounds almost patronizing when

Clark says "a more sympathetic consideration ought to be given to divine

37. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 15;

emphasis Bahnsen's.

38. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible, ed. C. F.

H. Henry (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1959), 41.

39. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 24, 251, 318.

40. Clark , Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 134.

41. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 25.

42. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 2 If.

147

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

revelation than is customary in the universities of our land."43 And in har-

mony with that weak note is Clark's admission that he contrasts Kantian-

ism to Christianity, not to show Christianity to be right, but in order to

indicate that "the Christian position is not so implausible."44

Apparently, even broad theism would be more "plausible" than

Christian theism:

If theism is indeed necessary to the intelligibility of his-

tory, possibly Mohammedan theism or some other form

would function as well as or even better than Christian

theism. There has not been much argument so far to rule

out such a possibility.45

The first sentence of this quotation surrenders the strength of the Chris-

tian's challenge by its hypothetical mood, and the reference to possibility

again betrays Clark's failure to take God's Word as his absolute presup-

position. Surely a presuppositionalist would have more to offer than that

"the postulate of verbal revelation is at least worth trying."46 Clark him-

self admits that the axiom of God's revelation functions as a hypothesis

rather than an absolutely necessary presupposition: "[A]n hypothesis for

consideration may be proposed. It is that revelation should be accepted as

our axiom."47 However, on a genuinely presuppositional basis, a consider-

ation or evaluation of such an axiom could not be made without standards

of judgment, and those very standards must be derived from revelation.

Hence one must begin with Scripture and use it as his canon for compari-

son. But with regret we note that Clark nullifies even this premise of pre-

suppositionalism by means of his fatal "possibilism":

If there is a God, the Calvinists may possibly be right in

saying that the knowledge of God is fundamental and by

it one must judge worldviews and their details.48

43. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 183.

44. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 43.

45. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 231.

46. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 87.

47. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 59.

48. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 259; emphasis Bahnsen's.

148

GORDON CLARK

T H E PRIORITY OF LOGIC AND T H E TESTING OF G O D ' S W O R D

Since it is the case that Clark does not absolutely presuppose the truth

of God's revealed Word, it is only natural that his apologetic should

turn aside to test the veracity of God and His Word. Clark needs to

put the Bible to the test in order that his supposition of its truth can

be verified by independent standards. And this can be accomplished

only by elevating some principle above Scripture and holding that it

has greater epistemic certainty than does the Bible. Thus we discern

that not only does Clark fall short of being an apologetical presupposi-

tionalist, but in addition his suppositions are not biblical. Some form of

autonomy has infected his system.

Verifying God's Word

Clark makes it clear that the issue of the Bible's truth must be settled

generally before he can go on to consider its own self-testimony as to its

nature and source. Referring his readers to evidence that they can consid-

er for establishing the Bible's truth and passing on to assume the general

trustworthiness of Scripture, then Clark feels it legitimate to pass on to

the question of the Bible's inspiration and self-testimony. The question of

truth is prior, says Clark, for "unless the Bible is true, there is not much

use in discussing inspiration."49 Here Clark commits himself to the tra-

ditional non-presuppositional apologetic which attempts to work up to an

acceptance of the nature of Scripture by proving it to the unregenerate

man, who, it is wrongly assumed, can correctly interpret nature on his

own unbelieving principles.

Approached from this vantage point, the question of the Bible's ve-

racity is (for Clark) an open one; it is not precluded that Scripture might

be refuted. Also consider:

[T]he theistic proofs are destructive of Christianity;...

but fortunately they are invalid, so that Christianity es-

capes this danger.50

The first statement is certainly true (although, as we shall see shortly,

Clark may say this for the wrong reason); but the second one is telling as

49. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 9f.

50. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 13.

149

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

a criticism of Clark. We are led to believe that Christianity would be un-

dermined if certain proofs could be validly formulated. However, Clark

should have maintained that Christianity salvages logic, not vice versa.

The verificationalism implicit in the conjunction of Clark's view of

possibility and his view of Christianity as supposition or hypothesis sur-

faces at many points in his writings.

Our belief is a voluntary choice. But if one must choose

without a strict proof, none the less it is possible to have

sane reasons of some sort to justify the choice. Ulti-

mately these reasons reduce to the principle of consis-

tency. A postulate must be chosen such that it makes

possible a harmony or a system in all our thoughts,

words and actions.51

Clark would have us appeal to certain a priori principles independent of

revelation in order to choose between competing religious hypotheses.

Reason can pass judgment upon the validity of a revelation from God.

Clark is candid about the fact that, in his apologetic, "revelation will be

tested," and openly speaks of "the test of revelation as a postulate."52

Axioms ... are always tested in another way [i.e., veri-

fied, rather than demonstrated].... So too it should be

with Christian revelation as an axiom.... We can judge

the acceptability of an axiom only by its success in pro-

ducing a system.53

Those familiar with Clark's writings will recall that he is fond of the mod-

el of geometric axioms and theorems for his apologetical system and de-

lineation of the nature of truth.54 The strange thing, given this model, is

that he should designate the Bible as an axiom for him, for he clearly treats

it like a theorem subject to critical testing against the standard of the axioms

(i.e., self-evident truths of reason, rather than self-attesting Scripture!).

51. Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, 49.

52. Clark, "Several Implications (Wheaton Lecture III)," The Philosophy of Gordon

H. Clark, 107, 94.

53. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 59f.

54. For example, see A Christian View of Men and Things, 25.

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GORDON CLARK

Logic and Verification

A central question for Clark is, "Can the Christian ... meet the objec-

tion that revelation is unreasonable?"—a question that launches him into

a defense of revelation as rational,55 Having discussed the inadequacy of

natural theology in the essay, "Revealed Religion," Clark goes on to note

that we need "some other source of knowledge, a bona fide revelation";56

in proceeding to examine the claim of the neo-orthodox theologians to

an encounter as this bona fide revelation, Clark concludes, "The great

difficulty, as should now be clear, is the refusal to accept the law of

contradiction."57 It is evident that what Clark takes as the criterion of bona

fide revelation is meeting the ultimate demands of logic.

If the Biblical doctrines are self-consistent, they have met

the only legitimate test of reason. This test of logic is pre-

cisely the requirement that a set of propositions be mean-

ingful, whether spoken by God or man.58

The regulative demands of logic provide an atmosphere that envelops

both Creator and creature. Hence if God should wish to speak to man,

His revelation should be testable by the fourth book of Aristotle's meta-

physics. He should be able to pass the test honorably in man's estima-

tion. As Clark sees it, the sinner is not furthering his hostility against

God and His Word by calling His revelation into question and subject-

ing it to the criterion of logic, but rather has the right (and obligation) to

scrutinize any claim to revelation.59 The job of the apologist is to help

him in this task: "The apologist must exhibit the internal consistency of

the Christian system ... [and] urge the believer to repudiate the axioms

of secularism and accept God's revelation."60 This is what Clark con-

ceives as being his own purpose in writing: "This chapter, in fact the

55. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible, 1959,

29ff.

56. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 15.

57. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 23.

58. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible, 1959,

37.

59. Clark, "Reply to Gilbert B. Weaver," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 464f.;

see also Weaver's criticism itself, "Gordon Clark: Christian Apologist," The Philosophy

of Gordon H. Clark, 306.

60. Clark, Karl Barth's Theological Method, 96.

151

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

volume as a whole, has also tried to show that Christian theism is self-

consistent and that several other philosophies are inconsistent, skeptical,

and therefore erroneous."61

We really must query, however, why it is necessary to test the Bible

for consistency rather than presupposing it, since the revelation is from the

God of truth Himself. Scripture should be used as the canon of con-

sistency for all thoughts of men rather than being itself at the mercy of

the creature's critical faculty. However, such an authoritarian position

would not sit well with Clark's emphasis on the rational intellect of man

as the clearinghouse for all hypotheses.

Christianity includes the primacy of the intellect and the

sovereign claims of truth.62

Historic Christianity with its acceptance of a written rev-

elation is more in accord with intellectualism than either

of the rival theories.63

It should not go unnoticed that the primacy of the intellect Clark advo-

cates is one with the ancient Greek doctrine that the reason should rule

over the passions and will; the Platonists and Aristotelians were also like

Clark in their exalting of the test of rationality.

Having observed Clark's commitment to test and verify the sup-

posed revelation of God in Scripture by means of logic, it would seem

that F. N. Lee's comment about Clark is quite appropriate:

Like Buswell, Clark too is a strong adherent of the Old

Princetonian school of rationalistic Christian apologetics,

holding that reason is common to all men by virtue of all

men being created in the image of God, so that reason

may lead to faith—a basically scholastic position 64

Although a bit surprising at first glance, this comparison with Buswell

61. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 324.

62. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 107.

63. Clark, "On the Primacy of the Intellect," Westminster Theological Journal, V

(May, 1943), 195.

64. Francis Nigel Lee, A Christian Introduction to the History of Philosophy (Nutley, N.

J.: Craig, 1969), 228.

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GORDON CLARK

is accurate in that both he and Clark treat possibility as if it surrounded

God, treat Christianity as if it were a mere hypothesis, and strive to

verify the Bible in one way or another. Although Clark is a stringent

deductivist, and Buswell a dedicated inductivist, the abstract logic of

Clark and the factual contingency of Buswell need each other in a sys-

tem that does not begin with the self-attesting truth of God's special

revelation. However, this is not our main concern here. Lee's indication

of Clark's latent scholasticism is right to the point. When self-evident

rational principles are elevated to sit in judgment over God's revelation,

that revelation is bound to lose its authoritative character in deference

to man's unquestionable use of logic. Instead of faith in God's Word

leading to understanding of reason and science, understanding is taken

to lead to faith (thereby abandoning the Augustinian dictum).

Clark and Rationalism

The prime example of Clark's scholasticism (faith placed upon the

foundation of rationality) is his argument, or "proof" of God's existence,

"a thoroughly rationalistic argument that begins with an analysis of

truth and proceeds to man's knowledge of God."65 This can be found

in A Christian View of Men and Things, 318-321. Basically it asserts the

necessity that truth exist, that truth always exists, that truth is mental or

spiritual and is universal, and it concludes: "Is all this any more than the

assertion that there is an eternal, immutable Mind, a Supreme Reason,

a personal, living God?"66

Now beyond the fact that the conclusion exceeds the warrant of the

premises, that the argument is as poor as reasoning that hearing ears must

exist because trees fall in forests, and that the argument proves something

less than the Triune God of Scripture, the really notorious thing about

this is the confidence in self-sufficient reason to work up from self-evident

premises to the living, the true, the self-contained God, the God who in

His self-disclosure has delivered a self-attesting, clear, sufficient, necessary,

and authoritative revelation of Himself! We are reminded of the state-

ment by Jacobi that a "God" capable of proof would be no God at all.67

65. Ronald H. Nash, "Gordon Clark's Theory of Knowledge," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 158.

66. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 321.

67. Bahnsen refers to the statement of Friedrich Jacobi (1743-1819),

153

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Clark's argument betrays that logic, rather than God, has more epistemic

certainty than any other principle and hence is the ultimate authority for

him. Because belief in God has been built up from reason alone, God is

made to be less trustworthy and less authoritative than human reason.

"What depends on man and his reason or testimony is less than man, and

what depends on God is less than God."68

The very notion of proving God's existence is inherently mis-

guided; God alone is adequate to witness to Himself. All of man's

interpretative and discursive reasoning must be self-consciously sub-

ordinated to God and the authoritative direction of His Word. If the

truth of God's Word were Clark's absolute presupposition, he would

not consider it needing verification, or God's existence needing proof.

Sinful man does not understand himself, his world, or even his rea-

soning properly until he submits to God's authority and obeys His

Word; how then could he argue from autonomous considerations up

to the truth and sovereign prerogatives of God! Without holding that

the sinner must abandon his autonomy, without attacking the very

idea of truth, reason, demonstration, and the like if conceived of as

independent of God, the apologist, by the time he arrives at the end

of his argumentative conclusion, would be too late to bring in Christi-

anity—to do so would amount to sheer tokenism, an admission that

the sinner was only slightly mistaken and so in need of adding a few

religious beliefs to his thinking.

Having said these things about Clark and theistic proofs, how-

ever, one must pause, for does not Clark carry on an extensive and

intensive tirade against the traditional theistic proofs himself? Yes,

he does; and his polemic can be found in numerous of his writings.

Has our previous criticism been fair to him then? Again, the answer

is yes. If one will peruse his putative disagreements with the standard

proofs for God's existence he will find that Clark's disavowal of them

is not based on their pretensions to autonomy but on their empirical

foundations and logical invalidity. Now, empiricism is certainly beset

"Ein Gott, der gewuftt werden konnte, ware gar kein Gott" (A God, who

could come to be proven, were no God at all). See Jacobi, "An Fichte,"

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Werke, 6 Vols. (Leipzig: Gerhard Fleischer,

1812-1820 [1816]), 3:7.

68. R.J. Rushdoony, By What Standard? (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed,

1958), 15.

154

GORDON CLARK

with problems and invalid arguments deserve to be criticized, but

these are not the central defects of the theistic proofs; the root sin of

trying to prove God's existence in an autonomous manner is the fail-

ure to take His Word as the standard of truth and instead subjecting

it to autonomous canons for judgment.

The fact that it is empiricism, not autonomy, which Clark censures in

the theistic proofs is exemplified in an interesting passage. Clark quotes

from E. S. Brightman's book, Religious Values: "Revelation must be tested

by reasonableness, not reasonableness by revelation.... It is not a criterion

of truth, but presupposes a criterion by which it is judged."69 Now it is this

very attitude that we have been opposing and regrettably finding in Clark's

apologetic. Yet on the following pages this same book Clark also takes ex-

ception to Brightman—but not over his standing in judgment upon God's

Word! Clark's complaint has to do with Brightman's notion of reason as em-

pirically founded principles:

In opposition to this, Christianity should refuse to define

reason as a body of general principles empirically ob-

tained.... No such body of principles can be obtained....

This revelation [from God] need not be tested, in fact

cannot be tested by reasonableness in Brightman's sense of

the word, for Brightman's reasonableness does not exist....

Nonetheless reason may well be defined as logic. It should

not be identified with experience (emphasis added).70

And that is the sum total of Clark's objection! It is woefully deficient and

baldly exposes the core weakness of Clark's own apologetic. The presup-

positionalist should maintain that without revelation from God there is

no reason available to man by which he could judge anything. In principle, a

testing of God's revelation by rationalistic reasonableness is no better than

testing it by an empiricalistic reasonableness. The same sinful attitude un-

derlies both attempts.

69. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 109. See E. S. Brightman, Religious Values

(New York: The Abington Press, 1925).

70. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 109—110.

155

CONSISTENT pRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

Response to God's Word

Given Clark's view of revelation as a hypothesis subject to the need

for verification, his apologetic encourages the sinner to accept God's

Word, not on the basis of God's objective, rightful authority as expressed

in the self-attesting words of Scripture, but on the basis of rationalistic

demonstration (not syllogistic thought) of its worthiness. When God can

make His credentials good in the eyes of the reasonable investigator,

when the supposition of Scripture has been tested successfully, then God's

authority can start to be exercised.

It should be clear, however, that our reaction to God's Word is a reac-

tion to God Himself. The Bible is not mere human words that happen to

be true and consistent; rather, it is God's own words conveyed in human

speech. The Bible does not point or witness to God, it is the very Word

of God. Hence one does not test Scripture as to its reliability as a hu-

man word and then pass on to the judgment that God must be behind it;

the human and divine character of the Bible cannot be separated. There

is a christological parallel here; one can never consider the humanity of

Christ in abstraction from His divinity. So our response to the carpenter

of Nazareth should be our response to God Himself. And our response to

the words on the ink-printed paper pages of the Bible should always be our

response to a direct address of God to us; in reacting to God's speech we

are reacting to the very person of God.

Note how the word or voice of God is central to the very person of God.

God rules all of creation by His voice; He names (i.e., characterizes and

exercises sovereignty over) everything of the creation. A chief contrast be-

tween God and the idols is that He speaks while they are dumb, and so the

words of God are instrumental in identifying His works and His person (cf.

Ps. 29; 147:4; Isa. 140:26; Eph. 3:14; Hab. 2:18 if.; 1 Cor. 12:2; Ps. 115; 135;

John 14:9). Scripture points out that God's word is the means of creation,

providence, judgment, and grace (cf. Gen. 1:3; Ps. 33:6,9; 148:8; Matt. 8:26

fi; Heb. 1:3; 2 Peter 3:5 f.; Gen. 3:17; Hos. 6:5;Joel 2:11; Heb. 4:12 f.; Luke

7:7; Isa. 55:1 Iff.; Ps. 119; 2 Tim. 1:10; Rev. 19; plus many more). While God

the Father accomplishes all His acts by speaking, God the Holy Spirit is

the breath of God which carries the Word to its destined goal (Isa. 34:16;

John 6:63; etc.), and God the Son is the veiy Word of God (Rev. 19:13; John

1:1-4,14; 1 John 1:1-3; Heb. 1:1-3). Christ is called the "Logos" not against

the background of pagan Greek philosophy, but on the model of God's

156

GORDON CLARK

speaking and wisdom in the Old Testament. Therefore, in an important

sense we can actually say that the Word of God is God Himself.

Our response to the Scripture, then, is the measure of our response to

God (e.g., John 14:23 f.; 8:47; 10:27). When we call the Bible into question,

we call God into question. When we subject Scripture to a test for verifica-

tion, we presume to subject God to verification. If God's Word is subjected

to a criterion of reasonableness, then God is being barred from the uni-

verse of man until He meets the creature's requirements. This is a terrible

mistake, a reversing of the proper order of things. Who can presume to

rise in daring manner in judgment of God? Christ declared, "You shall

not subject the Lord your God to testing" (Matt. 4:7; Luke 4:12); to do so

is a sign of disapprobatory unbelief, such as characterized the Israelites at

Massah (Deut. 6:16; cf. Ex. 17). A consistently biblical apologetic cannot

capitulate to such unbelief by venturing out to verify the truth of God's

Word taken as a hypothesis; to do so would be to suppress God's rightful

authority in all areas and over all men. Clark should have maintained

that man's reasoning must be defined, circumscribed, and judged by the

inscripturated Word of God, and not that this self-attestingly authoritative

revelation can be verified by the independent jurisdiction of reason.

Abstraction of Epistemology from Metaphysics

When Scripture ceases to control every facet of our thinking, even

its evaluative and scrutinizing functions, then our policy and norms con-

cerning justification for beliefs are disconnected from the content of our be-

liefs; that is, epistemology is abstracted from metaphysics. In such a case

one's personal authority and autonomous criterion of judgment are used

to screen all possible intellectual commitments. Where epistemology is

elevated or made primary, metaphysical convictions are subordinated.

This amounts to what we have examined above: God is put to the test of

an autonomous method of verification.

Clark makes it clear in his writings that his apologetic does take epis-

temology as foundational and metaphysics as the superstructure. Before

one decides whether to believe the gospel or not, to commit himself to

God or not, Clark would have him face the question of justification for

such a belief; the standards of credibility would be determined indepen-

dently of God's direction and authority—since it is the very question of

God that is at issue. So then, Clark would allow a measure of autonomy

157

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

to be exercised in order that a sinner would submit to God; world-views

would be judged by some universal criterion found in a self-evident prin-

ciple (e.g., the law of contradiction or coherence) rather than the Word of

God, and the epistemological policy would be formulated and evaluated

independently of Scripture alltogether.

This indicates two things about Clark's apologetic: as seen above,

Scripture is not his absolute presupposition but is itself subject to verifica-

tion, and his genuine presupposition is not biblical (i.e., rooted in a meta-

physical commitment) but rationalistic (i.e., solely epistemological).

The important question is not whether or not the Bible

is true, but whether or not all knowledge is deducible by

reason, i.e., by logic alone.71

The first and most crucial matter in any philosophy of

religion, as indeed it is in all phases of philosophy, is the

method chosen.72

Clark recognizes that all statements presuppose an epistemology, that

epistemology is an underlying problem, and that a system that ignores it

must fail.73 However, because he fails to see that metaphysics must be coor-

dinated with epistemology and vice versa (see infra), he does not give proper

attention to the underlying importance of metaphysics. Instead he main-

tains that it is epistemology that controls the whole system of philosophy,74

whereas metaphysics also controls the whole system (e.g., an atheist's

metaphysic and his naturalistic epistemology aid and abet one another).

Undoubtedly one factor that has caused Clark to go astray on this

point is his erroneous belief that most people do not have a world-view.75

If this were true, then maybe a neutral epistemology would be a theo-

retical possibility (although I have grave doubts even about this). But

the fact of the matter is that all men entertain an outlook on the world

and life that guides their actions and thoughts. So we cannot agree with

Clark when he says,

71. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 53.

72. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 232.

73. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 55, 201, 179.

74. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 285.

75. Clark, "Reply to Gilbert Weaver," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 466.

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GORDON CLARK

But before any type of metaphysics can be accepted, an-

other and far more crucial question must be asked and

answered.... A theory that tries to explain how knowl-

edge is possible is called an epistemological theory. This

is where we must begin.... Metaphysics can be estab-

lished only on an epistemological basis.76

R. Nash has noted that

Clark has avoided the question of metaphysics. This is

due chiefly to his belief that one must first settle the prob-

lems of epistemology and then note the implications of

one's answers for metaphysics.... Too many philosophers

err, he believes, by making epistemology subordinate to

metaphysics or other concerns.77

In holding that metaphysics must be subordinate to epistemology Clark

does not allow his Christian commitment to control every facet of his

thinking; the living and true God whom he seeks to serve makes an

absolute demand on the lives of all men, a demand that extends even to

epistemological concerns.

LOGICAL CONSISTENCY AS AN ULTIMATE CRITERION

Having brought attention to factors that prevent a recognition of Clark

as a biblical presuppositionalist, factors such as his possibilism, sup-

positionalism, verificationalism, and abstraction of epistemology from

metaphysical commitment, we are ready to observe the type of test to

which Clark would subject Scripture. His logicistic rationalism and the

problems attending it must be noted.

There are many religious options that clamor for men's devotion; Clark

sees Christianity as one hypothesis among them. Now as in the case of the

scientific method, the verification of a hypothesis depends on its fitting

the evidence. While others may seek verifying evidence for the Christian

hypothesis in empirical or historical considerations, Clark pursues ratio-

76. Clark, "Secular Philosophy (Wheaton Lecture I)" The Philosophy of Gordon H.

Clark, 27; and "Reply to Arthur F. Holmes," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 435.

77. Ronald H. Nash, "Gordon Clark's Theory of Knowledge," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 170, 125.

159

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

nalistic evidence that will prove the supposition of the Bible. "Logical con-

sistency therefore is evidence of inspiration; but it is not demonstration."78

Formal logic by itself cannot be used to generate a conclusion in favor of

the Bible; there is no strict demonstration from self-evident principles of

its compelling truth. Yet if Scripture, like other religious options, be taken

hypothetically, then it can be placed side by side with its competitors in

order to evaluate their various and relative consistencies.

The evidence that will verify one of these alternative religions will

be found in logical consistency. This experiment in logic constitutes the

apologetical task for Clark. "The attempt to show the Bible's logical con-

sistency is, I believe, the best method of defending inspiration."79 Clark

takes logical consistency as the test of all religious theories because, as he

sees it, truth is defined as a rationally coherent system logically ordered

(this view will be criticized later); if the Bible presents a set of propo-

sitions that are logically consistent, then Clark would want to declare

that it is true. The test by coherence is the ultimate trial of truth;80 by

it Clark would show that Christianity hangs together,81 that it is self-

consistent,82 that it is a coherent system and completely logical.83 As well,

Clark would argue that theism gives coherence to life;84 "The 'proof of

God's existence ... results from showing that consistency is maintained

by viewing all things as dependent on God."85 Clark wants to show that

"acceptance of divine revelation ... gives a more consistent view than

any other."86 The supreme defense against attacks on the Christian faith

is that these opposing positions are incoherent or do not pay enough

attention to logic.87 Encounter theology is "cured" by logic, for its great

problem is the rejection of logic.88 The central question Clark has for

78. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 24.

79. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 23.

80. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 31 .

81. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 92.

82. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 147, 273, 324.

83. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 27, 194.

84. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 197, 264, 324.

85. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 318.

86. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 371.

87. See Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 281, 293; Religion, Reason, and

Revelation, 222; "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 14, 16.

88. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 2If.,

23.

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GORDON CLARK

Barth is, "Is his Logos logical?"89 Throughout this book it seems that

Clark is more concerned to have Barth bow to the requirements of logic

than to give proper place to the self-attesting Christ of Scripture. He

holds that the problem with existentialism and neo-orthodoxy is their

repudiation of logic.90

In all this we should have expected that the main problem with neo-

orthodoxy and with all attacks on orthodox Christianity is the rejection

of the self-attestingly authoritative Word of God in one form or another.

However, logic is Clark's apologetical weapon rather than the sword of

the Spirit (which is the Word of God).

First the apologist must show that the axioms of secu-

larism result in self-contradiction.... Then, second, the

apologist must exhibit the internal consistency of the

Christian system.91

Clark's conception of apologetics would lay "an emphasis on the ideal

of axiomatization,"92 and "axiomatization is simply the perfecting and

exhibiting of the logical consistency of a system of thought."93 Clark con-

firms our analysis of his apologetical scheme as one in which the Word

of God is taken (not as an absolute presupposition) as a hypothesis to be

verified in light of the ultimate test of logic when he states that "the apa-

gogic method must remain the basic apologetical procedure."94 In Aris-

totelian logic the apagoge is a method of indirect demonstration wherein

it is shown that impossible consequences follow from the contradictory of

a thesis under discussion, which thesis can (nevertheless) only attain to

probable truth when it is the conclusion of a syllogism. Thus Clark would

admit that he cannot demonstrate the truth of Scripture but can verify it

as a hypothesis by reducing his opponents' positions to incoherence and

demonstrating the logical consistency of the Bible, and thereby pointing

to its probable veracity. In this Clark gives practical evidence that logic,

not the revelation of God, is his ultimate authority. Instead of taking

the Word of God and using it as the standard by which all experience

89. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 13.

90. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible, 36f.

91. Clark, KarlBarth's Theobgical Method, 96.

92. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 80.

93. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 95.

94. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 85.

161

CONSISTENT pRESUPPOSITIONALISM

is organized and interpreted, Clark declares that "there is no method of

understanding superior to deduction."95

DIFFICULTIES WITH RELIANCE ON LOGICAL COHERENCE

In addition to disappointing us for failing to advocate a biblical pre-

suppositionalism, and in addition to advocating an unmodified Car-

tesian method which is far short of a distinctive Christian apologetic,

Clark has espoused an apologetic fraught with far-reaching immanent

difficulties. Somehow Clark has simply overlooked the fact that deduc-

tion does not insure truth, or even significance, in a set of propositions.

It is logically valid (though ridiculous) to argue for the Augustinian

authorship of the Bible thus:

1. Mohammed composed the Koran (A), and Moham-

med is the prophet of Allah (B). —axiom

2. If [Mohammed composed the Koran (A) or the Bible

is an abridgment of The City of God (C)], then Augus-

tine authored the Bible (D). —axiom

3. A—simplification of No. 1

4. A or C —addition based on No. 3

5. D —modus ponens from Nos. 2 and 4

6. Therefore, A and D—conjunction of Nos. 3 and 5 (i.e.,

Mohammed composed the Koran, and Augustine au-

thored the Bible)

A valid entailment can be constructed for any proposition (e.g., D in the

above syllogism) without telling us anything at all about the truth status ;

of that proposition; in the above example the conclusion is valid but

false. And if this construction of a valid deduction can be performed

for any proposition, then valid deduction cannot even serve us to distin-

guish worthwhile options from unworthwhile ones. Taking this a step

further, we note that since one conclusion can be shown valid and yet

95. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 89.

162

GORDON CLARK

| be false, and since this can be done for any number of conclusions, then

I we must see that any collection of propositions can be axiomatized with

I coherence and still remain a false system.

As G. Mavrodes points out,96 one can take as his axiom (therefore,

not subject to demonstration) the conjunction of a chain of material im-

plications, the apodosis97 of the last one being identical with the protasis of

the first one, with the asserted weak inclusion of the first protasis or the

last protasis in the chain; thereby one would be able to entail all the sepa-

rate links of the axiomatic chain.98 Just that easily any set of propositions

96. George I. Mavrodes, "Revelation and Epistemology," The Philosophy of Gordon

H. Clark, 237.

97. Bahnsen here employs the technical vocabulary of logic: apodosis is the

consequent in a formal conditional statement, and the following term protasis

refers to the antecedent. For example, in the statement, "If P, then Q," the protasis

is P and the apodosis is Q.

98. Bahnsen's condensing of Mavrodes' comments here will be clarified by

including the entire quotation. Mavrodes writes, "Suppose that we assemble a

motley list of propositions, A, B, C... N, as random as we can find. Can we

now axiomatize this random list? Certainly. A method of doing it can easily be

taught to a child or programmed for a computer. Simply form a list of axioms

which repeats the original list of propositions, A, B, C ... N. Since every proposi-

tion entails itself the original list will follow deductively from this set of axioms.

Presto! Axiomatization has been accomplished. But perhaps we are not satisfied.

Why not? Is it desired to form a system which has fewer axioms than theorems,

indeed only a single axiom? It is easy. Simply construct a single proposition

which is the conjunction of the original set, A • B • C • • • N, and take this

as the single axiom. It validly implies each of the originals.... Are there more

complicated deductions from axiom to theorems desired? They can be supplied.

For example, form the propositions A ⊃ B, B ⊃ C, C ⊃ D, ..., M ⊃ N, N ⊃ A.

Conjoin all these (in any order) along with A v N, and make this conjunction as

the axiom. It entails all of the original set" (Mavrodes, "Revelation and Episte-

mology," The Philosophy of Cordon H. Clark, 237). Mavrodes' point here is that

any statements can be assumed as self-evident "axioms" and then postulated

collectively, especially as symbols, as a single axiom, to be the deductive basis

of a system. The critique is of the inherent arbitrariness in the selection of these

axioms, and the ease of presenting them as axiomatic. Clark responds to this

overall critique in the same volume (442-446). I do not believe that Bahnsen

requires us to follow Mavrodes' argument in its entirety, but only so far as to

show that deduction in itself does not and cannot ensure the truth of the axioms

postulated. In fairness, Clark seems to agree with this point—that axioms postu-

lated arbitrarily can "become absurd" if construed as implications of each other,

or made into a "conjunction" (to use Mavrodes' logical term)—although Clark

163

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

can be axiomatized into a coherent system—without respect of their

special features (e.g., truth or falsity). If you have a vivid enough imagi-

nation and proficiency with elementary logical principles and rules of

inference, then you can make any position look plausible from a merely

deductive standpoint.

So any hypothesis can be "verified" in Clark's sense of that term by

construing it as a coherent system, i.e., by beginning with the desired

conclusion and working backwards by means of "syllogistic ornamenta-

tion" until the requisite axiom is built up, and then taking this axiom as

your "unproven assumption." We must conclude, therefore, that even if

Clark could successfully carry out his apologetical task of axiomatization

and demonstration of Christianity's logical coherence, he would only

have given us a trivial truth (i.e., Christianity can be seen as a coherent

system of propositions): "the collection consisting of the thirty-second

indicative sentence from each book in the Library of Congress consti-

tutes a system in exactly the same sense."99 Although in many contexts

the task of systematizing is useful to us, it would not seem that from an

apologetical viewpoint axiomatization has any advantage at all (at least

Clark has failed to show what it might be); Clark's view of axiomatiza-

tion would not appear to serve aesthetic, didactic, epistemological, or

explanatory ends in its present unqualified condition.100

Biblical Propositions

as an Ultimate Deductive System

We must question Clark's assumption that the Bible contains a sat-

isfactory number of axioms to form a complete deductive system as well

as the geometric ideal that Clark extols. I simply cannot imagine what

scriptural statements could be used in a syllogism to deduce the assertion:

"And the Lord said to Gideon, 'You shall separate everyone who laps

the water with his tongue'" (Judges 7: 5). In agreement with Arthur Hol-

mes we wonder whether Clark can adopt the methods of Spinoza without

expresses this agreement in the name of disagreeing with the argument.

99. Mavrodes, "Revelation and Epistemology," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark,

238.

100. See the fuller discussion by Mavrodes of this point, "Revelation and

Epistemology," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 239-244.

164

GORDON CLARK

modification and differ only as to the axioms with which he begins.101

Christian philosophy is much more than a pure logical science. It

involves a proper recognition of the full authority of the Bible (i.e., it

extends to everything written, not simply the indicative assertions) and

seeks the proper application of the various functions, and proper under-

standing of the contemporary relevance of the various contexts, of the

biblical language. It involves living obedience to God as well as spiritual

vision and continuing sanctification. It involves an ability to ascertain

the obstacles to belief in a particular society or era and the proper way

in which to search out the biblical answers to the questions of men's

hearts. It involves the ability to integrate the whole revelation of God to

man (i.e., what the entire Bible says to man and its bearing on general

revelation plus its role in guiding the execution of the cultural mandate).

It involves induction and adduction as well as deduction, etc. Christian

philosophy cannot be performed by a computer which has been fed with

the axioms from Scripture; it must be done by a Christian concerned to

drive the whole Word of God home to the hearts of men.

The deductive ideal falls short of the mark. It involves the view that

knowledge is exclusively of propositions and that the authoritative por-

tion of Scripture is its declarations. Both points are mistaken.102 Although

knowledge may be expressed only in propositions, one knows himself, or

certain states of affairs, or how to perform certain tasks, or other persons,

etc. The Christian actually knows God (i.e., the personal Creator and Re-

deemer), not simply a proposition about God. And the authority of Scrip-

ture attaches to all the functions of the biblical language; the Westminster

Confession of Faith expresses this principle well: "By this faith, a Chris-

tian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word, for the au-

thority of God Himself speaking therein; and acteth differently upon that

which each particular passage thereof containeth; yielding obedience to

the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the prom-

ises of God for this life, and that which is to come" (XIV. 2).

Moreover, Clark's view of apologetics and his extolling of the geo-

metric ideal involve a formal view of logic in its syllogistic sense that

is inappropriate for ordinary language such as is found in Scripture.

101. Arthur F. Holmes, "The Philosophical Methodology of Gordon Clark," The

Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 219.

102. See Arthur F. Holmes, "The Philosophical Methodology of Gordon Clark,"

The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 221-224.

165

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

We dare to say that Clark could hardly deduce Aristotelian logic from

Scripture itself or even its form. With a Christian apologetic we would

have hoped that Scripture could support the method and principles be-

ing employed by the apologist. Yet the axiomatizational goal of Clark's

apologetic and the rules that govern development toward that end are

independent of Scripture. The conclusion to which Holmes comes is ac-

curate yet regrettable: "Clark has incorporated into revelational theism

a logic deduced from the geometric ideal and propositional demand of

his rationalistic idealism.'"103

Practical Problems with the Test of Coherence

Even overlooking the above flaws in Clark's coherence approach we

still would have an immense practical problem to cope with when the

time comes to apply the test of coherence. Two disputants can agree on

the ground rules of coherence (e.g., the law of contradiction) and still not

come to grant their opponent's position. Different people have different

ways of evaluating evidence and coherence; the law of contradiction can

be shared by the disputants while neither one admits an inconsistency in

his position for the simple reason that they define their initial terms, un-

derstand their common assertions, allow their words to function in dif-

ferent ways. Who should ultimately be allowed to decide which system

is more coherent and less tending to skepticism? The analytic philoso-

pher? The idealist? The existentialist? The empiricist? The Christian?

We would expect, if the coherence test were as simple as Clark portrays

it and if only the rules of logic need be granted in order to discharge it,

that philosophers would have come to agreement years ago (how much

more in this age of the computer?). Logic can be a helpful tool among

men of like mind and spirit, but adamant opponents of different world-

views can be indifferent—and usually are—to the charge of incoher-

ence mutually leveled at one another. The significance of some kinds

of data, the proper application of principles, the right understanding

of fundamental assertions will all be colored by the world-view of the

person entertaining them.

G. Weaver makes this same point against Clark by saying,

103. Arthur F. Holmes, "The Philosophical Methodology of Gordon Clark," The

Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 226.

166

GORDON CLARK

Coherence is always relative to assumptions. The natural

man with his God-given reason has an amazing power

to "exchange the truth of God for a lie," and yet keep his

system consistent. He may have to deny some "facts" to

do so, but it seems he does not mind denying as "mean-

ingless" whatever does not fit his logic.104

It is plainly the case that non-Christians have a different notion of what

constitutes consistency than the biblical Christian. They might both

agree in distinguishing truth from falsehood (i.e., in avoiding violation

of the law of contradiction) while they are diametrically opposed on

whether or not it is consistent for God to love only some unto salvation

and not effect universal salvation. The Christian and non-Christian will

react differently to the position that the all-glorious God has allowed

glory to be brought to His name in the historical process; while the be-

liever glorifies God and enjoys Him forever, the unbeliever mocks that

very possibility. They also differ in their reactions to the fact that all

non-Christian epistemologies are hybrids of rationalism and irrational-

ism; the unbeliever seems insouciant about the incongruity, for example,

of his opinion that in religious matters "nobody can know for certain,"

yet "Christianity is false." The naturalist would consider a supernatural

revelation incoherent to a rational system, but the supernaturalist would

consider the absence of such revelation incoherent. Yet in all these cases

the disputants can agree to the formal law of non-contradiction as a

guiding principle. This does not point to any inconsequential nature in

logical consistency, nor does it amount to a recommendation of irratio-

nality; but it does demonstrate why Clark's emphasis on the apologeti-

cal value of coherence is misplaced. The law of contradiction does not

preclude the possibility of many logics!

Insufficiency of Coherence

Even if Clark's apologetical recommendation of logical coherence

as a defensive and offensive measure to be utilized in debate with un-

belief were not afflicted with triviality, inapplicability to Scripture, and

impracticality, there would be reasons for rejecting it. When Clark is

104. Gilbert B. Weaver, "Gordon Clark: Christian Apologist," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 306f.

167

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

pushed about the practical value of logical coherence as a test for truth

he himself admits that it is negative only and in need of supplementa-

tion.105 So in spite of his dislike for "facts,"106 his view that historical

investigation can give absolutely no fixed and unalterable truth107 just

as science cannot deliver genuine truth,108 and in spite of his insis-

tence that revelation delivers to man the only knowledge obtainable,109

Clark nevertheless (and inconsistently) appeals to non-revelational and

non-logical evidence to argue against his opponents. In discussing the

inspiration of Scripture he appeals to both coherence and the facts of

archaeology and history.110 In choosing between world-views one is

told to consider the implications his choice has in many fields of study.111

Consider these quotations:

Methodology or historiography must do justice to the

narrative of events, and the attempt must be made to

satisfy the historical researcher.... How Marxists might

reply to these criticisms is hard to say. They rather ig-

nore embarrassing details.... This all sounds very gran-

diose. But the essential evidence is missing.... It must

be repeated that Marxism fails to explain history con-

cretely and in detail.... When it comes to the details

of history, their vaunted scientific methods leave them

silent.... A theory that has made and still makes claim

to scientific prediction must be judged by the events....

Therefore this principle must be successfully applied to

a large number of historical sequences before it appears

plausible.... Nevertheless, the basic criticism is uncon-

testable: his scheme is a deduction from his metaphysics

and is not derived strictly by scientific observation....

105. Clark, "Reply to Gilbert B. Weaver," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 306,

459.

106. Clark, "Reply to Gilbert B. Weaver," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 460.

107. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 134f., 177.

108. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and the Belief in God (Nutley, NJ: Craig Press,

1964).

109. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 90-92.

110. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 9f.

111. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 34.

168

GORDON CLARK

The first view ... is free from the logical difficulties of

the other two views. It reduces to a question of fact.112

For all his boasted rationalism and refutation of empirical procedures

Clark must finally appeal beyond logic to "facts" after all. Indeed we

get the impression that Clark might consider the facts as brute facts that

need to be interpreted by the organizing mind of man. He clearly draws

a distinction between description of facts and the significance (as well as im-

plications) of facts, and he goes as far as to say that interpretation is imposed

on description.113 We conclude, then, that Clark is inconsistent with his

own criterion of logical consistency as the test for truth, and that when all

things are taken into consideration he presents us with the same impos-

sible task of all non-Christian epistemologies: bringing the brute facts of

history into fruitful union with the abstract laws of logic. (Yet, save on

a biblical presuppositional basis, man can neither juggle nor harmonize

the ultimate unity and diversity of the world.) It is an interesting com-

mentary on Clark to note that, when it comes to the question of provi-

dence and history, he abandons his proffered method of exhibiting logi-

cal coherence in apogogic fashion and argues that one must presuppose

providence in accordance with a method that depends upon revelational

principles.114 He seems to have had an unconscious realization of the

insurmountable problems in his apologetical system as he expounded it

(wherein coherence was taken as the most important principle and ulti-

mate standard of philosophical thinking).

Christianity Fails Clark's Test

The most telling criticism of Clark's apologetic has yet to be given. It

points out that, subjected to the coherence test as Clark has outlined it,

the Christian faith does not really pass the examination after all. There

are a number of observations, which the "reasonable man" can make,

that divest Clark's case for Christianity of any compelling force—most

of them being based on Clark's own statements!

First there are methodological difficulties. Clark's manner of argu-

ment is basically to fault the non-Christian alternatives and, thereby, leave

112. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 56, 97, 104, 105, 90, 96, 111, 123.

113. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 75.

114. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 245.

169

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

Christianity standing as the only available choice for the philosopher.

Now, outside of the fact that the weakness or invalidity of rival theses tells

us nothing about the genuine strength of that alternative we have left at

the end of our examination, Clark's use of the disjunctive syllogism—i.e.,

(1) Either A, B, or C; (2) Not A or B; (3) Therefore, C—is non-impressive

because his disjunction fails to do justice to the viable options.115 There are

many major schools of non-Christian philosophical thought that Clark

never stops to analyze or criticize; I am not thinking of some old, dust-

ridden ideas tucked away in an obscure corner of the tedious history of

philosophy, but of modern movements of which Clark must surely have

been aware: inter alia, absolute idealism (e.g., F. H. Bradley, Josiah Royce,

B. Blanshard); neo-idealism (e.g., B. Croce); neo-realism (e.g., B. Russell,

C. D. Broad, A. C. Ewing, R. B. Perry, W. P. Montague); critical realism

(e.g., G. Santayana, A. Lovejoy); common sense philosophy (G. E. Moore);

vitalism (H. Bergson); voluntarism (e.g., Schopenhauer, von Hartmann);

process philosophy (e.g., A. N. Whitehead); phenomenology (e.g., E. Hus-

serl, M. Scheler, M. Merleau-Ponty); language analysis (e.g., Wittgenstein,

J. Austin, G. Ryle). If the Clarkian type of apologetic is going to be con-

vincing it will (at least) have to meet the requirements it lays down for itself,

and at this point Christianity has not been shown to be the last rational

choice for the philosopher because Clark has failed to discredit modern

theories (or to indicate how his criticisms of older positions are relevant as

refutations of contemporary options).

Then again, if the test of coherence is going to be effectively applied

to various philosophic alternatives one must be certain as to the proper

standards of logical axiomatization and the categories of a priori judg-

ments; without a yardstick one cannot measure the length of his lumber.

However, Clark states that the list of a priori categories is still unsettled

and awaiting the unanimous results of symbolic logic.116 So we must

wonder just how moved we should be by Clark's apologetic when both

the objects and standards of his critical analysis are incomplete. Still the

most perplexing thing about Clark's apologetical test for coherence is

that it is bound to be ineffective as a justification for Christian belief and

a challenge to unbelief. As seen above, Clark's goal is to demonstrate

the inconsistency of the non-Christian philosophic position and the logi-

115. As Arthur Holmes also notes, "The Philosophical Methodology of Gordon

Clark," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 203ff.

116. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 313.

170

GORDON CLARK

cal coherence of the Christian system by contrast; once this is done the

reasonable thinker would be under obligation to adopt the Bible as true.

However, Clark admits that a secular system might be so consistent that

we could not crack it; "I do not deny that secular philosophies often

attain a degree of consistency.... Even beyond this, I admit that there

might be a secular system so carefully constructed that I could not dis-

cover the inconsistency."117

And not only might the secular system survive our logical scrutiny, the

Christian system has obvious problems which hinder us from adjudging

it as coherent. "Admittedly the theistic view of the world faces difficulties.

There are questions to which Christianity seems to give an inadequate

answer or none at all."118 And to worsen matters, when we come to evalu-

ate the coherence of the Christian system as a system we must concede

that "the arrangement of true propositions into a system of axioms and

theorems has never been accomplished in theology."119 Clark wants to put

forth Christianity as systematically coherent, but the non-Christian can

be given no system to evaluate as such. How could one tell whether a set of

assertions were in fact systematic if they were, as yet, unsystematized? We

might revert to guesswork or wishful thinking, but we could never be cer-

tain or could never demonstrate that some future factor would not throw

a monkey-wrench into the machinery of the developing system. Clark ad-

mits that revelation does not provide us with a complete system;120 yet

systematic coherence is what he intends to exhibit in Christianity. It would

seem his effort is doomed from the outset.

Now of course Clark has a reply to this problem, and it can be found

in the very contexts of the above citations. He seeks to encourage us by

saying that, after all, no discipline or philosophy (e.g., zoology or Spi-

noza) is completely axiomatized anyway. However, given the exposition

on apologetics as axiomatization and on the test for truth as coherence

by Clark elsewhere, I really cannot see what comfort it affords us as

Christians to be told that we are on a sinking ship, but we are sinking

with a lot of company! Just how does the failure of others exonerate

the failure of the Christian system? Rationalization is no substitute for

117. Clark, "Reply to Gilbert B. Weaver," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 464.

118. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 34.

119. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 69.

120. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 89.

171

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSitiONALISM.

apologetics. If Clark wants to make coherence his test for truth, and if he

wants others to decide that Christianity is true, then he simply must set

forth Christianity in a coherent system open to investigation; otherwise

he really should back off his overextended claim that the Christian sys-

tem is logically coherent while others are not. While he may hold forth

logic and the law of contradiction as principles that should move the

reasonable man to reject secularism and adopt the good news of Christ,

Clark finally must admit that on his basis "there is no compelling logi-

cal reason to believe any particular piece of evidence. This is true of the

Gospels."121 In the face of this test of logical coherence to point up the

truth of Christianity Clark has to confess (to our consternation) that the

Bible contains some contradictions.122 Surely our excitement over the

prospect of showing Christianity to be logical (to the utter embarrass-

ment of those illogical secular philosophies) must now begin to wane.

Indeed we must begin to waver with timidity when we see Clark, the

rationalistic apologist, attempt to avoid the fatality of admitting to in-

consistency in his "most coherent system" by reminding us that we can

still fall back on guessing as a methodology. He says that because the

number of instances of incoherence are small we are still free "to guess

that they will not ultimately prove insoluble."123 We now have second

thoughts about Clark's apologetic when, having been told that logical

coherence should guide our rational choices, he turns out to counsel us

to choose Christianity on the basis of promised and hoped for consistency

rather than the present and real thing.124 Having been geared-up for

a good, solid, logical testing of religious hypotheses, we are not a little

disappointed to hear the same "eschatological cop-out" that character-

izes the non-Christian philosophies (e.g.: "Sure, our system does not fit

the facts, or does not have sufficient evidence, or is logically invalid, or

seems ridiculous in light of certain commonsense considerations, but

give us time—we're working on it!"). On Clark's basis the reasonable

man might express sympathy for the Christian position, but he could not

render his assent until the test has actually been passed.

To this point we have noted that Clark's apologetic does not exam-

121. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 368.

122. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 10.

123. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 10.

124. Clark, "Response to Gilbert B. Weaver," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark,

460.

172

GORDON CLARK

ine enough viable options from non-Christian philosophy, expects a test

to be conducted without the standards for examination being decided

upon, presumes to show the inconsistency of a non-Christian thought

while admitting that this might not always be possible, wants to have the

unbeliever pass judgment upon the systematic coherence of a religious

hypothesis that is not yet a system, hopes to exhibit the coherence of the

Bible while noting its apparent incoherence, and desires the reasonable

man to grade the Bible favorably and accept it before it has passed the

requisite logical tests. This is all very unacceptable. The perceptive un-

believer is bound to demur. How effective can it be to announce that you

will disqualify secularism and display the merits of Christianity when

you concede that secularism can come across as consistent and Chris-

tianity can appear lacking in merit? This kind of apologetical thrust is

easily foiled by the non-Christian, and he foils it using the very prin-

ciples Clark has taught him.

Coherence Test Requires Omniscience

The final blow to Clark's apologetical use of the test for coherence re-

sides in the fact that "the coherence theory cannot be applied with final

satisfaction unless one is omniscient";125 even to fault the non-Christian

system as contradictory is the work of omniscience.126 So how can Clark

imagine that the coherence test is suitable as an apologetical tool for

those persons who are not omniscient? Clark holds that truth is the co-

herent wholeness of knowledge; but if man never attains to omniscience

(as Clark admits), then he never can have the truth (in Clark's sense).

Although Clark certainly wants to avoid the implications of his position,

I cannot see how he escapes giving the impression that his apologetical

system reduces to skepticism. God may be able to apply the coherence

test effectively, but it is certain that the human apologist cannot.

Clark's coherence view of truth leads him into manifold difficulties.

Since he holds that man cannot understand the infinite number of im-

plications and relations attaching to any assertion he makes, the conclu-

sion implied is that Clark should hold that man cannot understand any

of his assertions. We are thankful that Clark himself is a better apolo-

125. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 32.

126. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 370.

173

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

gist than his system would lead us to believe, for his verificationalism

by means of a test for coherence unwarrantedly exalts logic instead of

God's Word, does not insure truth, reduces to triviality, carries with

it a deductive ideal inappropriate for Scripture and the fullness of the

theological task, is not a telling method when used by proponents of

different world-views, needs as its complement the brute facts of history,

requires exhaustion of the live alternatives and settled logical standards,

does not always work out to disqualify secularism or reward Christian-

ity (on Clark's basis, remember), eventually abandons its rigorous ratio-

nal testing, is ineffective, and implies a skepticism wherein the apologist

can neither understand his own assertions nor criticize those of others.

We need to maintain a more sober evaluation of the prowess of Clark's

apologetical method than his writings usually expound; when we are

careful to weed through the enthusiasm, Clark himself gives occasional

indication (though sometimes without intention) of the real difficulties

endemic to his rationalistic apologetic.

CLARK'S PROBABILISM

Flowing from Clark's previously noted suppositionalism and verifica-

tionalism is the next objectionable element in his apologetic scheme:

probabilism. Because Christianity does not completely pass his rational-

coherence test for truth, Clark retreats to the position that the Christian

faith (while not fully certified as true) has fewer difficulties than the rival

hypotheses. The believer may have full persuasion or moral certainty

of the truth of the Bible, but from an apologetical viewpoint he cannot

have complete rational certainty or intellectual justification.

Again, rather than viewing the Bible as an absolutely necessary pre-

supposition, the only possible grounding for intellectual endeavor, Clark

speaks of the Christian faith as "the best general philosophy,"127 of its

formulation of answers to questions of philosophic theory as "a better

solution,"128 of the Christian outlook as "a more consistent view than any

other,"129 of the Bible as " more likely" the work of God's mind than an

accident,130 and Clark offers the Christian revelation (not as an absolute

127. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, 95; emphasis Bahnsen's.

128. See Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 142; emphasis Bahnsen's.

129. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 371; emphasis Bahnsen's.

130. Clark, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired?," Can I Trust My Bible?, 24;

174

GORDON CLARK

demand but) as a "strong recommendation."131 Since Clark has been unable

to demonstrate the truth of the Bible with rational certainty and thereby

lay down an unassailable challenge to unbelieving philosophy, he is will-

ing to settle for an evaluation of high probability in the Christian sys-

tem. Christianity, then, ceases to be the only reasonable position a man

can choose and one that must be true if anything else is to be known at

all, and it becomes in Clark's apologetic merely the most promising and

least irrational. The unbeliever still has a leg to stand on.

But if one system can provide plausible solutions to many

problems while another leaves too many questions unan-

swered, if one system tends less to skepticism and gives

more meaning to life, if one worldview is consistent while

others are self-contradictory, who can deny us, since we

must choose, the right to choose the more promising first

principle?... Theism is not the only philosophy that faces

difficulties. All arguments seem doubtful.... The argu-

ment requires a particular type of religion, best exempli-

fied in Christianity. The argument does not aim to prove

or demonstrate that Christianity is true and that Russell is

wrong. The aim is to compare.... Which assumption is

true is another matter.... Anyone who for some personal

motive desires this type of life would, if impressed by the

argument, be inclined to adopt a theistic worldview.132

Christianity is probably true, on this basis, but still possibly false. Prob-

abilities might suit a person when making decisions in a grocery store, but

they are totally inadequate when it comes to a matter of one's personal

destiny for eternity. And given the unbeliever's outlook, the problem of

pain and evil, the scarcity of trustworthy reports of an after-life, the allur-

ing force of present indulgence and pleasure, and the religiously negative

reports of impressive modern science, all mount up to a high probability

against the Christian faith. Moreover, probability offers no firm founda-

tion for intellectual endeavor; if Christianity is the only alternative to

skepticism (as Clark maintains) but we must have a degree of skepticism

emphasis Bahnsen's.

131. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 110; emphasis Bahnsen's.

132. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 34, 29, 80, 197.

175

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

as to its truth, then skepticism has engulfed us and won the day anyway.

A defense of the faith that, in the long run, must make appeal to prob-

ability is simply an inadequate and ineffective apologetic. Just consider

the plight of the Clarkian apologetic: Clark completely disqualifies em-

pirical evidence;133 says that no historical judgment can be certain;134 ad-

mits that there is no logical reason to accept the Gospels;135 and concedes

that his standards of possibility are chosen (not indispensable).136 So why

should the unbeliever accept the Bible on Clark's autonomous basis for

judgment? The strong impression is that the rational man is left with no

alternative except to "leap."'

KEY CRITICISMS OF CLARK'S APOLOGETIC

Before leaving Clark's apologetic for a consideration of the writings of E.J.

Carnell, four critical aspects of Clark's thought should be mentioned. They

are his overweening rationalism, doctrinal imperfections, misguided an-

swer to science, and inherent skepticism. These will be examined in order.

Clark's Rationalism

Clark takes pride in calling himself a rationalistic Calvinist137 and

confesses great respect for rationality.138 He goes so far as to say that "a

Christian must commit himself to rationalism or rationality ... and he

must be logical."139 Although we would say that a Christian should strive

for consistency, it is going too far to commit oneself to rationalism as a

school of thought; this, no more than empiricism, has been a tool forged

by the unregenerate for attack upon God's revelation. It was an unhappy

oversight for Clark to fail to distinguish between a Christian and non-

Christian conception of reason (but in terms of his own thought, Clark

probably could not do so). Given Clark's commitment to rationalism, it

is no surprise that he should exalt the intellect: "The supreme value in

133. See Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God.

134. See Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious.

135. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 368; Clark, A Christian View of Men

and Things, 80.

136. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 371.

137. Clark, "Reply to Roger Nicole," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 484.

138. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 59.

139. Clark, "Reply to Roger Nicole," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 479.

176

G O R D O N CLARK

the life of man is to be sought in the activity of the intellect as it grasps

truth."140 Clark maintains (using an incredibly fallacious argument) that

the preponderance of intellectual references for the word "heart" in Scrip-

ture "shows the preponderance of the intellect in the personality."141 As he

sees it, "Christianity includes the primacy of the intellect."142

However, Clark again fails to note that the Christian and non-Chris-

tian do not have the same view of the intellect's function and authority.

Furthermore, the Greek notion of the intellect's primacy (which Clark

has adopted) simply does not save the non-Christian from the skepticism

that Clark seeks to avoid. Clark's deepest theoretical commitment would

indeed seem to be an unqualified rationalism. "A satisfactory theory of

epistemology must be some sort of apriorism,"143 rather than the requisite

Christian presuppositionalism. Clark's outlook would "require a great

trust in the law of contradiction."144 Indeed for him logic is the transcen-

dental of all meaning and intelligibility;145 further, "language is capable

of conveying literal truths because the laws of logic are necessary."146 And

the refutation and rejection of empiricism rests on the fact that it cannot

establish the law of contradiction.147 These are but a few examples of the

practical ways in which Nash's (sympathetic) interpretation of Clark's sys-

tem is substantiated: for Clark "the law of contradiction is the most cer-

tain of all principles."148 According to Nash (and uncorrected by Clark

in reply), Clark holds that the rational is the real, and the real is the ra-

tional.149 In doing so, Clark falls prey to the same fault of non-Christian

140. Gordon Clark, "On the Primacy of the Intellect," Westminster Theological

Journal, 5.2 (May, 1943): 193.

141. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 93.

142. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 107; see also Clark, "On the Primacy of

the Intellect," Westminster Theological Journal, 5.2: 182—195.

143. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 312.

144. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 75.

145. See Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible,

1959, 36; KarlBarth's Theological Method, 59. See also Nash's assessment, "Gordon Clark's

Theory of Knowledge," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 128f.

146. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bibb, 1959,

41; emphasis Bahnsen's.

147. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 308.

148. Nash, "Gordon Clark's Theory of Knowledge," The Philosophy of Gordon H.

Clark, 126.

149. Nash, "Gordon Clark's Theory of Knowledge," The Philosophy of Gordon H.

Clark, 171; see also Clark, "The Bible as Truth," Bibliotheca Sacra, 114(April, 1957): 168.

177

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

rationalism: annihilating the individual existence of the particulars of

historical eventuation. "Only the rational is capable of being understood;

and to understand is to reduce multiplicity to unity."150

Everything in an intellectual system must be logically connected, says

Clark;151 however, it is clear to most people that history is not deducible.

Hence it would appear that Clark is forced to hold either that history does

not constitute an intellectual system, or that absolute logical necessity

(while not observable to finite minds) characterizes the counsel of God.

The first alternative is unacceptable because Christianity is a historical

religion staked on the truth of a calendar fall of man, actual historical

dealings of God with Israel, the incarnation of the Second Person of the

eternal Trinity, His death and resurrection in the space-time continuum,

the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost, and the victorious march of the

church into the world until the final parousia of Christ. The second alterna-

tive has nothing to support it, least of all scriptural considerations.

Another unfortunate trait of Clark's rationalism is his willingness to

accept autonomous argumentation. While the philosophical method of

Descartes is a perfect example of non-Christian procedure (identifying

man in terms of one's own self and without reference to the revelation

of God, and then proceeding to identify the world and God in terms of

this self-interpreted man), Clark has great compliments for it. According

to Clark, the cogito argument of Descartes is indubitable152—whereas in

fact, if one does not begin with the presupposition of Scripture even his

own existence is subject to grave doubt. By beginning with your own ex-

istence as certain and the existence of God as problematic, atheism is in-

evitable. Cornelio Fabro is quite accurate in tracing the roots of modem

atheism to the Cartesian cogito.153 Noting Clark's unhealthy respect for

rationalism, it gives us pause when we see him bind God to the laws of

logic; it is not that we think God inconsistent or a liar, but the standard of

consistency should be God's word, not man's. It seems a bit inconsistent of

Clark to criticize Carnell for binding God by human moral expectations

and standards, but then to object to those who say God is not bound by

150. Clark, Thates to Dewey (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1957), 7.

151. Clark, Historiography: Secular and Religious, 179.

152. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 5 If.

153. Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: Modern Atheism, ed. and trans. Arthur Gibson

(Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1968).

178

GORDON CLARK

human logical expectations or standards.154 On a non-revelational basis

the autonomous logician could well find it inconsistent for an immutable

God to have a transition from wrath to grace; Abraham could have fol-

lowed Clark's method and concluded that the supernatural guidance he

received with respect to sacrificing Isaac could not logically have been

from the true God, who hates human sacrifice. In the spirit of true ratio-

nalism Clark declares that theology cannot violate the norm of logic;155 he

should have taken the theology of Scripture as normative instead. Even

when Clark claims that logic is not an external test over revelation, in the

same paragraph he demonstrates that it actually is a test for revelation in

his way of thinking; for he says that anything that does not match up to

the law of contradiction "could not constitute a revelation."156

No doubt the most incredible manifestation of Clark's overweening

rationalism is his identification of God with logic.157 Clark translates

John 1:1, 4: "In the beginning was Logic, and Logic was with God,

and Logic was God.... In logic was life.'"58 Clark goes on to make the

impression clear:

Logic is God The law is God thinking.... Hence logic is

to be considered as the activity of God's willing.... The Ar-

istotelian definition of God as "thought-thinking-thought"

may help us to understand that logic, the law of contradic-

tion, is neither prior to nor subsequent to God's activity-

God and logic are one and the same first principle.159

By this bold move Clark thinks he avoids being subject to criticism for

subordinating God to logic. However, the artificiality of his position

should be plain. He wants logic to determine what "constitutes" genuine

revelation, and he wants to avoid the charge of autonomy. But if God

154. Clark , Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 190f.; see Nash, "Gordon Clark's Theory

of Knowledge," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 167ff.

155. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 59.

156. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible, 1959,

39.

157. See Clark, "Revealed Religion," Christianity Today, December 17, 1965, 24;

Christian View of Men and Things, 268.

158. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 67.

159. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 67f.

179

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

Himself is the logic by which revelations are tested, how does Clark

know this? If he refers to Scriptures, he can no longer make logic a test

of revelation; and if he does not refer to Scripture, he proves that at base

his philosophy is indeed autonomous. It is clear that Clark is trying to

straddle competing positions: rationalism and Christian revelation. At-

tempting to perform this impossible feat has led to his distorted and dog-

matically controlled translation of John 1:1, 4. Clark has reduced God

to an abstract epistemological principle, such as might be "revealed" on

a certain page of Copi's Introduction to Logic (or would it be Carney and

Scheer's Fundamentals of Logic instead?). God is not a principle of man's

reasoning, however, but is the personal Creator who declares the scope,

nature, principles, and content of the creature's knowledge. Rational-

ism has always sought to create God in man's image; the error is not

alleviated in this procedure simply because one does it in the interest of

a rationalistic apologetic.

Furthermore, Clark's exegesis of the prologue to John's Gospel a la

Aristotle offers no relief from the error of autonomy. The determinative

background to this prologue is the Old Testament (in particular, God's

word, speaking, and voice), not pagan philosophy of a Greek rationalis-

tic bent. In fact, John's notion of the Logos is antithetical to the Logos

speculation of the Greeks. But even a Greek background to the term

cannot be identified with what is generally meant by the English term

"logic." The only explanation for Clark's abnormal translation of John

1:1, 4 is found in the fact that his system demands it, not in sound ex-

egetical considerations. The repudiation, furthermore, of Clark's iden-

tification of God with logic does not commit one to an irrational sort of

theology (as Clark is wont to imply). The Logos of God is certainly self-

consistent, but that does not make God into a deductive, axiomatized,

and propositional system or a necessary principle of thought!

Having identified God with logic, Clark creates an unfortunate im-

pression when he goes on to identify the image of God in man as logic.160,

161 Th e Logos of Go d is certainly self-consistent, but it is the "image" of

160. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl E Henry, 32.

161. For the sake of clarity the editor has removed the following sen-

tence fragment from this point in the original text: "Since logic is the same

thing for God and man (a position Clark is wont to imply)." It remains unclear whether

Bahnsen had begun to elucidate or critique Clark's position with this fragment. For

elucidation the reader should refer to the sources in notes 160 and 162.

180

GORDON CLARK

God in man. According to Clark, the image of God is that which dis-

tinguishes man from the animals, and this must be logic.162 Yet we are

hesitant to adopt this line of thought, for although animals may not have

linguistic and discursive abilities for writing propositional syllogisms,

nevertheless they do draw non-contradictory distinctions and engage

in a shallow form of reasoning and drawing conclusions (examine the

behavior of your pet dog!). Furthermore, not even all human thinking

is cast (or can be cast) into syllogistic, logical form. For a more basic and

scriptural understanding of the antithesis between man and animal I

think one would have to look to the area of personal morality and the

ability to make ethical decisions.

Be this as it may, the unfortunate impression that Clark creates in

making logic identical with God Himself and a constituent aspect of

man is that of semi-pantheism. Although as a theologian Clark would

certainly disavow any hint of pantheism, as a rationalistic apologist he

does not disperse the impression of semi-pantheism when he says that

"the Divine Mind that encloses or surrounds all others penetrates them

completely,"163 or that "there is an area of coincidence between God's

mind and our mind,"164 or finally that "this so-called 'human reason' is

not so much human as divine."165

The adamant rationalism which has been noted in the above obser-

vations could have been avoided with a slightly different view of logic on

Clark's part. In the first place, even granting that all meaningful discourse

involves a drawing of distinctions, the fact remains that the use of logic is

sensible only in a certain metaphysical environment. Logic is not its own

foundation, but depends upon the consistency of truth, personal identity,

and a fixed ontological frame of reference if it is going to be utilized.166

Since Clark sees man's innate logical ability as due to his creation in God's

image, there is all the more reason to expect that Clark should not divorce

logic from its metaphysical assumptions. He should use logic in a biblical

162. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 72fF.

163. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 322.

164. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 77.

165. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 76.

166. As Weaver correctly notes, "Gordon Clark: Christian Apologist," The Phi-

losophy of Gordon H. Clark, 307.

181

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

presuppositional framework at all times and not rationalistically abstract

it so as to test the coherence of the Bible.

Next, Clark might have shown that in practice the law of contra-

diction in itself is of trivial value; formal logic is a tool of scholarship

and not a final truth.167 The science of logic, after all, is a second-order

discipline which argues about argumentation; it does not give us the facts

of the world, but guides our discovery thereof. Although logic requires

ontological grounding, it itself is not some metaphysical machinery of

the universe. Strictly speaking, it is not the world that is logical, but argu-

ments that are logical or illogical. Logic presupposes a world where argu-

ments are possible and meaningful; but the laws of logic govern the use

of arguments and do not tell us about the world as a whole. When logic

is thus conceived as a tool, it becomes clear that the issue is not the law

of contradiction per se but the use made of it—in which case rationalism

would be avoided by the Christian, not embraced.

Next, it should have been reflected in Clark's writings that logic is

a developing science, not something partaking of academic finality. Ar-

istotle summarized the best rules of argumentation observed by him

in his day; Russell felt the need to refine and correct them. Not only is

logic a developing science, there are many logics; Clark should explain

why he thinks a logic patterned after Euclidean geometry has ultimate

authority. Yet, noting the work of Kurt Godel,168 we should not stake our

apologetic on the superiority of any logical system, it would seem.

Another point that Clark should have recognized is that logic has its

limits. Some things, though not unreasonable, are beyond our human

ability to reason (e.g., an eternally all-glorious God being glorified in

history). God's understanding transcends our logical abilities (Isa. 55:8

f.),169 and while remaining self-consistent God may not even need to use

logical rules of inference—much less those that secular philosophy has

167. See Arthur Holmes, Christian Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Nutley, N. J.:

Craig, 1969) 27.

168. Mentioned earlier; see page 89, and 89 footnote 6 above.

169. Clark does address this passage, but appears to limit its ap-

plication to the quantitative nature of man's knowledge versus God's,

while remaining silent as to its qualitative nature which forms the crux of

Bahnsen's comment. See Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture

II)," The Philosophy of Cordon H. Clark, 76-77. Bahnsen further pursues the

quantitative/qualitative critique below, pages 187-188.

182

GORDON CLARK

appropriated throughout history. It should be quite clear that a Chris-

tian cannot push his logic to a conclusion that is contrary to the state-

ments of Scripture. So logic indeed has its limitations.

As a consequence of his failure to make the preceding qualifications

with respect to the authority of logic, Clark has generated difficulties for

himself in his notion of truth as well. According to him truth must be

a rational system of logically related propositions;170 his idealistic epis-

temology suggests an identification of truth and reality.171 Even God's

knowledge must be propositional, says Clark.172 Such a notion of truth

leads Clark to distort the straightforward assertion of Christ in John

14:6 to the effect that Christ is said to be only the source of truth rather

than the truth itself.173

In addition to not doing justice to this verse of Scripture, Clark's no-

tion of truth denies the omniscience of God and nullifies general revela-

tion. If God knows only propositions, then He cannot know people and

things—in which case He does not know everything. It is also the case

that the general revelation of God in nature and in man's constitution is

not propositional (if it were, it would be special revelation), and on Clark's

basis this could not qualify, then, as a revelation of truth. The Bible ex-

hibits a number of uses for "truth." There is the common sense notion

of truth (e.g., Deut. 17:4; Eph. 4:25), but there is also the sense in which

truth is a way of life to be practiced (e.g., John 3:21; Gal. 5:7; Ps. 26:3).

Even more uncommon, however, is the fact that there is such a thing as

true bread or true vine (John 6:32; 15:1), and the clearest revelation of

God is found in Jesus Christ who Himself is the truth (Heb. 1:1—3; John

14:6). So as an alternative to Clark's rationalistic notion of truth one

could suggest that truth is conformity to the mind of God in thought,

word, or deed, and is founded upon (i.e., presupposes and is guided by)

the word of Christ's gospel as illumined by the Holy Spirit.

170. See Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, pp. 24f.; "The Bible as Truth,"

Bibliotheca Sacra, 114 (April, 1957): 158, 168.

171. See Clark, "The Bible as Truth," Bibliotheca Sacra, 114 (April, 1957): 168;

Arthur Holmes, "The Philosophical Methodology of Gordon Clark," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 221.

172. Clark, "The Bible as Truth," Bibliotheca Sacra, 114 (April, 1957): 167.

173. Clark, "The Bible as Truth," Bibliotheca Sacra, 114 (April, 1957): 169.

183

C O N S I S T E N T PRJESUPPOSITIONALISM

Doctrinal Difficulties

A number of doctrinal aberrations accompany Clark's rationalistic

apologetic. Some of them have been mentioned already, but others de-

serve our attention as well. In the first place Clark's apologetic suggests

that he has failed to take account of fallen man's total depravity. Al-

though he would theologically assent to the doctrine of total depravity,

Clark does not take sufficient account of it in apologetical practice. He

holds that reason is a common element between believer and unbeliev-

er174 and that reason enables the sinner to choose "the most plausible

solution" that "tends less toward skepticism." Clark would appeal to

the image of God in m a n (i.e., logical ability) to test religious hypoth-

eses for their coherence; apparently he has forgotten that the image of

God in fallen m a n is no longer normal—it cannot operate properly

on its own. Following the apologetical method Clark proposes would

imply that m a n is able to choose correctly among rival world-views

without the aid of revelation (in fact, he would pass judgment upon

what constitutes revelation and what does not in terms of logical con-

sistency). Throughout Clark's writings m a n seems to be encouraged

to choose Christianity on purely intellectual grounds; the basis of his

choice would be its ascertained coherence rather than his repentance.

Not only does Clark grant the unregenerate the ability to judge among

religious hypotheses by means of a common (unfallen) reason, he also

says that the unbeliever has the right to test God and that it is a good

thing for the sinner to wield his logic in the process.175

A second point of doctrinal weakness in Clark's apologetic is his

view of the value of general revelation. We must disagree when he says

that it is dim, restricted, and minimal; and when he asserts that observa-

tion of nature is a very unsatisfactory method of obtaining knowledge

of God we again demur.176 Apparently overlooking the direct, personal

awareness of God that is given all men in the created world, Clark goes

so far as to deny that there is any empirical evidence for creation.177 He

174. Clark, KarlBarth's Theobgical Method, 102.

175. Clark, "Reply to Gilbert B. Weaver," The Phibsophy of Gordon H. Clark, 464f.;

see also Weaver's relevant criticism, "Gordon Clark: Christian Apologist," The Phi-

bsophy of Gordon H. Clark, 306.

176. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 15.

177. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 14.

184

GORDON CLARK

claims that general revelation is inadequate to show God's full wisdom

and power and to provide ethical norms.178 Yet Romans 1 tells us that

creation clearly manifests God's attributes, even His power and divinity,

and that this revelation is sufficient to guide men into a proper worship

of God. So when Clark rhetorically asks, "Who can deny that the sav-

age tribes of the jungles know very little about God?"179 the answer that

should be forthcoming is: the apostle Paul! The situation is not that of

ignorance but unwillingness to face the knowledge all men have of God

by nature. It is because Clark fails to maintain the clarity, sufficiency,

necessity, and authority of general revelation that he is able to speak of

God as possibly inconveniencing the atheist by hiding on some planet;180

Paul teaches the very opposite. Instead of speaking of an insignificant

God who can escape the atheist's search, he says the revelation of God's

divinity and power are everywhere present and clearly seen; thus God con-

fronts man, even the self-proclaimed atheist, in every fact.

Accompanying Clark's unsatisfactory view of general revelation is

an unsatisfactory element in his view of special revelation. He claims

that special revelation needs to be systematized,181 that axiomatization

is the ideal of theology but not the form of the Bible,182 and that "the aim

of the theologian is to deduce the doctrines from their Scriptural ma-

trix and arrange them in systematic, logical form."183 Furthermore, he

claims that the literal statements of theological truth are more adequate

than other types of expression.184 In all this Clark impugns the formal

adequacy of Scripture. The Bible is both materially and formally ad-

equate; it has no need for someone to come after it and "systematize" it.

Scripture has an order and arrangement and progression all its own; it

was planned this way by God and is completely satisfactory for the task

it is intended to perform. The poetic sections cannot be improved upon

by reducing them to "literal" indicatives (whatever Clark means by "lit-

eral"). Moreover, there are many kinds of system; Clark is overextending

himself to presume that a logical system is the only kind a systematic

178. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible, 28f.

179. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 15.

180. Clark, A Christian Philosophy of Education, 44.

181. Clark, "Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible, 41.

182. Clark, KarlBarth's Theological Method, 217.

183. Clark, "Several Implications (Wheaton Lecture III)," The Philosophy of Gordon

H. Clark, 122.

184. Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation, 143, 146.

185

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

theologian would properly be interested in.

The final point of doctrine we need to comment upon in Clark's writ-

ings pertains to the epistemological attributes of God, in particular His

incomprehensibility. Since Clark was a leading figure in a theological

controversy between 1944 and 1948 which had as its main focus the in-

comprehensibility of God and which was triggered by Clark's own con-

ception thereof, it might seem that we could get to the root of the matter

by examining the documents involved; in particular we might want to

analyze the paper entitled "The Answer to a Complaint against Several

Actions and Decisions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia taken in a Special

Meeting held on July 7, 1944" (the "Complaint" mentioned in this title

contained objections to certain theological views of Clark). However, since

the formulation of the reply found in "The Answer" is not Clark's own, it

would be methodologically faulty and a sign of poor scholarship if anyone

used this document as the basis for criticism of Clark himself. Only what

Clark actually authored can serve as a solid foundation for criticism of his

views. So we must overlook "The Answer" with the simple indication to

the reader that, to the degree that this document faithfully reflects Clark's

own position, appropriate consultation could be made of the critical re-

views of "The Answer" in the Minutes of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth

General Assemblies of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (1946 and

1948) as well as in F. H. Klooster's The Incomprehensibility of God in the Or-

thodox Presbyterian Conflict;185 in these writings the issues are fully discussed.

Clark's own view of the incomprehensibility of God is easily ascer-

tained in his article, "The Bible as Truth," and his book, What Do Pres-

byterians Believe?186 It is quite simply the position that God's knowledge

must be a logical system of propositions, and we do not know all of

them. Outside of the fact that God may come to know by an eternal in-

tuition and man depends on a discursive process, the difference in their

knowledge is quantitative. However, this doctrine of Clark's is insufficient.

It is not enough to affirm that, even with all the logical relations and

implications, God simply knows more than man. Nor is it enough to dis-

tinguish between ways of knowing, for this is only to say that God receives

information differently from the way we receive information. God should

be viewed as the "original of truth"; that is, He is the original truth, He

185. (Franeker, NL: T. Wever, 1951).

186. See especially p. 30.

186

GORDON CLARK

originates all truths, and He is the standard of all truth. God's mind alone

is self-attesting and originally creative. All our thinking must be brought

in line with His; we must think His thoughts after Him in a receptive

and re-creative manner. He, on the other hand, need not compare His

thoughts with anything, for His knowledge is receptive only in that it is

creative knowledge. God does not come to knowledge—even by an eternal

intuition—but creates knowledge; being perfectly self-conscious of his

creative activity and plan, God can anthropomorphically be said to re-

ceive knowledge.

Hence a qualitative distinction must be maintained between the

knowledge of the Creator and of the creature; the former is originally

creative, but the latter is receptively re-creative. God's knowing can never

be man's knowing, for man's thought is dependent and uncreative. This

in no way implies that the standard or referent point of God's knowledge

and man's knowledge are different; it is God's mind for both God and man.

Nor is this to say that our language does not literally apply to God; there

is continuity between the meaning of terms as applied to God and as

applied to the creature. God, after all, truthfully speaks of Himself to us

in our language. And finally, what God knows (e.g., a state of affairs in the

world) is not different from what man knows when he [man] is thinking

correctly (i.e., thinking God's thoughts after Him in obedience to His

revelation). It has already been noted above that there are grave difficul-

ties in maintaining that God's knowledge is propositional only; not even

man's knowledge is restricted to propositions (e.g., he "knows" his wife,

or "knows" how to play the piano) or can always be expressed in propo-

sitions. By placing his view of knowledge as propositional at the base of

his doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God, Clark would seem to

limit God beyond the limits upon man's knowledge! The incomprehen-

sibility of God has more packed into it than a mathematical difference

of propositions. No description by the creature can accurately describe

God's thinking, for the qualitative aspect of being the Creator is crucial

at every point in His thought. In saying that God's thought is always

original and creative, we affirm that God's knowledge has a different

logical and metaphysical status from man's.

Furthermore, in contrast to God's thought, human thinking must

always have a quality of wonder about it; while God is never in awe

about things, we can never know a truth the way God knows it. Hence

a quality of surprise characterizes our knowledge. In turning from our

187

c o n s i s t e n t presuppositionalism

rationalistic reliance u p o n o u r own thoughts a n d ways to God's rev-

elation we learn to wonder at the world; in doing so we w o n d e r at the

incomprehensible G o d who m a d e and directs it. In a f f i r m i n g God's in-

comprehensibility we submit to His thoughts a n d learn that the creature

must never covet His epistemological prerogatives a n d attributes. T h e

difference between God's knowledge a n d man's knowledge is qualitative;

G o d is not only omniscient, He is incomprehensible.

Clark's Answer to the Attacks of Science

We come now to a discussion of Clark's apologetic against the at-

tacks of science on the Christian faith a n d the weakness of his method.

As Clark sees it, if Christianity is going to safeguard itself against the

types of criticisms raised by science it needs a philosophy that c a n call

into question the finality of scientific conclusions.187 T h i s Clark finds in

w h a t he calls the best available philosophy of science: operationalism.188

Clark's position can be s u m m a r i z e d with a few quotations f r o m his ar-

ticle, " T h e N a t u r e of the Physical Universe."189

Now, in view of the absence of basic definitions, in view

of the chaos of our time, a n d in view of the constant re-

placement of one scientific theory by another, it should

be quite evident that science can provide no firm g r o u n d

for denying the possibility of miracles or for m a k i n g any

confident declaration r e g a r d i n g spiritual realities....

O p e r a t i o n a l i s m asserts philosophically...that science

provides no knowledge of n a t u r e itself.... W h a t twenti-

eth-century science has come to is the view t h a t science

will never, c a n never describe how n a t u r e works. Science

does not a i m at truth; it aims at invention.... Scientific

concepts...are plans for action.... But science now has

n o t h i n g to do with describing or explaining nature. Its

a i m is invention, that is, control of nature.... But now

187. Clark, "Revealed Religion," Fundamentals of the Faith, ed. Carl F. Henry, 29-30.

188. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, 92.

189. In C. F. H. Henry, ed., Christian Faith and Modern Theology (New York: Channel,

1964), 129-143. T h e ideas expressed are also found in Clark's longer work, Philosophy

of Science and Belief in God.

188

G O R D O N CLARK

the present chaos in science itself, and the operational

philosophy, enforcing the double lesson that science is not

stable and is not a transcript of nature, form a propitious

situation in which to show the futility of scientific objec-

tions to Christianity.190

Since science cannot be true, holds Clark, it cannot challenge Christi-

anity.191 He declares that "All the laws of physics are false,"192 and that

"the most certain truth of physics is that physics is not true—not true

as an account of what nature is and how nature works. T h e concepts of

physics are the operations of the physicist."193 So Clark sees science as

having an instrumental value (e.g., building bridges) but as not supply-

ing us with "truths" about the world that could contradict theological

propositions. There is an odd inconsistency in Clark's view of science.

Having said that physics cannot be true, he also says that science

cannot be cognitive. Science is non-cognitive operationalism, he main-

tains.194 However, if something is non-cognitive it is not subject to the

predicates of truth or falsity; yet Clark calls science both non-cognitive

and false.195 He goes so far as to say that perhaps science is non-sense;196

but an analysis of Clark's twofold assertion about science seems closer

to being nonsensical! Clark makes it clear that he is embracing the most

recent philosophy of science in his operationalism; he feels that the Chris-

tian must take advantage of the skeptical attitudes that are currently in

vogue.197 This Clark does to defend the faith. However, we really must

question the wisdom of such apologetical methodology. C. S. Lewis well

expresses the point we would make against Clark:

Science is in continual change.... We must be very cau-

190. Clark, "The Nature of the Physical Universe," Christian Faith and Modern The-

ology, 140, 142f.

191. Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, 209, 216, 228.

192. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, 64, 74.

193. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, 80.

194. Clark, "Secular Philosophy (Wheaton Lecture I)," The Philosophy of Gordon H.

Clark, 42f.; The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, 92.

195. See Clark, The Phihsophy of Science and Belief in God, 64, 92.

196. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, 27.

197. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, 82, 91; "The Nature of the

Physical Universe," Christian Faith and Modern Theology, 143; Karl Barth's Theological

Method, 65.

189

c o n s i s t e n t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l i s m

t i o u s o f s n a t c h i n g a t a n y s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y w h i c h , f o r t h e

m o m e n t , s e e m s t o b e i n o u r f a v o u r . W e m a y mention s u c h

t h i n g s ; b u t w e m u s t m e n t i o n t h e m l i g h t l y a n d w i t h o u t

c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e y a r e m o r e t h a n " i n t e r e s t i n g . " . . . I f w e

t r y t o b a s e o u r a p o l o g e t i c o n s o m e r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t i n

s c i e n c e , w e s h a l l u s u a l l y f i n d t h a t j u s t a s w e h a v e p u t t h e

f i n i s h i n g t o u c h e s t o o u r a r g u m e n t s c i e n c e h a s c h a n g e d

its m i n d a n d q u i e t l y w i t h d r a w n t h e t h e o r y w e h a v e b e e n

u s i n g as o u r f o u n d a t i o n s t o n e . Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes

[ " I f e a r t h e G r e e k s e v e n w h e n t h e y b e a r g i f t s " — f r o m

V i r g i l ' s Aeneid] is a s o u n d p r i n c i p l e . 1 9 8

T h e t y p e o f a p o l o g e t i c a g a i n s t s c i e n c e C l a r k s u g g e s t s d o e s n o t d e m a n d

t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t a c c e p t C h r i s t i a n i t y b u t s i m p l y g e t s s c i e n c e o f f t h e

C h r i s t i a n ' s b a c k t e m p o r a r i l y — a n d a t t h e c o s t o f a d e p r e c i a t i n g v i e w o f

s c i e n c e a t t h a t .

A l t h o u g h t h e p r e s e n t a u t h o r f a v o r s a v i e w o f s c i e n c e t h a t sees t h a t dis-

c i p l i n e u t i l i z i n g models for o p e r a t i o n a l p u r p o s e s — r a t h e r t h a n B a c o n i a n

" f a c t s " - I d o n o t c o n c l u d e t h a t s c i e n c e h a s n o r i g h t t o m a k e truth c l a i m s .

O n e m u s t s t o p a n d w o n d e r w h a t k i n d o f d e s c r i p t i o n C l a r k w o u l d b e will-

i n g t o d e s i g n a t e a s " t r u e " ! E v e n t h e s i m p l e e y e b a l l o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t " t h e

t a b l e i s g r e e n " c o u l d b e r e n d e r e d s u b j e c t t o n o n - c o g n i t i v e e v a l u a t i o n o f a n

operation i n C l a r k ' s sense. I n f a c t m a n y , i f n o t all, s t a t e m e n t s c a n b e v i e w e d

a s h a v i n g o p e r a t i o n a l m e a n i n g . E v e n C l a r k ' s c h e r i s h e d l a w s o f logic d o

n o t describe t h e w o r l d b u t d i r e c t u s i n a r g u m e n t a t i v e operations', t h e r u l e s

o f i n f e r e n c e s t a t e t h e p r o p e r w a y s o f d e d u c i n g c o n c l u s i o n s (an o p e r a t i o n ) .

W h e n I say t h a t " t h e t a b l e i s g r e e n " I c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d a s s a y i n g t h a t i f

s o m e o n e w a l k e d i n t o t h e r o o m h e w o u l d e x p e r i e n c e a c e r t a i n s e n s a t i o n

(an o p e r a t i o n o f e m p i r i c a l n a t u r e i n v o l v i n g light, c o l o r f r e q u e n c y , r e t i n a

r e a c t i o n , etc.) a n d w o u l d b e i n a p o s i t i o n t o a s s e n t t o m y v e r a c i t y ( a g a i n ,

a n o p e r a t i o n ) . B y s a y i n g t h a t s c i e n c e o n l y r e n d e r s o p e r a t i o n a l t r u t h s a n d

n o t d e s c r i p t i v e t r u t h s C l a r k m a y h a v e s a i d s o m e t h i n g t r u e , b u t o n l y trivi-

ally t r u e . H e m a k e s t h e s a m e m i s t a k e t h a t T h o m a s K u h n m a k e s a t t h e

e n d of h i s b o o k , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, i.e., t h i n k i n g t h a t an

o p e r a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k m a k e s all t a l k o f scientific " t r u t h " m e a n i n g l e s s a n d

u n i m p o r t a n t . S c i e n c e c o u l d r e c a s t all of its l a w s or c o n c l u s i o n s into predic-

tive a s s e r t i o n s (e.g., i f y o u d r o p t h e b a l l f r o m s o h i g h o f f t h e g r o u n d i t will

198. C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, 92.

190

GORDON CLARK

hit the ground in such and such a time, given the measuring devices and

their degrees of accuracy, which are specified), and no one would deny that

these assertions can be true or false (to find out, simply follow the instruc-

tions and watch!). A "fact" simply states what is the case when the men-

tioned state of affairs actually obtains. Given this framework, why should

science be deprived of giving us "facts"?

The way to defend Christianity against science is not to be found

in trying to pull the rug out from under all science. The real problem

arises when scientists do not recognize that they are working with models

and the normal-science problems that these models set up for answer-

ing; when a model is expanded into a metaphysical creed or naturalistic

interpretation of reality, then the scientist has to be reminded of what

his limits and tools really are. Furthermore, he should be shown how

operational models in science need the wider, theological model pro-

vided by revelation. The kinds of faith that science still uses, even under

an operational understanding of that discipline, need to be undergirded

with Christian faith. The Christian did not need to wait for this current

operational analysis of science to arise before he could say with Clark

that science has no ground for denying miracles; it has always been the

case that science was rootless without Christian presuppositions, and so

science could repudiate a miraculous Christianity only at the expense of

its own life and practice. ,An immanent critique of science's procedures

and calling into question the metaphysical finality of its conclusions is

fine as a "debris clearing" tactic (it would function to get the scientist's

mind off his "idol"); but the kind of criticism that Clark goes into is mis-

guided, seeing that it undercuts science altogether.

Moreover, it does not go far enough in the right direction, since it does

not show the scientist the absolute necessity of embracing the Christian

faith. Clark's ploy is only defensive—and defensive with only the best tools

of pagan science! A transcendent, dogmatic criticism is necessary, one that

urges the repentance of the scientist. Clark's view of science as non-cogni-

tive surrenders the revelational character of all facts and all research into

God's world; thus there can be no forceful, positive approach or challenge

to the scientist by the Christian apologist. Science must not be allowed to

be pragmatically free from matters of "truth" or else God's rights in the

area of science will be surrendered. Instead of denying science any right

to statements of "truth," Clark should have suggested something to the ef-

fect that a true statement is one that does not mislead its hearer as to what

191

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

is the case; in this way both theology and science would be concerned

with "truth" and could work together. Then the non-Christian scientist

could be challenged with respect to the metaphysical level of interpreta-

tion of his scientific work. But Clark's view of science leaves the scientist

not responsible to God and His truthful, clear revelation in nature. It is

insufficient merely to "make room" for the Christian faith by setting sci-

ence free to its autonomy and recasting its cognitive status. By contrast, a

presuppositional apologetic holds that all men, including scientists, must

find God's truth revealed to them everywhere; all facts are what they are be-

cause of God's sovereign scheme and direction, and as such the scientist is

clearly confronted by God, His power and divine nature, continually. The

scientist cannot escape the necessity of basing all his interpretative efforts

on God's revelation as explicated in Scripture.

Clark's Implicit Skepticism

Finally we must mention the fact that Clark's apologetic, because

of its contrived method of having Christianity escape criticism, itself

reduces to skepticism. According to Clark there is no knowledge to be

obtained except in God's revelation and deductions therefrom.199 This

position is built upon the foundation of Clark's refutation of empiri-

cism in his many writings. Since nothing except Scripture can be true,

or known to be true, then Scripture is of course safe from criticism.

However, Clark also holds that the coherence of the Bible recommends

it over competing hypotheses of a religious nature. This reliance on

coherence joined with a repudiation of empiricism can be used against

Clark's own apologetic, thus invalidating it. Clark, as a genuine Chris-

tian, would undoubtedly object to the following conclusion:

1. The effective prayer of a righteous man can accom-

plish much (James 5:16).

2. There is none righteous, not even one (Rom. 3: 10).

3. Therefore, no prayer accomplishes anything.

Yet to refute this conclusion Clark must retreat to exegesis of the passag-

199. Clark, "The Axiom of Revelation (Wheaton Lecture II)," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 90-92.

192

G o r d o n C l a r k

es involved (thereby showing that it is improper to combine them in this

manner), and exegesis depends upon things like lexicography, compara-

tive linguistics, archeology and cultural studies, etc. These disciplines

are dependent to various extents, of course, upon empirical methodol-

ogy and study. T h u s Clark, with his repudiation of empiricism, must

avoid exegesis; thereby we see that Clark must accept the conclusion of

the above argument. But Clark, knowing that his own prayer of repen-

tance and faith must have accomplished something if he is to be saved

from the wrath of G o d due to sinners, would certainly lay claim to the

promises of Scripture that G o d will heed our prayers.

T h u s a fourth proposition must be introduced; for instance,

4. A n d everything you ask in prayer, believing, you shall

receive (Matt. 21:22).

But proposition 3 contradicts proposition 4, and this means that the Bi-

ble is logically inconsistent with itself. Failing to be a rationally coherent

system of propositions and deductions, the Bible (on Clark's basis) would

have to be false. Such is the inherent skepticism of Clark's apologetic. If

we accept it, we must reject biblical Christianity!

Further examples of the difficulties Clark gets into by his immoder-

ate rejection of all empiricism and affirmation that there is no knowl-

edge outside of the Bible can be given. George Mavrodes points out that

the same hyper-skeptical reasoning that Clark uses against the person

who thinks he can certainly know who his wife is may effectively be used

against Clark's own feeling that he can know what the Bible is and says—

the possibility of substitution by an evil demon is always there, in the

case of one's wife or one's Bible.200 Both Mavrodes and R. Nash have

pointed out that Clark's rejection of empirical experience implies that

he cannot even know what the Bible teaches.201 Nash indicates that such

an implication reduces Clark's apologetic to skepticism and hence, on

Clark's own standards, to falsity:

A R G U M E N T I — Clark contends:

P I . Any position that leads to skepticism is false.

200. George I. Mavrodes, "Revelation a n d Epistemology," The Philosophy of Gordon

H. Clark, 247.

201. The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 247f., 174.

193

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

P 2 . Empiricism leads to skepticism.

C1. Empiricism is false.

A R G U M E N T II — Furthermore, Clark argues:

P3. Man cannot know anything through his senses

(from C1).

P4. Human knowledge is limited to the contents of di-

vine revelation (The Bible).

P5. But man cannot know the content of the Bible save

through his senses.

C2. Therefore, man cannot know the truths God has

revealed in the Bible.

A R G U M E N T III

P6. The only knowledge available to man is contained

in the Bible (from P4).

P7. But, for Clark, man cannot attain this knowledge

(from C2).

C3. It follows that Clark's view reduces to skepticism.

C4. It follows further that Clark's view is false

(from P1).202

Clark's reply to the above criticism of his position is simply unsatisfac-

tory. First he claims that his critics are obligated to refute his own argu-

ment against empiricism before their criticisms can be meaningful.203

This is mere question-begging. It is perfectly acceptable to refute an op-

ponent's position by a reduction of it to absurdity, and this is what Nash

has done. Under this circumstance Nash is under no obligation to an-

swer Clark's (absurd) repudiation of empiricism. From a Christian view-

point Nash's argument against Clark is even more telling-and should be

reckoned with by Clark. Consider:

202. Ronald H. Nash, "Gordon Clark's Theory of Knowledge," The Philosophy of

Gordon H. Clark, 174f.

203. Clark, "Reply to Ronald H. Nash," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 414f.

194

GORDON CLARK

1. God makes an absolute demand upon our lives.

2. Hence, in obedience to God we must reject anything

which hinders obedience to God's demand.

3. Clark's repudiation of empiricism prevents us from

knowing God's Word (from Nash's Argument II).

4. If we cannot know what God's Word says, we cannot

obey His demand.

5. Therefore, Clark's repudiation of empiricism hinders

obedience to God's demand (from 3 and 4).

6. Consequently, Clark's repudiation of empiricism must

be rejected (from 5 and 2).

Clark's second reply to Nash's criticism seems hard to believe. I can

only hope that I have misread him, but each rereading gives the same

impression. Clark holds that written words (which, we remember, have

to do with the Bible in this context) do not communicate truth after all;

everything signified by these words was already in our knowledge, and

the words serve to remind us of that fact. God, after all, is the One who

does the teaching through direct revelation or illumination although by

means of written words.204 Such a view does great damage to the doc-

trine of the necessity of revelation; the Bible no longer informs us, but

only brings an innate knowledge to consciousness (like heat applied to

invisible ink). Furthermore, this position could easily be pushed toward

the death of a thousand qualifications: What is the difference between

being "reminded" of something that I have never been conscious of and

simply being consciously informed for the first time? Moreover, if all peo-

ple have this knowledge innately but only need to be reminded of it, why

should there be any differences in biblical interpretation? Did different

interpreters have different innate knowledge? Or does the Bible remind

some people better than others? As to Clark's idea that God is the real

teacher, we must note that Clark here denies the reality and necessity

of secondary causes. God is the real cause of a windmill turning its

blades, but this does not reduce the wind to a pseudo-cause! At its best

(which is still uncommendable) Clark's reply means that the Holy Spirit

grants a form of inspiration to all men (not just prophets and apostles)

204. See Clark, "Reply to Ronald H. Nash," The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, 415f.

195

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

whereby they ascertain the truths of God's word directly—in which case

the Bible's indications of a special influence of the Holy Spirit upon the

authors of Scripture is trivial. Clark's reply to Nash's criticism just can-

not be accepted by a Christian or even a clear-thinking unbeliever. It is

self-refuting and at odds with basic Christian beliefs.

Clark's view that no knowledge is possible outside of revelation must

be rejected also because it prevents us from drawing any ethical conclu-

sions. We can know that it is forbidden to take any property which is not

our own (because the Bible so), but we cannot know what property is

ours and what is our neighbor's (because the Bible does not tell us this).

So we could never conclude that taking any particular piece of mer-

chandise was stealing, or that it was not. Ethical chaos would result—as

well as the collapse of civilization. On Clark's principles he could never

confess, "I know that the Bible is God's true Word," for while Scripture

claims to be God's Word, it neither asserts nor implies that Gordon Clark

knows this to be the case! For all these reasons, then, we see that Clark's

apologetic actually reduces to skepticism and so is unacceptable.

C O N C L U S I O N

Gordon Clark has made good points of presuppositional analysis in his

writings from place to place, but we have found that as a whole his

system is not genuinely presuppositional and his presuppositions are not

biblical. Furthermore we have noted that numerous difficulties attach

to his apologetic method and that it is ineffective on many counts. Clark's

rationalism is basically incompatible with presuppositionalism and with

Reformed theology, and his rationalistic apologetic is not an adequate

challenge to unregenerate thought.

196

C H A P T E R 5

EDWARD J. CARNELL

As was the case with Gordon Clark, the writings of E.J. Carnell

r e f l e c t a c c u r a t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s i n p l a c e s ; a s a m p l i n g

o f t h e m i s r e p r o d u c e d b e l o w . I n t h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s C a r n e l l

c o n c u r s w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n e s p o u s e d b y V a n T i l .

G o d i s t r u t h b e c a u s e H e i s t h e A u t h o r o f all f a c t s a n d all

m e a n i n g . . . S i n c e t h e m i n d o f G o d p e r f e c t l y k n o w s r e a l -

ity, t r u t h i s a p r o p e r t y o f t h a t j u d g m e n t w h i c h c o i n c i d e s

w i t h t h e m i n d o f G o d . I f m a n , t h u s , fails t o s a y a b o u t r e a l -

ity w h a t G o d says a b o u t it, h e h a s m a d e a n error.1

W h e n o n e b e g i n s h i s p h i l o s o p h y a p a r t f r o m t h e a s s u m p -

t i o n o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a r a t i o n a l G o d , h e h a s t h r o w n

h i m s e l f i n t o a s e a o f o b j e c t i v e l y u n r e l a t e d f a c t s . E v e n

i n i n f i n i t y a f i n i t e m a n c o u l d n o t s u c c e e d i n u n i t i n g t h e

e n d l e s s f a c t s w h i c h a r e s i r e d o u t o f t h e w o m b o f c h a n c e .

A n d e v e n i f h e d i d , h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w o u l d b e s u b j e c t t o

c h a n g e w i t h o u t n o t i c e , f o r t h e f l u x o f r e a l i t y m i g h t s h i f t

a t a n y m o m e n t . 2

1. E . J . Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

1948), 46f.

2. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 123.

C O N S I S T E N T PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Christianity assumes the existence of the God W h o has

revealed Himself in Scripture to solve both metaphysical

and epistemological problems.3

Since God is the definition of consistency ... the law of

contradiction has final meaning only in relation to God.4

I have no interest in proving the existence of God.... His

existence is the sine qua non for all demonstration.5

The creature-Creator relationship is inviolable.6

Just as time and eternity are two orders of being, so the mind

of man and the mind of God are two orders of thought.7

The universe is ordered by [God's] personal interests, not

logic.... In history, then, there is no surd, inexplicable,

or antinomy. History is as rational at every point as the

rational God Who decrees its movement.8

Being contingent upon God's will, it is this Will, and not

an antecedent system of logic, which gives meaning to

the movement of the space-time world.9

God is God, not man. Two orders of being are being jux-

taposed, and we must not force on the other conditions

which define normalcy in the one.10

To subject God to abstract standards is a proof that God

is not man's highest ultimate.11

3. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 96.

4. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 60.

5. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 109;

An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 159.

6. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 185.

7. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 278.

8. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 247; An Introduction to Christian Apologetics,

296.

9. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 40.

10. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952),

336 f.

11. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 248.

198

EDWARD J. CARNELL

God's sovereignty is the metaphysical foundation of

the Christian world-view.... God gives critical account

of himself to no one; there is no supreme court above

him.... God is the final criterion of goodness; what he

does is good because he does it.12

Without revelation, there is no truth; for revelation is the

light in which we see light.13

The power by which the heart is enabled to see that the

word of God is true is the Holy Spirit. T h e word of God

is thus self-authenticating. It bears its own testimony to

truth; it seals its own validity. If the word required some-

thing more certain than itself to give it validity, it would

no longer be God's word.... It would be a derogation

to the efficiency of revelation to suppose that anything

more than God's Spirit is needed to seal the word to the

hearts of believers.14

The surest proof one can have that his faith in God's

word is valid is the internal witness of the Spirit of God

in his heart.15

It is my conviction that man's difficulty is not lack

of knowledge, but lack of moral courage to act on the

knowledge he already has.... Only a refusal to be spiri-

tually honest prevents one from consciously recognizing

the place of God in his life.16

If we try to come to the Bible with a principle of selectiv-

ity found outside of the Bible, we render the Bible need-

less, since we can accept of it only what coincides with

the truth which we had before we ever came to Scripture

in the first place.17

12. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 270.

13. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 156.

14. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 66.

15. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 68.

16. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 27.

17. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 198.

199

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

The Christian, having chosen as his logical starting

point the existence of the God Who has revealed Him-

self in Scripture, is admonished, as an implication of this

starting point, to hew to the implications of this decision

in every phase of life.18

Rational self-sufficiency is a sign of ignorance, not learn-

ing.... The Christian denies the competency of man's

mind to know reality without revelation, while the non-

Christian confesses it.19

But, being in defection by their sins, what they see is viti-

ated. Thus, they are not able to see and appreciate that

one of the peculiar characteristics of this God is that He

is the Creator of the world and the Savior of men.20

Technically speaking, whenever a man talks and expects

something to be meant by it, he is resorting to a preroga-

tive which belongs to the Christian alone.21

Without Christianity, science has no metaphysical, epis-

temological, or ethical frames of reference within which

to give world-view meaning to the facts it colligates.22

What a man thinks of Jesus Christ, therefore, determines

his entire view of God and man.23

The very nature of Christianity demands that there be

no common ground between the system of the godly and

the system of the ungodly, for a man's attitude toward

what he considers to be the highest logical ultimate in

reality determines the validity of his ... starting point, his

method, and his conclusion.24

18. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 212.

19. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, p. 279; An Introduction to Christian

Apologetics, 201.

20. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 171.

21. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 212.

22. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 232.

23. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 212.

114. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 103, Bahnsen's emphasis.

200

E d w a r d J . C a r n e l l

T h e C h r i s t i a n b e l i e v e s t h a t s t a r t i n g p o i n t c o n t r o l s b o t h

m e t h o d a n d c o n c l u s i o n . 2 5

H o w e v e r , a s w a s t h e c a s e w i t h C l a r k , C a r n e l l d o e s n o t b u i l d h i s e n t i r e

a p o l o g e t i c a l s y s t e m o n t h i s b o l d C h r i s t i a n c h a l l e n g e . T h e s o l i d p r e s u p p o -

s i t i o n a l i s m r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s e q u o t e s i s n o t m a i n t a i n e d b y C a r n e l l t h r o u g h -

o u t h i s w r i t i n g s , a n d i t i s n o t m a d e t o c o u n t a s b a s i c a r g u m e n t a t i o n . I n

f a c t , i t i s p l a i n l y c o n t r a v e n e d . W i t h d i s a p p o i n t m e n t w e n o t e t h a t t h e l a r g e r

p o r t i o n o f C a r n e l l ' s w r i t i n g i s g i v e n o v e r t o a t y p e o f a p o l o g e t i c t h a t a b r o -

g a t e s t h e c o m m e n d a b l e a s s e r t i o n s a b o v e . H e c o m m i t s m a n y o f t h e s a m e

e r r o r s a s d o e s C l a r k ; w h e r e t h i s i s t h e c a s e w e s h a l l i n d i c a t e t h e p o s i t i o n

o f C a r n e l l t h a t i s n o t a p p r o v e d o f a n d r e l y u p o n t h e l o n g e r d i s c u s s i o n o f

C l a r k t o e x p l a i n t h e r e a s o n f o r o u r d i s a p p r o b a t i o n .

C A R N E L L ' S A U T O N O M O U S S T A R T I N G P O I N T

I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e w e n o t e t h a t t h e t r u t h o f S c r i p t u r e i s n o t C a r n e l l ' s a b -

s o l u t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n w h i c h , a s t h e v e r b a l r e v e l a t i o n f r o m G o d , i s n e c -

e s s a r y t o a l l p h i l o s o p h i z i n g a n d w h i c h f u n c t i o n s a s t h e f i n a l c r i t e r i o n

o f t r u t h t o b e c r i t i c a l l y a p p l i e d t o a l l n o n - C h r i s t i a n w a y s o f t h o u g h t .

H e n c e C a r n e l l p o s i t s o n l y a r e l a t i v e a n t i t h e s i s b e t w e e n C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d

o t h e r r e l i g i o u s c o m m i t m e n t s . A s h e s e e s it, C h r i s t i a n i t y i s ( m e r e l y ) t h e

h i g h e s t s t a g e o r f o r m o f r e l i g i o n — i n s t e a d o f f u n d a m e n t a l l y c h a l l e n g -

i n g a l l r i v a l s , C h r i s t i a n i t y m o v e s b e y o n d t h e m . I t i s t h e t o p r u n g o f t h e

l a d d e r o r h i g h e s t l i n k i n t h e c h a i n . 2 6 B y c o n t r a s t t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l i s t

w i l l w a n t t o h o l d t h a t only C h r i s t i a n i t y i s a v a l i d r e l i g i o u s c o m m i t m e n t ,

t h a t i t i s a n e c e s s a r y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t o a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t i e s o f l i f e —

t h e r e b y r u l i n g o u t a l l o t h e r r e l i g i o n s . C a r n e l l d e n i e s t h e p e e r l e s s d o m i -

n a t i o n o f C h r i s t t h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n s u c h a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l a p p r o a c h ; h e

s a y s t h a t C h r i s t built upon h u m a n i s m r a t h e r t h a n d e r o g a t i n g it.2' W i t h

s u c h a n o u t l o o k i t i s n o s u r p r i s e t h a t C a r n e l l c o u l d i d e n t i f y t h e C h r i s t i a n

m e t a p h y s i c w i t h P l a t o n i s m . - 8 S u c h c o n f u s i o n s a s t h e s e p r e v e n t a v i e w o f

t h e a n t i t h e s i s a n d a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y o f b i b l i c a l C h r i s t i a n i t y .

25. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 123.

26. See Carnell, "Preface," A Philosophy of the Christian Religion.

27. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 276.

28. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 86, 127.

201

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

The Word of God Not Self-Verified

Indeed Carnell admits for us that his apologetic aim is not to show

the absolute need of Christian presuppositions but merely to show "how

Christianity is able to answer the fundamental questions of life as ade-

quately as, if not more adequately than, any other world-view."29 So then,

God's revelation is not necessary for evaluation and choice between ulti-

mate values, but certain self-evident truths guide us in this area instead.30

The Christian God is not indispensable for a balanced world view in Car-

nell's system, for according to it a balanced life is constituted by clarity,

objectivity, facts, logic, and conscience.31 Apparently it is this combination

that will bring us to a Christian outlook rather than vice versa!

In the place of God, logic is taken by Carnell as the transcendental

of meaningfulness;32 love is the precondition of all value;33 and the even-

tuation of history determines the possibility of miracles.34 As with Clark,

Carnell applies only immanent criticisms of his non-Christian oppo-

nents and never comes to the place where a transcendent evaluation

based on the Word of God is used against them.35 In fact, when he deals

with the theological position of universalism Carnell still does not bring

in Scripture but depends on extraneous considerations for his refuta-

tion.36 In Christian Commitment as well as Philosophy of the Christian Religion

Carnell analyzes men and their sinful predicament in terms of experi-

ence rather than the Word of God—in reading these books, simply note

where and how Scripture is brought into the consideration, and contrast

that to the free use of extraneous explanation and argumentation. One

notes that Carnell can arrive at what he considers to be many sure and

safe conclusions without even consulting Scripture as a trustworthy pre-

supposition.37 In line with this, one is said to be certain with respect to a

29. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 10.

30. Carnell, "Preface," A Philosophy of the Christian Religion.

31. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 24; Christian Commitment, An Apologetic,

71.

32. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 184, 185, 187.

33. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 211.

34. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959),

93.

35. For example, see Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 20ff., as he deals

with hedonism, Marxism, positivism, rationalism, and humanism.

36. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 389f.

37. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 211, 222, 255.

202

EDWARD J. CARNELL

particular question about man, while with reference to God the answer

to that question remains uncertain;38 quite apart from an understanding

of God we can arrive at an unquestionable understanding of man.

That Scripture is not an absolute presupposition for Carnell is also

indicated by the fact that he grants that science can be done without a

Christian foundation,39 and hence he ends up deferring to the conclu-

sions of science and allowing them to dictate his understanding of topics

on which Scripture teaches contrary to "science."40 This is a fatal move;

by it Carnell has left the authority of Scripture as an absolute presup-

position of all thought and substituted an autonomous guide which is al-

lowed to call even God's Word into question. What Carnell ends up with

is the authority of the "expert" (e.g., W. F. Albright) who can establish for

us "that the Bible is almost throughout a reliable account of historical

events";41 so then, the Christian "is pleasantly surprised to discover the

jot-and-tittle correspondence of the Bible to the facts."42

By contrast, the presuppositionalist begins with God's Word as the

true and reliable standard by which all other thoughts are judged. How-

ever, Carnell looks to the human self rather than to God as a firm start-

ing point and guide for his apologetic. He makes much of his analysis of

self-transcendence, s elf-indignity, self-determination, and the free self?43 and

these are used as the standard for accepting or rejecting any particular

world-view.44 The autobiographical method of Christian Commitment also

demonstrates this point; in the book Carnell wants to examine the mor-

al-spiritual environment and the inwardness of philosophy in terms of

the self and with respect to the way of knowing by moral self-acceptance

(wherein one is transformed by the duties that already hold him) so that

we might arrive at a knowledge of God.45 In this Carnell admits that he

is catering to the modern spirit:

The defense must answer to the spirit of the times.... The

38. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 205f.

39. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 214fF.

40. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 95fF.; e.g., man's immediate or mediate

creation.

41. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theohgy, 89; Bahnsen's emphasis.

42. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 109; Bahnsen's emphasis.

43. See Carnell, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 67ff.

44. Carnell, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 118.

45. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 4 -8, 22.

203

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

climate of our modern world is dynamic and existential....

That is why we have sought to impress the contemporary

mind with evidences drawn from man's marvelous power

of moral and rational self-transcendence.46

In passing we can hardly overlook the inconsistency of Carnell when

later in this same book he stresses that it is the will of man that is cor-

rupted by sin,47 for this fact undermines his whole approach of following

the way of knowledge by moral self-acceptance! By beginning with the

self Carnell sees his apologetic as adjusting to the existential spirit of

our day, and since this existentialism has deep roots in the philosophic

method of Descartes it should be no surprise to us that Carnell declares,

"I have always been warmly attracted to the Cartesian starting point,

for it has close affinities with my own procedure."48 The error involved

in this was discussed under Clark. What is important to note is that by

this method Scripture is not presupposed", rather than being foundational, it

is brought in only later—after an autonomous argument or examination

of personal experience has been used for guidelines and information 49

Selfhood as an Ultimate Criterion

As Carnell sees it, the citation of Scripture is not enough in an argu-

ment. Having noted the golden rule as stated by Christ, Carnell says,

"If we expect to establish the validity of the practical imperative, how-

ever, we must do it by a patient application of moral self-acceptance."50

Immediately following this Carnell replies to the person who thinks that

Scripture "will not be improved by the strategies of human reason," that

"a man of character can believe nothing until it is established by sufficient

evidences."51 Indeed, if one merely subordinated his thinking to authorita-

tive Scripture, Carnell thinks he would destroy his individuality.

If we submit to a particular book, church, or priestly

46. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, vii—viii.

47. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 198.

48. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 37.

49. See Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 151 f., 163f., 167ff., 169f., 1741F.,

176f., 179ff., 185.

50. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 82.

51. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 82f.

204

EDWARD J. CARNELL

caste ... the counsel of Kierkegaard, is again germane.

Whenever individuals rely on objective security as an

escape from moral decision, they jeopardize their own

individuality.... Neither book, church, nor priestly caste

can relieve us of the responsibility of closing the gap be-

tween descriptive essence [i.e., man's natural features, p.

16] and the imperative essence [i.e., freedom to create

rectitude, pp. 16 f.]; and any attempt to do so would rob

us of selfhood.52

Yet as the presuppositionalist sees it, submission to the particular book

revealed by God is not an escape from, but a yielding to, moral deci-

sion; it is not the destruction of "freedom" but the proper use thereof.

So we note that Carnell does not presuppose the authority of Scripture

but would bring it in only later in an argument, and the citation of it

there is insufficient without established evidences. One must establish

and defend his right to appeal to the Bible, says Carnell,53 and when

Carnell does appeal to Scripture he is anxious to tell us that "we are not

abandoning that spirit of verification which we have defended up to this

point."54 Thus when Carnell views the doctrine of Scripture's inerrancy

to be an inference that must be based on empirical investigation and

inductive authentication, we can clearly see what it is that has highest

epistemic certainty for him. The presuppositionalist would say by con-

trast that it is the mind of God as revealed in the Bible.

Reason and External Evidence

Carnell feels that Christian "presuppositions" are subject to the

judging standards of reason: "If one will proceed to reality with a hum-

ble attitude, he will discover that the presuppositions of the Christian

are friendly to the highest tests of reason."55 He should have held that

without Christian presuppositions there could be no test by reason at all.

So far from taking Scripture as his authoritative presupposition, Carnell

endorses Warfield's note that "a right faith is always a reasonable faith;

52. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 141.

53. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 61 footnote 20, 173.

54. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 175.

55. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 197.

205

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

that is to say, it is accorded only to an authority which commends itself

to reason as a sound authority."56 To this Carnell adds his own note that

"a normal person does not submit his life to an authority until, guided

by reason, he is fully assured in his mind that the authority in question

is trustworthy."57 Hence in Carnell's apologetic the authority of the Bible

must first commend itself to the more ultimate authority of reason—-

which means that the Bible is not being presupposed.

Bernard Ramm's analysis of Carnell in Types of Apologetic Systems?58 is

instructive for us and takes us to the root of his system. Ramm sees Car-

nell as holding that the validity of the object of faith must be tested;59 Carnell

says, "Faith is but a whole-soul trust in God's word as true."60 Yet on the

same page Carnell had asserted that the Word of God is self-authenticating.

So in Carnell's apologetic he both affirms and denies the need for us to

authenticate—test—the Word of God! Returning to Ramm's analysis,

he says that Carnell depends on the intersection of internal witness (the

Spirit) and the external witness (systematic consistency!) to build a firm apolo-

getic.61 This exhibits for us that the external witness in Carnell's apologetic

is not the self-authenticating Word of God, but philosophy. "If the Spirit of

God has an inner witness and an external witness, then we must be able to

come to the truthfulness of Christianity from the external dimension, i.e.,

we may make a philosophical approach."62

In support of this indication that Carnell abandons the self-attesting

nature of Scripture is Carnell's own statement that God's Word must "join

forces" with "external evidence."63 So at heart Carnell is not a presuppo-

sitionalist who depends on the self-attesting equality of Scripture, but he is

a rationalist who would endeavor to verify that the Bible is a revelation of

God. Right in line with this is the fact that Carnell feels that something (in

particular, the synoptic starting point of a system) must establish grounds

for, and make good, the highest principle of unity in a system (i.e., logical

starting point); he sees this highest ordering principle as the Trinity for

56. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 72f.

57. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 73.

58. Bernard L. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems: An Introductory Study of the Christian

Philosophy of Religion (Wheaton, IL: Van Kampen Press, 1953).

59. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 216.

60. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 66.

61. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 217.

62. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 222.

63. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 84, 86.

206

EDWARD I. CARNELL

a Christian. Taking all these facts together results in the conclusion that

Carnell feels we must provide verification for the Triune God.M Because

Carnell needs a pou sto65 outside of God's Word which can be used to vali-

date that the Bible is in fact God's Word, he understandably draws back

from the presuppositionalist's position that truth would be impossible on

anything but a Christian position; his apologetic depends on a measure

of autonomy and must shun Christianity as an absolute presupposition.

Carnell rejects the apologetical attempt to show the impossibility of truth

outside of Christianity66 and says that the gospel should not be used as an

ideological weapon against the natural man and non-Christian wisdom

(The Case for Orthodox Theology, p. 128).67

Possibilism

Apparently fearing the situation, Carnell makes the argumentative

observation, "When a Christian attacks general wisdom in the name

of the gospel, the natural man will attack the gospel in the name of

general wisdom."68 But the truth is that the natural man always attacks

the gospel in the name of autonomous thought—even when one uses

a diluted apologetic that embodies autonomous principles itself! The

only adequate defense is not to try and meet the antagonist point for

point but to show him that he must assume the Christian position even

to argue against it. So we should attack general wisdom as impossible

in the name of the gospel; this leaves the unbeliever no leg to stand on

and only the prospect of repentance. Carnell's approach is a fatal settle-

ment for "peaceful coexistence." The Christian has nothing to fear in

the believer's assault upon the wisdom of God expressed in Scripture;

"where is the disputer of this age?" Worldly-wisdom is defeated by the

wisdom of the gospel, for the "foolishness" of God is mightier than the

"wisdom" of men. So our apologetic should be a strong one, challeng-

ing the very core or foundation of apostate philosophy—and not worry-

ing that the rebel will many times respond by trying to assert his vain

autonomy against the Word of God. Our weapons are mighty to the

64. See Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 124.

65. Place to stand.

66. Carnell, Christian Committment, An Apologetic, viii.

67. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 128.

68. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 128.

207

C o n s i s t e n t P r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l i s m

p u l l i n g d o w n o f r e a s o n i n g s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y C a r n e l l w o u l d n o t a s s e r t t h a t

G o d ' s W o r d i s a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y f o r m e a n i n g a n d i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o r

t h a t i t i s G o d ' s e x i s t e n c e a n d p r o v i d e n c e t h a t s u p p o r t t h e u s e o f s c i e n c e ,

l o g i c , a n d a r g u m e n t a t i o n , b e c a u s e h e w a n t e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t o C h r i s t ' s

d e s p i s e r s t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l m a n , t h e f r e e m a n , t h e m a n o f c h a r a c t e r c a n

u s e a u t o n o m o u s s t a n d a r d s t o m a k e G o d ' s a u t h o r i t a t i v e W o r d p a s s t h e

r e q u i s i t e t e s t s f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n .

B e c a u s e C h r i s t i a n i t y w a s n o t t a k e n a s h i s absolute p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , C a r -

nell's a p o l o g e t i c i n c l u d e s t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e n o t i o n t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y s u r r o u n d s

G o d a n d H i s W o r d . T h i s i s t h e s a m e " p o s s i b i l i s m " t h a t C l a r k i s g u i l t y of.

F o r all t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y t h a t C a r n e l l sees i n t h e C h r i s t i a n sys-

t e m , h e still a l l o w s t h e a b s t r a c t p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t G o d d o e s n o t e x i s t . " T h i s

m o r a l d i l e m m a d o e s n o t p r o v e t h e e x i s t e n c e of God, for it may be that God

does not exist,"69 R a t h e r t h a n v i e w i n g it as a n e c e s s i t y , an u n d e n i a b l e f a c t ,

C a r n e l l a t t e m p t s t o d e m o n s t r a t e " t h a t g e n e r i c r e v e l a t i o n i s possible."10

C a r n e l l a l s o g r a n t s t h a t i t i s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t G o d i s not

c l e a r l y r e v e a l e d i n t h e B i b l e : " O n e m a y f i n d u p o n e x a m i n i n g t h e

B i b l i c a l s y s t e m t h a t h e cannot b e l i e v e t h a t t h e m i n d o f G o d i s t h e r e i n

c o n t a i n e d ; a n d i n t h i s c a s e h e s h o u l d a b i d e b y h i s c o n s c i e n c e i n t h e

m a t t e r . " 7 1 H o w e r r o n e o u s a n d g r a v e l y m i s l e a d i n g t h i s is! N o s i n n e r

c a n f a i l t o s e e G o d r e v e a l e d i n H i s W o r d ; i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t h a t G o d

s h o u l d n o t m a k e H i m s e l f c l e a r l y k n o w i n H i s s e l f - d i s c l o s u r e . W h a t

s i n c a n d o i s t o p r e v e n t acknowledgement a n d conscious recognition o f t h e

o b j e c t i v e n a t u r e o f S c r i p t u r e ; t h e u n b e l i e v e r d i s t o r t s w h a t h e s e e s a n d

f a i l s t o l i v e b y w h a t i s c l e a r l y r e v e a l e d . W h e n h e c l a i m s n o t t o s e e G o d

r e v e a l e d i n S c r i p t u r e h e s h o u l d n o t a b i d e b y h i s c o n s c i e n c e i n t h e m a t -

t e r ; h e i s u n d e r obligation t o a c k n o w l e d g e a n d l i v e b y t h e t r u t h e v e n

i f h e , i n f a c t , refuses t o s e e a n d o b e y . I f h e f a i l s t o b e c o n v i n c e d i n h i s

r e c a l c i t r a n t h e a r t , h e n e e d s t o r e p e n t .

W e s h o u l d n e v e r g r a n t t h a t i t i s possible t h a t o n e c o u l d h o n e s t l y f a i l t o

b e o b j e c t i v e l y c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a c l e a r w o r d f r o m G o d i n S c r i p t u r e . I t i s

p o s s i b l e f o r t h e s i n n e r t o c o n t i n u e i n r e b e l l i o n , b u t h e cannot c o m e t o t h e

n o n - C h r i s t i a n c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t t h e B i b l e i n a n y l e g i t i m a t e f a s h i o n . T h e

s i n n e r has t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l e q u i p m e n t n e c e s s a r y , and t h e c l e a r r e v e l a -

t i o n n e c e s s a r y , t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e m i n d o f G o d i s r e v e a l e d i n S c r i p t u r e .

69. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 261; Bahnsen's emphasis.

70. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 176, Bahnsen's emphasis.

137. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 277.

208

E D W A R D J . C A R N E L L

I t i s not possible t h a t o n e s h o u l d t r u l y f i n d t h a t h e " cannot" b e l i e v e , o n l y

t h a t he will not b e l i e v e .

S o C a r n e l l h a s s u b o r d i n a t e d b o t h G o d a n d H i s r e v e l a t i o n t o t h e

n o t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y ; p e r h a p s t h e c l e a r e s t i n d i c a t i o n o f t h a t f a c t i s g i v e n

i n t h i s q u o t a t i o n : " A s t h e r e i s a 5 0 / 5 0 c h a n c e t h a t w e w i l l f a l l i n t o j u d g -

m e n t b e f o r e G o d , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t w e w e i g h c a r e f u l l y t h e c h a r a c t e r o f

t h e u n i v e r s e . " 7 2 I t i s possible, t h e n , t h a t G o d d o e s n o t e x i s t a n d H i s W o r d

i s n o t t r u e , a c c o r d i n g t o C a r n e l l ' s a p o l o g e t i c . T h e a b s o l u t e p r e s u p p o s i -

t i o n o f S c r i p t u r e d o e s n o t c o n t r o l h i s d e f e n s e o f t h e f a i t h ; h e n c e G o d i s

n o t t a k e n a s t h e sole s o u r c e o f m a t e r i a l a n d l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , b u t p o s -

s i b i l i t y i s m o r e u l t i m a t e t h a n G o d .

F o l l o w i n g f r o m C a r n e l l ' s p o s s i b i l i s m i s h i s r e d u c t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y

t o a hypothesis, i n l i k e m a n n e r t o C l a r k .

G o o d p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e t h o s e w h o c a n c o n s t r u c t s y s t e m -

a t i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t s y s t e m s o f m e a n i n g . . . . T h i s c o n c l u -

s i o n e s t a b l i s h e s t h e possibility o f C h r i s t i a n i t y a s a n a n s w e r

t o life's d i l e m m a . C a r e f u l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f i t a s a s y s t e m

m i g h t e s t a b l i s h its actuality.73

C h a p t e r 5 of An Introduction to Christian Apologetics is e n t i t l e d " T h e C h r i s -

t i a n H y p o t h e s i s . " I n i t C a r n e l l m a i n t a i n s t h a t " i n t h e c o n t e s t o f h y -

p o t h e s i s - m a k i n g ... t h e w i n n e r [is] h e w h o c a n p r o d u c e t h e b e s t set o f

a s s u m p t i o n s t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e t o t a l i t y o f r e a l i t y . " 7 4 T h i s i s t h e g u i d i n g

p r i n c i p l e o f h i s a p o l o g e t i c . A c c o r d i n g t o C a r n e l l , t h e C h r i s t i a n " b e l i e v e s

t h e p o s t u l a t e o f a r a t i o n a l G o d t o b e a w o r k a b l e h y p o t h e s i s i n t h e l i g h t o f

t h e e v i d e n c e . " 7 5 A n d h e g i v e s u s a b u n d a n t i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f h i s t a k i n g t h e

B i b l e o n l y h y p o t h e t i c a l l y : W e a r e a s k e d t o suppose t h a t a p e r s o n a l G o d i s

t h e u l t i m a t e b e i n g a n d t o suppose t h a t t h e B i b l e i s G o d ' s W o r d f o r m a n .

W e a r e t o l d t h a t a t r a n s c e n d e n t - i m m a n e n t G o d i s a live option j u s t a s

s o t e r i o l o g i c a l p a r t i c u l a r i s m i s a n o p t i o n . A n d C a r n e l l c a n s p e a k a b o u t

i f t h e r e i s a G o d , ...if G o d i s a b l e t o s a t i s f y t h e h e a r t , ...if t h e b i b l i c a l w o r l d - v i e w i s p l a u s i b l e , . . . i f G o d i s o u r F a t h e r . 7 6

72. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 154.

73. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 97.

74. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 94.

75. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 164.

76. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 29, 35, 294, 373, 30, 31, 274,

312, 315.

209

C O N S I S T E N T P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L I S M

Y e t w e s h o u l d n o t e t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e m i s t a k e o f r e d u c i n g t h e

B i b l e t o h y p o t h e t i c a l s t a t u s , C a r n e l l ' s a p o l o g e t i c f a c e s t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h a t

m o s t o f h i s h y p o t h e s e s a r e e a s i l y c h a l l e n g e d b y t h e q u i c k - t h i n k i n g u n -

b e l i e v e r . F o r i n s t a n c e , i t i s n o t h a r d t o p i c k a p a r t C a r n e l l ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t

t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f o m n i p o t e n c e a s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g G o d i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y

b e t t e r t h a n t h e c o n t r a r y v i e w 7 7 — a s C . M . H o m e h a s s h o w n . 7 8 O v e r

a n d o v e r a g a i n C a r n e l l a p p l i e s t h e t e r m " h y p o t h e s i s " t o C h r i s t i a n i t y . 7 9

T h u s C h r i s t i a n i t y c a n n o t b e a n a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n

i n C a r n e l l ' s s y s t e m . I n s t e a d i t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y s t a t e m e n t s like:

A r a t i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s m a y b e n e c e s s a r y t o a s s u r e u s t h a t

t h e r e i s m e a n i n g i n s u r r e n d e r i n g o u r h e a r t s t o G o d . 8 0

I f t h e r e i s a G o d , a n d i f t h i s G o d i s a b l e t o l o v e u s , a sat-

i s f a c t i o n w i l l b e g a i n e d . . . .81

S i n c e w e a r e n o t y e t p e r s u a d e d t h a t t h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f a

n o n - r a t i o n a l g i v e n i s n e c e s s a r y , h o w e v e r , h o p e r e m a i n s

t h a t o n e m a y still t r u s t a G o d w h o e n j o y s s o v e r e i g n t y

o v e r e v e r y h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y . 8 2

[ T h e a s s u m i n g o f t h e w h o l e Bible] i s a n h y p o t h e s i s t h a t

h a s b e e n c h o s e n w i t h t h e s a m e d i l i g e n c e a s t h a t o f a s c i e n -

tific h y p o t h e s i s . L i k e a n y h y p o t h e s i s , i t i s v e r i f i e d w h e n i t

r e s u l t s i n a n i m p l i c a t i v e s y s t e m w h i c h i s h o r i z o n t a l l y self-

c o n s i s t e n t a n d w h i c h v e r t i c a l l y f i t s t h e f a c t s . 8 3

B e c a u s e G o d ' s W o r d p a s s e s t h e t e s t o f m a t c h i n g u p t o t h e w e l l - k n o w n

f a c t s t h a t m e n h a v e c o l l e c t e d , i t i s a w o r t h y h y p o t h e s i s :

T h e f a c t o f t h e s e d a t a m a k e s t h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f G o d ' s e x -

i s t e n c e b o t h s c i e n t i f i c a l l y a n d r a t i o n a l l y s a t i s f y i n g . . . . I t i s

l i k e w i s e g o o d s c i e n c e t o d e c l a r e f o r f a i t h i n t h e e x i s t e n c e

77. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 253.

78. C. M. H o m e , "Van Til and Carnell—Part II," Jerusalem and Athens, ed. E. R.

Geehan (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 373.

79. See, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 161, 170, 174f., 205.

80. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 321.

81. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 253.

82. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 307.

83. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 174f.

2 1 0

EDWARD J. CARNELL

of God. The mark of an acceptable hypothesis is its abil-

ity to explain the facts as we experience them.... Is it not

good science to postulate the existence of God to account

for known data in human experience?84

Hence, simultaneous with the devaluation of the Bible to the status of a

hypothesis is the elevation of human reason and science as the proper

standards of truth against which all suppositions must be judged. If the

supposition of the Bible is to be accepted, that decision must be based on

coherence rather than the clear revelation of God, which carries utmost

authority in itself.

LOGICAL COHERENCE AND THE TESTING OF G O D ' S W O R D

Says Carnell, "The Biblical system ... presupposes (but refuses to dis-

cuss) that in whole perspective coherence, and in it alone, lies adequate

truth."85 Because of this man "must use the laws of logic to guide him into

paths that are rationally coherent.... We should only commit ourselves

to that which is rationally coherent.... The Bible defends the primacy

of reason as the faculty through which all options must clear."86 Logical

consistency is the surest negative test, the universal test, and the first test

of validity.87 Apparently this test is more certain than even the Bible, for

"in choosing between the system of Kant and the system of Christ, see,

first of all, which makes better peace with the law of contradiction."88

As Carnell sees it, Christianity can be judged as coherent be-

cause it never asks us to violate the reasonable dictate of non-contra-

diction.89 Man is pledged to balance all options by the rule of whole

perspective coherence.90

Since all we can find in history is probability, and since

all we can find in logic and mathematics is formal validi-

84. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 273, 270f.

85. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 40.

86. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 83.

87. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 187, 215; An Introduction to Christian

Apologetics, 86, 109.

88. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 99.

89. Carnell, "Preface," A Philosophy of the Christian Religion.

90. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 446.

211

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

ty, we cannot have complete truth until we unite them....

Perfect coherence always involves two elements: the law

of contradiction to give formal validity, and concrete facts

of history to give material validity.... This is proof by co-

herence.... The only proof [any man] can offer, both for

his system of philosophy and for the actions which flow

from it, is systematic coherence.... It is in this framework

that the Christian offers proof for his system.91

Carnell holds that it is reason that must test revelation.92 "Unless, there-

fore, we are to throw our apologetics to the wind at this point, a test for

faith must be devised.... If what is being believed makes peace with the

law of contradiction and the facts of experience, it is a faith which is

prompted by the Spirit of God."93

Systematic Coherence Test Self-Defeating

Has this last premise been proven by Carnell, or has he offered

scriptural reasons for us to accept it, or has it passed its own test? No.

We are left to presuppose its authority in order that we might establish

the authority of Scripture; the method should have been reversed! But

Carnell submits to the Bible only after it has met the test of "system-

atic consistency."94 For example: "Submission to the system of Biblical

Christianity is good ... because the system is able to support spirituality

through its rigorous systematic consistency."95 Or again,

The Christian finds his system of philosophy in the Bible,

to be sure, but he accepts this, not simply because it is in

the Bible, but because, when tested, it makes better sense

out of life than other systems of philosophy make.... In

91. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 106f.

92. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 31, 38.

93. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 67, 70.

94. "It is a consistency because it is based upon a rigid application of the law of con-

tradiction, and it is a systematic consistency because the data which are formed into this

consistent system are taken from the totality of our experiences, within and without"

(Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 59).

95. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 506; see also An Introduction to Chris-

tian Apologetics, 175.

212

EDWARD J. CARNELL

the game of locating truth, the winner is he who estab-

lishes coherence."96

There are numerous problems with this test by systematic consistency:

In the first place it requires the abandonment of the self-authenticating

nature of Scripture (as indicated above). So the Bible does not function

as the absolute standard of truth for man, but a more ultimate standard

is raised above it. Furthermore, Carnell has simply not grasped what

a massive claim he makes when he thinks Christianity can be shown to

pass the test of systematic consistency; to examine the totality of even

our own personal experience (inner and outer), much less the totality

of experience of mankind, and to make full syllogistic and logical in-

quiry into our thinking and knowledge (plus the knowledge gained by

the sciences throughout history) would take far more than anyone hu-

man lifetime and energy—yet Carnell handles it in one volume\ We really

must doubt that Carnell has done an adequate job of testing the Bible

for systematic consistency. Moreover, has he really considered the stakes

involved or the heart's feelings in his test? Given the extremely low num-

ber of men who have risen (allegedly) from the dead, the fact that I have

never seen it happen, the coldness and lifelessness of a corpse, the great

discontinuity between the process of living and the state of death which

is followed by decomposition in the grave, the stakes are simply too high

for me to live a life of self-renunciation and honesty, struggling to know

more and more about an apparently irrelevant book of history and aph-

orisms (i.e., the Bible); there is little to base a belief in an afterlife upon,

but much to commend the philosophy of "eat, drink, and be merry."

Could an application of systematic consistency dissuade such reasoning?

Carnell is also inconsistent with his own system. He says that truth is

both that which has systematic consistency and that which corresponds

to the mind of God.97 These can be combined then by saying that "per-

fect systematic consistency is perfect correspondence with the mind of

God."98 But then Carnell turns around and makes the test for truth to be

systematic consistency rather than conformity to God's Word! He even

subjects God's Word to that test! Hence Carnell ends up seeing the test

mentioned in 1 John 4:1 as that of systematic consistency, whereas John

96. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 102.

97. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 47, 61, 64.

122. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 117.

213

CONSISTENT pRESUPPOSITIONALISM

takes it to be conformity to the Word of God!"

Then again Carnell's actions betray his own lack of confidence,

though not admitted, in this test by systematic consistency, for when

the opposition gets really tough he resorts to appeals to the Bible.100

Since Carnell saw the centrality of the Bible in modern philosophic

presuppositions,101 why did he not simply begin with the authoritative

truth of God's Word in confronting his opponents rather than bringing

it in only after the test for systematic consistency was exhausted?

Another grave problem with this test is the fact that, without the reve-

lation of God given in the Bible as presupposed, there is no way for the au-

tonomous man to unite bare facts and bare logic. The problem of the one

and the many remains the skeptical chasm under all unbelieving thought.

Carnell's test appears to be the very endorsement of this vain attempt to

bring the uninterpreted diversity of experience into fruitful contact with

the organizing and unifying principles of logic.

And then again, there is the drawback in the test by systematic con-

sistency that it really does not accomplish the validation of Christianity

to which Carnell sends it. Since Carnell does not think that the sys-

tematization of the Bible can be accomplished, there is no Christian

option in the form of a system to be tested by systematic consistency

after all. "It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to coax all the data

of Scripture into neat harmony."102 Furthermore, Carnell confesses that

the believer "will not always see the consistency in God's thoughts, but

he is convinced that there is a consistency."103 How then can Carnell

grant the un believing, unregenerate, natural man the prerogative to test

consistency of God's revelation! That consistency is presupposed by the

Christian; it cannot be worked up to as a conclusion by the hostile sinner

who will not bow before the authority of God's Word. Finally, the reader

is referred to the problems that were mentioned above as undermining

the coherence test suggested by Clark in his own apologetic.

99. See Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 70, 73.

100. See Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 73; A Philosophy of the Christian

Religion, 82, 126f., 273, 328, 506.

101. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 28.

102. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 285; The Case for Orthodox Theology,

99.

114. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 103, Bahnsen's emphasis.

214

EDWARD J. CARNELL

God's Word Subject to Logic

Concommitant to Carnell's failure to take the Bible as his abso-

lute presupposition, his possibilism, and his view of Christianity as a

hypothesis to be tested by systematic consistency, is his verificationalism.

This is, as was the case with Clark, perhaps the most obvious proof

that Carnell is not a presuppositionalist but at heart a rationalist with

affinities to scholasticism.

Why should faith be exempted from the general rule

that all belief is subjected to the law of contradiction in

the light of the facts of history? What higher floor in the

building of knowledge is there than coherence?... A con-

sistent system is a true system. Were a person to demand

a higher or a more perfect test than this, he would only

show his want of education.104

The section from which the latter portion of this quote was taken is

entitled "The Verification of the Christian World View," and in it Car-

nell offers two principles for verification which he says apply equally to

philosophy and theology. Contrary to his opinion, a revelation from

God is much higher in the building of knowledge than coherence, and

divine revelation is a far more perfect test for truth than coherence. If

this shows a lack of education, it is a lack of education from the school of

Athens, not from the wisdom of Jerusalem (see Tertullian, The Prescrip-

tion Against Heretics, VII). Carnell audaciously maintains that the way in

which we validate the authority of another man must be the same way

in which the trustworthiness of God's authority is authenticated: "If this

credible individual be oneself, the man across the street, or God, one

should follow exactly the same rule."105 "When one comes averring to be

from God, it surely is a man's duty to demand a proof that this is so."106

"All pretenses to revelation must be put through a scrutinizing test."107

Therefore, "the Bible should be tested in the light of relevant criteria."108

104. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 119; Christian Commitment, An

Apologetic, 286.

105. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 30.

106. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 268f.

107. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 31.

108. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 41.

215

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Far from being a self-attesting, authoritative book, the Bible is viewed by

Carnell as in need of being "grounded in reasonable evidences."109 "The

Spirit of God draws men through the convicting power of evidences'"110

rather than by witnessing to the word of God.

This brings us to what is perhaps the most characteristic quota-

tion from Carnell's apologetic writings; it sums up well the attitude and

method of his defense of the faith:

Bring on your revelations! Let them make peace with

the law of contradiction and the facts of history, and they

will deserve a rational man's assent.111

Because the Bible is not repulsive to the reason of man or the corpus of

well-attested truth, because it satisfies the "scholar," because it appeases all

the criteria of truth laid down by the unregenerate philosopher, because

it satisfies the needs of hedonism, positivism, philosophy, humanism,

finitism, universalism, Roman Catholicism, and existentialism, it passes

its exams "summa cum laude"—says Carnell.112 And the most amaz-

ing thing about this misguided apologetic is Carnell's saying that when

a man will not believe on the basis of the testimony of God's revealed

Word but persists in making such a test of God, "God honors the effort,"

which Carnell describes as "humble"!113

We must register strong disagreement here; true humility was exempli-

fied by our Incarnate Lord when He refused to put God to a test but rested

secure in the divine Scriptures as Satan tempted Him in the wilderness.

This attitude is worlds apart from the apologetic thrust of Carnell when he

says that the Christian '''"must prove that the Red Sea actually parted, that

Lazarus actually rose from the grave, and that there is a heaven and hell

toward which the righteous and the unrighteous are gravitating.'"114

109. Carnell, A Phibsophy of the Christian Religion, 449.

110. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 8.

111. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 178.

112. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 178f.; The Case for Orthodox The-

ology, 90; A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 512ff.

113. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 84.

114. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 103, Bahnsen's emphasis.

216

EDWARD J. CARNELL

CARNELL'S VERIFICATIONALISM

Because Carnell has this defective verificationalism inherent in his apol-

ogetic, he also has an erroneous view of faith. In its unexplained form

the statement, "Generic faith is a resting of the mind in the sufficiency

of the evidences,"115 would seem acceptable enough, for a self-attesting

revelation of God is indeed sufficient evidence (as well as necessary, au-

thoritative, and clear). However, this is not allowed by Carnell; he insists

that "the ground of belief is the sufficiency, not the kind or source, of

evidence."116 Even if it is the revelation of God it must prove its suffi-

ciency as evidence before it can be believed; the source of the Bible does

not guarantee its sufficiency as Carnell sees things.

Faith Subject to Reason

What does he mean by the "sufficiency of the evidences"? It is clear

that when he sees faith as the resting of the heart in the sufficiency of

the evidences,117 he does not mean trusting an authority of any kind, even

God's.118 He says, "The extent of this sufficiency is measured by a cool

and dispassionate use of reason,"119 and, "Sound generic faith always

rests on warranted belief."120 Carnell tells us clearly what he means by suf-

ficient evidences when he says, "As long as I have breath, I shall argue

that faith is a whole-hearted response to critically tested evidences.... We

mean a whole-souled satisfaction with critically tested judgments."121

Carnell maintains, therefore, that faith is based on autonomous

reasoning which has verified or proved to the critical faculties of man

himself that the object is worthy of trust; the authority is clearly man's,

not God's. "Faith must be founded in objectively verifiable metaphysical

theories."122 So in Carnell's apologetic, one does not begin his reason-

ing with God as the necessarily presupposed authority, but his ultimate

115. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 450.

116. Carnell, The Case for Orthotdox Theology, 25.

117. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 70, 83, 175; Christian Commitment,

An Apologetic, 76, 267.

118. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 70.

119. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 76.

120. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 78.

121. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 198, 267; Bahnsen's emphasis.

122. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 117.

217

C O N S I S T E N T P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L I S M

starting point is the authority of man's reason. This signifies a departure

from the Augustinian position that faith leads to understanding and an

endorsement of the position of Aquinas that faith must have a rational founda-

tion or platform on which to stand. Generic faith is based on rationally

warranted, autonomous, and critically tested judgments for Carnell. He

says, "Unless saving faith is grounded in generic faith, it is really not

faith at all. It is blind trust."123 (Should we conclude that those who draw

back from following Carnell's autonomous apologetic method do not

have saving faith?)

T h e traces of scholasticism are not difficult to find in Carnell's writ-

ings. "First we know in order that we might believe."124 A good example

is his book A Philosophy of the Christian Religion. In it Carnell attempts to

ease up the ladder from the worst philosophies to the bad ones, to the

better ones, to the best one (i.e., Christianity). Carnell works up through

natural revelation eventually to special revelation later; the Bible is

brought in at the last as the unbeliever is gradually led from paganism

to Christianity by means of "stepping stones" or a ladder of rational de-

grees. ("The rational connections seem sufficient to me.")125 T h e r e is no

challenge of the sinner's autonomy and hypocritical "neutrality" from

the very outset; starting with the ground on which the unbeliever stands,

Carnell would build the Christian apologetical edifice. While still dis-

cussing non-Christian philosophy, Carnell says, "It is at this point where

the first piles are driven for the bridge which leads us to God";126 he

works from well-attested truth gathered by m a n to belief in God.127 He

presses on from humanism to theism128 and brings in G o d to complete

his system, the capstone to a rational structure beneath.

Man's Moral Sentiment Primary

Carnell exhibits the same method in his book Christian Commitment.

His starting point is m a n in action, not G o d the moral judge. From an

autonomous pou sto constituted by his own analysis of the moral-spiritual

123. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 269.

124. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 515.

125. Carnell, "Preface," A Philosophy of the Christian Religion.

126. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 260.

127. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 270f.

137. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 277.

218

Edward j. C a r n e l l

e n v i r o n m e n t and the duties that hold m e n , Carnell would work up to

the surety of God's existence, a d v a n c i n g his analysis by degrees of ever-

deepening autonomous u n d e r s t a n d i n g of man's situation (without the

interpretation rendered in God's Word). " W e start with realities t h a t hold

us f r o m existence itself"; " G o d completes the moral cycle by answering to

the judicial sentiment.'"129 C a r n e l l sees each m a n as revealing his belief

in an administrator of justice when that m a n judges others,130 a n d this

is analytically established. However, it is not h a r d to see that Carnell's

particular conclusion does not follow by definition at all, and even if it

did he would fallaciously be a r g u i n g f r o m a definition to the reality of

its referent! His m e t h o d of a r g u m e n t shows us t h a t while the Bible needs

proof, the correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the realities that hold a m a n in the

moral a n d spiritual environment c a n be ascertained independently. T h e

a r g u m e n t is to the effect that we can be certain of h u m a n morals, a n d

these point to the (less certain) conclusion that there is a G o d .

But the direction of this a r g u m e n t is wrong. Carnell says, "If we

c a n n o t a p p r o a c h one another without satisfying the claims of the moral

a n d spiritual environment, how can we avoid these claims w h e n ap-

p r o a c h i n g God?"131 Yet he should a r g u e vice versa, f r o m G o d to m a n (as

the first great c o m m a n d m e n t precedes the second!). Moreover, Carnell's

a r g u m e n t s against all options except the Christian G o d as qualifying

as the moral j u d g e involved in the judicial sentiment are completely

unconvincing.132 Carnell thinks that his " m o r a l a r g u m e n t " escapes the

pitfalls of Kant's, for K a n t dealt with conscience (rather t h a n the j u -

dicial sentiment) which is subject to cultural conditioning, a n d K a n t ' s

postulation of God's existence was based on wishful thinking.133 How-

ever, conscience is just as unconditioned as is judicial sentiment in the

weak sense that Carnell sees judicial sentiment as unconditioned (i.e.,

all m e n are aroused by mistreatment—yet all m e n are pricked by con-

science as well!). What constitutes mistreatment a n d what brings p a n g s

of conscience are both culturally influenced. C a r n e l l thinks that the j u -

dicial sentiment analytically includes G o d , a n d so his a r g u m e n t is not

wishful thinking like Kant's; yet this analytical connection between the

129. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 102, 101, Bahnsen's emphasis.

130. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 103.

131. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 127.

132. See Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 104-107.

133. See Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 110—116.

219

C O N S I S T E N T P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L I S M

judicial sentiment and G o d is far from self-evident! M a n y people do not

use moral language meaning that G o d exists (even if they should in order

to have a basis for ethics). So Carnell's argument is basically K a n t i a n in

approach and fellowships in its errors.

Lastly, we note that Carnell's insistence that the will of m a n is cor-

rupted by sin undermines his apologetic method in Christian Commitment.134

A final indication of the scholasticism in Carnell's apologetic is found in

his three philosophically autonomous arguments for God's existence. A

rational argument from the self as finite and the rationes aeternae can be

found, and an argument for the necessary existence of God,135 as well as

an argument from the time-and-space-transcending nature of values.136

T h e errors of attempting such autonomous theistic proofs are discussed

under our treatment of Clark. T h e interesting thing with Carnell is that

he himself criticized philosophers for doing exactly the same thing he

was engaged in doing: calling in G o d to give completeness to a ratio-

nally devised system!137

A f u r t h e r indication that autonomy afflicts the apologetic system of

Carnell is found in the fact that he held that G o d and His Word could

be tested by standards that unregenerate men devised to anticipate

God's character.

If the meaning of God's character cannot be anticipated

by information drawn from our own conception of de-

cency, what significance is conveyed by the term "God"?

A n d how can G o d be distinguished from other unknow-

ables? ... If we have no moral equipment with which

to judge what agrees or disagrees with the character of

G o d , then what we think is consistent with perfect rec-

titude may, when the scrolls of eternity are unrolled, be

134. See Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 198.

135. "We here argue from within the Thomistic-Kantian tradition. If anything

exists, something exists of necessity. This necessity is God" (Carnell, Christian Commit-

ment, An Apologetic, 130).

136. "Since values can exist only in a mind ... and since the values with which we

are confronted in the cycle of guilt and forgiveness are time-and-space-transcending,

it follows that the mind which supports them must likewise be time-and-space-tran-

scending. What mind can this be but God?" (Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Reli-

gion, 271).

137. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 277.

220

Edward j. C a r n e l l

found consistent with malignity a n d error.... If G o d does

not extend fellowship in ways that can be n a m e d by a pa-

tient study of the m a n n e r in which we extend fellowship

to one another, we have no sure way of answering those

w h o say t h a t G o d m a y confront m a n on terms which,

when j u d g e d by o u r highest n o r m s of rectitude, are con-

t r a r y to goodness.... Unless we can meaningfully antici-

pate God's standards of rectitude, it m a y t u r n out that

the book ... that is least moral on h u m a n standards is

most moral on divine standards; a n d we are once again

left with skepticism.138

T h e most f u n d a m e n t a l question that we must direct at Carnell's position

at this point is whether sinners have or do not have p r o p e r standards of

ethical j u d g m e n t . Scripture says that while m e n c a n n o t eradicate the

image of G o d a n d voice of conscience, nevertheless m e n on the con-

scious level of intention do not judge aright but need the special revela-

tion of G o d . To allow the apologetic m e t h o d proposed by Carnell here

would be to p e r m i t m a n to create G o d in man's o w n image; rather, we

should d e m a n d that man's imago Dei be set right by God's revealed law in

covenantal Scripture. T h e skepticism which Carnell uses to drive us in

the direction of a u t o n o m y would be valid only if it were not the case that

God's general revelation is constantly impressing all men; when their

hearts are regenerated by the Holy Spirit they have sufficient evidence

to corroborate that it is indeed the Creator w h o is speaking in the Bible.

T h e clear revelation in n a t u r e a n d man's constitution parallels the clear

revelation of G o d in Scripture; Carnell has no grounds for skepticism.

Further, in Carnell's a r g u m e n t , who is the upright m a n ? Using

Carnell's o w n observation,139 we are led to ask if G o d is the author of

confusion based on the variation of standards held by m e n . T h e r e is

no practical way for Carnell to apply his apologetic of anticipation, for

the unregenerate disagree a m o n g themselves as m u c h as they disagree

with the Bible! A g a i n , we wonder if A b r a h a m could have used Carnell's

m e t h o d a n d concluded that the supernatural direction he received with

respect to sacrificing Isaac was that of the devil, since A b r a h a m could

138. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 138, 133, 152, 142.

139. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 111.

221

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

not have anticipated that such a request could comport with the nature

of God. The real threat is not that on Judgment Day we should find our

accepted standards to be wrong after all, but is that we should grant

the unbeliever the presumption to judge God's Word even though the

unbeliever is totally depraved and misuses the moral and epistemologi-

cal equipment that is his by creation. In ourselves we are not sufficient

to work out a proper ethical system, for Adam was given special revela-

tion even in the Garden; and after the fall into sin, only a written law

revealed by God can serve as our moral standard.

Carnell does not escape the difficulties of his apologetic by noting that

he would apply an abstract notion of Goodness to determine who is God

and who is the devil only in an introductory sense.140 Carnell holds that once

God has passed our test and we are sure that it is God addressing us, then

it would be inappropriate to continue to judge Him by anything but His

own Word. However, this will simply not do in the context of Carnell's

apologetic. We simply could not know how long a malignant demon could

continue to deceive us, so we would have to maintain our application of the

abstract notion of goodness to every supernatural message that came our

way. And even overlooking this fact, it is not at all clear why God should

honor any application of an autonomous principle to Himself even if for

only introductory purposes; He has given clear revelation of Himself to

man, and only sin (which is due to the will of man) obstructs it. The sinner

can never be held innocent in subjecting God to his autonomous criteria of

divinity; the reason for unbelief has nothing to do with God but everything

to do with the disobedience of the unbeliever. It is the rebel who is on trial,

not God. The unregenerate will never self-consciously be able to anticipate

God's standards (though he may know them in his heart of hearts); because

of his sin he will do everything possible to avoid being openly confronted

with God. And because of his sin his own reasoning and moral standards

are distorted. Hence there is no unprejudiced pagan to whom Carnell

might appeal and have him by self-reflection arrive at something pretty

close to Christian standards—even at an introductory level.

The presuppositionalist who takes God's Word as the most ulti-

mate authority and standard of thought will be appalled when Carnell

holds that,

140. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 315, 326, 342f.; Christian

Commitment, An Apologetic, 149.

222

EDWARD J. CARNELL

The reason why we are able to trust Christ is that he spoke

and lived in a way which is congenial with our axiological

expectations.... Jesus Christ is worthy of our faith—and

consequently ought to receive it—because both his per-

son and his doctrine are rationally continuous with the

values which we have already accepted in ordinary ex-

perience Jesus is a good man because he verified ev-

erything that a decent society means by goodness.... He

is the absolute embodiment of whatever relative goodness

we acknowledge in one another.141

The amazing inconsistency of Carnell at this point is seen in the fact

that he turns around and with critical tone delivers this indictment: "All

non-Christian religions construe their ethic on the optimism that the

virtues of the tribe are continuous with the virtues of God."142 Carnell

should have applied this very criticism to his own apologetic; he might

then have avoided its crippling autonomy.

CARNELL'S PROBABILISM

We saw in the case of Clark that his failure to take the truth of

Scripture as the absolute presupposition, together with his possibilism,

his suppositionalism, and his verificationalism led inevitably to viewing

Christianity as probably true only; this same probabilism is the outcome

of Carnell's apologetic:

Since their systems are never complete, however, proposi-

tional truth can never pass beyond probability.... In lieu

of perfect insight men must live by the rule of probability

... [in the realm of material truth]. Here one cannot rise

above probability.... Probability, as Butler established, is

the guide of life.... Rational probability is the guide of

life.... All we can find in history is probability.143

141. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 474, 495; The Case for Orthodox

Theology, 82.

142. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 89.

143. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 453, 43; An Introduction to Christian

Apologetics, 105f., 113.

223

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Now if contemporary man only has probability to guide him,144 he will

not get much more when he turns to Scripture. Rather than finding

there the certain truth of God which is necessary for all of man's in-

tellectual ventures, Carnell tells him that the Bible contains (only) "a

plausible system of thought."145 Carnell does not take God's revelation

as essential to all demonstration and argumentation, nor does he see the

truth of it as essential to making sense out of the notion of probability

itself. Instead he asserts that

Proof for the Christian faith, as proof for any world-

view that is worth talking about, cannot rise above ra-

tional probability.... The first reason why Christianity

cannot—and does not want to—rise to demonstration

is that it is founded on historical facts, which, by their

very nature, cannot be demonstrated with geometric

certainty.... If the scientist cannot rise above rational

probability in his empirical investigation, why should the

Christian claim more?146

The answer to that last question should be obvious to a presuppositional

apologist. Not only do the Christian Scriptures claim far more than

mere probability for their truth, but the apologist for this faith wants his

defense to present the strongest possible challenge to unbelief—a chal-

lenge that demands the repentance of those who rebel against the sure

truth of God. If the defender of the Christian system does not argue for

the certain truth of the Bible he is not defending the message of that

Bible, and if he presents its truth as only probable he forfeits his argu-

mentative strength and he drops Christianity to the level of any other

"probability." The Christian wants to claim more than the scientist be-

cause the Christian wants the scientist to see that his efforts depend

upon the prior truth of God's revelation. Christianity is "worth talking

about" precisely because it rises above mere probability.

Adding injury to insult, Carnell sees the fact that Christianity (on his

basis) cannot be more than probably true as a gain! "This admission...

is not a form of weakness.... The system of Christianity can be refuted

144. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 23.

145. Carnell, A Phibsophy of the Christian Religion, 38.

114. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 103, Bahnsen's emphasis.

224

EDWARD J. CARNELL

only by probability. Perhaps our loss is our gain?"147 By reducing the

truth of God to the epistemic level of its opposition Carnell would pro-

tect it from refutation; if mystery or uncertainty surrounds everything,

then there is always hope that the Bible is perchance the truth. Since no-

body knows, nobody knows that Christianity is false. Such a "defense"

of the faith is not worthy of that name; this is simply a non-apologetic, for it

offers no positive reason for the hope that is in us. The retreat to skeptical

probabilism does Christian apologetics no service; the despisers of the

faith can make exactly the same move. Carnell makes the same mistake

that Clark did in his coherence approach to apologetics; he as much as

admits that this coherence cannot be exhibited. So the next best thing

would be having the least faults.

There are blind spots in the Christian revelation—many

of them. Therefore, whoever wants to find fault with

Scripture will assuredly meet with no difficulty in his

labor. But is this the course prudence dictates? Is not a

rational man satisfied with that system which is attended

by the fewest difficulties?148

The best that the apologist could offer under these conditions is that

Christianity is not as wrong as other alternatives. And although Carnell

tends to give the impression in many points of his writing that Christi-

anity has a high probability of being true, he does finally admit, "When

judged by the precision of science, the claims of religion rate low on the

scale of plausibility."149 Hence the Carnellian apologetic is doomed to

be practically ineffective, for it intends to show the probability of the

Bible's truth while recognizing its low plausibility and while capitulating

to the ascendancy of science. Moreover, Carnell's probabilism nullifies

any conclusiveness that his apologetic might hope to attain; if Christianity

is only probably true, as Carnell claims, then he is certainly mistaken

to conclude that only it will bring dignity, hope, and spiritual promise.150

Not only is Carnell inconsistent with his view of probability, we also

wonder about the consistency of the very notion of "rational probabil-

147. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 115 footnote 15.

148. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 514; see also Carnell, An Introduc-

tion to Christian Apologetics, 121.

149. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 81.

150. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 329.

225

C O N S I S T E N T P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L I S M

ity." T h i s a p p e a r s t o b e a h y b r i d o f r a t i o n a l demonstration p l u s a f i t w i t h

t h e f a c t s t h a t no one can be sure of, f u l l y k n o w , or a s s u r e d l y e x p e c t — t h a t

is, omniscient ignorance! O v e r l o o k i n g t h i s h o w e v e r , w e still m u s t q u e r y a s

t o h o w C a r n e l l c o u l d a v o i d t h e c o n c l u s i o n t o w h i c h E . S . B r i g h t m a n

c a m e , s e e i n g t h a t C a r n e l l o p e n l y a d m i t s t h a t h i s e p i s t e m o l o g y i s t a k e n

f r o m B r i g h t m a n . 1 5 1 A c c o r d i n g t o B r i g h t m a n n o conclusions c a n f i n a l l y b e

r e a c h e d : " t r u t h n e v e r r e a c h e s t h e s t a g e o f c o m p l e t e n e s s . . . . T h e r e i s a

n e v e r e n d i n g q u e s t a n d a n e v e r w i d e n i n g h o r i z o n . " 1 5 2 T h i s p o s i t i o n i s

e x p r e s s e d b y B r i g h t m a n a t t h e e n d o f a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e test f o r t r u t h , a

d i s c u s s i o n w h i c h C a r n e l l s a y s h e t o o k e n bloc f r o m B r i g h t m a n ' s b o o k . 1 5 3

W e m u s t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e e p i s t e m o l o g y o n w h i c h C a r n e l l ' s p r o b a -

b i l i s m r e s t s i s i n h e r e n t l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a C h r i s t i a n a p o l o g e t i c t h a t

i n t e n d s t o b e conclusive i n its a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y i s t r u e . O n e

m u s t i n d e e d w o n d e r h o w C a r n e l l c o u l d h o l d t h a t i t w a s p o s s i b l e t o h a v e

c o m p l e t e m o r a l a s s u r a n c e o f C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s t r u t h . T h e a n s w e r lies i n

s t r e s s i n g t h e w o r d " m o r a l . " C a r n e l l s o m e h o w t h o u g h t t h a t m o r a l c e r -

t a i n t y w a s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h m e r e rational probability,154 H o w e v e r , i n c o n -

t r a d i c t i o n t o t h i s , C a r n e l l t o o k " m o r a l a s s u r a n c e " t o b e " a p p r e h e n d e d

s t r e n g t h o f e v i d e n c e " 1 5 5 a n d s a i d ,

T h e o n l y w a y a p e r s o n c a n m a i n t a i n b o t h s o c i a l r e s p e c t

a n d p e r s o n a l s a n i t y is to proportion his commitment to t h e

v e r a c i o u s n e s s o f t h e e v i d e n c e w h i c h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g

p r o c e s s e s . . . . T h e o b l i g a t i o n o f t h e w i l l t o c l e a r w i t h t h e

v e r d i c t o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g r i s e s i n direct ratio t o t h e i m -

p o r t a n c e o f t h e v a l u e a t stake.156

A n d R o n a l d N a s h q u o t e s C a r n e l l a s s a y i n g " i n o u r d a i l y l i v i n g w e pro-

portion o u r i n w a r d r e s p o n s e t o t h e c e r t a i n t y o f t h e e v i d e n c e s . " 1 5 7 A c c o r d -

i n g l y C a r n e l l ' s a p o l o g e t i c c o u l d o n l y a l l o w o n e t o h a v e p r o b a b l e m o r a l

a s s u r a n c e a n d n e v e r c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y o f t h e B i b l e ' s t r u t h . H e n c e t h e

151. See Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 47, 56, 59, 82, 95.

152. E. S. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and

Winston, 1951), 71.

153. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 47 footnote 2.

154. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 116-120.

155. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 117.

156. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 474, 477; Bahnsen's emphasis.

157. Ronald Nash, The New Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1963), 57.

226

E D W A R D J . C A R N E L L

p r o b a b i l i s m o f C a r n e l l ' s d e f e n s e o f t h e f a i t h u n d e r m i n e s C h r i s t i a n f a i t h

i n b o t h its o b j e c t i v e a n d s u b j e c t i v e a s p e c t s .

M I S C E L L A N E O U S C R I T I C I S M S O F C A R N E L L ' S A P O L O G E T I C

B e f o r e l e a v i n g o u r c r i t i q u e o f C a r n e l l , s h o r t c o m m e n t s h o u l d b e m a d e u p o n

f u r t h e r f l a w s i n h i s a p o l o g e t i c , i n c l u d i n g h i s v i e w o f b r u t e facts, r a t i o n a l i s m ,

e x p e r i e n t i a l i s m , a u t o n o m y , c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , a n d d o c t r i n a l a b e r r a t i o n s .

Brute Fact vs. Revelation

T h e b i b l i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l i s t h o l d s t h a t e v e r y f a c t o f t h e u n i v e r s e

a n d h i s t o r y i s p r e i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e s o v e r e i g n C r e a t o r ; i t i s what i t i s

i n v i r t u e o f H i s p l a n a n d k n o w l e d g e . H e n c e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e w o r l d

c o r r e c t l y o n e m u s t s u b o r d i n a t e h i s t h i n k i n g t o t h e r e v e l a t i o n o f G o d ,

t h i n k i n g H i s t h o u g h t s a f t e r H i m i n a r e c e p t i v e l y r e c o n s t r u c t i v e f a s h i o n .

M e a n i n g i s n o t a t t a c h e d t o b r u t e f a c t s b y m a n ' s m i n d , b u t a l l f a c t s b e a r

t h e m e a n i n g t h a t G o d a s s i g n s a n d m u s t b e k n o w n a s s u c h .

I n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n f r o m t h i s C a r n e l l a l l o w s f o r t h e b r u t e n e s s o f

f a c t s , a n d b e c a u s e h e d o e s s o h e c a n h o l d t h a t t h e r e i s c o m m o n g r o u n d

b e t w e e n t h e C h r i s t i a n a n d n o n - C h r i s t i a n s c i e n t i s t s — a c o m m o n g r o u n d

t h a t i s u n a f f e c t e d b y o n e ' s l o g i c a l s t a r t i n g p o i n t a n d i s i r r e l e v a n t t o o n e ' s

p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t s o r r e l i g i o n . 1 5 8 B e r n a r d R a m m e x p l a i n s t h i s f a c e t

of C a r n e l l ' s a p o l o g e t i c by s a y i n g t h a t it holds facts to exist prior to meaning:

" T h e y a r e c o m m o n a s f a c t s ; t h e y a r e n o t c o m m o n w h e n i n t e r p r e t e d . " 1 5 9

S o i n s t e a d o f d e m a n d i n g t h a t all f a c t s b e u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e b a s i s o f

C h r i s t i a n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e r e v e l a t i o n o f G o d , C a r n e l l s a y s ,

K n o w l e d g e i s t h e m i n d ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f meaning.... F a c t s

j u s t are.... A f a c t i s a n y u n i t o f b e i n g w h i c h i s c a p a b l e o f

b e a r i n g m e a n i n g . . . . E a c h o f t h e s e f a c t - s i t u a t i o n s m u s t b e

e x p l a i n e d . . . . M e a n i n g i s w h a t t h e m i n d e n t e r t a i n s w h e n

i t p a s s e s j u d g m e n t u p o n t h e f a c t s . 1 6 0

O n t h i s b a s i s f a c t s d o n o t r e v e a l t h e i r C r e a t o r b u t t h e o r d e r i n g m i n d o f

158. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 214.

159. Bernard R a m m , Types of Apologetic Systems, 232; see also p. 231.

160. Carnell , An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 9 If., 213.

227

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

the creature-—the creature who is rebelling against the clear revelation

of God all about him! It comes as no surprise that Carnell, holding to

the bruteness of facts, fails to capitalize in his apologetic on the fact that

God makes Himself perspicuously known in all the facts of His universe;

instead Carnell maintains that "all reality is obscure."161

Carnell's Rationalism

The overweening rationalism in Carnell's system is exhibited first

of all in his view that truth is propositional correspondence to reality and

that truth is a property of a proposition162 This propositional view of truth

has been discussed and criticized under Clark.163 Truth is broader than

propositions (e.g., John 14:6), but such an assertion makes a rationalist

holding to the coherence ideal uneasy. It makes the presuppositionalist

uneasy when Carnell says that "Christianity does not gainsay ... that

reason guides the wise man into life," or that we must have "faith in

what reason gains."164 Is it not rather that the Word of the Lord is the lamp

of our feet, the light of our path? Should not our trust be in the Lord,

looking to Him to direct our paths?

Carnell would have reason judge the trustworthiness of the Lord

rather than vice versa. He holds to the ultimacy and primacy of the laws

of logic165 rather than the law of the Logos, the Word of the Lord. To

Carnell the "most perfect philosophical argument ever devised" is, "Sig-

nificant speech must obey the law of contradiction."166 However, one

should think that the existence and revelation of God is a more suit-

able foundation for logic than human needs for speech, and hence the

presuppositional argument for God's existence, rather than that of logic,

would be more certain than the argument Carnell mentions. Carnell

makes reason the supreme judge in matters of truth, even more authori-

tative than the revelation from God;167 he declares that "there are no

161. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 209.

162. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 450, 453.

163. See pages 159-174 above.

164. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 29, 30.

165. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 184

166. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 40.

167. Carnell , An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 178.

228

EDWARD I. CARNELL

limits to reason as a test for truth."168 The presuppositionalist would

maintain, by contrast, that reason cannot and should not be used to put

the Lord God to a test; therefore, it has its limits. It gives us pause when

we see the picture that Carnell seems to paint of the status of logic in his-

tory. "Rationally necessary connections will abide yesterday, today, and

forever. Validity is immutable."169 These laws of logic are uncreated.170

And in harmony with a Platonistic gestalt Carnell says that God made

the world to be relevant to the laws of logic.171 The bad impression such a

viewpoint creates is not relieved when Carnell uses language suggesting

that God is bound to the laws of logic.172 A more proper view of logic was

suggested above in our critique of Clark.

Carnell's Experientialism

The bankruptcy of authority in Carnell's apologetic is manifest in

his references to experiential verification of Christianity. Rather than

demanding repentance of the sinner based on the objectively true and

ultimately authoritative Word of Christ, Carnell reverts to a form of

"Christian hedonism" (what a sorry phrase!).

There is no proof of any pudding apart from the eat-

ing.... One should commit himself wholeheartedly to

that which gets him where he wants to go A perfect

commitment should leave deposits of satisfaction on the

spirit which are able to sustain love even after physical

vitalities have failed.173

Carnell says that positivism should be rejected because it does not bring

anticipated happiness for one's person174—but what if this is just the cold,

bleak fact of existence? He says we should view God as both transcendent

168. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 246.

169. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 213.

170. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 306 footnote 49.

171. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 306.

172. For example, He "follows," "obeys," "abides by" the "laws of Aristotelian

logic"; see Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 306; An Introduction to Christian

Apologetics, 60 footnote 19.

173. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 45, 147, 220.

174. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 146.

229

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

and immanent since this is more satisfying in meeting man's needs175—

but what if the universe is simply not congenial to man and his needs?

Carnell says that the heart cannot yield to a finite god without disappoint-

ment; "the heart... knows that it would be better if God were sovereign,

for love would then have a perfect environment for expression."176 Yet he

does not tell us why we should not expect reality to disappoint us or why

Bertrand Russell's "A Free Man's Worship" is not more in tune with what

is objectively the case about the world in which we exist.

Autonomy

In examining various doctrinal hypotheses Carnell wants "to test

the gains and losses which the heart experiences if it chooses one option

over against the other."177 In addition to being a slight to the authority of

God's Word, this procedure reduces to the relativistic error of creating

God and the world according to man's imagination. Forgetting that the

natural man is satisfied with any number of sinful desires, that his powers

of evaluation are distorted, Carnell encourages him to test Christianity

finally by experience: "The final proof is in the actual taste.... Thus with

Christianity: are its premises able to satisfy the whole man? Is Christianity

nourishing and clean?"178 The fact that the man regenerated by the power

of the Holy Spirit answers yes but the unregenerate answers no "proves"

nothing at all; these facts are about the various persons involved, not the

world that objectively forms their environment. Christianity will never

satisfy the reprobate, but it will always be true. The Christian hedonism179

that Carnell encourages simply cannot escape the sneering accusation of

its being wishful thinking; it serves to prove Marx's declaration that reli-

gion is merely "the opiate of the masses." It is certainly the case that faith

in Christ is most satisfying to the believer, but the objective truth and ne-

175. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 290—294.

176. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 304, 305.

177. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 361.

178. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 516.

179. Since Bahnsen penned this no later than 1979, it appears that

he coined the phrase "Christian hedonism" years before John Piper. Most

people rightfully attribute it to Piper, who certainly came to it on his own

in 1986, and who uses it in a different sense. Nevertheless, here we have

great example of how Bahnsen's intellect put him way ahead of his time.

230

E D W A R D J . C A R N E L L

cessity of the presupposed authority of Scripture must be conjoined with

this fact before it can be effectively used as an apologetical lever.

A few r a n d o m observations centering around the autonomy implic-

it in Carnell's apologetic should be made. W h e n Carnell asserts that

"all knowledge is inferential" and "knowledge is inference drawn from

facts,"18() he would seem to imply that we can "know" neither our ulti-

mate premises nor the facts themselves, but only the inferences based

upon them. Applying this notion of knowledge to the existence of G o d

we would end up in natural theology; we could only know G o d as an

inference drawn from the "facts." W h e n Carnell says he would defend

a system of authority,181 it should be clear to us that the authority he

has in mind is no different from that used by men in general. It is not

a distinctively theistic and presuppositional authority at all, for God's

"authority" must be established by the apologist.

Although it is the case that God's common grace makes it possible for

us to speak to the unregenerate and expect him to understand our words,

Carnell uses common grace to establish common ground in a completely

illegitimate way. Instead of seeing common grace as that which curbs the

sinner's autonomous methodology, Carnell appeals to it in order to validate

autonomous common ground. C o m m o n grace prevents the sinner from

completely breaking out of the Christian epistemological circle, but Car-

nell uses common grace to establish the sinner outside that circle! Hence

it is not surprising that Carnell begins his apologetic by expressing ulti-

mate areas of agreement with the unregenerate on his grounds; then he

wants to "add" Christianity to this foundation. This endorses the non-

Christian's refusal to begin with the presupposition of G o d and His truth.

Any transition from Carnell's foundational principles (agreement with

the autonomous thinking of the unbeliever) to the authority and truth of

Scripture would be an incongruent and violent changeover—a sheer leap.

T h e way in which Carnell encourages the sinner to append the authority

of God's Word to that primary authority of the "rational, free m a n " is by

apologetically doing better justice to logic and facts than did the unbeliever.

In attempting to do this, however, Carnell falls prey to the core dif-

ficulty of all autonomous thought. He tries dialectically to balance off

logical unity with factual diversity.

180. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 9If.

181. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 7 1 .

231

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

This is the foundation thesis upon which this system of

Christian apologetics is built: In the contest between the

rational and empirical schools of thought, a Christian must

pitch his interests somewhere between the two extremes....

[We need] to establish a perfect balance between a priori

and a posteriori elements in a consistent epistemology.182

Hence Carnell pits Kierkegaard against Spinoza183 and tries to walk

an Aristotelian golden mean between Parmenides and Heraclitus, Plato

and the Sophists, throughout his apologetical writings. Aquinas also at-

tempted to conjoin pure rationalism with utter irrationalism and ended

up with his "analogy of being";184 secular philosophy has put its mind to

this same feat and at best has arrived at Kant's dialectic. Carnell fares

no better. Indeed it is easy to discern strong elements of Kantian analysis

in Carnell's writings;185 an excellent discussion of this fact can be pur-

sued in Van Til's The Case for Calvinism. 186

Having noted Carnell's affinities to Kant, we might also make men-

tion of his unhealthy fraternizing with pagan and unorthodox philoso-

phy. It is not that unbelievers may not possess some elements of truth in

their thinking, but when a Christian admits a large measure of respect

and dependence upon anti-biblical thought we must pause to wonder

as to the significance of such a reliance. According to Carnell, Plato

hit upon the right synoptic starting point by illumination, spoke much

Christian truth, and was not far from the kingdom.187 Carnell also

shows great admiration for Kierkegaard188 and, following Kierkegaard,

he proposes truth as based on man's spiritual freedom to make his own

being.189 "There can be no question but what Kierkegaard has given a

profoundly convincing defense of the third locus of truth. What Christi-

182. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 7; A Philosophy of the Christian

Religion, 177.

183. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 201f.

184. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, Q. 13.

185. For example, see Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 68, 72, 82, 147,

155 f., 183, 21 Of., 272,218.

186. (Nutley, N.J.: Craig Press, 1964), 69-81, 88-94.

187. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 186; Christian Commitment, An

Apologetic, 135 footnote XX.

188. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 455-473.

189. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 16.

232

EDWARD J. CARNELL

anity has always assumed, Kierkegaard made explicit."190 With respect

to his relation to Kierkegaard's thought Carnell said, "It is easy to follow

the very one who wanted no followers It is a pleasure to acknowledge

my indebtedness to Kierkegaard."191 And in The Burden of Soren Kierkeg-

aard Carnell said that "apart from a few critical remarks" his "approach

to Kierkegaard is affirmative rather than negative."192 Again we wonder

how Carnell, having said that starting point, method, and conclusion

are inseparable, could avoid ending up in final agreement with Plato, or

Kierkegaard, or Brightman.193

The same question comes to mind when we see Carnell designate

areas of R. Niebuhr's writing as "both profound and convincing," "bril-

liant and correct," "pure gold," "matchless insight."194 Yet how can a false

system provide a foundation for the truth? If Niebuhr arrived at some

true conclusions he should have been designated as "inconsistent" with

his own system, not "brilliant." Since Carnell held that all aspects of the

biblical world-view involve each other, how could he say of Niebuhr's cri-

teria of verification, "I find the pre-soteric criterion entirely compelling.

The more I ponder Niebuhr's arguments, the less successful is my escape

from their force"195—how could he say all this and remain orthodox in his

own theology? Having said that Niebuhr rejects the biblical view of im-

manence, how could Carnell assert that "we may assume that he at least is

open to the possibility of Biblical authority?"196 The outcome of Carnell's

favorable attitude to the thought of such unorthodox men as Plato, Kant,

Kierkegaard, Brightman, and Niebuhr was his failure to present a solid

challenge to liberal thinking in general. William Hordern felt that Car-

nell's method of verifying Christianity like a broad hypothesis in the tra-

190. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 473.

191. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 73.

192. p. 7.

193. From whom he admittedly derived his test for truth, An Introduction to Christian

Apologetics, 47 footnote 2, 56.

194. E. J. Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Mebuhr (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

1951), 5, 136, 235, 202.

195. E.J. Carnell, Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social and Political Thought, Library

of Living Theology, vol. II, eds. C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan,

1961), 379.

196. E.J. Carnell, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Scripture," Inspiration and In-

terpretation, ed. J. F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1957), 240.

233

C O N S I S T E N T P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L I S M

dition of the scientific method was the same as liberalism's procedure.197

L. H. DeWolf thought it odd that Carnell would, with his endorsement of

testing all putative revelations, reject the method of higher criticism.198 Fi-

nally, Niebuhr's response to Carnell's critique of him is especially telling:

I do not know whether Professor Carnell would regard

his criticism of my thought as substantive, but I do not,

because he agrees with me up to the point of verifying

the Christian faith in the experience of redemption.199

Because Carnell did not take Scripture as his absolute presupposition he

ended up with an improper epistemology, authority, view of common

grace, and cooperation with unorthodoxy. We concur with the conclu-

sion of C. M. H o m e to the effect that Carnell makes m a n intellectually

ultimate, that is, autonomous.200

Carnell's Contradictions

Carnell's system of thought contains a n u m b e r of contradictions

which weaken the cogency of his apologetic. First, he has at least four

things that he takes as having ultimate "primacy": reason,201 spirit,202

fellowship,203 and love.204 It is simply not possible that all of these should

have primacy over each other! A n d it simply will not do for Carnell

to segregate these various primacies into axiological and epistemologi-

cal compartments in order to avoid the implicit contradiction,205 for he

defines a value as anything a m a n esteems206—and Carnell clearly has

high esteem for reason. Hence he ends up with two value primacies:

197. See Hordern's article in The New Evangelical Theology, ed. M. Erickson (New

Jersey: F. H. Revell, 1968), 226.

198. L. H. DeWolf, The Case for Theology in Liberal Perspective (Philadelphia: West-

minster Press, 1959), 5 If.

199. In Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social and Political Thought, 443.

200. See C. M. H o m e , "Van Til and Carnell--Part II," Jerusalem and Athens,

369-371.

201. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 183,187.

202. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 176, 179.

203. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 215.

204. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 15.

205. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 215.

137. See Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 277.

234

EDWARD J. CARNELL

reason and fellowship. The contradiction is again evident.

It is also unlikely that we shall be able to reconcile Carnell's insis-

tence that starting point, method, and conclusion are bound together,207

and that starting point is of utmost significance,208 with his declarations

that the method one elects to follow is an irrelevant issue209 and that the

route to faith is not important.210 If method and starting point mutually

influence each other, then method must be as vital as starting point—

not indifferent, as Carnell alleges.

Another contradiction is found in Carnell's assertions of the mind's

depravity but also its non-corruption.211 Carnell holds that Christianity

is foolish to the natural man because he makes faulty use of the principle

of systematic consistency, but also that the natural man can use this test

to pass Christianity summa cum laude.212

Carnell's apologetic has two mutually exclusive, absolute starting

points: man (and his use of systematic consistency) and Christ (and His

revelation in Scripture); this contradiction reveals itself in the fact that

Carnell would have his logical starting point validate his synoptic start-

ing point, yet have his synoptic starting point establish his logical start-

ing point.213 Moreover, with respect to belief in the existence of God,

Carnell posits both faith and reason as epistemologically ultimate,214 and

he himself had criticized Thomism for committing this very mistake!

Such inconsistencies or contradictions would bring down any system

of thought, but they are especially painful in a system which boldly af-

firms (with McTaggart) that no man ever tried to break logic but what

logic broke him.215 We should conclude, following Carnell's advice, that

at crucial junctures logic has broken Carnell's apologetic.

207. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 123.

208. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 4.

209. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 102.

210. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 86.

211. See Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 156f.; Christian Commitment,

An Apologetic, 198.

212. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 85, 178.

213. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 124 f., 212.

214. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 66, 101, 157-172.

215. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 184.

235

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Doctrinal Difficulties

The last major problem we shall examine in Carnell's apologetic

pertains to his many theological misconstructions. Carnell implicitly

denies the incomprehensibility of God when he says, "Time and il-

lumination alone stop us from understanding the entire revelation of

God."216 He overlooks the fact that Scripture contains the "deep things

of God" and that nature reflects the character of its Creator, who is

incomprehensible to the creature. When Carnell says that God is held

by the same moral necessities that bind man, that the finite moral-spiri-

tual environment is precisely the same as the divine moral-spiritual en-

vironment, and that a single genus of knowledge envelops both time

and eternity,217 we question whether he has adequately safeguarded the

Creator/creature distinction. Indeed pantheism is very strongly implied

when Carnell asserts that man shares a common environment with God

and that this moral-spiritual environment is identical with God;218 when

he says, "Man shares in the life of God whenever he makes contact with

ultimate elements in either the rational, aesthetic, or moral and spiritual

environment";219 and when he says, "We know truth because God gra-

ciously allows us to participate in the divine Logos."220

Further aberrations in Carnell's doctrine of God are found in his

holding that God is unknown until experienced in fellowship 221 and that

God has fellowship with man on the same terms that men have fel-

lowship among themselves.222 In this Carnell forgets that God is clearly

revealed to all men through the creation and that He is known in judgment

as well as grace (cf. Rom. 1:21, 32; Ex. 14:4, 18; Ezek. 35:11 f.; 38:22

f.; James 2:19); and that, on Carnell's own analysis of the conditions of

fellowship among men, he would be making God to humble Himself

before us and have to make explanation for His moral requests!223

216. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 194.

217. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 133, 138; A Philosophy of the

Christian Religion, 507.

218. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 138; the identity can definitely be

inferred from 136, 206, 208, 212, 253, 269.

219. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 135.

220. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 269.

221. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 275,278.

222. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 149.

223. See Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 149, 182.

236

EDWARD J. CARNELL

Corresponding to his weak view of God, Carnell has a poor view

of revelation. According to him general revelation provides insufficient

evidence for the existence of God;224 and the evidence that it does give

is apparently unclear as far as Carnell is concerned, for he maintains

that God could inconvenience and hide from the atheist225 (as Clark

also maintained), and that it is difficult to know what the conditions for

fellowship with God are.226 Yet the first chapter of Romans supplies a

corrective to both of these points. We have commented above on Car-

nell's practical denial of the self-attesting nature of special revelation;

this denial comes out again in his assertion that orthodoxy accepts the

inspiration of the Old Testament for the single reason that Jesus did.227

In fact, with respect to the full question of the canon of Scripture Car-

nell establishes a "canon" outside of the genuine canon which is God's

authoritative Word, for he says that the canon question must be settled

by historical evidences 228—thereby refusing to bow to the self-authenticat-

ing authority of the canonical books themselves.

Not only does Carnell attempt to "out-canon the canon," he also sets

up a "canon" within the canon of Scripture. "Romans and Galatians are

the highest ranking sources in theology, for they alone develop the terms

of the Abrahamic covenant in systematic, didactic language."229 In fact,

Carnell would abrogate anything from the Old Testament that "does not

materially advance the Abrahamic covenant."230 This inordinate stress

on the Abrahamic covenant and use of it as a razor for shaving off the au-

thority of parts of the revealed canon is out of tune with the full canonical

status of every word revealed and inscripturated by God for His abiding

church. Hence Carnell has a canon outside the Bible and a canon within

the Bible; instead we should accept the canon which is the Bible.

Carnell also held that one could defend the inerrancy of the Bible

when Chronicles had been shown to contradict other Old Testament

histories; to do so one need only shift his conception of the thing signi-

fied (e.g., Chronicles would be an inerrant copying of errant source docu-

224. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 175.

225. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 175f.

226. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 121.

227. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 35.

228. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 43, 45, 47.

229. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 66.

230. Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 56.

237

C O N S I S T E N T P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L I S M

ments). However, by this move Carnell empties inerrancy of its original

meaning and practical significance; one's certainty that a passage is true

would have to rest on his knowledge that no source lies behind it or that,

on independent grounds, this source is accurate.231 Furthermore, as with

the case of inspiration, inerrancy is predicated of the finished document,

not the process leading up to the completion of Scripture.

Carnell's faulty views of G o d and revelation are accompanied by his

misconceived anthropology. He holds to the unbiblical, Greek view of

man's constitution: "Perhaps a more graphic way to express the union

of soul and body is that of two mighty stallions—pulling, but in opposite

directions."232 And Carnell's explication of guilt as the juxtaposition of

one's self with his projected ideal233 is nowhere close to the scriptural con-

cept of guilt with its profound theological overtones. T h a t Carnell has not

carried the implications of the scriptural doctrine of man's guiltiness be-

fore God over into his apologetic is evident when he says with respect to a

believer's inability to convince the unbeliever of the truth of the Bible that

"it may be that the heart of the natural m a n is adverse to what Christian-

ity teaches."234 May be? Nay, it is. On the level of practice, Carnell goes so

far as to deny total depravity: "We say that m a n is already systematically

in contact with God, and thus knows God.... M a n can become rationally

conscious of this relation whenever he wills to."235 Carnell declares his re-

jection of total depravity by refusing to view the intellect of m a n as corrupt:

" T h e truly peccant part of m a n is his Will, not his intellect."236 Moreover,

Carnell denies total inability, he holds that m a n can indirectly meet the

law's demands: "We can be sorry for our want of rectitude, we are ca-

pable of humbling ourselves before God."237 Along this same mistaken

line Carnell wrote, "Pre-soteric synergism is within our power"238 and,

"Depraved affections... do not destroy either our power to flee temptation

or our power to be sorry after we yield."239 Furthermore, Carnell's heavy

appeal to the unregenerate consciousness of the self-made autonomous

231. See M. Erickson, ed., The New Evangelical Theology, 80, 223.

232. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 79.

233. Carnell, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 70ff.

234. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 116.

235. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 101.

236. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 198.

237. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 200.

238. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 265.

239. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 266.

238

EDWARD I. CARNELL

man involves an incipient denial of man's sinful depravity and inability as

well. And because of this Carnell held that the gospel was foolish to the

natural man, not as a result of sin, but because he uses the test of systematic

consistency in a faulty manner.240 Carnell reflects a totally unbiblical view

of God's sovereignty as well as the unregenerate's free will when he says

with respect to Christ's statement in Revelation 3:20 that He stands at the

door and knocks: "But God will not break down the door. He will not

violate the sanctity of human personality. The door opens on the inside,

and man can turn the handle."241

With such views as these it is not very surprising that Carnell de-

nies the view of Reformed theology to the effect that regeneration pre-

cedes and enables genuine repentance. On the same page where he

declares his rejection of this biblical truth (cf. Acts 5:31 for instance),242

Carnell asserts that "whenever theologians view repentance as a fruit

of regeneration, they end up with a harsh view of predestination. The

universal offer of the gospel becomes nothing but an empty form."243

In light of Carnell's view here we must seriously question the bibli-

cal and Reformed character of his theology. Grave doubt is also cast

upon the scripturalness of his theology when Carnell espouses an un-

scriptural "preparationalism" within man's power with respect to the

Holy Spirit's regenerating and converting work: "Man is not totally

depraved.... It is pedagogically wiser to have man admit his unhap-

piness before showing him the deeper reason why this unhappiness

exists. This preparatory work ... may serve to prepare the way for the

display of those objective evidences for Christianity through which the

Holy Spirit may be pleased to effect regeneration."244 Indeed Carnell's

whole apologetic falls under the error of preparationalism: "Apologet-

ics can only prepare the heart for faith."245

The final indication of doctrinal aberration in Carnell's writings

that we shall mention is his weak view of the law of God in Christian

ethics and his negative view of the Old Testament ethic;246 his view is

240. See Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 73.

241. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 303.

242. Also see John Murray's discussion in Redemption: Accomplished and Applied

(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1955).

243. Carnell, Christian Commitment, An Apologetic, 265.

244. Carnell , An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 41 footnote 23.

245. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 70.

246. Especially in Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology, 55f., 73; see also Christian

239

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

countered in this author's Theonomy in Christian Ethics.247 All in all Carnell

demonstrates the principle that, with respect to both message as well

as method, the strength and validity of a man's apologetic will vary in

proportion to the purity of his theology.

CONCLUSION

The many difficulties that attach to Carnell's apologetic, his rationalism

and irrationalism, his doctrinal weaknesses, his failure to presuppose

the truth of Scripture as absolute, his possibilism, suppositionalism, veri-

ficationalism, and probabilism lead us to reject it as an effective defense

of the faith and as a clear representative of presuppositional apologetics.

His argumentative method is not presuppositional, and his presupposi-

tions are not biblical. We must conclude, then, that although we can

appreciate Carnell's insights and analysis at points in his writings we

must refrain from embracing his apologetic as a whole. We wish that

Carnell had genuinely set forth a system of authority and not capitu-

lated to the demands of autonomous philosophy. We wish that he had

presented God's clear and self-attesting revelation as the transcendental

of all thought. But with regret we note that, for the most part, he spoke

of God's Word in the hypothetical mood.

Commitment, An Apologetic, 201, 221, 238.

247. 3rd Ed. (Nacadoches, TX: Covenant Media Press, 2002).

240

C H A P T E R 6

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

Our treatment of Schaeffer writings need not be as exten-

sive as our examination of Clark and Carnell; this is so

for several reasons. Schaeffer's books have not dealt as ex-

plicitly and intensively with the question of apologetic method and

epistemology per se as have those of Clark and Carnell, he has cov-

ered wider ground, and for the most part he has done a better job of

relating biblical Christianity to the whole of life than either of these

other men.

Schaeffer's apologetic has arisen out of his analysis of cultural

trends in this century. Though what he has to say has not been thor-

ough in any one area, all of his works suggest valuable insights with

which no substantial difference need be taken. Over all Schaeffer has

been more consistently presuppositional in his outlook than Clark and

Carnell, but not so much so that he escapes their fundamental short-

comings. The above discussion of the problems in Clark and Carnell

will be assumed in our critique of Schaeffer. Many fine statements are

scattered through the writings of Schaeffer; for instance:

Christianity is a philosophy—though not a rationalis-

tic one because we have not worked it out beginning

from ourselves. Rather, God has told us the answers.

In this sense it is the true philosophy, for it gives the

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

right answers to man's philosophic and intellectual

questions.1

There are two concepts or ideas of knowing which must

be kept separate. The first is the rationalistic or human-

istic concept, namely that man, beginning totally inde-

pendent and autonomous of all else, can build a bridge

towards ultimate truth.... The second concept is the

Christian one.2

Christ is Lord of all—over every aspect of life. It is no use

saying He is the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and

the end, the Lord of all things, if He is not the Lord of my

whole unified intellectual life. I am false or confused if I

sing about Christ's lordship and contrive to retain areas

of my own life that are autonomous.3

The Judaistic-Christian position is rational, but it is the

very antithesis of rationalism.... The Christian is not ra-

tionalistic, he does not try to begin from himself autono-

mously and work out a system from there on.4

The point to be stressed is that, when nature is made au-

tonomous, it is destructive. As soon as one allows an au-

tonomous realm one finds that the lower element begins

to eat up the higher.... There is nothing autonomous—

nothing apart from the lordship of Jesus Christ and the

authority of the Scriptures.5

Christianity says man is now abnormal—he is sepa-

rated from his Creator, who is his only sufficient refer-

ence point—not by a metaphysical limitation, but by

true moral guilt.6

1. Francis A Schaeffer, Death in the City (Chicago: Inter-Varsity, 1969), 139.

2. Francis A. Schaeffer, Escape from Reason (Chicago: Inter-Varsity, 1968), 88.

3. Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, 83.

4. Francis A. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There (Chicago: Inter-Varsity, 1968), 17, 113.

5. Francis A. Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, 16, 29.

15. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 15, 126.

242

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

In turning away from God and the truth which He has

given, m a n has thus become foolishly foolish in regard to

what man is and what the universe is. He is left with a

position in which he cannot live, and he is caught in a

multitude of intellectual and personal tensions.7

We must realise that their system as a system is wrong.8

But, in fact, no non-Christian can be consistent to the

logic of his presuppositions. The reason for this is simply

that a man must live in reality.... No matter what a man

may believe, he cannot change the reality of what is. As

Christianity is the truth of what is there, to deny this,

on the basis of another system, is to stray from the real

world.... Non-Christian presuppositions simply do not fit

into what God has made, including what man is.... The

more logical a man is to his own presuppositions, the fur-

ther he is from the real world.9

Any autonomy is wrong. Autonomous science or auton-

omous art is wrong, if by autonomous science or art we

mean it is free from the content of what God has told us.10

Finite man in the external universe, being finite, has no

sufficient reference point if he begins absolutely and au-

tonomously from himself and thus needs certain knowl-

edge. God gives us this in the Scriptures.11

Christianity is poles apart from any form of optimistic

humanism. But it also differs from nihilism, for nihil-

ism, though it is correctly realistic, nevertheless can give

neither a proper diagnosis nor the proper treatment for

its own ills. Christianity has a diagnosis and then a solid

foundation for an answer.12

7. Schaeffer, Death, in the City, 13.

8. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 51.

9. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 121, 122, 123.

10. Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, 84.

11. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 93.

12. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 46.

243

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

It is plain, therefore, that from the viewpoint of the Scrip-

tures themselves there is a unity over the whole field of

knowledge. God has spoken, in a linguistic propositional

form, truth concerning Himself and truth concerning man,

history and the universe.... The unity is there because God

has spoken truth into all areas of our knowledge.13

The non-Christian had no right to act on the presup-

positions he acted upon.... But in reality no one can live

logically according to his own non-Christian presupposi-

tions, and consequently, because he is faced with the real

world and himself, in practice you will find a place where

you can talk... but this point is not properly to be spoken

of as "neutral." It exists because, regardless of a man's

system, he has to live in God's world.14

Many Christians still do not know what is happening.

And this is because they are still not being taught the im-

portance of thinking in terms of presuppositions.... The

flood-waters of secular thought and the new theology

overwhelmed the Church because the leaders did not un-

derstand the importance of combating a false set of pre-

suppositions. They largely fought the battle on the wrong

ground.... Man thinks differently concerning truth, and

so now for us, more than ever before, a presuppositional apologetic

is imperative.. .. To try to work below the line of despair

without a clear and defined concept of presuppositional

apologetics is simply to destroy the possibility of helping

twentieth-century people.15

It is not with statements such as these that we demur, but rather with

those that directly contradict this outlook. As strong as Schaeffer may

seem in the above quotations, he more strongly emphasizes a position that

nullifies this presuppositional emphasis.

13. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 92f.

14. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 14, 126.

15. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 15, 126.

244

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

G O D ' S W O R D N O T PRESUPPOSED

Despite surface appearances, Schaeffer does not take Scripture as his

absolute and necessary presupposition for all meaningful thought, eval-

uation and discourse. The truth of Scripture is not presupposed but is

subjected to autonomous consideration. "We must have faced the ques-

tion, 'Is Christianity true?' for ourselves."16 Schaeffer gives us an auto-

biographical explication of what this entails (as well as a microcosmic

insight into the fundamental problem in his apologetic method):

In 1951 and 1952 I faced a spiritual crisis in my own life.

I had become a Christian from agnosticism many years

before Gradually, however, a problem came to me—

the problem of reality.... I realized that in honesty I had

to go back and rethink my whole position.... I had to go

all the way back to my agnosticism and think through

the whole matter.... As I rethought my reasons for being

a Christian I saw again that there were totally sufficient

reasons to know that the infinite-personal God does exist

and that Christianity is true.17

Such an independent establishment of the credibility of Scripture is

taken by Schaeffer as crucial for the believer: "But how can one expect

Christianity to be real if one hasn't taken time to consider what truth

is, and whether Christianity is true?"18 Extraneous to the direction

and authority of Scripture, an epistemological position must be erect-

ed; then one can meaningfully attribute "truth" to the word of God.

So before commitment to Scripture, one is encouraged by Schaeffer to

develop a view of truth and see if the Bible can pass the test. However,

on the presuppositionalist's basis epistemology and the activity of test-

ing would be unintelligible without prior submission to the revealed

word of God. Schaeffer would, on the other hand, have us consider

whether Christianity is true or not—rather than insisting that nothing

could be true if it were not.

16. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 128.

17. Francis A. Schaeffer, "Preface," True Spirituality (Wheaton: Tyndale House,

1971).

18. Francis A. Schaeffer, "Historic Christianity and Twentieth Century Man,"

Lectures delivered at Westmont College, October 1965, 3.

245

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Schaeffer goes so far in his divorcing of the nature of truth and the

question of proper methodology from God's Word that he makes them

matters of pre-evangelism:

There must be a pre-evangelism before evangelism is

meaningful to twentieth century people.... This pre-con-

sideration falls into two areas: the first is in the area of epis-

temology and the second, in the area of methodology.19

A man must be prepared by philosophic considerations (particularly from

classical Greek philosophy) even before he submits to God's authorita-

tive word: "Before a man is ready to become a Christian, he must have a

proper understanding of truth."20 This epistemological work done sepa-

rately from a commitment to Scripture is pre-evangelism: "In reference

to conversion, in a Christian sense, truth must be first."21

Because Schaeffer severs the question of truth from God's Word of

truth it is no surprise that he espouses something other than a revela-

tional concept of truth; as did Carnell, Schaeffer makes truth out to be

a hybrid of "real history" and "rationality."22 So in the end Schaeffer

is asserting that the Bible is "true" in the context of an epistemologi-

cal position not derived from the Scriptures themselves but established

autonomously. Although the truth of God is not anti-historical and

anti-logical, we must draw back when history and logic come to have

greater epistemic certainty than the revelation of God's mind. By not

taking Scripture as the standard of truth Schaeffer inevitably joins

with the unregenerate in the common problem of discovering if the

Bible is "true." This parallels the mistake made by Adam and Eve

when they endeavored to develop a theory of "truth" aside from God's

revelation to them; in terms of such a "theory" they purposed to arbi-

trate the question of truth between God and Satan. In so doing they

had already rebelled against their Maker—even before applying the

empirical test with respect to historical eventuation. By not holding

that the truth of Scripture (and its own epistemology) is the necessary

condition for meaningful predication and intelligible thought Schaef-

19. Francis A. Schaeffer, "Historic Christianity and Twentieth Century Man,"

Lectures delivered at Westmont College, October 1965, 1.

20. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 143.

21. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 143.

22. Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, 92.

246

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

fer permits the blinded autonomous man to misconstrue the very pos-

sibility and nature of "truth."

Concomitant with Schaeffer's failure to presuppose absolutely the

outlook of Scripture by means of his epistemological pre-evangelism is

his refusal to accept the authority of God's Word from the outset of rea-

soning and discussion.

It always seems to me a very false thing to ask an honest

man who is wrestling as to what the Bible is, to believe the

Biblical system on the basis that the Bible is a sufficient

authority, when that is the subject under discussion.23

The Bible as a system must stand openly and by itself in

the arena, in the forum, of the thought of men. Never,

never, never will I say "You must believe it because the

Bible teaches it." Why should the nonChristian listen?

This is the very thing that is under discussion. This is

the point: is there a God there? Is this book anything

more than a book of fables? We cannot expect twentieth

century men to take the authority of the Scripture as a

reason for believing the Christian system.24

These quotes cut the heart right out of the presuppositional position.

Schaeffer refuses to see the self-attesting character of Scripture, turns

away from its authority, and reduces it to one alternative among many

to be decided upon by autonomous man. The Bible cannot function as

an absolute necessity for thought and ultimate standard of authority

under such circumstances. Scripture's authority is secondary to that

of man's critical faculties, hypothetical rather than indispensable, if

we follow the apologetic set forth by Schaeffer. The defense that he

offers rests upon something other than God's Word, and apparently

more dependable:

The truth that we let in first is not a dogmatic statement

of the truth of the Scriptures but the truth of the exter-

nal world and the truth of what man himself is.... This,

23. Schaeffer, "Speaking the Historic Christian Position into the 20th Century,"

Lectures delivered at Wheaton College, 12.

24. Francis A. Schaeffer, "Historic Christianity and Twentieth Century Man," 10.

247

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

I am convinced, is the true order for our apologetics in

the second half of the twentieth century for man living

under the line of despair.25

Here Schaeffer implicitly, but erroneously, assumes that certain facts or

truths can be properly understood or meaningfully apprehended outside

of the foundational truth of Scripture; further, he assumes the natural

man can have a proper interpretation of certain states of affairs with-

out regeneration. Moreover, he exhibits again that God's Word is not his

genuine pre supposition, but merely a supposition or hypothesis. This fits in

with his statement that "we must strain through the grid of reason every-

thing that comes into our mind,"26 and with his indication in the chapter

"How Do We Know That It Is True?" that "reason began the process."27

Hence Schaeffer has asserted the primacy of reason over revelation from

God rather than making that revelation the presupposition of reason. In

this his position has an unfortunate resemblance to the natural theology

of Aquinas. Indeed, forsaking the Augustinian dictum that faith is unto

understanding, Schaeffer declares, "Knowledge precedes faith."28

POSSIBILISM AND T H E TESTING OF G O D ' S W O R D

As in the cases of Clark and Carnell, so with Schaeffer a refusal to take

God's Word as an absolute presupposition based on its self-authenticating

authority and requisite for all cognitive activities results in a lowering of

its epistemic status to a hypothesis subject to, and in need of, verification

by an autonomous standard of truth. Schaeffer presents Christianity in

a hypothetical mood at many places in his writings:

If God exists and we are made in His image we can have

real meaning, and we can have real knowledge through

what He has communicated to us.... I would ask him

also to be honest in considering the other possibility, that

all this is not so, but rather that we started with a per-

sonal beginning and therefore there is intrinsic meaning

25. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 129.

26. Francis A. Schaeffer, The Church at the End of the 20th Century (Downer's Grove,

Illinois: Inter-Varsity, 1970), 104.

27. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 113.

28. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 142.

248

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

to personality.... This is the crux of the matter; either an

intrinsically personal "what is," in the sense of a creation

by the personal God, or John Cage's devilish din!29

And since Schaeffer's apologetic thinks of Scripture's truth as one hypoth-

esis among other possibilities, it is incumbent that he not only attack the

neo-orthodox for rendering the faith non-cognitive (a proper criticism) but

also for not subjecting it to verification. Schaeffer knows that his own faith

would be left suspended as a hypothesis if he did not hold out for its histori-

cal proofs', so he criticizes the neo-orthodox position in this way:

Their new system is not open to verification, it must sim-

ply be believed.... It remains irrational... because it is

no longer open to verification.... There is no place for

reason and there is no point of verification Faith... be-

comes a leap without any verification because it is totally

separated from the logical and the reasonable.... They

are divorced from possible verification by reason.... The

sphere of faith is placed in... the unverifiable as opposed

to the verifiable.... The Scriptures are not discussed as

open to verification.30

When Schaeffer uses the word "verification" he makes it clear to us just

exactly what he means, for at the end of The God Who Is There he strictly

defines it as "the procedure required for the establishment of the truth or

falsity of a statement."31 The implication was clear enough in Schaeffer's

criticism of neo-orthodoxy, but he directly affirms his thesis that "the Bible

claims itself to be a propositional truth.... Therefore it is open to discus-

sion and verification,"32 and, "This makes Christian faith open to dis-

cussion and verification."33 Hence we see that Schaeffer definitely holds

out (as did the older form of apologetic represented by men like Butler)

that we must follow a procedure calculated to establish the truth of our

assertions about the Bible being God's Word, Christ being God's Son,

etc., etc. Against both neo-orthodoxy and Schaeffer the presupposition-

29. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 71, 90f., Bahnsen's emphasis.

30. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 54, 94; Escape from Reason, 51, 53, 75, 77.

31. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 180.

32. Schaeffer, "Historic Christianity and Twentieth Century Man," 15.

33. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 62.

249

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

al approach would take Scripture as the most ultimate authority in hu-

man affairs, self-attestingly true, and self-interpreting, clear revelation

from God. It is not verified (contrary to Schaeffer), and that is because

it is God's authoritative, clear (cognitive) Word of truth necessary to all

other intellectual endeavors (contrary to neo-orthodoxy). The Bible is

the very words of God; the neo-orthodox does not pay sufficient attention

to it as the words of God, and Schaeffer (in his apologetic method) does

not pay sufficient attention to it as the words of God. The Bible is the cog-

nitive foundation needed for the verification of anything at all; as such

it should not have been itself made subject to verification by Schaeffer.

Rather than demanding that "nature" be interpreted through

the spectacles of "grace" (i.e., general revelation read through special

revelation), Schaeffer would attempt to make "nature" a foundation

for "grace." In his chapter entitled "How Do We Know It Is True?"34

Schaeffer comes to a discussion of "The Nature of Proof."35 Therein he

declares that Scripture deserves no special consideration or handling:

"scientific proof, philosophical proof and religious proof follow the same

rules." The Bible must not be presupposed then as the basis of the very

activity of "proving" but is subject to the same conditions of verification

as any scientific hypothesis would be.

The standards of proof laid out by Schaeffer bear great resemblance

to those formulated by Carnell:

The theory must be non-contradictory and must give an

answer to the phenomena in question. We must be able

to live consistently with our theory.... The answer given

must conform to what we observe.36

That is, the Bible must pass the tests of logic, fact, and life before it will

deserve our intelligent acceptance; with such a standard of autonomous

judgment Schaeffer could challenge any putative revelation from any al-

leged God to match up to his human expectations. The Christian Scrip-

tures will be acceptable only if they fit into the pattern of our previous

knowledge about the world; as Schaeffer puts it, the question is, "Does

the Christian answer conform to and explain what we observe concern-

34. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, chapter 5.

35. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 109.

15. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 15, 126.

250

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

ing man as he is (including my knowledge of myself as a man)?"37 This is

not an obedient submission to the self-attesting word of the Lord, presup-

posing His truth as we carry out the cultural mandate with respect to

the world in which He is revealed (i.e., as Adam was to do), but a putting

of the Lord God to a test (i.e., as the Israelites did at Massah, and to which

Satan tempted Christ in the wilderness). God's Word should interpret

our world and experience, not vice versa! Even in our fallen situation

God's word is self-attestingly, clearly, and authoritatively a revelation of

His mind; man has no excuse for not accepting it.

Schaeffer would appear to imply that man does have a reason for

questioning the Bible. Hence he turns to general revelation. But the only

"reason" man does not hear God's voice in the Bible (i.e., self-willed

and self-inflicted sin) is the very same reason he does not see God's face

in natural revelation! Schaeffer's method will be of no use to us as it

stands. Moreover, Schaeffer gives reason for us to see him as holding

that natural revelation is unclear (as a witness to God and His character)

and fragmentary (rather than sufficient), as well as that special revela-

tion supplies us with a "god of the gaps."38 Whatever may be the inner

tension of Schaeffer's own method of defending the faith, our point has

been that his defense does not presuppose, but presumes to establish, the

"objective" truth of God's Word. He says, "Christianity, beginning with

the existence of the infinite-personal God, man's creation in His image

and a space-time Fall, constitutes a non-self-contradictory answer that

does explain the phenomena and which can be lived with, both in life

and scholarly pursuits."39 With such a consideration Schaeffer thinks

that he can "demonstrate the truth of the historic Christian position";40

indeed such a demonstration will be the basis of God's indictment of sin-

ners on the Day of Judgment!41

Flowing from Schaeffer's recommendation of God's Word because

it passes an autonomous test of credibility and truth is his position that

"only the faith which believes God on the basis of knowledge is true

faith."42 He would have us accept the Word of God if there is justifica-

37. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 109.

38. See his illustration of the "torn book"; The God Who Is There, 108f.

39. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 111.

40. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 111.

41. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 123.

42. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 142.

251

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

tion of an independent sort for us to do so, that is, if there is "good and

sufficient evidence that Christ is the Messiah."43 It would seem that God

is on trial with sinful man His judge! Schaeffer does not demand that

men submit their thinking to the true Word of God based on the author-

ity of God inherent therein, for as he sees it "we are not asked to believe

until we have faced the question as to whether this is true on the basis

of space-time evidence."44 The presuppositional approach would not, by

contrast, attempt to build faith upon the pedestal of rational evidence,

but would contend that neither reason nor evidence are intelligible out-

side of the truth of God's revelation. We should not attempt to build up

to the credibility of God from a pou sto outside of God's Word, but rather

Scripture itself must be our Archimedean point of departure.

T H E PRESUPPOSITION OF AUTONOMOUS REASONING

Having seen that Schaeffer's apologetic is not presuppositional in its

method, we should also note that the presuppositions he does contend

for are not biblical. The presuppositions for which Schaeffer is jealous do

not come from Scripture but from classical and pre-twentieth century

philosophy (that such was apostate is apparently irrelevant).

Biblical Christianity has often been weak in not sufficient-

ly stressing something of the presuppositions upon which

men base their thinking and action Yet prior to these

dates (1890 in Europe or 1935 in America) this ignorance

did not make a great deal of difference because in examin-

ing the thinking of that time, one finds that men in gen-

eral were operating upon a certain set of presuppositions

which in a substantial way was not too different from the

Christian's presuppositions.45

Schaeffer demonstrates by this statement an amazing lack of under-

standing of the history of philosophy; what is distressing is that he has

failed to demarcate clearly between Christianity and its foes. Our main

point, however, is that certain philosophical assumptions rather than

43. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 141.

44. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 141.

45. Schaeffer, "Historic Christianity and Twentieth Century Man," 22.

252

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

the truth and authority of Scripture have been taken by Schaeffer as the

presuppositions in which he is interested. He wants us to return to the

good old days of pre-twentieth-century philosophy, when everyone (sup-

posedly) worked on "Christian" presuppositions of absolutes and antith-

esis; he thinks we need to build back a mentality of antithesis against the

new epistemology which came in the wake of Hegel.46 Our real enemy

is not sinful autonomy, but dialecticism.47

Now overlooking the fact that the ancient Sophists did not believe in

absolutes and that modern philosophy still has an astounding penchant for

logicistic rationalism (i.e., that Schaeffer has grossly over-generalized),

we should note that non-Christians who accept the validity of consis-

tency and logical thinking do not, nevertheless, have the same concept

and use of logic as does the biblical Christian. Furthermore, what the

presuppositional apologist should be working to present is (deeper than

the idea of antithesis) the crown epistemological rights of our self-attest-

ing Christ (without which there could be no value in logic anyway). It

is rebellion against God's authority in the area of truth and revelation,

not defection from Aristotle, that is our genuine enemy. As an aside

we notice an interesting contradiction in Schaeffer at this point of his

affirmation of pre-twentieth century man's use of "Christian" presup-

positions, for Schaeffer simultaneously asserts that it is modern man (i.e.

twentieth-century man) who is already part way to the gospel,48 making

our apologetical task easier!49

Apart from Schaeffer's violation of the very law of antithesis that he

vies for, his failure to begin with biblical presuppositionalism has been

noticed. This is akin to what was discovered with respect to the presup-

positionalism of Clark and Carnell. In harmony with them Schaeffer

begins his apologetic, not with God's revelation in the Bible, but with

man's own knowledge of things (despite the fact that they are not seen as

preinterpreted by God): "Christian apologetics do not start somewhere

beyond the stars. They begin with man and what he knows about him-

self.... He knows something of the external world, and he knows some-

thing of himself."50 We could wish that Schaeffer had pointed out that

46. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 13f., 44, 47, 54.

47. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 46.

48. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 47.

49. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 46.

50. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 123.

253

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

the unregenerate have knowledge only in spite of themselves and only on

the adequate basis of God's truth (which remains in force regardless of

the sinner's rebellion against it). Then he could have driven home the

thrust of presuppositional apologetics and its point that man can only ac-

count for his possession of knowledge on scriptural grounds. But Schaef-

fer's apologetical starting point is not God's Word; hence he could not

make this strong challenge to unbelief. Because he does not begin with

the Christian Scriptures but with "facts" and "logic," it is not surprising

that Schaeffer can endorse a two-step, double-level apologetical proce-

dure: from broad theism to the Redeemer-God of the Bible. " Firstly, be

needs to bow in the realm of Being (metaphysically).... Secondly, he needs

to bow in the realm of morals.... Now he is faced with God's proposi-

tional promise, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved.'"51

In this respect Schaeffer has not advanced beyond the mistakes of the

traditional method of apologetics.

DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM SCHAEFFER'S M E T H O D

A syndrome of difficulties comes along with Schaeffer's apologetical

suppositionalism and verificationalism. Reason comes to be viewed as

some neutral tool used by believer and unbeliever alike, something that

has its own status as independent of divine revelation. Hence Schaeffer

can speak of "a culture cut loose not only from God and revelation, but

also cut loose from reason."52

Schaeffer's View of Science

Concommitant with his view of reason is Schaeffer's idealizing of

neutral, objective science.53 In fact, as Schaeffer sees things, materi-

alistic science is perfectly fine as far as it goes; its problem is that it is

simply incomplete.54

This approach fails to challenge science at its very foundations and to

demand a change, a substitution of outlook. Schaeffer merely calls for sci-

ence to add more information (i.e., about the spiritual aspect of the world)

51. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 134.

52. Schaeffer, "Preface," The Church at the End of the 20th Century.

53. Schaeffer, The Church at the End of the 20th Century, 91f.

54. Schaeffer, Death in the City, 129-131.

254

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

to its deposit of (apparently correctly apprehended) truths. It is true that

Schaeffer says that Christianity and materialistic science are antithetical

and hence cannot be synthesized; the problem resides in the reason Schaef-

fer offers for this fact. It is because, at the comprehensive level, the two differ

as to what the range of truth is; Christianity affirms and science denies

that there is a spiritual dimension, and so they cannot be synthesized.

Here Schaeffer only reconfirms the difficulty we noted in his view

of science: the difference between materialism and Christianity is seen

as merely quantitative, and not qualitative. As Schaeffer puts it, science

has half the orange; Christianity provides the remaining portion. This

approach is clearly impotent to challenge the scientist with the epistemo-

logical prerogatives of Christ in every fact of the universe—empirical or

spiritual (using Schaeffer's dichotomy). The unbelieving scientist needs

a new outlook, a complete revamping of his presuppositions; additional

religious information is not enough, for he can take this information

and simply feed it through his naturalistic grid (thereby neutralizing its

effect). The Christian apologist must challenge the non-Christian's in-

terpretation of the seen portion of the universe as well as the unseen; this

is what Schaeffer cannot, in terms of his apologetic system, do. Conse-

quently he does not set forth the stark antithesis between Christian and

non-Christian viewpoints and assumptions.

Indeed, Schaeffer denies that the problem with naturalistic science

is its rejection of a Christian foundation (as the biblical presupposition-

alist maintains); its problem is that it does not do justice to the phenom-

enon of personality in the universe, that's all. The crucial antithesis

has been dropped.

Why is naturalistic science poor science? It isn't that I'm

saying that it is non-Christian. I am carefully saying it is

poor science. And I would say that it is poor science be-

cause it doesn't explain the surrounding phenomena....

Now then, let's ask the question "What does naturalistic

science have to do to become good science?" The simple

fact is it just has to stop being naturalistic. That's all. Nat-

uralistic science can't be good science because you are

there. This is why it can't be good science.... Naturalistic

science fails to explain one thing. It just simply fails to

255

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

explain you. And that's all. It is as simple as that.55

Schaeffer's view of reason and science as neutral areas of thought is not

only mistaken as to the true nature of things, but it nullifies the Chris-

tian's apologetical challenge to unbelief. Indeed one must wonder how

Schaeffer can avoid the very difficulty he pinpoints in Aquinas' system of

thought (which led the way for the difficulty of modern culture's divided

field of knowledge), for his neutral view of reason and science (i.e., there is

no necessity that they be subordinated to Scripture from the very outset of

their use) contains an incipient nature/grace scheme all his own! Failing

to see the necessity of Christian presuppositions for the very use of critical

faculties and assimilation of knowledge, Schaeffer presents an inadequate

answer to those who hold out for the possibility that a future alternative to

Christianity might arise.56 He is right that such a hope can be applied to

any question or issue and that every man must now use some working hy-

pothesis, but this answer does not go to the root of the problem; he allows

abstract possibility to surround the truth of Scripture rather than view-

ing God's Word as the necessary foundation for all philosophy (in which case

God is the source of possibilities, rather than one possibility among other

imagined possibilities). Schaeffer's avoidance of a true presuppositional

apologetic weakens his defense of the faith.

Autonomy and Truth

The above materials suggest another area of difficulty in Schaeffer's

writings: He appears to grant the natural man has the competence to

judge the truth of Scripture for himself and in terms of self-understood

facts about the universe and his personal experience. Thinking that an

appeal to an antithesis-founded concept of truth will facilitate accep-

tance of God's Word, and (in practice anyway) assuming the capabilities

of proper rational thought and honesty on the part of unregenerate hu-

man reason, Schaeffer does not take serious account of the depravity of

man's intellect (1 Cor. 2:14). At base his problem is that he does not see

that classical rationalism is as antagonistic to God's absolute truth as

modern irrationalism.

As did Clark and Carnell, Schaeffer has erred in trying to formulate

55. Schaeffer, "Historic Christianity and Twentieth Century Man," 15f., 23.

56. See Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 110.

256

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

a concept of truth prior to, and independent of, commitment to the au-

thoritative, self-attesting Word of God. Although they all thought such

methodology would help to defend the "truth" of Scripture, in reality

their approach is an obstacle to submission to God's absolute demand

upon man's life—including his intellectual activities. If natural man

is given the impression that he can think properly on the issue of the

nature of truth, and this without submission to God's revelation, what

should keep him from assuming that he can autonomously answer any

other question that confronts him? Schaeffer should have heeded his

own advice: once autonomy is allowed in any realm of our thought it

will engulf the whole.

Subjectivism and Emotion as Verification

There is one final, underlying and crucial weakness in Schaeffer's

apologetic. We have seen that he considers Christianity to be a hypoth-

esis that can make sense of the facts and be confirmed by experience,

that is, Christ's lordship can be accepted since Christ's word is a sup-

position that explains the phenomena and gives wholeness to life. That

is Schaeffer's broad approach. However, in his writings he does little,

if any, analysis of natural phenomena and history per se; neither does

he take up specific scientific, sociological, historical, philosophical ques-

tions and show how Christianity succeeds in these areas where secular-

ism does not. No, the one single datum that Schaeffer is concerned to

handle is human personality—more specifically, personal longings for sig-

nificance, purpose, love, freedom, morals, etc. The Christian hypothesis

is verified by Schaeffer in its ability to ground or explain these human

desires. He would say that if Scripture is true, then man is a personal be-

ing with significant moral freedom and the purposive ability to love; he

would then have his readers (or hearers) consider their own human long-

ings and activities—we all function as personal agents in the world, and

love is an ineradicable element of our experience (e.g., even the naturalist

kisses his wife when he gets home from work). This being so, Schaeffer

considers the Christian hypothesis to be verified and shown necessary.

However, within his framework of thought (where the very ability of

the unbeliever to evaluate and ascertain knowledge is not challenged by

the presuppositional demands of Scripture), this approach is incredibly

weak, for it surrenders the objective, truth and authority of Christianity

257

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

(remember, Schaeffer does not show how external states of affairs or

philosophizing or the very concepts of truth, logic, and fact demand the

presupposition of God's Word). Although not wanting to do so, Schaef-

fer has reduced Christianity to a glorified aspirin for the twentieth-cen-

tury man who cannot bear to face the headache of reality about him.

"Man simply cannot live as though he were a machine."57 Such a fact

could exhibit the dependence of man upon God's revelation if it were

conjoined with similar observations: e.g., man cannot reason, evaluate,

discover, analyze, conclude, etc., without the revelation of God—that is,

if objective as well as subjective affairs were held to demand Christian

presuppositions by Schaeffer. Yet we have already seen that he fails to

make this demand upon reason and science.

As a result we have Schaeffer concluding that Scripture must be

true because it gives us an antidote to personal nihilism, provides

an outlook and personal understanding with which we can live in

the face of the dehumanizing forces of our century and civilization.

Because he does not make a further point about the necessity of pre-

supposing Christianity in all matters of truth pertaining to the world

(i.e., logic, science, predication, reasoning all require the assumption

that what Scripture says about reality is the case), Schaeffer's point

that man cannot live with materialistic, deterministic conclusions

about himself but needs the outlook of the Bible is simply a fact about

personal individuals—not about the objective truth and authority of Scrip-

ture! Schaeffer simply cannot maintain that nihilism is untrue because

suicide is an activity that is undesirable to some people (yet taken as

consistent by others).

Antony Flew makes a telling refutation of Schaeffer's type of apolo-

getic:

There is, therefore, nothing inconsistent in saying: both

that the universe and our individual lives are without

meaning, point, or purpose in God's sight, because there

is no such sight; and that those lives and many objects

may be given purposes—often rival purposes—by our

decisions. We are thus certainly not logically dependent

upon God to provide meaning, point, and purpose for

our lives.... Almost all the mistakes usual and possible

15. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, 15, 126.

258

FRANCIS SCHAEFFER

here are found in a review article on New Essays in Philo-

sophical Thought by Brother Leo Williams.... [He claims]

that belief is necessary because the alternative is so

grim;... [yet] even if there was only one alternative to

the religious system favoured by Brother Williams, and

even if that alternative was indeed as disagreeable as he

believes, this would constitute not the slightest reason for

thinking that the more comfortable option must be the

truth. Considerations of cosiness are for present purposes

simply irrelevant.... It would be grossly smug for a well-

fed and well-heeled English academic of the sixties to

have no compassion for the unfortunate for whom "re-

ligion is the sigh of the hard-pressed creature, the soul

of soulless circumstance, the heart of a heartless world."

Before the cry of the real nineteenth-century wage slave

one can only be silent: "I think, if this life is the end, and

that there is no God to wipe away all tears from all eyes,

I could go mad...." Yet when it is a question of argument

and truth the need for comfort becomes, if anything, a

reason against belief in whatever is found comfortable.

The final and more often quoted sentence from that of

Marx is not usually construed as a compliment to the

realism of religion: "It is the opiate of the masses."58

Against such a consideration Schaeffer's apologetic leaves him no reply—

at least no convincing reply (unless Schaeffer shifts his ground). It is still

a toss-up as to whether one should choose the hopefulness of Schaeffer or

the bravery of Bertrand Russell.59 Therefore, Schaeffer has failed to pres-

ent an effective apologetic thrust that shows the unbeliever the demand

for him to accept a new outlook (the presupposed truth of God's Word).

CONCLUSION

After the preceding discussion of Schaeffer's apologetic we must con-

clude that he has not escaped the problems inherent in the systems of

58. Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World), 1966,

105-107.

59. See Russell's essay, "A Free Man's Worship," Why I Am Not a Christian, 104ff.

259

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Clark or Carnell (and with them, Butler and the old Princeton apolo-

gists). He is in basic harmony with the method of these men; they all

draw back from presenting Christianity as an absolute presupposition

for all predication, reasoning, evaluation, and thought. They all have

autonomous presuppositions instead of biblical starting points.

It has been more difficult to deal with the writings of Schaeffer

than those of Clark and Carnell. On the one hand the reviewer is

sympathetic to the valuable insights suggested in Schaeffer's rapid,

rhetorical style as well as his effective, in-service demonstration of love

and concern for lost men in our generation, plus his emphasis on Re-

formed theology in his L'Abri ministry. But on the other hand his lack

of organization, caricatures of certain philosophies (e.g., analytic phi-

losophy), lack of accurate handling of specific artists and their works

in their own right, uncritical use of terms (e.g., "reality"), and mis-

guided over-generalizations (e.g., all twentieth century thinkers and

artists take the "leap" of irrationalism) tend to distress the reader and

make understanding difficult. Still it is unhappily clear that Schaeffer

is subject to the same criticisms that pertain to the more exacting and

punctilious, rationalistic writings of Clark and Carnell. While appre-

ciating his ministry, we must decline Schaeffer's un-Reformed apolo-

getic method.

260

C H A P T E R 7

CONCLUSION TO PART 2:

THE CRITICAL

QUINTESSENCE

Ronald H. Nash has a discussion in his book The New Evangelical-

ism 1 of the sort of "presuppositionalism" represented by Clark

and Carnell. Although the book was published before Schaef-

fer began to be influential, its account is also accurate as a description of

Schaeffer's apologetic method. The heart of the problem with the apolo-

getics of these three men becomes manifest in Nash's (favorable) exposition

of their (alleged) "presuppositionalism." A short look at his book will serve

as helpful summary of the central flaws observed in the positions of Clark,

Carnell, and Schaeffer as they were analyzed above.

Having granted the necessity of basic assumptions in all reasoning,2

assumptions that as starting points "are important because they de-

termine the method and goal of theoretical thought,"3 Nash correctly

states that these ultimate principles are incapable of strict proof.4 But

then enters the difficulty, leaving apologetics standing on an Achilles'

heel. Overlooking the fact that God's revealed truth is the foundational

necessity even for the task of evaluation and verification, Nash asserts,

"There is, however, a way in which they [the ultimate principles] may

1. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1963) 112 143.

2. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 114.

3. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 115.

4. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 116.

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

be indirectly verified."5 Thence he goes on to discuss "The Verification

of Basic Assumptions."6

Nash says that the presuppositional method of verification is similar

to the scientist's way of testing a hypothesis.7 "We conduct a rational

and consistent investigation of the implications of every proposed basic

assumption to see which assumptions are more probably true."8 It would

seem that, after all, there is some more ultimate standard above these

assumptions being investigated; it is against this standard that Nash's

"presuppositionalists" would test the truth of God's Word.

The nature of that test Nash describes thusly:

Basic assumptions may be tested by following out their

implications as they lead (logically) to a world view or

metaphysical system. We then test the system for truth.

If a world view can measure up to standards and tests for

truth, it reflects reliability back upon its first principles....

Thus metaphysical systems must be and can be tested for

truth on the basis of their consistency, coherence, appli-

cability and adequacy.9

Metaphysical systems would be graded, then, according to their logical

consistency, relevance, and ability to explain available data; the suppo-

sitionalists expect that the Christian faith will be passed with honors by

the unbeliever. Viewing the teaching of the Bible as a supposition to be

indirectly verified like a scientific hypothesis rather than as an absolute-

ly necessary presupposition, Nash can render this faint praise: "There

are no prima facie reasons why, at least in the beginning of an inquiry,

the Christian assumption should be any worse than its denial."10 Taking

such a stance as this is a fatal move in apologetics, for it fails to apply the

absolute demand of God's true Word to every level and movement of

reasoning—it does not challenge from the outset the unbeliever's rebel-

lion against God's clear revelation.

In this short presentation by Nash we see that epistemology has

5. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 116.

6. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 116ff.

7. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 118.

8. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 117.

9. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 118f.

10. Nash, The New Evangelicalism, 121.

262

THE CRITICAL Q U I N T E S S E N C E

been made prior to, and independent of, metaphysics. Revelation has

not been taken as the criteria of truth. Reason has been made autono-

mous in that it is taken to stand over and test revelation. The epistemic

status of Scripture has been reduced to a mere probability. The truth

of Scripture has not been taken as absolutely essential to all reason-

ing, the condition of intelligibility for logic, science, and history, but

rather Christianity is seen as one hypothesis among others. Finally, the

method recommended fails to take account of the noetic implications

of man's total depravity, his rebellion against God's revelation every-

where, and the distorting-naturalizing effect of the unregenerate's in-

terpretation of everything. These are the fundamental problems that

afflict the apologetics of Clark, Carnell, and Schaeffer; these are the

basic reasons why we cannot consider them genuine presuppositional

apologists of the Christian faith.

Ironically Nash offers the unwitting refutation to the apologetical

position he has been expounding and reviewing when he quotes (in con-

densed form) from Remaking the Modern Mind by Carl F. H. Henry. Nash's

quotation (with slight expansion) bears repeating:

One must begin with God, not only to get to God, but

to get to anything [for] the existence of God is the nec-

essary presupposition for the affirmation of intelligibility

anywhere.... From a certain vantage point, the concept of

God is determinative for all other concepts; it is the Archi-

medean lever with which one can fashion an entire world

view. If the great periods of philosophy have diversely in-

terpreted history, the nature of man, and the space-time

universe itself, these differences are traceable to variant

presuppositions concerning God.... The modern attempts

logically to prove the existence of the Christian God be-

tray almost invariably a failure adequately to appreciate

this revelatory principle. The Hebrew-Christian writers

nowhere argue to God with Aristotle or any other phi-

losopher as a stepping stone, and this not because of philo-

sophic inability as much as an awareness of the signifi-

cance of revelation.... Where God has spoken, revealed

truth becomes the starting point of consistent knowledge;

revelation is the test of truth, furnishes the framework and

263

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

corrective for natural reason, introduces consistency into

fragmentary human knowledge.... Christian theology in-

volves a revelational philosophy.... It is when revelational

truth is considered within its own framework that it is

agreeable to a reason that does not insist on paring away

one implicate and then another to satisfy non-revelational

prejudices. Generation after generation has called Chris-

tian theism before the bar of humanistic rationalism, not

realizing that all the while the non-revelational philoso-

phies were themselves being tried by the historic faith.11

The apologetics offered by Clark, Carnell, and Schaeffer also suffer

from major internal weaknesses, thus rendering them ineffective. The basic

strategy which all three men use is represented by the following syllogism:

1. If the hypothesis of Christianity is true, then X.

2. X is the case.

3. Therefore, Christianity is true.

For Clark "X" would be "The Bible is logically coherent"; for Carnell,

"The Bible is systematically coherent"; for Schaeffer, "Man is a nonme-

chanical personality."

As it stands, however, this strategy commits an elementary logical

blunder; it involves the fallacy of affirming the consequent. A paral-

lel example of this fallacy which clearly exhibits its fallacious character

would be:

1. If Shakespeare wrote Paradise Lost, Shakespeare was a

great writer.

2. Shakespeare was a great writer.

3. Therefore, Shakespeare wrote Paradise Lost.

Clark, Carnell, and Schaeffer simply overlooked the possibility that

some rival hypothesis might explain "X" as well as, if not better

than, Christianity.

11. Carl F. H. Henry, Remaking the Modern Mind (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1946),

226f., 171, 196, 227, 232.

264

THE CRITICAL Q U I N T E S S E N C E

So, in order to shore up their defenses, these three apologists would

have to add the following argument to their case for Christianity.

1. Christianity, or Hypothesis1 or Hypothesis2 or ... Hy-

pothesis"

2. Not (Hypothesis1 or Hypothesis2 or... Hypothesisn)

3. Therefore, Christianity is true.

Yet no human, not even a Christian apologist, has the omniscience to

know all possible rival hypotheses nor the eternity needed in which to test

them all. Hence only God could apply this argument with any final

satisfaction (but He is the very issue under discussion!), and the human

apologist is driven to skepticism, agnosticism, or ignorance.

Lacking omniscience, the apologist has no choice but to retreat to

probabilism; having disqualified a few rival hypotheses he might claim

that Christianity is more probably true. Yet because the apologist does

not know all the alternatives and their relative strengths (i.e., does not

know how extensive his ignorance is), there is no way for him to grade

probability—in which case his appeal to "probability" is argumenta-

tively worthless. Moreover, the appeal to probability is a confession of

some skepticism as to the truth of Christianity; yet Christianity had

been offered as an alternative to skepticism. Hence in reality skepticism

has engulfed the apologetic and won the day after all.

Thus far we see that the non-presuppositional apologetics of Clark,

Carnell, and Schaeffer is stranded between a logical fallacy and (for lack

of omniscience) skepticism. As a final measure they might suggest the

following type of argument:

1. Christianity or Hypothesis1 explains SituationA

2. Christianity or Hypothesis2 explains SituationB

3. Christianity or Hypothesis3 explains SituationC etc.

4. Therefore, choose Christianity.

However, the conclusion rests upon the validity of the unproven law

of parsimony. (What is to say that the world is not more "messy" than

the simplest hypothesis offered? Why assume that economy or elegance

265

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

characterize the cosmos?) Even if one accepts the law of parsimony the

above argument still rests upon aesthetic grounds for its conclusion (and

hence it is not telling in a matter of truth).

More important, however, is the fact that this argument commits

the fallacy of equivocation, for it compares two different senses or levels

of hypotheses, general and particular. Christianity is a broad, general

hypothesis that includes numerous specific hypotheses (e.g., the various

doctrines of systematic theology), while Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2,

etc., are specific and particular hypotheses that explain the concrete sit-

uation under discussion. Therefore, the argument is more properly cast

when it contrasts one item of Christian doctrine with one specific secu-

lar viewpoint on a subject (or, on the other hand, contrasts Christianity

with secularism—broad labels for various sets of specific hypotheses). So

this final argument must also go by the boards.

The ineffectiveness of the non-presuppositional apologetic is the

inevitable outcome of not challenging unbelief at its very foundation.

When the truth of Scripture is not presented as the necessary presup-

position for all reasoning and evaluation, what compelling reason can

be offered for accepting Christianity as the truth of God? If the apolo-

gist offers as his reason that Christianity meets the needs of the heart

and brings satisfaction for our personal longings, he overlooks the fact

that this could be the case without Christianity actually being true in its

assertions. That Christianity satisfies someone tells us something about

that person, but nothing about the truth status of his beliefs. Moreover,

secular psychology can offer alternative explanations for this phenome-

non, and secular sociology can offer alternative examples from different

cultures. Furthermore, Christianity simply does not satisfy all the hearts'

desires (i.e., the sinful ones); so you could not even rate the probability

of Christianity's being the true religion without a prior commitment to

what are taken as "proper" desires of the heart.

If the apologist shifts his ground and argues from the consistency of

the Christian system or the non-contradictory character of Scripture,

he overlooks the fact that a system can be consistent without being a di-

vine revelation or a canon for the true religion (i.e., the poem "Humpty

Dumpty," the novel Moby Dick, etc.). The absence of contradiction does

not establish the presence of truth (a valid syllogism for a false conclu-

sion can easily be generated), much less the presence of divinely revealed

truth; the test for coherence is a negative test only. Moreover, since no

266

THE CRITICAL QUINTESSENCE

Christian can legitimately claim to have knowledge of the entire Chris-

tian system (all will grant their lack of omniscience and the presence of

error in their thinking), he can never be sure whether it is coherent as a

whole or not; the best that might be claimed is that the Bible is consistent

to the degree that the apologist knows it. However, certain mysteries

and antinomies might also make us cautious even with respect to this

moderate claim. And, as was seen above, the appeal to considerations

of probability must be ruled out of court when one does not know how

extensive his ignorance is.

Well, since the test for coherence is only negative in character, the

apologist might now make argumentative reference to the accuracy of

the Bible's historical, geographical, and scientific statements (while in all

honesty admitting that there are still some unresolved difficulties). But

again, the Bible could well be totally accurate in these areas without be-

ing of divine origin (compare the case of Churchill's The Gathering Storm).

That the Bible is correct in its factual assertions (e.g., "he rose again

the third day") does not establish its truthfulness in the interpretative

assertions (e.g., "was raised again for our justification"). Disproof of the

factual assertions could disprove the system (by modus tollens), but verifi-

cation of the factual assertions can prove the system only by committing

the fallacy of affirming the consequent (see above). Even the resurrec-

tion of Jesus Christ can be accepted by the non-Christian as factual, but

not as having the significance claimed for it by Christian theologians;

the unbeliever could view the resurrection as simply some freak event in

a contingent and "odd" universe.

Furthermore, since facts and their interpretation (to cater to a suspect

dichotomy) are held to be separate matters by both non-Christians and

those trying to "verify" the Bible, you cannot impute any probability to

the realm of interpretation based upon your verified results in the distinct-

ly different realm of fact; that the Bible is factually accurate does not even

make it probably true in its theological interpretations. Moreover, what a

historian will admit or accept as evidence is determined by his view of

reality; so it is questionable whether the Christian "verificationalist" could

get very far with a naturalist anyway. Each would view the data according

to his preconceived scheme of interpretation.

As a final move the non-presuppositionalist apologist could attempt

to present a case in favor of Christian faith by conjoining the personal,

logical, and factual arguments just mentioned; perhaps the various ar-

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CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

guments could aid one another even though they are not telling ones

when separately considered. As each consideration "points" toward the

truth of Christianity, maybe many pointers would amount to an affir-

mative argument. But even this tactic is misguided and unconvincing.

The only thing that a faulted argument points to is the incompetence of

those of us who use it, and an accumulation of faulted arguments simply

reinforces the impression of our incompetence. "If one leaky bucket will

not hold water, that is no reason to think that ten can."12

We can only reiterate our main objections to the apologetic systems

of Clark, Carnell, and Schaeffer. All three men fail to be presuppo-

sitional in their argumentative method, and the presuppositions they

do utilize during the course of their defense are not biblical. Although

not intended to be so, the apologetics of these three authors is merely

a weakened form of natural theology. They have two final authorities:

reason and the Bible; of the two, reason plays the paramount role. They

make little, if any, argumentative appeal to God's clear revelation in

nature and man's constitution, and they bring in the self-attesting rev-

elation of Christ in Scripture only at the end of an argument as confir-

mation of their previously reasoned out conclusions. Where Scripture is

introduced at the beginning of an argument it is presented merely as a

hypothesis to be verified.

Moreover we have observed that the case for Christianity that all

three men present is afflicted with numerous inner weaknesses and

faults; their arguments fail to accomplish the task assigned to them.

The foundation of a house is its beginning point (for a building is not

constructed from the roof down), and the beginning of the apologetics

of Clark, Carnell, and Schaeffer fails to be the authoritative words of

Christ in Scripture (these words, as the three men see things, need to be

verified or justified).

We must conclude, then, that they have "foolishly" erected their

apologetic edifices upon the ruinous sands of human autonomy (see

Matt. 7:24-27). Theirs is not a distinctively Christian apologetic

through and through.

12. Antony Flew, God and Philosophy, 63.

268

A P P E N D I X 1

THE NECESSITY

OF REVELATIONAL

EPISTEMOLOGY

1 . "SELF-SUFFICIENT K N O W E R "

In this article we shall maintain that a person cannot deny the exis-

tence of a "self-sufficient knower." Next we shall indicate that there

can be no more than one such knower. Then, after exploring cer-

tain metaphysical and epistemological possibilities this leaves open to us,

we will note a significant implication the existence of the "self-sufficient

knower" has for Christian philosophers. In all this what we shall mean

by a "self-sufficient knower" is a mind whose judgments are incorrigible,

infallible, and never in need of verification by independent standards.

To deny that there is a knower who makes incorrigible judgments

amounts to pronouncing that there can be no indubitable and certain

judgments. Yet such a pronouncement is either subject to doubt (in

which case we might ignore it, or at least infer that incorrigible judg-

ments are still possible) or is indubitable (in which case it is self-falsi-

fying). Moreover, if someone were to claim with certainty that there

exists no self-sufficient knower, his claim would be credible only if he

had knowledge of every state of affairs; yet a person with universal

knowledge could hardly be impugned with respect to his assertions

(i.e., his judgments would be incorrigible). This is only to say that the

only person who could deny that there is a self-sufficient knower would

have to be a self-sufficient knower himself! Hence the existence of a

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

self-sufficient knower cannot be denied (this is not to prove that it can

be affirmed, however).

A dualism of self-sufficient knowers would, furthermore, be impos-

sible. If the existence of two such knowers is alleged, a number of obser-

vations are appropriate. We shall label these two alleged self-sufficient

knowers as K ("Knower") and DK "Deutero-Knower"). Now K could

never be sure that his judgments were not products of illusions and de-

ceptions generated by DK. K would have to consult DK to make sure

that his own epistemological apparatus was not being manipulated. (Re-

member: we cannot appeal at this point to the self-sufficiency of K's

knowledge to refute this observation, for that is the issue under ques-

tion.) If DK has an independent life and is not governed (e.g., by men-

tal telepathy) by K, then K could not know everything about DK; K

would depend upon revelation, then, from DK in order to assure the

truthfulness of his own judgments. Also K could never be sure that his

judgments about ultimate states of affairs would not have to be altered

by DK's self-knowledge (which is obviously inapprehensible to K). In ad-

dition, K could never be sure of his universals and general interpreta-

tive principles without first ascertaining whether DK were secretly in

control of historical eventuation or not; the "radically new" might oth-

erwise threaten his interpretative schemes. All in all, K would indeed

have to consult standards independent of himself (notably DK) before

he could be certain with respect to his judgments. All attempts to escape

this circumstance fail either to guarantee incorrigibility to each knower

or to make the two knowers genuinely independent of each other. In

summary, the difficulties of comprehension, past deception, and control

over historical eventuation make the existence of two independent, self-

sufficient knowers impossible. If they have independent histories, K and

DK could maintain their respective self-sufficiencies only if they had

mutual control over each other's thoughts, plans, activities, and judg-

ments. However, the concept of reciprocal control is obviously muddled;

K cannot both be in control of and controlled by DK (just as by defini-

tion you cannot have two "ultimates").

If we are prevented from denying the existence of a self-sufficient

knower as well as from affirming the existence of more than one such

knower, then three alternatives are left to us: solipsism, skepticism, and

revelational epistemology (i.e., thinking God's thoughts after Him on a

creaturely level; also designated "analogical thinking").

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THE NECESSITY FOR REVELATIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

If a man will not grant an existential plurality of minds he need not

worry that there is a self-sufficient knower upon whose revealed judg-

ments he depends; all the experiences of such a solipsist (including ra-

tional argumentation) are staged by his own mind. Such a position lacks

plausibility, and its obvious absurdities do not warrant elaboration. But we

will note one difficulty that seems to be overlooked in many cases where

solipsism is under discussion: it is afflicted with an irradicable element of

fate (irrationality). Solipsists are not immune from frustration; when one is

late for work he finds that he cannot simply "alter the scenery" at will, and

so he (like the other commuters) hastens through the traffic. The solipsist

does not have control over what his mind spins out for him but is subject

to its conditions (which are created irrespective of his wishes). So we can

say that the "world-creating" mind of the solipsist is separate from the

"world-perceiving" mind of the solipsist, and the former is governed by

inexplicable fate. This is to say, then, that a solipsist who does not have

manipulative control over his experienced world is only a pseudo-solipsist

since now there are two minds that have to be reckoned with.

To say that there is a real world independent of my mind and that

my mind is the only mind inhabiting that world leads to insuperable

difficulties as well. There is something absurd about denying that the

person with whom I am fervently debating does not have a mind. And

even if we might have warrant to deny that he has a mind, the fact that

he still argues, informs, corrects, deliberates, etc., just as I do, indicates

that on a practical level there is no difference between mind and non-

mind. Furthermore, unless I claim to have comprehensive knowledge, to

be free from delusion, and to be in control of historical eventuation, the

affirmation that mine is the only mind in the world amounts to the de-

nial of the existence of a self-sufficient knower. Such a denial has already

been disqualified. If I am not the self-sufficient knower but am the only

mind in the world, then the problem of fate afflicts me as much as it does

the solipsist. And in an irrational world I could not be sure of anything

(past judgments, general principles, present experiences, future unifor-

mity, etc.); even my sense experience could be deceptive, and (further) I

could be deceived as to my deceptions. Skepticism would result.

Now, overlooking the analytic discussion of "other minds" in cur-

rent academia, if we grant a plurality of minds, we must query as to the

possibility of attaining true judgments and knowledgeable conclusions.

One might have a valid propositional calculus in his argument as well

271

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

as a proof of the truth of each of its premises, but then he would have to

go on and prove his proofs, on and on until he either reached an incor-

rigible starting point or encompassed all true propositions. In the latter

case he would have to be the self-sufficient knower (since his knowl-

edge would be universal). He could, then, supply us with foundational

premises by revealing them to us. But if revelation from a self-sufficient

knower were rejected, what could serve as starting point in establishing

truth? So-called "necessary truths" would not inform us of extramental

states of affairs; self-evident truths would be valuable only if they were

universally self-evident (but what is obvious to everybody? and how

could we canvass all opinions?). Empirical observations might be sub-

jectively incorrigible, but then any case built upon them would be valid

and effective only for the subject who had the foundational experiences.

And even if we grant the objective incorrigibility of phenomenological

protocols (e.g., "I see a pencil now"), such could not be utilized with-

out principles of causation and explanation, assumptions of uniformity

and identity, rules of inference, categorical warrants, etc.—all of which

would have to be verified in their own turn.

Moreover, an inductive argument (as is well known) leads only to

probability, and such probability can be evaluated only in relative and

subjective terms (e.g., "better or worse," "persuasive or non-telling"),

terms which have to be qualified by designating to whom the argument

is convincing or unconvincing. We would be left with personal opin-

ion, but not justified true belief (i.e., knowledge)—unless one holds that

a majority vote of convinced listeners could impute justification to an

argument (in which case even invalid arguments could be "justified"

with certain audiences who have great emotional attraction for the

conclusion!). Unless an absolute authority guarantees the truth of ini-

tial premises to a nonautonomous thinker, that thinker (no matter how

renowned a chair of philosophy he might occupy) has his feet planted

in the quicksand of relativism, and skepticism cannot be prevented.

The man who precludes any revelation from a self-sufficient know-

er commits himself (in principle, even if not in consistent practice) to

skepticism. Yet skepticism implies the denial of a self-sufficient knower,

a denial that has been disqualified above.

Therefore, if we affirm the existential plurality of minds (against so-

lipsism) and the possibility of knowledge (against skepticism), we require

the self-sufficient knower's revelation. All non-autonomous thinkers would

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THE NECESSITY FOR REVELATIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

depend upon such revelation for grounding initial truths and for synthe-

sizing new knowledge. Knowledge for such thinkers would need to bear

an image-relation to the self-sufficient knower's judgments; that is, knowl-

edge for someone who is not self-sufficient would have to be analogous

and not autonomous. Reasoning and knowledge would be possible only in

an atmosphere of revelation.

2 . S Y S T E M AND T R U T H

The significance of context for the understanding of individual words

and assertions has come to be recognized in recent times. The word

"desist" could not be understood if we did not have knowledge of the

history of its application and use. The utterance of the word would be

meaningless outside of a sentence or in-life situation to provide that ut-

terance with a context (e.g., "Growers should cease and desist from using

DDT"; in a situation where someone is committing a crime a policeman

might utter the word as an imperative). What is true with respect to an

individual word is also true with respect to sentences in which it is used:

they require a context of understanding before they can function mean-

ingfully. "Not nothings itself' may sound inapprehensible in itself, but

if one has a vivid enough imagination he can create a context in which

this sentence makes sense (Heidegger apparently thought that he had

such a context).

Now if the epistemic importance of a context applies to individual

words and to simple assertions, we can ask where one acquires the broad-

er context for paragraphs of thought, large-scale judgments, ultimate

conclusions about "reality." How does one arrive at a system of univer-

sal interpretative principles that can relate particular thoughts or facts

to one another? Within what context does one synthesize his knowledge

into a coherent system? The finite knower who tries to construct his sys-

tem from the particulars of his knowledge will always lack universality

in his interpretative principles, but without exhaustive foreknowledge of

what history will eventuate he can have no assurance of any projected

systems of interpretation. If the finite knower starts with his immediate

experiences and imposes categories of understanding upon them, then

he must search every nook of the world to make sure that there are no

anomalies for his interpretative principles; by not deriving his principles

from the particulars of experience he tends to deprive history of its indi-

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CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

vidualities. Yet by taking careful account of the integrity of the particulars

he is denied any assurance of universality in his interpretation of them;

his overarching contextual scheme is made impotent. If, in search for a

context that can give meaning to his knowledge, the philosopher denies

that there can be any pre-interpretation of the facts of history (by God the

Creator of all states of affairs), then he will (because of his lack of exhaus-

tive foreknowledge of historical particulars and lack of assured coherence

in his interpretative system) posit the ideal of comprehensive knowledge

to safeguard the autonomy and validity of his system. Such is the ideal of

much modern science (with the aid of computer technology, to be sure),

and it is at least a limiting concept in most fields of thought (witnessed by

the common deference to the authority of the "expert" or person having

the most years of training and/or academic degrees). Complete certainty

comes to rest on comprehension, a context wide enough to give meaning

to all the particular facts of experience and history.

It is obvious to most people, however, that no human (or even a com-

puter) can attain to omniscience; failing this, man can have no assurance

of meaningful knowledge, no system of truth. He seems to be caught on

the horns of a dilemma; one horn is uninterpreted (uncategorized) par-

ticulars, and the other is rootless interpretative principles (i.e., divorced

from factual and particular information). The choice is meaninglessness

or sheer imagination. If the would-be autonomous thinker would work in

a context of revelation, however, he could be in a position to recognize the

objective integrity of historical particulars while being assured that they

were all meaningful. The comprehensive system of God's mind must pre-

cede temporal experience and pre-interpret all facts if they are going to

be objectively meaningful. God's revelation to man provides the contours

within which man's thinking about the world can take place and make

sense. Working within the context of God's revelation the human thinker

can attain coherence in his interpretation of his experience and can make

meaningful predications. This he would do by striving to think God's

thoughts after Him (i.e., on the basis of revelation) on a creaturely level

(thereby imaging what God thinks on the level of Creator), thoughts that

constitute the plan according to which history proceeds and has mean-

ing. Because man's mind is created by God and revelatory of Him, and

because the world is created by God and is revealing Him and His plan,

man's mind and the facts of his experience are suitable for each other—

they can meaningfully come together. Man can build further meaningful

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THE NECESSITY FOR REVELATIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

knowledge upon the foundation of God's revelation; alternately put, he

reads general revelation through the spectacles of special revelation.

According to this revelational epistemology, the ultimate point of

reference in all mental judgments would be the original and compre-

hensive system in God's self-sufficient mind; hence knowledge for man

would have to be analogous to God's and not autonomous. In summary:

there must be a "universe" that is the context of all meaningful mental

judgments and intelligible experiences. The requisite "unified-diversity"

is found in the mind of God as the sovereign and self-sufficient knower.

Revelation from Him brings coherence and meaning to human experi-

ence and knowledge. The sovereign Lord orders the world and history

as well as creates the mind of man with its interpretative categories, thus

making the attainment of knowledge in a meaningful context possible

for man. Hence if man is to have both system and truth in his thinking

he must renounce his attempts to be autonomous of God's revelation

to him. Rather he must seek receptively to reconstruct the system of

truth known by God. The creature of God must implicate himself more

and more into God's ways of thinking by submitting to the authoritative

word of Scripture, learning ever more of God Himself and the world,

and finding a basis for all other meaningful reasoning and investiga-

tion. Context is essential to meaning; the meaning of our lives and the

meaningfulness of our thoughts can be found in the context of God's

revelation, a revelation that tells us of the contextual situation in which

we live, and move, and have our existence—God Himself.

3. T H E EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CREATOR-RELATION

Because man lives in an environment conditioned by, and resting upon, the

knowledge and interpretative principles of his ancestors, and because man

is created with certain inherent knowledge of his Creator, man has epis-

temologically been able to take too much for granted. Men deceive them-

selves to such a degree that they conclude that they are epistemologically

autonomous (i.e., free from the necessity of exploring the Creator-relation

when doing science and philosophy). Consider the following illustration.

Imagine an acoustic society where the people are pre-alphabetic

and unacquainted with linear type or printed materials. All their com-

munication is oral, and their thinking is based upon sounds and voices

rather than written sentences. Should the intellectual elite of this society

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CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

happen upon what we call a "typewriter" we could imagine their ques-

tions. What is it? How is it? What emotional and operational response

is appropriate? Is this active or passive? Is it art or machine or surd?

Etc. These thinkers will seek an interpretation of this object in terms of

their own personal experiences, but try as they may their efforts would

always be arbitrary or distorted or both. Should they simply posit that

this object has some useful purpose (rather than not), where would they

begin testing? Should they simply posit (again arbitrarily) that this falls

within the general category of machinery, how would they determine

how it properly works? By a great stretch of the imagination they might

discover through guesswork and trial-and-error that pressing the keys of

the object could crack a strategically placed walnut! If they ever could

come up with an analysis for this unknown object, it would certainly be

as misguided and incorrect as this one. It could be no other way.

On the other hand, suppose that these pre-alphabetic people were

given the benefit of seeing the strange object in operation. Imagine that

a motion picture was provided for the typewriter's being loaded with

paper and used to type a paragraph of thought but with the hands of

the operator edited out of the film. Would they fare any better in their

interpretative endeavors? Again they would be left to guesswork as to

the activity of the strange object. Using their previous experience to

guide them they would always analyze its function in an arbitrary or

distorted way. Where should their analysis begin? Are the marks on

the page causing the keys to depress? Does the ring of the bell frighten

the carriage back? Is tabulation merely a burp? Moreover, the printed

sheet itself would be to them a hodgepodge of strange marks, uniform

scribbles. Obviously the real intent or use of the typewriter would be lost

for lack of reading ability.

Only if this acoustic society receives information from the person

who designed and operates the typewriter will they even begin to un-

derstand it and its function properly. The creator-relation has to become

a factor in their interpretative schemes. The creator and controller of

the typewriter could explain what an alphabet and written language

are, how to make the typewriter operate, and what the resultant printed

sheet communicates. Outside of such consultation with the typewriter's

creator these people could never have any assurance of knowledge with

respect to the strange object, but with revelation the acoustic society

could know for sure the nature, significance, and function of the ob-

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THE NECESSITY FOR REVELATIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

ject. Only when the creator-relation is accounted in their interpretations

could knowledge be gained; without that foundation, not even one com-

ponent of the typewriter could be understood.

This illustration can be applied to all human interpretations of

the world. The typewriter represents the whole of created reality,

and its functioning stands for the history of the world. Neither the

universe nor history can be approached intellectually without a prior

revelation from their Creator and Controller that delivers founda-

tional information as to structure, interpretative categories, purpose,

goal, meaning, and significance for the universe and history. Every

detail need not be mentioned, but starting points and direction are

indispensable. With these the human knower can proceed to learn

more and more about the world and history, being assured that his

interpretation rests upon and subsequently reflects the original inter-

pretation in the mind of God.

If a thinker were to attempt to gain knowledge "on his own," there

would be no hope for him; his guesswork would be arbitrary and dis-

torted. He would not know whether the diversity or unity of things

were to control his philosophy. He would not know whether things were

strictly determined by antecedent causes or whether novelty ruled the

day. He would not know whether partial ignorance vitiated his interpre-

tations, etc., etc. His arbitrary categories of understanding and rootless

assumptions would lead to anything but justified, true beliefs. Autono-

mous knowledge is no knowledge at all. Epistemological significance is

grounded in the Creator-relation. Not even a simple detail of the world

or history can be understood properly without revelation from the Cre-

ator. Apart from such a revelation the world would be a completely un-

known object, without even a hint as to its meaning and an explanatory

method appropriate to it. The Creator-relation in epistemology is a sine

qua non, and so revelational epistemology is maintained against all forms

of autonomous philosophy (which would be cogitation in and against the

utterly mysterious or unknown).

Since God is the Creator of all facts and His comprehensive inter-

pretation precedes all states of affairs, the reference point of all knowl-

edge must be revelation from Him; otherwise we force our distorted

and groundless categories upon misapprehended facts. If a fact is what

it is as a result of God's activity, it will never be given a true interpre-

tation unless understood in terms of the Creator and His plan. To

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CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

attempt an interpretation of the world or its details "on one's own"

is to assume erroneously the non-createdness of facts. If the revela-

tion of God is turned away from so that His sovereign control over all

things is ignored, the resultant assumption that anything can happen

in history and that all things must be organized and assigned meaning

by the human mind will eventually issue in skepticism. Fate rules the

day, and subjective arbitrariness is the quicksand of all reasoning. One

either begins his philosophizing with the God who comprehends all

things and who delivers an apprehensible revelation, or he begins with

an incomprehensible and inapprehensible world. If the world is to be

known, we must consult its Creator.

278

A P P E N D I X 2

THE PRAGMATIST'S

REJOINDER AND THE

CHRISTIAN ALTERNATIVE

To all of the preceding discourse1 the modern-day pragmatist

would merely sneer and tauntingly respond, "Well, my laws of

logic and scientific procedure still work, even without acknowl-

edging your God, and whatever theoretical inadequacy or inner tension

there may be in my thinking, it has not kept me from success yet!" The

pragmatist can still live his life, be fruitful in his scientific endeavors,

and be satisfied with his thinking even though he continually rejects

revelational authority; he can stubbornly refuse to be affected by the

above critique. According to the pragmatist, ideas are no more than

plans-for-action. The only meaning any proposition has are its practical

consequences for his life. And truth is constituted by an idea's workabil-

ity and beneficial results in concrete living situations. The pragmatist

faces insuperable difficulties in this "convenient relativism."

To be at all helpful, pragmatists must base future plans for action on

past effects and experiences of success, thereby depending upon some-

thing that is illegitimate for him: the truth of uniformity or regularity in

nature. Then, in order to be convincing, the pragmatist's position must be

set forth as true, as a moral imperative, or as a personal recommendation.

1. The "preceding discourse" which Bahnsen here mentions refers to Ar-

ticles 1 through 5 of Chapter 3 above. He excised this section of text during his

reworking of the proofs.

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

If pragmatism is only a recommendation we are free to reject it. If prag-

matism is a moral imperative we can refuse to recognize the authority of

the commander and investigate the nature of its moral force by means

of reasoned criticism. To have any hearing at all or any intellectual force

whatever, then, pragmatism will have to be presented as true.

The irony is that pragmatism is a relativistic theory that tacitly as-

sumes itself as absolute! But then the pragmatist finds himself required

to solve the dilemmas posed for autonomous epistemology above. Most

likely though, the pragmatist will simply assert that pragmatism is "true

for him." Outside of the fact that tomorrow pragmatism might no longer

be "true" (in this self-contradictory sense), this use of "true" is at diamet-

rical odds with ordinary language usage; it is at variance with what we

mean by "true." Can you imagine the pragmatist's notion of truth being

utilized in our law-courts? Truth is usually held to be universally appli-

cable or recognizable. It is not assigned to private and/or contradictory

states of affairs. If the pragmatist means that pragmatism is "true" in

this common sense, then he is obligated to argue for it (and not simply

point to his smug self-satisfaction). If he takes "true" in a different sense

altogether, we can ask him, nevertheless, if he believes pragmatism to

be true in the traditional sense. If he does, we expect a reasonable case for

it; if he does not, then we can simply fail to be moved by his personal

testimony. If something is not true should we be concerned with it? If the

pragmatist buries his head in the sand, he cannot expect to convince

anyone or even get a respectable hearing. If he will not squarely face the

perplexities in autonomous reasoning, our most appropriate response to

his personal point of view is, "So what?"

There are other considerations relevant to rejecting the pragma-

tist's position. Pragmatism rests on an experimental methodology;

those ideas that are to have the most beneficial consequences in my life

can only be found out by trial and error. However, every experiment is

conducted within the context of certain presuppositions (which delimit

the conditions of experimentation, method, and standard of success,

etc.) and is specifically tailored to solve some particular problem. The

outcome and evaluation of the experiment is relative to those presup-

positions and problem. Could the pragmatist ever be certain that what

he considered most workable really was so? He could have determined

the outcome of his experiment just by the way he set it up; hence his

evaluations could be distorted. His methodology itself needs to be sub-

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THE PRAGMATIST'S REJOINDER & THE CHRISTIAN ALTERNATIVE

ordinated to some higher interpretative principles. Thus we begin to

approximate the difficulties already encountered in autonomous rea-

soning. The pragmatist is obligated to offer a credible defense. More-

over, since "practical" and "satisfactory" are standards that are very

vague and relative to the person utilizing them, they cannot give us a

clear idea of what constitutes truth. Furthermore, the pragmatist does

not seem able (or willing) to specify the nature of that goal which "true

ideas" serve. Indeed his position is too ambiguous to tell us anything at

all. If the pragmatist is to be accounted as saying anything meaningful

he is going to have to prove himself.

In addition, pragmatism can easily be seen to endorse untrue ideas

that lead to certain kinds of practical ends. If I utter a lie but thereby

gain what is useful to me, the pragmatist would be in the awkward posi-

tion of calling a lie "true." By considering only his own desires a man

can conveniently exclude obvious truths from his thinking in order to

successfully gain personal comfort. And some truths would be simply

beyond pragmatic verification (e.g., Royce's illustration: "The totality of

experience of many men really exists" can be neither denied nor prag-

matically verified). Consistent pragmatism reduces to holding that we

must act "as if" our ideas were true to life and reality while realizing

all along that they fail to describe genuinely anything at all. The idea

of a pragmatist does not assert anything but only challenges behavioral

response. Hereby pragmatism leads to skepticism and destroys itself as

a truth criterion. The autonomous man who simply mocks the theoreti-

cal problems raised previously because he can continue to operate as a

scientist or philosopher without consciously acknowledging revelational

epistemology fails to be clear in what he is saying, self-consistent in his

method, or even plausible in his outlook. Of philosophies pragmatism

turns out to be quite impractical!

Finally, when the autonomous thinker refuses to be affected by

the critical attacks on his autonomous epistemology and appeals to

the successes of his intellectual endeavors, he simply testifies to a self-

acknowledged faultiness in trying to be consistently autonomous. He

is also testifying to the intuited (yet unacknowledged) truth of the

contrary system (i.e., revelational epistemology) which does give him

grounds for epistemic significance, success in reasoning, and motive

for exerting his intellect.

In other words, the pragmatist is "successful" simply because he is

281

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

wrong in his profession, not in spite of the perplexities of his autonomy. If

the pragmatist wishes to deny that he secretly knows that revelational

epistemology is correct, let him give some reason for his intellectual ven-

turing. What did he think to gain? Furthermore, let him resolve the

difficulties of that position he outwardly espouses. Let him account for

his purported intellectual successes! Otherwise, every time he taunts

the critic of autonomy with his proficiencies and accomplishments the

autonomous man plays right into the critic's hands. The ability of the

self-proclaimed autonomous thinker to do science and philosophy, even

in the face of insuperable dilemmas in autonomous epistemology, will

always be evidence of the mistaken nature of his autonomy and of the

truth of what he consciously denies (but apparently endorses uncon-

sciously). If then the pragmatist wishes to avoid adding further evidence

against his professed autonomy, it will be necessary for him to get to

work defending himself against those criticisms of his position that were

initially laid down. His only alternative is embarrassed silence.

T H E C H R I S T I A N ALTERNATIVE

The Christian has an ultimate metaphysical commitment (derived from

God's clear revelation) to the sovereign, self-contained, self-sufficient, trini-

tarian God who created all things from nothing. Hence the Christian on-

tology is dual-level: (1) the uncreated, autonomous, absolute, as well as (2)

the derivative, created, contingent (i.e., the Christian insists on the Creator/

creature distinction). All the facts of this creation are preinterpreted by the

counsel of God, and they all reveal the person and divine attributes of God,

their Creator, in an authoritative, necessary, sufficient, and clear manner.

Consequently there are no "brute," neutral, uninterpreted, or non-revela-

tory facts. God's revelation in man and in man's environment is so certain

that men who refuse to believe the truth about God are without excuse.

Their unbelief is an ethical, not an epistemological problem. As a creature

made as the image of God, the Christian understands that he must reason

in subordination to God (or "analogously")—that is, in a derivative and re-

interpretative way. He must think God's thoughts after Him in all areas of

intellectual endeavor. Because God is the absolute authority over all creation

His infallible understanding must be made foundational for man's thinking.

For man, all reality is reinterpreted in the light of God's revealed thoughts.

So then, basic to all truly Christian epistemology is the absolute self-

282

THE PRAGMATIST'S REJOINDER & THE CHRISTIAN ALTERNATIVE

sufficiency and comprehensive knowledge that characterize God, the

Creator and Controller of all reality. This God alone is self-explanatory.

As such He is the final reference point of all thinking and He speaks with

an absolute authority. His judgments never fail to be justified and rel-

evant, seeing that He has infinite knowledge and that He is the Creator

of all states of affairs. His intelligent plan and interpretation lie behind all

facts, thus rendering the universe reasonable and coherent throughout;

mystery is not ultimate. God's system of thought embraces everything in

a meaningful order. That system is exhaustive and incorrigible, since all

things happen according to God's sovereign plan.

Thus a rational, coherent God directs every event of history. This

God exists exclusively in terms of Himself, needing nothing over against

which He must identify Himself, being subject to neither temporal limi-

tations nor spatial requirements, and requiring no test of internal con-

sistency against principles of logic—nothing is more ultimate than this

divine Person (neither non-being, time, space, nor logic). Factuality and

consistency must, therefore, be measured in terms of God and not vice

versa. God's originative, interpretative system for all reality cannot fail

with respect to coherence and material factuality, since all things are cre-

ated by Him and operate according to His wise, sovereign control. The

meaningful Word of God, according to which the world was structured,

precedes all facts and provides their meaningful context. Therefore, God

is the original of truth: He creates all truth, He is the standard of truthful-

ness, His Word alone is self-attesting and incorrigible, His interpretation

originates all states of affairs and guarantees their meaningfulness (even

before discovered by man's mind).

Because God orders both the world and man's mental functions,

man can reflect truly upon those states of affairs external to him. The

interconnection and relations between facts thought upon by man were

originally in the objective world according to the plan of God. Man

depends on God's general revelation in nature and its corresponding

revelation in his own self-conscious mind to bring principles of reason

and facts of experience into fruitful contact. Lacking a comprehensive

interpretation of reality, man depends upon divine revelation to get his

bearings set and to place his thought in a context of meaning and truth.

Prepared by general revelation, man can recognize the authority and

self-attesting truth of Scripture, which gives him his standards of mean-

ing, knowledge, and truth. Man, as the image of God, thinks in the at-

283

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

mosphere of God's original and comprehensive interpretation of reality,

utilizes dependable axioms of truth found in God's verbal revelation,

and has a basis for extending his knowledge according to the pattern of

general revelation.

Striving to think his Creator's thoughts after Him on the creaturely

level, man unquestionably accept's God's verbal revelation as that through

which he reads general revelation. Man strives to have his own interpre-

tation of reality bear an image-relation to God's interpretation. In this

way man's knowledge can be true even though not comprehensive. Just as

man cannot comprehend God, so he cannot fully comprehend any part

of the created world, since it reveals this God. Yet man can apprehend

God in a true fashion (based on God's revelation) and so can apprehend

the created world truly when he bases his thinking on God's revelation.

In his interpretative endeavors man can use the laws of logic, because the

created world is a coherent system under the control of God who created

man's mind to function in terms of the laws of thought appropriate for the

created world, and sense experience since he is reinterpreting the facts of

the created world as the analogue of God. Man can also use the principle

of the uniformity of nature, since God has promised the orderly function-

ing of nature according to His wise providence.

Hence the Christian alternative to the hopelessness of autonomous

reasoning is revelational epistemology or "analogical thinking." This re-

quires beginning with God's Word as the most certain truth available to

man and basing all reasoning upon it. This authoritative Word is not to be

subjected to verification by human reason before being accepted. Human

reason makes sense only in terms of God's revelation, not vice versa. So the

Bible does not appeal to human reason to justify what it says.

The Bible is no short-cut to the truth for those who are not blessed

with abilities in science and philosophy (and thus cannot arrive at the

truth on their own as do the intelligentsia). Rather, the Bible is the foun-

dation of any and all true science and philosophy, disciplines that would

never arrive at the truth about God independent of revelation. According-

ly human reason must be seen for what it really is: created and subject to

God's authority. Human intellect is not independent of God. Only when

man's epistemological abilities are exercised under the authority of God

and His Word, begin with the truth of God's Word, and are guided by it,

can he arrive at truth (which is theoretically founded) in any area. Men

who find truth while denying God have no theoretical foundation for their

284

THE PRAGMATIST'S REJOINDER & THE CHRISTIAN ALTERNATIVE

thinking. They find truth only in spite of what they say about themselves

and God (i.e., they know the truth that is revealed even while refusing

to acknowledge it; this knowledge makes it possible for them to discover

truth). This all points to the necessity of regeneration for sinful man, who

is in rebellion against God. Only as man is made a new creature recreated

unto knowledge will he submit openly to God's absolute authority.

For the Christian, truth is taken to be conformity in thought, word,

and deed to God's mind based on Christ's gospel as learned in His Word

and illuminated by the Holy Spirit. Our thinking begins with, and is

based upon, the absolute, complete, underived, and eternal truth in God's

mind and should proceed to generate assertions which never contradict

God's authoritative Word, which reflect God's interpretation of any area

of reality, and which are true to the facts of God's created world and the

laws of thought God provides man's mind with which to function. Realiz-

ing that he cannot intelligibly conceive of God's non-existence, man must

acknowledge that only if the world and he himself are what God's Word

says they are can there be any science or philosophy at all.

In any knowledge transaction man is governed by: (1) God's Word and

its implications (man is never to impugn his Creator's veracity), (2) logical

coherence (God has created the world with a meaningful order accord-

ing to His own counsel, and man should seek to reflect God's thoughts

on a creaturely level), and (3) the facts of experience (man, who is not the

original of truth or interpretation, cannot excogitate facts at will but must

accept the world as God made it and presents it to him). Man can gain

genuine knowledge when depending upon revelation, coherence, and ex-

perience. Of these God's Word is not subject to correction by experience

and coherence (though occasionally man's interpreting of God's Word

might be), but logic and perception can be corrected by Scripture.

One implication of the concept of "knowledge" delineated above is

that "knowledge" must be "justified true belief'; knowledgeable belief

must be grounded in justification in accordance with God's thoughts.

The primary justification for any belief is the authoritative Word of

God written. In this Word and everything that can be deduced from it

by good and necessary consequence is found the guidelines for any and

all of man's intellectual activities. When Scripture does not specifically

speak to a point at issue man is to work within the boundaries that are

set down, using the gifts God has provided him in order to fulfill the

cultural mandate. Empirical investigation and logical ordering work

285

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

under the authority of God's Word. Since God intends for man to gain

knowledge beyond that verbally revealed (hence the cultural mandate)

man can discover truth by efficient and cautious work. When a man

has good reasons for a belief and that belief is true to the facts, then

we can say of him that he has knowledge. Verification of truth comes

via careful exegesis of Scripture, cautious and constantly re-examined

scientific examination and painstaking logical scrutiny. God, by His

Spirit of truth, intends that we be able to adjudicate the relevance of

argumentative premises and become assured of proper justification for

alleged cases of "knowledge." This calls for faithfulness to all of the

tools, gifts, and resources He has put at our consecrated disposal.

A Christian view of God, the world, man, and knowledge as repre-

sented briefly in the preceding paragraphs constitutes the only effective

alternative to autonomous reasoning of all varieties. In the case of au-

tonomous reason, assertions about states of affairs would be meaning-

less if not impossible, and "knowledge" would always be engulfed in

the yawning chasm of skepticism. Revelational epistemology provides

a solid foundation for meaningful knowledge, genuine science, and le-

gitimate philosophy. In it skepticism is vanquished, and the prospect

of ascertaining truth is confirmed. Christian epistemology, based on

both special and general revelation of the authoritative, living God,

provides coherence for experience, uniformity and predictability, intel-

ligible facts, valid principles of logical inference, a connection between

the mind and the world, continuity and discontinuity of facts according

to the plan of God, and standards of truth and meaning—all of which

autonomous reasoning despairs to attain. Only by subordinating them-

selves to God's authoritative, necessary, sufficient, and clear revelation

can empirical investigation and logical thinking find their legitimate

function and beneficial employment.

286

A P P E N D I X 3

THE POSSIBILITY

OF ARGUMENT

When the Christian and non-Christian argue with one another

they will both seek to be coherent in their use of premises that

are true. Yet neither one will be able to prove the truth of

each and every premise used, for that would lead to an infinite regress and

make argument impossible (since it could never get started). Every argu-

ment must begin with some foundational, unproved premises. What sort

of premises must these be? In the case of the allegedly self-evident prem-

ises one disputer can always claim that the premise is not so self-evident to

him. Analytic propositions fail to give any substance to the debate. Pro-

tocol statements need to be accompanied with a more ultimate outlook if

they are going to be suitable for deductive reasoning or inductive relating.

Inductive arguments are always inconclusive, being subjectively evaluated

for their strength. A person may he persuaded by an inductive argument, but

what he has thereby is personal belief, not knowledge. There is always some

doubt as to whether the person was persuaded by the truth of the argument

or by circumstantial conditions. Even if the initial unproved premises in an

argument could be agreed upon by the disputants, when subsequent dem-

onstration disproves one disputant's position he could take this as evidence

that they did not mean the same thing after all by those initial premises.

This is only to say that unless an absolute authority guarantees the

truth of initial premises, one disputant can always refuse to be moved by

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM.

the argument of the other (and with cogent reasons for his stubbornness).

In mundane matters men can often agree on initial premises and pur-

sue genuine argument (based on the authority inherent in their personal

agreement at the outset). But an authoritative revelation of the truth is the

only basis for premises in an argument over ultimate issues, premises that

can be used to drive an opponent from his position. If a theological argu-

ment is going to be a genuine argument and not a mere exercise in per-

suasion tactics, then initial truth must be supplied from an authoritative

source. Should any disputant question how this authority is known to be

genuinely authoritative he has failed to recognize the meaning of "author-

ity." If the authority depended upon some proof of its authoritative status

in order that it be acknowledged as the authority, then it would cease to

be the final authority.

So then, if an argument is going to constitute a genuine exchange of

ideas and legitimate debate, the two opponents must meet on common

ground. If disputants do not use the same initial premises that are known

to be true, then nothing is "proven." But we could never know whether

two opponents were really using the same foundational premises without

a revelation of that fact from One who knows the truth about every situ-

ation. In Romans 1 we read that all men have a clear revelation of God

that they seek to misuse and hold down. As seen above, only this inner

conviction of God's existence provides a basis for knowledge of any sort.

So this knowledge must be presupposed in order for any argument to take

place. Since all men have this knowledge of God (whether they admit it or

not) argumentation is possible. No one could intend to convince his op-

ponent of the truth without the conviction that each of them shared an

initially true premise; this conviction can be based only on a word from

God. When the non-Christian rejects the revelation of God and holds to

a secular cosmology, anthropology, etc., he has no reason to suppose that

contact with another mind on any common ground is possible. If argu-

mentation is going to be possible we need not just any presupposition, but

we require clearly revealed and universally necessary ones—presupposi-

tions that Scripture declares God has provided all men.

Here then is the logical oddity of arguments between skeptics and

believers. Only if Christianity is true when it claims that all men have

a presupposed knowledge of God can there be any common ground

on which to maintain an argument at all, and only if God provides the

authoritative beginning premise in an argument can the non-Christian

288

THE POSSIBILITY OF ARGUMENT

ever hope to do more than merely persuade (in an irrational or emotive

fashion). No matter what type of argument is carried on and no mat-

ter what type of attack is argumentatively directed against Christianity,

they must all presuppose the truth of Christianity if they purpose to be

genuine arguments.

The only point of contact between any skeptic and believer who

argue with each other must be the truth that the non-Christian is at-

tempting to disprove! He does in fact presuppose this truth but will not

acknowledge it (because of his depraved mind). Nevertheless, all genu-

ine argumentation and the attempt to prove a truth presupposes Chris-

tianity. To the degree that the unbeliever has any knowledge at all he is

dependent upon the revelation of God, even though he may outwardly

repudiate this revelation. This knowledge, which God commonly and

graciously allows those who disobey Him, makes it possible for them to

argue. The non-Christian, while recognizing the necessity of common

presuppositions for argumentation, cannot be assured of them on his

own autonomous basis nor can he supply unquestionable axioms that

all men know and use. Only the Christian, depending upon the verbal

revelation of God, can be assured that God has revealed certain unques-

tionable truths to all men in all ages. This revelation given to all men

provides the necessary point of contact for an argument between two

men. Without it, disputants would be incapable of proving anything,

being adrift without a common foundation.

Because the unbeliever will outwardly denounce the truths that

Scripture declares God has revealed to all men, truths that are neces-

sary for all science and philosophy, the Christian apologist must not

carry on his dispute with the unbeliever on the unbeliever's own terms

or opinion of himself. Common ground cannot be found at this level.

The apologist must appeal to the truth that the unbeliever suppresses

(yet utilizes in order to arrive at truth). On the level of outward profes-

sion there is antithesis in the presuppositions used by the Christian and

the non-Christian, but in their "heart of hearts" all men know the truth

about God—for God has Himself shown it to them. Argument will be

possible on this level only. It is only because the unbeliever is not true

to his professed position but unconsciously draws upon his "ignorant"

beliefs that argument can be exercised between him and a believer.

Hence the Christian apologist should seek to lay bare the character of

those presuppositions on which the non-Christian operates when argu-

289

CONSISTENT PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

ing against the faith, demonstrate their self-vitiating quality, and then

show the suppressed beliefs that make the unbeliever's formal reasoning

and knowledge possible and that offer common ground for legitimate

argumentation. Autonomous reasoning, with its inherent irrationalism,

rather than presuppositional apologetics, makes common ground and

argument impossible. The apologetical endeavor is salvaged by a pre-

suppositional approach to the unbeliever, for it allows for genuine and

purposed argumentation between them.

290

SUBJECT & PERSON INDEX

A

Areopagus 44

argument 49, 51

absolute authority 285

indirect 15

absolute idealism 170

argumentation 53 , 74 , 85 , 87, 117,

absolute presupposition 234

125, 126, 127, 182, 208,

agnostic 58, 48, 73, 128

288, 289

agnosticism 128, 245, 265

agnostic 129

Albright, W. F. 203

autonomous 65, 178

analogical thinking 270, 284

arguments

anthropology 238, 288

circular 86

antithesi 55-57

Aristotle 104, 151, 180

antithesis 30-31, 46, 48-49, 51,

atheism 128

71. 112, 128, 143, 201,

atheist 42, 143, 158, 237

253-256

Athens 29, 43-44, 50

antithetical mindset 91

authority 4, 36, 51, 101, 127

apologetical argument 86

absolute 6

apologetical method 174

autonomous 128

apologetical system 150

cosmic 127

apologetic method 12, 59, 218-

final 288

220, 241, 261

God's 57, 83, 137, 140, 154,

apologetic procedure 75

156, 253

apologetics 25, 35, 37, 67, 113,

human 3, 60

225

man's 109, 218

presuppositional 4, 43

of God 56, 60

probabilistic 34

of the Word 3

Reformed 6

personal 88, 90, 125, 157

task of 3, 15

ultimate 4, 85, 87

traditional methods 13

autonomous 33-34, 56, 58, 61,

apologetic task 6

70, 99-101, 115, 204, 275

apologist 36-38, 47, 52-57, 64,

autonomous epistemology 282

69-74 , 96, 115, 119, 121,

autonomous man 73, 90, 97-99,

126, 129, 146, 151, 266,

102, 103, 105, 107, 109,

289

111, 238, 247

apostasy 45

autonomous method 157

apostate 51

autonomous methodology 231

Aquinas, Thomas 218, 232, 248

autonomous reason 7, 217, 281,

256

286, 290

arbitrariness 99

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS

autonomous thinker 100, 105, 105, cosmology 288

111, 281, 282

creation 45

autonomous thinking 103, 108,

creature 62

110, 207, 231

critical realism 170

autonomy 5 - 6 , 91, 116, 129, 149,

cultural mandate 285

154, 207, 218, 221, 225,

245, 256

D

deception 30, 51

B

defending the faith 12

Bahnsen, Greg vii

Descartes 178, 204

Barth, Karl 145, 161

determinism 125

belief

DeWolf, L. H. 254

justification 79-81

dualism 81

believer 48

Brightman, E. S. 155, 226, 235-254

Buddhist 89

empiricism 6, 154, 177, 192

empiricist 85

Cage, John 249

Epicurean 45

Calvin, John 5, 10

epistemic authority 111

Carnell, Edward J. 155, 178, 197-

epistemic certainty 127, 149, 154,

259, 241, 246, 250, 255,

205, 246

256, 260, 261, 263-265, 268 epistemic ground 86

Cartesian method 162

epistemological autonomy 97

challenge to unbelief 69

epistemological belief 81

Chisholm, R. M. 77, 78, 84

epistemological method 80, 82

Christ

epistemological standards 85

Lordship 5, 27

epistemology 4, 12, 15, 54, 37,

Word of 6, 26

45, 77, 83-87, 90, 100, 108,

Christian presuppositions 7, 97

110, 114, 125-124,, 127, 158,

Clark, Gordon H. 155, 157-195,

144, 157-158, 185, 241, 245,

197, 202, 204, 209, 215,

255, 262, 277, 282

225, 241, 255, 256, 260,

autonomous 97, 124

261, 265-265, 268

revelational 5, 97, 108, 124

Collingwood, R. G. 145

equal ultimacy 16

common grace 45, 123, 231

ethical 45

common ground 91, 115, 129, 141, ethical absolutist 111

200, 231, 288-289

ethical norms 185

common sense 183

ethics 34, 223

common sense philosophy 170

evidence 57, 95, 125, 126, 184

conversion 47

existentialism 5, 161, 204

correspondence theory of truth 82

experientialism 227, 229

292

SUBJECT & PERSON INDEX

F

Hordern, William 233

H o m e , C. M. 210, 234

Fabro, Cornelio 178

Hume, David 5, 107

facts 15, 106, 110, 112, 125, 126,

197, 227, 231, 284

brute 169, 227, 282

1

faith 63-67, 71, 191, 199, 235

idealism 5

fideism 13, 15

ignorance 39, 44, 48, 55, 66, 265

Flew, Antony 258, 268

impossibility of the contrary 124

fool 75

inconsistency 92

foolish 72-73

independence 98

foolishness 37, 4 8 - 5 3

independent thinker 101, 103

indeterminism 123

G

internal critique 75, 116, 124

interpretation 97, 113, 115, 191,

geometric axioms 150

197, 277, 278

Gettier, E. L. 99

interpretative principles 88

God

interpretative systems 116

authority of 86

interpreting the facts 14-15

in the dock 9, 11, 15

irrational leap 116

mind of 16

self-sufficient 16

veracity of 58-59, 61, 69, 149

K

Godel, Kurt 89, 182

Kantianism 148

God's existence

Kant, Immanuel 5, 219, 232, 233

probability 5

Kierkegaard, S0ren 205, 232, 233

God's Word

knowing 92-93

sufficiency of 63

God's 187

gospel 38, 48

impossibility of 97

man's 187

H

knowledge 15, 32, 33, 51,' 67, 73,

80, 94, 96, 98, 115, 118,

hedonism 230

186, 204, 215, 227, 275

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

comprehensive 39

104, 253

foundation of 66

Henry, Carl F. H. 140, 188, 263

genuine 55, 75, 85, 285

Heraclitus 232

inescapability 40

history 7, 43, 45, 49, 52, 55, 91,

man's 62

115, 169, 198, 216, 277, 283

necessary conditions of 72

Holmes, Arthur F. 164, 166

saving 66

Holy Spirit 8, 10, 12, 26, 34-37,

unacknowledged 41

50-51, 64, 67-68, 69, 116,

Kuhn, Thomas 89, 109, 190

121, 124, 128, 141, 183,

Kuyper, Abraham 9

199, 230, 285

293

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS

L

monist 80

morality 7

language 118-120

Murray, J o h n 10

theory of 138

language analysis 170

law of contradiction 172, 182, 198,

N

216

Nash, Ronald H. 159, 177, 193,

law of non-contradiction 103, 167

194, 226, 261, 262, 263

law of parsimony 115

naturalism 143

Lecerf, August 9

naturalist 108, 167

Lee, F.N. 152

naturalistic scientism 138

Lewis, C. S. 7, 189

natural theology 4, 151

logic 7, 8, 15, 49, 63, 82, 90,

nature 45, 115, 184, 188

97, 103, 104. 114, 127, 144, neo-orthodoxy 151, 249

151, 165, 180, 198, 208, 285 neo-realism 170

formal 160, 182

neutral 14, 43, 101, 104, 121,

laws of 91, 104, 112, 166, 169,

125, 127, 129, 244, 254,

178, 211, 228

256

limits of 183

neutral ground 123

logical analysis 5

neutrality 3, 15, 89, 125

Lystra 44

impossibility of 8 8 - 8 9

neutral methodology 114, 115, 139

Niebuhr, Reinhold 233

M

nihilism 243, 258

North, Gary viii

m a n

fallen 45

image of God 16

O

mind of 16

open-minded 14

natural 8, 214, 230, 235, 239

operationalism 188, J 89

self-sufficiency 16

Mars Hill 45

Marxists 168

Marx, Karl 230, 259

P

Mavrodes, George I. 136, 163, 193

P a c k e r J . I. 8

metaphysical 26, 34, 45, 78, 81

pantheism 181

metaphysical beliefs 82

Parmenides 232

metaphysical determinist. I l l

phenomenology 170

metaphysics 15, 82-86, 90, 108,

philosophy 3, 12, 28-29, 31, 46,

110, 114, 124, 127, 144,

48, 50-54, 69, 82-83, 103,

157-158, 191, 201, 263

165, 215, 252, 256, 277, 284

mind

autonomous 50, 77

depraved 52

foundation for 55

renewed 66

vain 30, 53

mind-set 53

294

SUBJECT & PERSON INDEX

Plato 83, 232, 233

repentance 7, 66, 67

Platonism 6, 201

revelation 17, 19-22, 40, 51-54,

positivism 229

55, 67, 71, 98, 113, 144,

possibilism 207-211, 215 , 248

150, 191, 199, 224, 252,

possibility 5, 142, 145, 147

263, 289

pragmatism 5, 280-282

general 183, 184, 275, 283,

prayer 68

286

preaching 37

God's 86, 97, 246

pre-evangelism 246

natural 8, 43, 44, 218, 251

presuppose 36

necessity of 38

presupposed 57

redemptive 32, 34

presupposition 10, 203

self-attesting 217

absolute 223

special 5, 8, 16, 57, 185, 218,

presuppositional apologetics 62, 64,

237, 275

75, 91, 122, 125, 126, 127,

voluntary 34

192, 244, 290

revelational epistemology 270,

presuppositional apologist 253

275-277, 281, 284

presuppositionalism 162

Russell, Bertrand 230, 259

presuppositionalist 205, 222, 227

presuppositional method 127

presuppositions 15-16, 46, 55,

120-121, 191

Satan 61, 216, 251

apostate 75

Schaeffer, Francis 135, 241-261,

secular 31, 50, 51, 69

261, 263-265, 268

probabilism 223-227, 265

scholasticism 153, 215, 218, 220

probability 27

science 3, 5, 7, 8, 33, 49, 52, 55,

process philosophy 170

69, 91, 96, 103, 106, 108,

proof 57, 63, 64, 129, 199, 219,

143, 175, 188, 190, 203,

250, 272

208, 2 1 1 , ^ 5 4 - 2 5 5 , 284

scientific m e t h o d 159

scientific methodology 108

R

Scripture 46, 59, 103, 126, 185,

Ramm, Bernard 206

192, 198, 202, 208

rationalism 153, 159, 167, 169,

authority of 47, 59-62, 65, 69,

176, 180, 181, 227, 228,

141, 214, 231, 245, 275

232, 253, 256

credibility of 245

Rationalism 6

inerrancy 205

rationalist 111, 206

infallible 6, 7

rationalistic idealism 166

neutrality 4

reason 10, 13, 29, 211, 234, 254,

self-attesting 4 - 5 , 9-10, 12, 13,

258, 263

64, 69, 71, 75 , 88, 156,

Reformed Theological Seminary ix

206, 247, 257, 283

regeneration 64, 65, 69, 71

truth of 4, 10, 47, 55, 123,

relativism 99, 101

125, 144, 256

295

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS

veracity of 56

thought

secular assumptions 75

secular 55

secularism 151, 173, 174, 266

total depravity 140, 184, 238, 263

secular system 171

truth

secular thought 244

self-attesting 54

self-deception 94-95

self-sufficient knower 269-273

skeptic 54, 112, 113, 116, 118,

U

120, 124, 126, 289

ultimate authority 12, 88, 124, *

skepticism 109, 173, 175-176, 184,

154, 161, 247

192-193, 221, 265, 270, 281, unbelief 38

286

unbeliever 36, 37, 38, 41, 46, 48,

Smith, Morton viii

53, 67, 119

solipsism 106, 270

uniformity of nature 96, 106, 107,

solipsist 80

284

Sophists 232

utonomous thinker 107

Spinoza, Baruch 164, 171, 232

standard

ultimate 12, 15

V

starting point 142, 200, 201, 203,

Van Til, Cornelius vii, viii, x, xi,

206, 227, 235, 254, 277

xii, xiv, xv, xvii, 4, 14, 20,

St. Augustine 10, 65, 218, 248

21, 25, 117, 135, 137, 197,

Stoic 45

232

suppositionalism 254

verification 8, 64, 126, 128, 157,

suppressing truth 42, 44

205, 215, 249, 261, 269, 284

systematic consistency 213-214

verificationalism 150, 159, 174,

system of interpretation 88

215, 217, 254

system of thought 16

vitalism 170

unbeliever's 75

voluntaris 170

at

w

T

Warfield, B. B. 205

theism 34, 152, 160, 254

Weaver, Gilbert B. 166

theist 138

wisdom 32, 34, 48-51, 68

theistic proofs 5, 154, 220

God's 32

theologian 60, 83

pseudo 51

theology 6, 12, 37, 171, 185, 192

worldview 15, 56, 81, 87, 121,

215, 239

166, 168, 184, 199, 200,

natural 34, 43 , 44, 231, 268

202,. 203, 209

thinking

worship 54

vain 53

Thomism 235

296

Document Outline

- Editor's Preface

- Part One : Presuppositional Apologetics Positively Stated

- Chapter 1 : Introduction : God in the Dock?

- Chapter 2 : The Christian Mind & Method

- Chapter 3 : Neutrality & Autonomy Relinquished

- Part Two : Consistency Applied : Critiques of Incomplete Presuppositionalism

- Chapter 4 : Gordon Clark

- Chapter 5 : Edward J. Carnell

- Chapter 6 : Francis Schaeffer

- Chapter 7 : The Critical Quintessence

- Appendix 1 : The Necessity of Revelational Epistemology

- Appendix 2 : The Pragmatist's Rejoinder and the Christian Alternative

- Appendix 3 : The Possibility of Argument

- Subject & Person Index

Table of Contents

Editor's Preface vii

1 Introduction; God In the Dock? 3

2 The Christian Mind and Method 25

3 Neutrality and Autonomy Relinquished 77

4 Gordon Clark 137

5 Edward J. Carnell 197

6 Francis Schaeffer 241

The Necessity of Revelational Epistemology 269

The Possibility of Argument 287

Subject and Person Index 291

Part One : Presuppositional Apologetics Positively Stated

Part Two : Consistency Applied : Critiques of Incomplete Presuppositionalism

Chapter 7 : The Critical Quintessence

Appendix 2 : The Pragmatist's Rejoinder and the Christian Alternative

Subject & Person Index

Table of Contents

Editor's Preface vii

1 Introduction; God In the Dock? 3

2 The Christian Mind and Method 25

3 Neutrality and Autonomy Relinquished 77

4 Gordon Clark 137

5 Edward J. Carnell 197

6 Francis Schaeffer 241

The Necessity of Revelational Epistemology 269

The Possibility of Argument 287

Subject and Person Index 291

Part One : Presuppositional Apologetics Positively Stated

Part Two : Consistency Applied : Critiques of Incomplete Presuppositionalism

Chapter 7 : The Critical Quintessence

Appendix 2 : The Pragmatist's Rejoinder and the Christian Alternative

Subject & Person Index